ENFORCED LAW (CC) 4124

ENFORCED LAW (CC) 4124: “For criminal prosecution of suspicious persons”.

DECREE “G” and other laws: PZ 433/45 “On illegal possession of weapons”, PZ 753/45 “On illegal possession and use of weapons.” “For emergency measures and public safety.”

A trial was held in Kostur against 106 Macedonians from the town Rupishta, Kostur Region. They were accused of collaborating with the occupier despite the fact that they were ELAS fighters who fought against the occupiers. Some were sentenced to life imprisonment and others to long sentences.

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN 1946

Development of partisan forces and General Markos’s shrewd tactics for keeping the force small

At the beginning of 1946 the CPG and EAM, given the political climate in the country, decided it would be premature to develop the population and amass its forces for an armed resistance, and as such, thousands of experienced ELAS soldiers and officers, as well as CPG members and sympathizers were sent home where they were fiercely persecuted by the new Greek government of Athens.

What is really surprising about all this is that while the CPG and EAM dismissed/demobilized their experienced fighters, the CPM/CPY created NOF in order to mass mobilize the Macedonian population and prepare the Macedonian people for war. Obviously, this shows that strategy and tactics were being carefully planned by strangers (CPY/CPM) for the Macedonian people’s future.

What is also surprising is that after the CPG dismissed its ELAS fighting force, thus preventing the leftist forces throughout Greece from participating on mass. It later forcibly mobilized those same ELAS fighters in DAG. And, it is no wonder that from the 25,000 partisans forcibly mobilized in DAG’s 50% were Macedonian fighters. The rest were Greeks. That means that out of the Greek population numbering eight million there were no more than 18-20 thousand Greek fighters in DAG. And that out of the Macedonian population numbering three hundred thousand there were about 15-20 thousand Macedonian fighters in DAG, throughout the Greek Civil War period (1946 - 1949).

According to General Zafiropoulos’s research, the partisan forces during 1946 developed according to the following dynamics:

- Until April 1946 950 - May 1,300 - June 2,700 - July 3,500 - August 3,600 - September 4,490

- October 5,930 - November 7,450 - December 9,285

Which means the ratio of government forces to partisan forces was 10:1 and the military armaments were unmatched.

But let us look at the facts:

Markos Vafiadis said to me (Kisavos): “…When I arrived in Belgrade I immediately met comrade Ioannidis in an office where I also met two CPY leaders; Tempo (Vukmanovich) and Rankovich. They asked me what they needed to do to help us (DAG). I told them that we needed armaments for 18,000 fighters. As soon as Ioannidis heard that (that I was looking for armaments for 18,000), he stood up and said: ‘Markos, are you thinking straight? What are you going to do with all that armament?’ He then said ‘You only need enough to arm 4-5 thousand, not one more…!” (Page 94. Kisavos).

Markos continued:

When I (Kisavos) asked Markos “why did you change the number when you returned from Belgrade back to Greece?” Doctor Sakelariou was there with me. Markos said: “Ioannidis changed my number in Belgrade, Comrade Georgi.”

It is most certain that the number was changed by the Yugoslavs and by Ioannidis and since then Markos gained special sympathy from the Yugoslavs and personally from Tito, which is noticeable to this day. In other words, the CPY and the CPG wanted a small left armed force in Greece. Was this how were they going to win against the Greek government or was this done to get the Macedonians and the communists into trouble?

In his book Kisavos has confirmed that, after returning from Belgrade to his headquarters in Greece, Markos decided to send large numbers of DAG volunteers back to their homes. For example: about 1,500 - 2,000 volunteers were returned home and after their return the enemy mercilessly destroyed them like “dogs”. Kisavos

also cites other examples, such the one where Kostas Aridas, Political Committee Secretary of Trikala, returning a large group of volunteers back to their homes. These volunteers had firmly made up their minds that they wanted to fight in the surrounding area of Thessaly. They were prepared to go into the mountains and fight. When they returned home they were all were arrested and shot. (Page 88.)

According to Kisavos, another, more tragic and even shameful event took place:

“When the CPG authorities tried to send home a group of about 250 armed young volunteers from the Kalambaka-Kastrakiou District, the volunteers resisted and on their own initiative, organized themselves into 2-3 companies and decided to fight alone against the enemy government forces during the largest military operations the government army had undertaken.

They were led by Spiros Tsaras from the village Kastraki, Kalambaka. During the fiersest fighting they proved to be excellent fighters without any casualties. But, instead of congratulating them for their bravery, the leadership in Markos’s headquarters scolded them for disobedience and, for a long time, viewed Spiro Tsaras with suspicion.

Developing NOF and AFZH and CPM/CPY policies for Macedonian mass participation

So, if Markos Vafiadis’s political strategy and tactics were not to arm the resistance movement on mass with experienced ELAS fighters, then where should we look for the logic for this political move? Let us not forget that when Markos was dismissing volunteers, NOF was recruiting Macedonians villages on mass:

(See NOF main leadership report dated February 9, 1946, on NOF’s organizational structure in Aegean Macedonia: Am. Collection “Aegean Macedonia in NOB 1945-1949”, AE: 86 and 87. Published in the edition: “Aegean Macedonia in NOB 1946”, T. Sh..., doc 42 and 43. Pages 97, 100, 103-106.)

Villages / CPG members / NOF / NOMS / SKOJ / AFZH members