A) THE CPG’S POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS AND THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL QUES

A) THE CPG’S POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS AND THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL QUESTION

The idea that the CPG accepted a policy for a united and independent Macedonia caused a deep internal crisis in the ranks of the CPG’s membership. This internal crisis was further intensified by the significant stagnation that lingered in the ranks of the Greek workers’ and revolutionary movement. The stagnation was a result of the economic process initiated to stabilize the Greek economy. Subsequent Greek governments, with help and advice from the League of Nations, continued to settle colonists in Greek occupied Macedonia and thereby avoided political destabilization that would have otherwise seriously threatened the Greek state after its defeat at the Sakaria River in the Greco-Turkish war. The battle at the Sakaria River was a historical battle which ended in 1922 with Kemal’s Turkey as the victor. The revolutionary crisis that gradually surfaced in Greece after the “Great War” and especially after the Asia Minor Greek catastrophe, under relatively stable economic conditions, slowly began to subside. This, according to the Greek bourgeoisie, of course, was due to its reprisal policies against the Greek workers’ movement, especially expressed during the period of the Pangalos dictatorship. Its internal problems as well as the stagnation in the ranks of the Greek workers’ movement further aggravated the CPG causing a greater split between the “minority” supporters and those who supported the “majority”. By their actions the “majority” gave the “minority” the opportunity it needed to activate and continue the attacks against the policy of a united and independent Macedonia adopted by the CPG at the Third Extraordinary Congress in 1924. But, in order to avoid further internal conflicts and controversies, in November 1926 the CPG’s Central Committee, prior to holding the Third Party Regular Congress in March 1927, decided to hold a public discussion on all CPG policies including the policy on the Macedonian National Question.

As it turned out, the contradiction that arose between the so-called “majority” and “minority” over the Macedonian National Question was, of course, a reflection of the deep political and ideological contradictions resulting from the way in which the Marxist theory was understood and implemented in the Greek historical reality. On the one hand, the “minority” demanded that the general Marxist principles be adopted according to existing conditions in the country, but the “majority”, on the other hand, applied the Marxist science as “dogma” (J. Kordatos, Iperano olon to Koma ke ohi ta prosopa, alla miliktos agonas kata tis iperaristeras, “Rizospastis” 21. II 1927, p. 3.) Unfortunately the way this “dogma” was applied was in contradiction with the Greek historical reality. (X. Vatis, Liga gia tin sizitisi, tus aftoklitus prostates mu, “Rizospastis” 24. II 1927.)

The political and ideological perception demonstrated by the “minority” was championed in 1925 by Ianis Kordatos, leader of the “minority”. According to an article in “Rizospastis” which Kordatos wrote: “The Party cannot skip its historical past and with a single jump overcome its historical era because the Bolshevization of the Party is nothing more than knowing that every communist could adjust the basic Leninist principles in accordance with the real conditions in the country...” (I. Kordatos, Iperano olon to Koma…, “Rizospastis” 20. II 1927.) So, according to Kordatos, the maturity of each communist, especially the leadership, understands the full depth and breadth of the real political and social issues in their country, bearing in mind that in all countries there is not one uniform situation, but various situations due to various political and economic conditions. (Ibid., 21. II 1927, p. 3.) Kordatos concluded: “The crisis in the Party and the stagnation in the Greek workers’ movement can not be resolved by ‘personal attacks and dogmatic aphorisms’…”. (I. Kordatos, Zitima Puliopulu i zitima iperaristeras, “Rizospastis” 15. II 1927, p. 3.) “These problems can be solved by simply unifying the basic Marxist principles with the Greek historical reality which must be objectively reviewed and analyzed.” (I. Kordatos, Iperano olon to Koma…, “Rizospastis” 20. II 1927.)

Ianis Kordatos’s political views found support in H. Vatis who in 1927 published an article in “Rizospastis” entitled “Little for Discussion, Self-Titled Patrons, etc.” in which he argued that: “Marxism and Leninism are theories that are inseparable from the practice of a revolutionary struggle and lose their value if they become a dogma or a scripture…” (X. Vatis, Liga gia tin sizitisi…, “Rizospastis” 24. II 1927.)

After 1926, Pantelis Puliopoulos, CPG Secretary General and leader of the 1924 “majority”, finally accepted the political views of the “minority”, but only temporarily. Puliopoulos believed the stagnation of the Greek workers’ movement and other communist movements in Greece, were due mainly to the weaknesses in the Party being unable to systematically “conquer and properly process the Marxist-Leninist theory and adapt it to the real economic and social conditions in the country…” (Pantelis Puliopoulos, Me pia enia mborume na milisume gia istorikes “diomorfies” tu kinimatos mas, “Rizospastis” 6. II 1927.) So, in order to avoid and prevent the stagnation in the ranks of the Greek workers’ movement, Puliopoulos proposed that the Party “get to know the most important real issues it encounters on a daily basis,” and then take a good look at the Greek historical reality in “light of Marxism”. (Pantelis Puliopoulos, Gia to melon tu Komatos, “Rizospastis” 7. XII 1927.) Only this way can the Party “explain the Marxist Greek reality…” (Pantelis Puliopoulos, Me pia enia..., “Rizospastis” 6. II 1927.) Without the unification of the Marxist theory with the Greek reality, concluded Puliopoulos during the internal party discussion in 1927, it was not possible for the Greek workers’ movement to get out of the severe crisis, which came after 1923.

Based on this political and ideological concept the “minority” continued with its attacks against the policy of a united and independent Macedonia adopted during the 1924 CPG Third Congress - demanding its rejection. After the so-called population exchanges between Greece and Bulgaria and Greece and Turkey, the “minority” viewed Greek occupied Macedonia as a new ethnographic reality. After the large colonist population was settled in Greek occupied Macedonia, the so-called “Greek population” became the majority, and the policy of a united and independent Macedonia was not only a false reflection, but also a profound contradiction to the new Greek ethnographic reality. And, according to Kordatos: “All inhabitants in Greek Macedonia were Greeks…” (Kosta A. Bramu, op. cit., p. 32). Kordatos supported this because he liked to believe that the Greek bourgeoisie expelled the entire “Slavic population” from Greek occupied Macedonia and settled “Greek Macedonia with Greek refugees”. (From Alkidamos’s letter which I. Kordatos published on the 20th VIII, 1926 in “Revolution proletarienne”.) Kordatos’s idea was supported by H. Vatis as was

shown in an article entitled “The National Question and Our Party”, published in the newspaper “Rizospastis” in 1927. “In the part of Macedonia that belongs to Greece, before 1912,” wrote Vatis, “there lived 513,000 Greeks, 415,000 Turks, 190,000 Macedonians (Bulgarian-Exarchates) and 98,000 others. Today, there are 1,341,000 Greeks, 78,000 Macedonians and 91,000 others (mainly Jews).” (X. Vatis, To ethniko ke to Koma mas, “Rizospastis” 24. III 1927, p. 3). The national structure of the population provided by Vatis, however, did not correspond to the historical reality before or after 1912, or up until the end of World War I. The name “Macedonia”, for Vatis, had only geographical meaning. After 1926, Pantelis Puliopoulos believed that the settlement of the so-called Greek colonists in Greek occupied Macedonia and Western Thrace was an apparent reality as well as “a deadly mistake for a political party to escape”. (Pantelis Puliopulos, i krisi istera op ton noemvri 1924, “Rizospastis” 5. II 1927, p. 3). Puliopoulos concluded, as did Ianis Kordatos, T. Apostolidis and H. Vatis, that the Greek ethnographic reality required a new policy for the Macedonian National Question. According to the “minority” group, the contradiction that existed within the new Greek ethnographic reality, which was expressed through the non-Macedonian political and national interests for a united and independent Macedonia, i.e. the Macedonian National Question, contributed to the stagnation of the Greek workers’ movement. According to Kardotos: “This policy (the Macedonian Question.), delivered the last blow against the Party, scattering and liquidating it...” (From Alkidesmos’s letter published in “Revolution proletarienne”. Tomas Apostolidis, second representative of the “minority”, also viewed the policy of a united and independent Macedonia as a damaging factor harmful to the Greek workers’ movement, essentially making it an “anti-communist policy”. (Tomas Apostolidis, likvidarizmos, tihodiotizmos ke “ortodoksos” marksismos, “Rizospastis”, 12. III 1927.) The policy, adopted during the Third CPG Extraordinary Congress, since 1924 has been nothing but pure sophistry and political incompetence, unworthy of a serious political party. Supporters of the “minority” connected the policy of a united and independent Macedonia, to the interest of the colonists. In other words, those who supported this policy worked against the interests of the colonist population in Greek occupied Macedonia and Western Thrace.

Warning the “majority” that the “fate of the colonists” depended on the capitalists in Greece, the “minority” group argued that the policy for a united and independent Macedonia be changed to reflect the new Greek ethnographic reality. (X. Vatis, To ethniko zitima…, “Rizospastis” 24. III 1927.) If the policy was changed to reflect the new Greek ethnographic reality and to protect the new Greek national interests, argued the “minority”, the Party would essentially achieve two things. On the one hand, the CPG would attract the large colonist population; because these people would be assured that the Party actually supported their colonization of Greek occupied Macedonia. And, on the other hand, the Party would avoid the possibility of the colonists turning against it and becoming a “political reserve of the Greek bourgeoisie”. (Ibid.) If, on the one hand, the policy for a united and independent Macedonia remains as is, argued the “minority”, it will continue to contradict the Greek internal reality because that policy already contradicts the Balkan political reality. The “minority” argued that after the September uprising in Bulgaria failed, a new political situation was created in the Balkans. After the September 1923 uprising failed, Bulgaria ceased to be the revolutionary movement centre in the Balkans. That centre moved to Greece. The Greek kingdom, and later the Greek republic, after 1923, argued the “minority”, entered a profound national crisis similar to the 1919 Bulgarian national crisis. If such a policy, as the policy for a united and independent Macedonia, was to help the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, then the Bulgarian Communist Party would have attracted the Macedonian refugees, especially the right wing of the VMRO. But after the failed September uprising, and especially after VMRO’s defection to Todor Aleksandrov and Alexander Protogerov, the policy for a united and independent Macedonia, argued the “minority”, should be quickly changed to favour Greece in order to help the CPG attract the Greek population, i.e. the colonist masses, and thus maximize the Greek society’s needs for a proletarian revolution. But the Comintern, wrote Kordatos in the newspaper “Rizospastis” in 1927, instead of taking into account the objective historical reality and aligning the Marxist theory in accordance with the specifics of the country, it was satisfied with only setting CPG tasks and “with no knowledge of history, reality, true influence, and power…” (“Rizospastis” 21. II 1927, p. 3.) Naturally, the Greek and Balkan

situation was not described as it truly was but as the Comintern would have liked it to be…” (I. Kordatos, Mia paranthesi, “Rizospastis”, 8. II 1927.)

The “majority” group tried hard to reject the “minority” group’s basic argument that the interests of the colonists in Greek occupied Macedonia were “endangered” by the policy for a united and independent Macedonia. P. Puliopoulos and the other leaders of the 1924 “majority” tried to answer this crucial question immediately after the CPG Third Extraordinary Congress was concluded. In the period from 1923 to 1925, Puliopoulos tried hard to dispel the “minority” group’s views. In a 1924 article entitled “The Macedonian Volcano”, among other things, Puliopoulos wrote: “The workers and the agricultural population, including the refugees in Macedonia and Thrace, have nothing to fear... immediately after the proclamation of autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace is made, the Greek population will be given the opportunity to organize itself in councils and engage in the development and prosperity of Macedonia and Thrace.” (Pantelis Puliopulos, To Makedoniko ifestio, “Rizospastis”, 14. XII 1924.) In regards to the fate of the country which was illegally taken from the Macedonian people, a problem that was of interest to both the Greek and non-Greek colonists, the “majority” group reassured the colonist population that it had no reason to be worried because, immediately after the proclamation of a unified and independent Macedonia was made, the Greek colonists and local villagers “would be called to the National Council to divide the land in accordance with the interests of the poor agricultural population.” (Ibid.) The same idea was expressed in the CPG Central Committee Manifesto immediately after the policy for a united and independent Macedonia was adopted at the Third Extraordinary Congress in 1924. In its proclamation to the working people, the CPG Central Committee assured the colonist population that the land would be fairly distributed in favour of the local villagers and colonists within the framework of a unified and independent Macedonia, but through the “National Councils” consisting of colonists and local villagers. (Manifesto tu telefteu sinedriu tu Komunistiku Komatos pros ton ergazomenon lao, “Rizospastis”, 14. XII 1924.) At the same time, the “majority” group figured that when the Party accepted the policy of a united and independent Macedonia, under these conditions, it

was possible to attract the colonist population. Despite the fact that the colonists were awarded lands by the Greek state, this population was in a difficult economic situation, and the Party figured it could turn this economic difficulty into class dissatisfaction and make it a class struggle. (“Rizospastis”, 28. II 1928.)

The controversy over the Macedonian National Question, which was also a central issue in the political discussions that led to the Party splitting into a “majority” and a “minority” in 1927, led Party members to question the logic of whether this was a “principle” question for a communist party? First attempting to provide a theoretical explanation was Georgios Siantos, future CPG Secretary General in the period from 1941 to 1944. According to Siantos, a “national question” by its very nature can never be a “principle” question for a communist party. The “principle” question for a communist party, according to Siantos, was the “class struggle” whose purpose was “to replace capitalism”. (G. Siantos, Giro apo tin Krisi tu Komatos, “Rizospastis”, 12. III 1927.) Therefore, Siantos concluded, a “national question” is always a secondary or tactical question and such a question needs to be resolved exclusively through the needs of the “proletarian class struggle”. On this basis, Siantos concluded that adopting the policy of a united and independent Macedonia was “extremely wrong...” despite the fact that in 1924 he had thought the opposite. (Ibid.)

Contrary to Siantos’s views, H. Vatis thought that a “national question could be both tactical and principle at the same time” for a communist party. According to Vatis, a struggle for national liberation of enslaved nations was a “principle” issue for a communist party, and “a communist party could not exist” with an unresolved national question. (X. Vatis, To ethniko zitima… “Rizospastis”, 24. III 1927.) At the same time, Vatis saw the “national question” as a tactical issue for a communist party where revolutionary reserves, including a national liberation movement, could be exploited in a class struggle against capitalism. (Ibid.)

The debates that took place inside the Party, especially around essential issues such as Marxism and its connection to the reality of each country, including the Macedonian national question, very much contributed to polarizing the forces inside the Party. If, on the

one hand, the political views of the so-called “minority” were condemned by the CPG “majority”, and the “majority” Party membership stood firmly behind the political views of the “majority” then, on the other hand, the views of the “minority” against the Macedonian National Question, were supported, but in different ways, by the “majority” of the membership. But, despite the conflict that existed between the “majority” and the “minority” regarding the Marxist theoretical application of the Macedonian National Question and its connection to the Greek reality, the “majority” did not rise in its argumentation to the level of the “minority”. “Majority” representatives were limited to quoting excerpts, mainly from Stalin’s writings. In that respect N. Kutvis (Nikos Zahariadis) was particularly emphasized. Another “majority” supporter (D. Sakarelos) believed that the crisis which existed in the Party, as well as the stagnation that existed and manifested itself in the ranks of the Greek labour movement, was not a real “crisis”, wrote Sakarelos in “Rizospastis”, but one that existed only in Puliopoulos’s mind and not on historical grounds.