Introduction - Part 10

After crying wolf to the world in an attempt to pin its internal problems on its northern neighbours, Greece, with the assistance of its patrons in Washington and London, tried to turn the situation to its advantage by involving an International Inquiry Commission. The request for an investigation to the United Nations Security Council was made by the Tsaldaris government which claimed it had physical evidence to prove that its neighbours were the cause of its internal problems and of its current crisis. Armed with Serbian military uniforms, buttons and other items which Serbian detachments left behind in 1915 as well as statements taken from prisoners sentenced to death, the Greek government was prepared to prove that “it did not have a civil war in its hands but rather the problems it was experiencing were of an external nature.” In other words the reasons for the internal conflict, Greece alleged, could be found outside of Greece and the crisis inside Greece was actually created by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. Tsaldaris went a step further and declared to the whole world that “Greece was a paradise on earth”. He quoted two Pomaks who had fled Bulgaria because, as they put it, it was “hell on earth” to live in but who found freedom and great satisfaction by living in Greece. He then arranged for the Pomacs to go to New York and speak to the Americans about their freedom and the good life they found in Greece. The USA and Britain also saw the Greek crisis as an opportunity to justify their military presence there. Even though Greece had been traditionally a British ally the USA saw the crisis as an opportunity to extend its own sphere of influence. The American plan for intervention in Greece under the Truman administration became public knowledge when on November 29th, 1946 the newspaper “Daily News” published a story which among other things disclosed that “With a strong sea presence in the Mediterranean, the Americans are hoping for a lasting stay to secure the British vital lanes to the far east, until those lanes are out of danger from Russia… There is also a danger that a ‘Spanish type of War’ may break out in Greece at any time which will require the United States to intervene in the same way the Germans, Italians and Russians intervened in Spain.” (“Daily News”, November 29, 1946) Osten, the American representative of the Security Council, was a bit more critical when he later revealed that if his country was going to intervene, it would intervene with force. After a long and vigorous debate, the Security Council decided to support the formation of a Special Inquiry Commission which was to be sent to Greece with the understanding that its mission would NOT be to investigate “reasons why a civil war was taking place in Greece” as the Soviet delegation had recommended but to investigate “Yugoslavian, Bulgarian and Albanian involvement in Greece” as was recommended under the insistence of the delegates from the Western Block countries. A Special Inquiry Commission was put together in early February 1947 with delegates from various countries in the world and observers from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, the four states under investigation. Although the Commission arrived in Athens the headquarters from which it was expected to work until the investigation was completed was established in Solun. After completing its investigation the Commission was required to go to Geneva where it was expected to deliver its findings which later were to be delivered to the Security Council and brought before the General Assembly of the UN. The same day the Commission arrived in Athens it faced its first protest from one of the democratic Greek National Liberation Front (GNLF) organizations carrying a huge well lit sign bearing the inscription “English Leave Greece!” Later on the same day another incident occurred which should have clued the Commission in as to what was really was going on in Greece. This particular incident was an attack on a central prison in Sparta by the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) resulting in the escape of 300 political prisoners.

Was this not enough evidence to clue in the Commission that these incidents couldn’t have possibly been a result of “external meddling” as the Greek government was so boldly claiming? To expedite its investigation the Commission was divided into four teams each investigating various incidents that had occurred in particular sectors of Greek occupied Macedonia. But given that the Commission’s mandate was to only investigate “external involvements” in Greece and given that most of its members were pro-American why would one expect its findings to be fair and impartial? In other words, perhaps unbeknownst to most of the Commission’s members, the entire investigation was staged to justify American and British military involvements in Greece. It was never the Commissions mandate to uncover the truth of what was really was going on inside Greece, even from the outset. In fact Greece did not admit to “having” a civil war until the 1970’s. Before the Commission’s arrival at designated places in Greek occupied Macedonia, the Royalist army, police and gendarmes were dispatched to stage the area and produce evidence and witnesses coached to tell the Commission’s delegates what the Greeks wanted them to know. Stories were obviously fabricated and lies concocted for witnesses to tell and testify to the effect that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were behind all this. Looking at this another way, which by the way only people that have lived in Greece can understand, what soul would have had the courage to come forth and tell the truth and expect to live after the Commission was gone? The oppressed people living in Greece, particularly the Macedonians, have had too many tragic examples to draw on and to have faith to trust strangers with the truth, a truth which would surely end their life. Macedonians have been betrayed too many times, especially by strangers who pretended to have their best interests at heart. Given their tragic past experiences not all Macedonians could afford to expose themselves to misfortunes just for the mere truth. But not all Macedonians were like that. There were also those brave but foolish Macedonians who in fact did step forward and told their stories only to end up dead. Among the brave witnesses who stepped forward and paid with their lives were Mahavis, Panakilis, Tsereos, Mihailidis, and many others. Unfortunately their suffering did not end with their death. Greeks were not above mistreating their families, stigmatizing them for life and for generations to come so that their descendents would never prosper in Greece. Then when someone from those families crossed the Greek border, they were banished from their homeland and never allowed to return. This by the way continues in Greece to this day. People born in the free world who take their freedom for granted do not understand or believe that such behavior can be possible in a so-called “civilized” democratic country like Greece, let alone believe the fantastic stories the Macedonians have told about their experiences in Greece during that dreadful civil war. Another brave group of Macedonians to step up to the plate and voice their displeasure with the Greek regime, particularly with staging false scenes and concocting lies about the Macedonian National Liberation Front (MNLF), were 161 Macedonians from Lerin Region who at the time were jailed in the Pavlos Melas prison in Solun. They were particularly disgusted with the way Valtadoros, a paid government witness and professional liar was paraded in front of the Commission slandering the MNLF. The prisoners made their protest through a letter smuggled from the prison and handed to the Commission. Among other things the letter said “We are repulsed and deeply offended by Valtadoros and the government’s slandering lies about the MNLF calling it an autonomous organization. Worse than that is Valtadoros’s allegations that Macedonians are traitors when he and those in the Greek government know very well that the Macedonians fought to rid the Fascists and Nazis and liberate Greece.

They very well know that we Macedonians together with the Greek people fought in the front lines in Albania to defend the integrity and independence of Greece because we believed in one free and democratic Greece in which we all would be equals.” “During the tri-occupation” the letter continues, “we fought in the ranks of the GNLF – NLAG (National Liberation Army of Greece) to free Greece from the three occupiers. Unmercifully we attacked the invaders and we liquidated them, and today we are fighting together with the Greek people for freedom, democracy, for the independence of Greece and for our equal rights in this Greek state…” At the end of the letter the 161 prisoners made an appeal to the commission to visit them at the Pavlos Melas concentration camp and find the truth for themselves. They invited the Commission to question the Greek government and explain to its delegates why Macedonians were in jail after they fought and sacrificed their lives to free Greece. They also appealed to the Commission not to listen to the lies and made up stories of this government’s sponsored professional false witnesses. (“Zora”, April 15, 1947) During the Commission’s stay in Solun, the MNLF sent letters and documents through its regional committees providing detailed evidence of the terror that was conducted in Greece against the democratic population. The MNLF Voden Region regional council took a step even further by publishing a ten page open letter in the February edition of its newsletter “Pobeda”. The ten page open letter was addressed to the Commission and contained all kinds of documentation including names of people killed, jailed, interned, etc. It also included detailed information about the terrorist acts and atrocities committed by the Greek government supported armed bands, police, army, collaborators, etc., against the Macedonian people. What kind of an effect these protests and letters had on the Commission we don’t know but we do know that when the Maximos government took over from Tsaldaris it did everything in its power to create a kind of façade to confuse the Commission. To keep the Commission away from the prisoners, the government, in the name of prison reforms, released a large number of prisoners. Some of the internment camps were also moved to avoid being found by the Commission. The British too became involved in the conspiracy when the British Vice consul in Lerin began to organize an autonomous movement and to send agents into Yugoslavia. Not all claims and allegation the Greek government with its false witnesses brought before the Commission however went unchallenged. Following is a conversation that transpired between colonel Kerenezi, the Albanian representative, and Valtadoros, the Greek government witness, as was registered in the protocol of the Commission’s 36th sitting;

KERENEZI: Were you the only prisoner or were there others that were sued at the same time as you? VALTADOROS: There were four other people that went before the court with me. KERENEZI: What was the outcome of the court? VALTADOROS: They were all sentenced to death. KERENEZI: Where are the other four that were sentenced to death? VALTADOROS: They were all killed. KERENEZI: Can you please tell us why the other four, your comrades, were killed and why you are still alive?

VALTADOROS: I can’t tell you why, but I believe I am still alive so that I can come here and be a witness to the guilt of our neighbours…

Given the above conversation, the Commission should have further pressed the issue as to why Valtadoros was allowed to live and how he alone managed to escaped the clutches of his captors while his comrades were killed after being sentenced to death. Unfortunately the Commission was not interested in finding the truth but only to record what the witnesses had to say. Another example of the way the Commission handled its obligations was the way it handled the General Markos Vafiadis interview. Even though the Commission had made arrangements to meet with Vafiadis, the Belgian delegate whose team was expected to do just that was systematically avoiding Vafiadis. The Belgian delegate’s excuse was that he needed a government armed escort to accompany his team in the terrain. He knew full well that Vafiadis would not risk making contact if there was a chance of him being captured. Failing to make contact through the Belgian delegate, the Soviet and Polish delegates along with the representatives from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania then decided to pursue the matter on their own and visited Vafiadis in the mountains without the aid of armed guards. Vafiadis informed the Commission’s delegates not only of the current conditions in Greece but also gave reasons for them. Besides describing the general situation in Greece, Vafiadis it seems by telling the truth about the MNLF gave his support to the Macedonian cause referring to the Macedonians as a self declared Macedonian minority living in the Greek part of Macedonia. He also defended the MNLF’s program calling it identical to that of the GNLF, adding that Greeks and Macedonians have bled together to achieve their aims but the Macedonians bled more and experienced worse conditions than the Greeks. (Oskar Davicho, “Sa Markosovim Partizanima”, page 96) After spending two months in Greece, the Greek government requested that the Commission also interview witnesses in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Greek government alleged that there was an organized MNLF network of Partisans in Skopje and Bitola which conducted campaigns against Greece. The Greek government also produced a number of witnesses who it claimed would testify to that effect. Among the witnesses identified were Papatukas, Mensurakis, and Bopchis. Naturally these testimonies were intended to confuse the Commission. Yes Macedonian ex-Partisans did exist in Yugoslavia and perhaps they were organized in some ways but what the Greek witnesses failed to disclose to the Commission was that these Macedonians were Greek citizens, refugees who had fled Greek occupied Macedonia because of Greek oppression.

Unfortunately not all members of the Commission were interested in getting to the truth. In the protocol of the 57th sitting, on page 12, Orutia, the Columbian delegate, made a statement regarding one of the Greek witnesses which reads “There is no use listening to Bopchis because in the beginning of his testimony he told us one thing and later he told us something else. Some delegates believe his testimony is full of lies and inaccuracies, and as far as they are concerned, it’s worthless.” (Andonovski, Hristo. Vistinata za Egejska Makedonija. Skopje: Misla, 1971, page 210). Unfortunately the report the Commission handed to Geneva did not exactly reflect what was witnessed and observed in Greece. Besides reporting the unsubstantiated allegations collected from the witnesses as facts, the Commission failed to report on the atrocities committed by the Royalist and Republican regimes against the democratic people of Greece, particularly against the Macedonians. Instead of focusing on the real internal issues which were the primary cause of the crisis in Greece, the Commission went on a witch hunt looking for guilt in Greece’s northern neighbours Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. One thing however the Commission could not keep silent on was the terror with which the Greek regime used to persecute its minorities. The Commission’s special report was submitted to the United Nations on July 1947 and was discussed during the July 8th, 1947 Security Council sitting. Here Andrej Gromiko, the Soviet delegate, harshly criticized the report and accused the Greek government and its patrons Great Britain and the United States of concocting incidents at Greece’s northern border in order to internationalize an internal issue. He went on to say that the crisis in Greece was caused by internal problems mainly by the government’s use of oppressive measures against its democratic citizens who were left with no other choice but to rebel. Although it was not spelled out but certainly was implied; the reason for the crisis being most intense at Greece’s northern borders, Gromiko explained, is because the Greek government used extreme force against its northern-most citizens who experienced the full brunt of this Greek terror and oppression. After debating the issue the Council proposed a number of resolutions which among other things called for;

1. The Greek government to take appropriate measures to stop all incidents at the Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Albanian border; 2. Normal diplomatic relations between Greece on one side, and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania on the other, to be reinstated; 3. The governments of Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to solve their refugee problems in the spirit of understanding; 4. The Greek government to undertake measures to rid itself of all discrimination against its ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian citizens who live inside the borders of Greece and to provide them with basic human rights allowing them to speak their mother tongue, and enjoy their culture.

One other resolution the Security Council proposed was the evacuation of foreign armies from Greece but this resolution was defeated in favour of the British-American recommendation calling for a permanent Balkan Commission to document border incidents. Even though the Greek armed forces had not document even a single border incident, the British and Americans insisted that Greece’s internal problems were caused externally. The way voting was conducted at the UN indicates that the British and Americans had greater influence in getting what they wanted instead of getting at the truth. But even though the Security Council took the American side on the resolutions, it did not mean that the delegates, even the pro-USA ones, were convinced that the reasons for the Greek Civil War could be found outside of Greece’s borders. The Norwegian delegate, for example, stated that in his opinion the testimonies acquired by the Commission did not have sufficient evidence to prove that the governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were directly involved in helping the Greek Partisans or that they broke any UN rules. Delbos, the French delegate, also expressed his opinion by stating that “I cannot say with certainty that the Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Albanian governments provided any help to the Greek partisans. In my opinion there is no sufficient evidence to prove that. Speculation is not proof. Therefore I believe the reasons for the internal strife in Greece can be found inside Greece…” Even Spak, the pro-USA Belgian delegate, expressed concern when he stated that “I cannot say that it can be attested that Greece’s northern neighbours are in support of the Greek Civil War…” (Andonovski, Hristo. Vistinata za Egejska Makedonija. Skopje: Misla, 1971, pages 211 and 212) Perhaps if the United Nations played less politics and paid more attention to the realities on the ground many more problems could have been solved and many conflicts prevented. Even though, for the wrong reasons, the UN had a chance to solve the problems in Greece and prevent the escalation of the Greek Civil War and all the tragedies that followed. Unfortunately the UN, as usual, is more concerned with placating its powerful members than dispensing justice. Resolution 4 above recommended basic human rights for the minorities in Greece which have yet to be implemented. If the UN did its job and followed up on its recommendations we would not have so many problems today.

The Spring Offensive

Unable to continue financing the ailing Royalist and Republican regime in Greece, the British Labour government decided in early March 1947 to withdraw its support leaving Greece’s fate in the hands of the United States, which under no circumstances was prepared to let Greece slip away from its grasp. Without external intervention the Royalist and Republican regimes would have lost Greece to the Democratic forces and Greece would have taken its place among the family of Balkan Peoples’ Republics, at least in theory. The American government’s decision to support Greece was made public on March 12, 1947 when US President Truman in his speech to the US Congress introduced what came to be known in diplomatic circles as the “Truman Doctrine”. Soon afterwards the US government approved a 350 million dollar military assistance package to prop up the ailing Royalist and Republican regime in Greece. This however was contrary to what the United Nations had recommended when it requested that all foreign powers leave Greece. Ignoring the UN’s recommendation the US government reaffirmed its position by stating that it respects the UN decision and if the majority of the General Assembly or Security Council decides it wants a change in politics, the US will abide by its decision. However at this point, just after World War II, many UN members were heavily dependent on economic aid from the US and were not willing to take a stand against the US government’s decision. The US government, having studied the situation in Greece, was well aware of the shortcomings of the current regime and its inability to win without external intervention. Truman’s intervention plans, prepared by American experts familiar with the situation in Greece, proposed that the US provide Greece with an economic and military aid package to equip an army of 200,000 soldiers as well as pay for American agents and advisors to assist the Greeks with military preparations and training. It was also rumoured that the US loaned Greece American military officers to lead the Greek Civil War. While stationed in Athens, Tomas Reynolds in a telegram sent to New York on December 15, 1947 wrote: “The American experiment in Greece called for much more intervention than has been in other countries in Europe. The US aim here is to prevent by any means possible the falling of Greece into the Russian orbit which would then open a Mediterranean port for the Soviet Union”. If the obvious can be stated here, it never was the intention of the USA to help the Greek people as was stated by President Truman in his address to the US Congress on March 12, 1947 but rather to carry out the age old Western quest to keep Russia out of Mediterranean waters. In other words the American intervention in Greece was about extending the old British politics of blocking the Soviet Union from widening its influence in the oil rich Middle East which the USA wanted for itself. With the economic and military boost received from the Americans, the Greek government in April 1947 began preparations for a spring offensive aimed against the Democratic forces and the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). With American guidance a strategy for the spring offensive was prepared. The strategy called for forcefully evacuating villages and destroying properties in order to (a) deprive DAG of new recruits, (b) deprive DAG of its sources of food; the villages being the main providers of DAG’s food and (c) cut off DAG’s information networks which were mainly carried out by people from the villages. The majority of villages evacuated were those located in secluded areas in Greek occupied Macedonia where most of DAG’s bases were located. The evacuated villagers were relocated in cities or larger villages which at the time were under the control of Royalist and Republican police and military forces. The orders to evacuate the villages came directly from Napoleon Zervas, the Greek Minister of Internal Affairs, and were subsequently carried out by the Royalist and Republican police and military forces.

The evacuations naturally created serious problems not only for DAG, which lost its supply of food, new recruits and communication lines but also for the people evacuated. Before the evacuation villagers in remote areas enjoyed a relatively peaceful life away from the brutalities and terror that other citizens had to endure but now that they were evacuated they too came to live under the same harsh conditions. If there was any spirit left in them, in time and under those conditions, it was sure to be destroyed. They too now would begin to understand the brand of terror, killings and abuse the democratic population had to endure every day of its life. The Royalists and Republicans were counting on it. “Beatings, people being jailed and mistreated, killings, etc, are everyday occurrences in Greece which have nothing to do with the Partisans. They break the heads of women and everywhere they sow waste and fear and take kinds of measures which force the majority of people to flee to the Mountains.” (June 5, 1947, La veritè sur la Grece, “Livre bleu” p. 38) While the United Nations Inquiry Commission was still there, police agents in Solun in the middle of the day detained and killed Yanis Zevgos, high ranking member of the Communist Party of Greece (CPG) and a representative of the Greek National Liberation Front (GNLF) at the Inquiry Commission. There were rumours that orders to murder Zevgos came from as high up as Zervas himself. (This information comes from a letter written by one of the participants in the assassination by the name of Sidiropoulos. The letter can be found in “Livre bleu” page 32.)

During a separate incident two more people, leaders of the Macedonian National Liberation Front (MNLF) were also killed. Identified by informants, Todor Dojchinov – Morava, MNLF Regional secretary of Enidzhe-Vardar and Pavle, MNLF Regional commander were both killed in the village Krushari, Enidzhe-Vardar Region. (For more details on Morava’s execution see the document “Future”, August 1950 entitled “The Death of Captain Morava”. Also see the newspaper “Voice of the Aegeans”, April 1953, Documents of the leadership of NOF [MNLF] for Enidzhe-Vardar Region). The following table, submitted to the first world MNLF conference in May 1947 provides some detail of the terror and genocide conducted against the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia to the end of April 1947:

(Region) Sacrifices Kostur Lerin Voden Gumendzhe Total

1. Killed 56 2. Raped 42 3. Locked up 596 4. Sued 320 5. Sentenced 285 6. Interned 122 7. Mistreated 1396 8. Gone Mad 5 from beatings 9. Houses 110 Burned

90 74 48 268 96 150 9 297 3083 2057 814 6550 1507 1952 436 4215 1214 1305 436 3240 509 552 115 1298 10280 1085 1082 13816 5 2 1 13

no data 813 968 1891

(NOTE: The table above is by no means complete; it not only lacks information on Negush Region but has no information on other parts of Greek occupied Macedonia east of the Vardar River. Similarly there is no data for loss of property such as confiscation of herds of sheep, goats and large animals as well as the destruction of 45 villages and on its residents that were taken away by force). After terrorizing the population into submission making sure no one dared help the Partisans, let alone join them, the Greek government on April 9, 1947 began the spring offensive against DAG. DAG at the time numbered no more than 25,000 fighters armed with light weapons. The idea of the offensive was to push the Partisans north against Greece’s northern borders and either destroy them or force them out of the country as asylum seekers. Here again I would like to point out that Greece once again proved that that there was no “threat from the north” because if there was such a threat Greece would not have pushed the Partisans northward where they could easily enter the northern countries, re-organize and return to fight. If that were the case Greece could never have defeated the Democratic forces. In fact I believe another “benefit” that Greece received from the United Nations Commission’s visit is assurances that Greece’s northern neighbours would not allow armed DAG fighters to enter their territory. Having somewhat understood the motives of the spring offensive, in February 1947, the leadership of DAG ordered its battalions to leave their bases in Pajak –Kajmakchalan, Karakamen and Vicho Mountains and head south to Thessaly and southern Greece. The aim here was to amass a large Partisan force in southern Greece and lead the fighting there. Unfortunately the timing of this move and the way it was conducted angered the MNLF leadership. First the Macedonians were not properly informed about this move. Second, the move happened to take place just after all democratic forces, Greek and Macedonian, were consolidated under DAG. Third, the moment the battalions arrived in Thessaly the Macedonian leadership was relieved of command and replaced with Greeks. Having their leaders replaced naturally created bitterness in the Macedonian fighters and to make matters worse those who displayed their displeasure in public were singled out and executed outright. Among those who died this way was Gjorgij Milev from the village Tsakoni, Meglen Region. After witnessing the deaths of their compatriots, some Macedonian fighters could not bear to be part of DAG and decided to desert. Among those who deserted was Major Adramanov from the village Patele. Adramanov deserted in Thessaly in April 1947 and surrendered to the regular units. As soon as DAG units started arriving in the mountains of Thessaly, government forces began to implement “cleanup operations” in an attempt to surround the Partisans. But, being better at fighting in rough mountainous terrain, DAG units kept slipping away through enemy defenses, moving behind enemy lines, cutting off enemy retreat and communication lines and scoring victories against the enemy. On April 22, 1947 the Greek government with 12,000 infantry soldiers, artillery and aviation launched the first phase of a major offensive against the Partisan force of no more than 3,500 fighters. The campaign was conducted in the mountainous terrain and covered a radius of about 300 km. However, DAG by now had become familiar with the terrain and had established good communication lines with the surrounding villages and, being aware of the government’s objectives, was prepared for the offensive. Also DAG, consisting of lightly armed and smaller units, had the freedom of maneuverability to escape concentrated enemy attacks. The bad weather at varying heights of the mountainous terrain also had a negative impact on the success of the offensive by keeping the government air-force grounded. All in all the spring offensive was not as successful as anticipated and according to a government announcement on April 25, 1947 DAG’s losses numbered 651 dead, 84 captured, 414 deserted and 117 surrendered.

On the government side, 31 were killed and 80 were wounded and captured. According to a DAG announcement however, on the side of DAG 130 were killed, 42 were wounded and 39 deserted. On the government side 219 were killed, 294 were wounded, 19 deserted and 130 were incapacitated due to frostbite. (Andonovski, Hristo. Vistinata za Egejska Makedonija. Skopje: Misla, 1971, page 221.) The second phase of the spring offensive was launched on May 11, 1947 and was conducted by a horizontal frontal attack stretching about 250 km from Mechovo on the west side to Elasona in the east and involved 30 battalions. The government’s aim during this phase was to no longer surround and destroy DAG but to comb the terrain and push the Partisans north. During this phase the government’s objectives were to secure space and establish new bases to the north and as the campaign moved north to use the bases as stepping stones for the third phase of the operation which would strip the Partisans of their essential strategic points, food supplies and reservoir of new recruits. Another of the government’s objectives was to break DAG’s connections between its headquarters in Thessaly and those in Western Greek occupied Macedonia. By May 19, 1947 the government had fully deployed its forces and by mid-June 1947 it widened its reach to Mount Olympus. After a month of deploying phase two of the operation, the Partisans were pushed away from this terrain into new regions but not northward into the lands of Greece’s northern neighbours as was expected. A review of this phase of the “spring offensive” revealed that the undertaking on the government side was not as easy as expected. Similarly DAG too suffered many losses having to maneuver its fighters in unfamiliar terrains. In one particular instance an entire DAG detachment, under the command of Kartsionis, was decimated by government forces when it lost its way out of the Hjala massif while attempting to flee to Mount Kozijak. Many DAG fighters also suffered from frostbite because they were unprepared for the mountainous cold climate where they took shelter in the nights. Even more DAG fighters lost their lives during the attack on Grevena in the third phase of the spring offensive. And as D. Vlandas, former CPG member, former Minister of Farming in the former Democratic government put it; it was all General Markos Vafiadis’s fault. Vlandas blamed General Vafiadis for ordering DAG units to occupy the Hasija and Antihasija Massifs in the beginning of 1947, which by the way were located outside of the perimeter of the free territories. Instead of concentrating his defenses in Greek occupied Macedonia and setting an ambush for the Republicans and Royalists as was expected, Vafiadis was accused of using DAG elite units for his own purposes; one being to provide security for his meeting with the United Nations Inquiry Commission. Markos was also held directly responsible for the destruction of Kartsionis’s detachment since he was the one who ordered it to take the Koziak massif at any cost. Regardless of whose fault it was DAG’s leadership couldn’t have possibly known exactly what the enemy was planning but instead of taking action while it could, the Democratic leadership sat static while DAG, from March 31, 1946 up to September 15, 1947 kept registering casualty after casualty, a period during which the civil war in Greece could have been resolved. During its three and a half years of operation, as documented by “Neos Kosmos”, September 1950, pages 601-602, DAG fought 593 battles and skirmishes, killed 4,878 enemy troops, wounded 2,061 and captured 1,329. It terms of material damages DAG destroyed 17 tanks, 6 planes, 1 cannon, 14 locomotives, 11 rail cars, mined 6,248 meters of railway, destroyed 68 bridges and ripped out 1,640 meters of telephone line. DAG also confiscated 38 large 81 mm mine throwers with 1,268 rounds, 57 small mine throwers, 10 machine guns, 342 automatic rifles, 2,741 rifles, 323 semi-automatic rifles, 36 revolvers, 1,757 hand grenades, 44 radio transmitters, 6 telephone sets and 571 horses.

And what does all this mean? Considering the control the Democratic forces exercised over Greece and the support they enjoyed from about 80% of the population, they could have decimated the Royalists and Republicans, rid themselves of the Fascist regime, former oppressors and occupier collaborators and if not as a socialist republic they could have established Greece as a democratic republic with rights for all minorities, just as Yugoslavia did. The best time for doing that would have been the period from March 31, 1946 to September 1947 when DAG exercised considerable power. Provoked by the government forces, this was DAG’s best chance for widening the armed movement and even for taking over the government and establishing itself in Greece. The possibility of this becoming a reality would become obvious if we examine the facts and military potential of each side. According to Leonidas Stringos, Secretary of the provincial committee of the CPG in Macedonia and Thrace, the enemy (government) had only 5 divisions with 2,000 troops each and only 32 machine guns per division; that is only 10,000 soldiers and a total of 160 machine guns. The top CPG leadership through all of 1947 procrastinated and refused to deal with the reality it was facing especially when the question “is there is a need to take over the government” surfaced to which Zahariadis replied “Maybe in 1948 but not now. We will not talk about taking over the government”. When the top democratic leadership had a chance to recruit up to 60,000 Partisans, it looked the other way and busied itself with economic and party issues. (The above information was extrapolated from discussions with Markos Vafiadis at the 7th CPG plenum, April 1957, “Neos Kosmos” April-May 1957.) Considering that DAG could have had 60,000 Partisans at its disposal when the Greek government had only 10,000 troops, it could have easily won the war with probably a single decisive battle. According to Stringos, if the CPG wanted to mobilize its forces it could have done so with only a single news release calling on the Democratic forces to re-join the armed struggle. Right before the “spring offensive” the badly needed reserves were ready and willing to be recruited but instead of grabbing them when they were available, Zahariadis decided he did not need more that 2,000 fighters. Was this a decision of an incompetent commander or was this a decision of a conspirator working against the people who had entrusted him to protect them? What interests us here however, more than what the top leadership of CPG did or did not do to place itself in power in Greece, is what the leadership did not do for the Macedonians and other ethnic groups living in Greece. Even though the CPG made a lot of promises, particularly for granting the Macedonian people equal rights, it fell short on delivering them. Even though Article 4 of the Organization’s policies stated that “All Greeks, men and women are equal and have the same political rights” and that “National minorities have the same citizen and political rights as any other Greek citizens; to protect and promote their national culture, language, religion, education in their mother tongue, etc,” none materialized at the end. Even though article 5 of the same policy book promised to protect the rights of all people and punish those who had perpetrated acts of terror and who had harmed the innocent would be punished by law, to this day, we are still waiting for that to happen. Many other promises such as forming a “peoples’ government” in the free territories which would have allowed people to elect their own representatives from local and regional councils to administer education, security and justice, were made, on those too they did not deliver. Even though it heavily counted on the Macedonians to give it their support, and in spite of how badly Macedonians were repeatedly treated, and even though Macedonians delivered every time, in the end the CPG refused to recognize the Macedonian contribution.

Today we have members of the CPG who not only do not recognize the Macedonian contribution to the Greek struggle but insist “Macedonians don’t exist”. The one short term but positive thing that came out of these policies is the Macedonian peoples’ ability to set up Macedonian language schools in some of the so-called “liberated territories”.

A school to educate teachers in the Macedonian language was opened in the village German in Prespa Region in December 1947. The aim here was to prepare Macedonian language teachers who in turn would teach Macedonian children the Macedonian language. Among the regions that received Macedonian language education at the time were the villages in the free territories of Vicho and Kajmakchalan. Even though this program only lasted several months, 87 Macedonian schools were opened with the participation of over 10,000 students.

The struggle in Gramos, Vicho and Malimadi