5. REAL MOTIVES FOR CHANGING THE POLICY FOR A UNITED AND INDEPENDENT MACEDONIA - Part 02

The absence of anything tangible done in favour of the Macedonian National Question, in the period from 1923 to 1931, was due mainly to the fact that this issue “was never a CPG central issue. This was an issue the CPG had to accept (imposed externally by the Comintern) despite its great dissatisfaction”. For that reason, its membership demanded that this policy (for a united and independent Macedonia) be immediately replaced with an obligatory policy aligned with the official Party policy that reflected the intimate and real wishes of the Party membership.

Presence of the “Megali Idea” (Greater Greece)

The “Megali Idea” present in the Greek people’s consciousness played no small role in the replacement of the policy for a united and independent Macedonia with the policy of full minority rights within the Greek state.

Before and after the Greek state was created for the first time in 1829, the Greek bourgeoisie began to systematically implement a territorial expansion policy in the direction of purely non-Greek national territories. The Greek state educational system, generation after generation, instilled into people the belief that Asia Minor, Thrace (eastern and western), Macedonia and Southern Albania were historical and ethnographic Greek territories. The strength and need to create a Greater Greece, through the “Megali Idea”, was present not only in the awareness of the Greek bourgeoisie and the intellectual world, but also in the villagers in Crete, for example, who were convinced that it was a necessity to achieve this. The people in Thessaly, Epirus, Sterea Hellas, Peloponnesus… the sailors in the islands… the small merchants in Volos, Ioannina, Athens… almost the entire Greek society, was on board with this ambitious idea.

The CPG ranks lived in an atmosphere where the “Megali Idea” was present in the pores and well-understood by every member of Greek society. But even though the CPG took the new communist

direction, it did not mean that it was prepared to abandon the “Megali Idea” that existed everywhere including in the consciousness of every individual member. “Greek patriotism” was a reflection of the “Megali Idea” everywhere including in the ranks of the CPG, which appeared since its inception, and influenced its attitude towards its current and future policies. The presence of the “Megali Idea” was also present at the 1918 CPG Founding Congress when the so-called “minority” group proposed a Resolution for resolving territorial and national issues through the ranks of the Greek workers’ movement. Here, the “minority’s” approach to resolving national and territorial issues did not differ at all in any way from the approach taken by the Greek bourgeoisie. The presence of the “Megali Idea” in the ranks of the CPG, in fact, was one of the reasons for the emergence of the so-called “minority” in 1924, which at the time was headed by I. Kordatos and T. Apostolidis. Nationalism was so deeply rooted in the “minority’s” ideology that it began to squeeze even Kordatos and Apostolidis from their left orientation. This “Greek patriotism” was also present in the so-called “majority’s” consciousness, which treated the Macedonian National Question not as a “principle issue” but as a tactical issue. In 1924, in its ideology, the “majority” supported “class determination” over “nationalism” but gradually “patriotism” began to creep into its ranks and when it became strong enough it began to play an increasing role in the ideology of the left. The “Megali Idea”, through Greek “patriotism”, created a lot of pressure within the “majority” which forced the Party to look for “a modus vivendi” between its national and social standing. This problem found its answer in the 1935 CPG Sixth Congress when the Party adopted the minority rights policy within the Greek state and rejected the policy for a united and independent Macedonia. The “Megali Idea” was also present in the “new minority” in 1926 headed by Pulopoulos. The CPG described this particular “minority” as a “liquidation movement” in regards to the Macedonian National Question. This left oriented “new minority” opposition in fact greatly contributed to the left’s political determination to play a greater role in the suppression of nationalism that existed within the framework of the left ideology. If the CPG developed patriotism and won the right of its citizenship with its ideology, the left opposition lost its nationalism at the expense of its ideology. In other words, ideology also played a major role on how the CPG decided to treat

the Macedonian National Question. So, as of 1935, the CPG either evaded the Macedonian National Question altogether or used it solely as a tactical issue to draw the Macedonian people into its affairs. Use of the Macedonian National Question was especially prevalent during the National Liberation War and during the Greek Civil War.

Consequently the presence of the “Megali Idea” in the CPG ranks was one of the motives that influenced the replacement of the policy of a united and independent Macedonia with the policy of minority rights within the Greek state. According to Zahariadis: “The ‘Megali Idea’ reigned everywhere and forced every ideological, political and economic movement to shelter under its wings...” (N. Zahariadis, op. cit, p. 18.)

Existence of the Macedonian nation

Even though the existence of a Macedonian nation was a historical reality in Greek occupied Macedonia, the CPG could not bring itself to recognize, accept and acknowledge it. Instead it played games with the Macedonian people by allowing the “minority” within its ranks to attack and abuse them. And, even though the CPG harboured a policy for a united and independent Macedonia, it never approached the historical reality to see what kind of population this Macedonian population was, what national feelings it nurtured, and what were its historical desires and current aspirations.

Had the CPG adopted a policy that would have taken care of the Macedonian national interests, it would not only have been a strong affirmation of the Macedonian national consciousness, but the CPG would have gained their full support. The CPG should have adopted such a policy, at all costs, to attract the Macedonian population to its side, but it did not. So, the basic question here is how far was the CPG willing to go and for what in return?

When creating its policy with respect to the Macedonian National Question, the CPG should have taken into account the presence of two national interests (Greek and Macedonian), that were in essence contradictory to each other. The presence of Greek “nationalism” in the CPG ranks contributed to the Macedonian National Question

being compromised. The resolution adopted in 1935 was implemented in order to protect Greek national interests through the protection of the integrity of the Greek state. The only thing provided for the Macedonian people in that policy was the protection of language, customs, etc.

By protecting the Greek national interests, the CPG satisfied the Greek people’s national feelings as well as those of its own membership. But by doing so, it also disillusioned the Macedonian people who demanded their national interests be protected. But before that, the CPG promised to support the Macedonians and to allow the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO (United)) to operate inside Greek occupied Macedonia. By doing so, the CPG received Macedonian support. The role of orienting Macedonian sympathies towards the CPG was played by MRO (United). Many MRO (United) members, Macedonians by origin, were sincerely and deeply convinced that they were working for the good of their people, so the people looked up to them with full confidence. Cadres of MRO (United), speaking in the Macedonian language, informed the Macedonian people about of the CPG policy which, of course, left a strong impression on them.

Under the given circumstances, the MRO (United), unfortunately, did not achieve the results it was aiming for. This was largely due to the CPG’s 1935 compromise solution with regards to the Macedonian National Question. The CPG allowed Greek “patriotism” to invade its Left ideological framework and rejected and prevented Macedonian “patriotism” from doing the same. The CPG saw Macedonian “patriotism” within the Left ideology and in the ranks of the Macedonian progressive movement, as “dangerous” to Greek national interests. The CPG made sure that the level and intensity of Macedonian patriotism within the framework of the left ideology was carefully measured and controlled. The CPG, however, not only permitted Greek “patriotism” to invade the framework of the Left ideology, but allowed it to grow without limit. Outside of not allowing it, but to make sure Macedonian patriotism did not exist in the Macedonian progressive movement, the CPG fostered Greek patriotism in the ranks of the Macedonians. The CPG was more interested in suppressing Macedonian patriotism, at all costs, than helping the Macedonian people. So it

took the route of reinforcing and giving preference to social (class) awareness in the Macedonian population.

The presence of Greek “patriotism” in the Left ideology, as well as the narrow national framework imposed on the Macedonian progressive movement, had severe historical consequences for the Macedonian people. After 1931, all MRO (United) activities in Greek occupied Macedonia were paralyzed. Without the presence of Macedonian national interests in its Left framework ideology, the MRO (United) was unable to attract the Macedonian people, even those who were hardest hit by national oppression. “Without the Macedonian National Question on its agenda, the MRO (United) found it difficult to operate in its daily struggle with economic, political and other issues... There was not a single action organized against the terror perpetrated against the Macedonian people, against the banning of the Macedonian language, and so on.” (Materials for the ideological and political work of the party organizations on the topic “CPG Policies and the Macedonian National Question”, Macedonian Archives, 2 - / 29.) The only time the CPG allowed the MRO (United) to come to anything close to resembling a “Macedonian National Issue” was “when it allowed it to speak to members of the Macedonian community in the Macedonian language, which brought enthusiasm to the Macedonian people. This was about the only positive action that can be attributed to the MRO (United) membership that can be considered a positive result. The Party would not allow anything else.” (Ibid.) Maniadakis, then Minister of the Interior in the Metaxas dictatorship, was also responsible for imposing a “narrow national framework” on the Macedonian progressive movement. After the Macedonians N. Kachela, M. Keramidzhiev, R. Galabov, T. Poplazarov and G. Bozhikov were tried in Kostur for being communists they were brought before Minister Maniadakis, who was very interested to know to what extent the CPG, in addition to its ideological work in the ranks of the Macedonian population, also popularized the Party’s policy regarding the Macedonian National Question. They all admitted that they were communists, but “Maniadakis was simply astonished that they knew nothing about the CPG’s policy regarding the Macedonian National Question, and how Marxism dealt with unresolved National Questions”. (Statements made to the author of this book by Mihailo Keramidzhiev, on 10. XI 1980.)

Under pressure from all factors, external and internal, at its Sixth Congress in 1935 the CPG rejected the policy of a united and independent Macedonia and accepted the policy of full equality of minorities within the Greek state. With this, the Party thought it would intensify its activities inside the country and Greece would be able to more effectively resist Italian, Bulgarian and German revisionism. With this in mind, the CPG believed that had it implemented the correct policy which was also in line with the decisions made at the Comintern Seventh Congress.