CHAPTER SIX - Part 01

CHAPTER SIX

1. Zahariadis and NOF

As soon as Zahariadis returned from Dachau he immediately put himself in charge of the Party as secretary general.

The fierce terror gradually and inevitably forced many of the people’s fighters to flee to the mountains and create a revolutionary army - the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG).

And, as I mentioned earlier, the People’s Liberation Front (NOF) was created in Macedonia in April 1945, and armed units consisting of veteran Macedonian fighters began to assemble and act on the Vicho, Kaimakchalan and Paiak Mountain massifs.

Given the terrible situation at the time, the main highlight in Greece during this period was DAG’s growing power and influence.

In parallel with that, the main hallmark in the situation in Macedonia was NOF’s growing power and influence.

But the CPG leadership, led by Zahariadis, was not happy about NOF and reacted.

Two months after NOF was founded, during its CPG Central Committee 12th plenum, the CPG proclaimed that: “It is resolutely opposed to any party making any territorial claims against Greece. The preservation of the state territorial integrity is the first task of every Greek patriot...” (CPG 1931-1952, p. 110)

As a person can gather from reading the party newspapers of that time, and as the Zahariadis Politburo later confirmed at its September 12, 1951, meeting, the CPG feared that: “Tito, through NOF, was preparing to annex Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia and join it to Yugoslavia...” (CPG 1931-1952, p. 271.) This fear was also made known during the CPG Central Committee 6th Plenum, held in October 1949, when Zahariadis and the others spoke about some “war plans and... Tito, against Greek Macedonia…” (Ibid., p. 205) involving NOF and the Macedonian revolutionary movement.

This fear and concern from NOF’s growth and importance, whether Zahariadis liked it or not, was a sincere acknowledgment of NOF’s value, that is, the value of the Macedonian national liberation movement. Thinking about this, somehow, at this point in time made me think of the following false claims that were made against the Macedonian people:

“Rizospastis”: After the exchange of populations, Macedonia is as Greek as the Athens district of Attica…!

“Komunistiki Epitheorisi”: The Slavo-Macedonian population is non-existent. While the National Council of the “People’s Democratic Greece”, born from the struggle of the Greek people, as a newborn, was suffocated by the presidential policy of the Party’s top leadership, and, with the Caserta and Varkiza Agreements, was buried, it was claimed that the Macedonian people are only Greek people, as we have seen, proclaimed by the Greek character of Macedonia.

As it turned out these claims were only wishes, that is, a policy of keeping eyes closed before the Macedonian reality.

Zahariadis said that he was in fear looking at the Macedonian national liberation movement growing. This tells us that the policies his Party practiced were hostile to NOF and the Macedonian movement. If Zahariadis and the CPG were in favour of the Macedonian liberation movement they would have been happy and would have had nothing to fear. The CPG was afraid of the Macedonian movement because it felt it would jeopardize Greek interests in Macedonia. By recognizing the fact that the Macedonian people were and are a separate and unique nation… a subjugated nation in the Greek state… which deserved to have democratic rights and the fundamental right to self-determination, and admitting that would have meant that Zahariadis and the CPG would endanger “Greek national interests and the Greek position” in Macedonia. This kind of thinking, obviously, tells us that Zahariadis was looking at the Macedonian national question not from a Macedonian perspective but from a perspective that would only satisfy greater Greek interests in Macedonia. This was the exact same policy

practiced by the Greek bourgeoisie. It then should be no surprise to anyone that the bourgeoisie and the CPG were equally and resolutely against the Macedonian nation and were making every effort to keep the Macedonian people subjugated and in a humiliating and completely disadvantaged position...

2. Why it was necessary to have an English presence in Greece

It was very characteristic of the reactionaries and the Zahariadis leadership in the rise of the new revolutionary movement to have an English presence in Greece. This was confirmed during the CPG Central Committee 12th Plenum when it was declared that England was a “great friend” of the Greek people and its presence and “support” in Greece was a necessary factor for securing the “peaceful development of the country”. This is what was actually said:

“The Plenum proclaims that with our presence and with support from our two great friends - England and Russia, our peaceful development depends on the Greek brotherly agreement and democratic cooperation with the northern Balkan democracies...” (CPG 1931-1952, p. 111)

Here Russia was mentioned after England. But this was just diplomatic courtesy designed to blur and conceal the truth. Namely, in his opening statement Zahariadis, as I already mentioned, was very specific about the English presence in Greece as being necessary “to ensure our positions and our borders to the north…” (see: Brochure APOFASIS TIS 12 Olomelias, telikos logos Nikos Zahariadis - 12th PLENUM DECISION, opening statement and conclusion by Nikos Zahariadis, CPG Central Committee 1946 edition, p. 21. OR: FORTY YEARS OF CPG, p. 645)...

The above was also the exact line the Greek bourgeoisie followed.

In fact just a few months earlier the English army intervened against ELAS which led to ELAS’s desolation and to the disarming of the resistance movement.

As was stated during the CPG Central Committee 12th Plenum, England financed the plutocratic neo-fascist orgy of the one-sided civil war against the democratic forces. Having examined a number of facts, this Plenum found that English circles from abroad were responsible for the financing and support of the reactionary forces and terrorist gangs inside Greece who, radically and definitely, in the shortest possible time, within one to two weeks, were trying to improve the internal situation for themselves…!” (12th Plenum Resolution, CPG 1931-1952, p. 109).)

Life experience in general proved that an English presence in Greece strengthened the power of the reactionaries, broke up the democratic forces and abolished the democratic rights and freedoms of the common people.

The CPG request to have the “friendly presence and support” of England “a great friend” to Greece, to ensure the Greek position in the Greek northern borders was exactly what the Greek bourgeoisie wanted. And the CPG gave it to them without asking for anything in return. The CPG, as the bourgeoisie often did when faced with difficulties and crises, used the patriotic feelings of the Greek people and tried to distract their attention from internal problems, by waving the familiar and fanciful scare flag of the “Slavic danger” from the north...

3. In anticipation of Sofoulis

The economic chaos and political crisis in Greece widened and deepened as a consequence of the terrorist orgy committed by the “plutocratic neo-fascists” and the people resisting.

The English appointed bourgeois Greek governments kept falling one after another. The first government, Georgios Papandreou’s government in exile in Cairo, which arrived in Athens on October 18, 1944, fell right after two reorganizations, one on October 24 and the other on November 2, 1944.

After being in power for less than two months the newly English appointed government, headed by Nikolaos Plastiras, also fell. It was replaced by a newly formed “administrative government”

headed by a naval officer named Petros Vulgaris. This government too was reorganized on August 11, 1945 and Petros Vulgaris was forced to step down in October 1945.

This government was then headed by the Regent Archbishop Damaskinos but lasted only three weeks.

On November 1, 1945, headed by Georgios Kanelopoulos, a new government was formed which lasted only three months before it too fell. (Naum Peiov, Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece, p. 50.)

Obviously the English appointed bourgeoisie governments were not working out and there was a need for a “legal” government to be “elected” but it was imperative that the bourgeoisies win so that they could strengthen their power in Greece. To that end, the English used their trump card and brought the Liberals, headed by Themistoklis Sofoulis, to power.

At this crucial moment, the CPG came out in favour of the Liberals and put its support behind the Sofoulis’s cabinet. According to a November 25, 1945, CPG Politburo announcement: “The entire democratic world consisting of both citizens and those in the armed forces, has a supreme national debt, by all means possible, to prevent the Political Right from taking power. The entire democratic world must pay attention and follow the directives issued by Sofoulis…!” (Komunistiki Epitheorisi, No. 12. 1945.)

With the CPG and EAM’s support, this cabinet was put in office when it was most needed and because it was generally supported by “all sides”, unlike previous bourgeois governments, it was able to allow the bourgeoisie to forge the March 31, 1946 elections.

The abstention from the elections, which the CPG and EAM had caused, held back a large number of voters outside of the electoral struggle and thus prevented any undesirable outcome for the bourgeoisie, ensuring an objective victory.

Understandably, the “electoral victory” granted by the CPG to the monarchists of the populist party, “legalized” the way for the

restoration of the monarchy and opened the door for the counterrevolution in Greece to consolidate its power...

4. With England, not against England

In the meantime, during the CPG Central Committee 2nd Plenum, held in February, 1946, Zahariadis called on EAM to “urgently take all organizational and technical measures to acquire weapons. The state of unilateral war and the criminality of the plutocratic neo-fascists perpetrated against the people, from today forward, must not be tolerated. We need to respond to our enemies with the same fierce means, decisively and victoriously.” (CPG 1931-1952, p. 146.)

But there was more… So as not to lag far behind the events and, above all, to not call to arms against the English, the chief organizers and financiers of this “unilateral war” against the people, the EAM was urged to acquire weapons but not use them or “upset relations with England... And to do it without pleading, because that was not in harmony with our national dignity…!” (Ibid., p. 146.)

By doing this Zahariadis’s top leadership did everything in its power to prevent the new uprising that was building up, unremittingly, from being directed against “England”, our “great friend”, and orient it towards “cooperating” with England...

5. A crucial unbridled moment was missed

However, England seemed to be working against itself when it forced a unilateral war against the country’s still huge democratic forces, attacking a strong opponent which naturally counteracted with strong resistance.

This brutal English sponsored assault gradually led to strong and frequent counterattacks from the democratic forces (DAG) all across Greece. In April 1947, the Greek royal general staff was forced to issue orders to withdraw all royal garrisons and gendarmes from the field and station them in the cities.

And as morale was declining in the bourgeoisie forces it was rising in the general population and the DAG fighters.

In the period that followed there was a strong influx of fighters joining DAG and a strong swing towards an armed uprising. Slowly, but inevitably, the crisis in the bourgeois camps kept rising and reached its peak in August 1947 when it was left without a government and a civil war looming. The English were unable not find a suitable person who could form a new government.

With the general strikes, the demonstrations and the street fighting going on, the CPG could have paralyzed its opponent, at least in the cities.

A strong revolutionary military force could have easily been created with a wide mobilization and the revolutionary forces could have achieved supremacy over their opponent and could have restored peace and democratic development in the country.

But the CPG chose not to do any of those things, not even to coordinate the general strikes and demonstrations when the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) began its general offensive.

The CPG also abstained from conducting broad mobilization to turn DAG from a small rebel army into a major revolutionary army.

The Zahariadis leadership did nothing and took no measure against its opponent at this critical and decisive juncture. It failed to resolve the crisis and it failed to lead the people while resisting. The CPG allowed this crucial decisive moment to pass it by and did nothing...

6. Was the armed struggle a bluff?!

Let us have a look at some of the remarks made about this:

General Markos: “The period from March 31, 1946 (the day the elections were forged) to September 1947 was the most suitable time to bolster the armed uprising and even take power... It seemed like almost all throughout 1946, the CPG leadership showed apathy to the drama committed against ordinary CPG members and former

fighters of ELAS. Even during the first months in 1947, when CPG activists from field committees raised the issue of seizing power in the country, Zahariadis’s position was: ‘We are not going to take power for now, we will see, perhaps in 1948…’

During this time the CPG leadership insisted that the primary tasks of the Party were to solve economic problems and bring reconciliation. The CPG forbade ELAS fighters from joining the partisans, and those who insisted on doing it, because of the unbearable terror perpetrated against them by the monarchists, were labeled cowards, suspicious characters and provocateurs. It was during this period that all conditions were perfect for recruiting fighters into DAG and DAG could have easily grown into an army of over 60,000...” (Markos’s discussion regarding what was said at the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum held in April 1957. See: Neos Cosmos, number 4-5 (April-May), 1957. Hristo Andonovski, “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Misla 1971 edition, p. 226.)

Politburo member Leonidas Stringos: “If during 1946-1947 our Party opted for an armed struggle, it would have resolved the reserve issue successfully and well-timed, one of the most important issues, and with a single skillful manipulation of things and a firm mobilization policy, we could have increased DAG’s military effectiveness… But then, Zahariadis told us that we don’t need a force of more than 2,000 fighters in Macedonia…” (Stringos’s discussion regarding what was said at the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum held in April 1957. See: Neos Cosmos, number 4-5 (April-May), 1957. Hristo Andonovski, “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Misla 1971 edition, p. 226.)

CPG Central Committee member for Macedonia and Thrace Panaiotis Mavromatis: “Here I would like to point out the fact that, after the 2nd Plenum (held in February 1946), we received instructions from the Politburo to study the situation in Macedonia in order to see how much time and what kind of force we can mobilize. However, when the Provincial Bureau informed Zahariadis that we can mobilize 20-25,000 fighters within a month, he told us to stop, because he regarded the armed struggle as... a bluff…” (Mavromatis’s discussion regarding what was said at the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum held in April 1957. See: Neos

Cosmos, number 4-5 (April-May), 1957. Hristo Andonovski, “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Misla 1971 edition, p. 197.)

7. Destruction of the Macedonian battalions

By doing nothing to aid the revolution in Greece, the CPG in effect gave its opponent the time and opportunity it needed to overcome its crisis. But it was more than that. The Zahariadis leadership also actively helped its opponent. Namely, the Zahariadis leadership ordered the “Slavophone” Macedonian battalions to go into Greece where they were exposed to the Greek population which was unaware that Macedonians existed in Greece. To the uninformed Greeks the appearance of the Macedonians with their speech, songs and dances, was a provocation and their thinking was that the CPG was receiving military assistance from its northern neighbours in exchange for giving (Greek occupied) Macedonia away. The uninformed Greek people quickly responded with defiance against the CPG. This was a blow to the Macedonian people and the CPG which only aided its opponent.

I should also mention at this point that in February 1946, the following was said during the CPG 2nd Plenum: “In order to conceal their real plans and to deceive and divide the people, the Monarcho-Fascist reactionaries, together with the united plutocracy and their foreign leaders, constantly and relentlessly cultivated and spread slander against the CPG. They claimed that the CPG supposedly wanted autonomy for Macedonia, that is, it wanted to give Macedonia to foreigners… At the same time the reactionaries panicked the people by constantly pointing out that Pan-Slavism was a mortal danger to Hellenism...” (CPG 1931-1952, p. 149)

Even the villagers in central and southern Greece, who had heard that other people, Macedonians who spoke a Slavic language, lived in the Greek state, were against the Macedonians and not only used slanderous comments when referring to them but ran away when the Macedonians came to their villages. They treated the Macedonian units like they were units of their “eternal enemies” the Bulgarians, or members of some foreign “international brigade”.

Naturally, anyone who knew even the slightest thing about the situation in Greece could have easily predicted this was going to happen. The CPG should have known that this was going to happen, yet it sent the Macedonian battalions into the Greek south. Ironically, the reason the CPG sent the Macedonian battalions south into Greece, as was explained to us, was to intensify the popular revolution there. This, unfortunately, was not possible even in the best of circumstances. This would have been an impossible task for the Macedonian units to accomplish and the CPG was well aware of that...

But, by doing this, both the CPG and DAG were compromised to the extent that massive masses of uninformed people, who were DAG, EAM, and CPG supporters, in fury or in panic, depending on the conditions, fled to the cities and to enemy camps turning from reserves for the revolution into reserves for the counterrevolution. Because of this, DAG 8th Division command in Epirus went as far as ordering the Macedonian soldiers to stop speaking and singing in Macedonian and present themselves, not as Macedonians, but as Greeks.

By doing this the top Zahariadis leadership also weakened the revolutionary movement in Macedonia and demoralized the Macedonian people. The withdrawal of the Macedonian battalions from (Greek occupied) Macedonia took away the direct influence they had on the Macedonian people with their presence and activities. While in the Greek south, the Macedonian battalions were exposed to fighting uneven battles with the numerically superior and modern armed Royal Army which slowly and successfully “wasted” them like they were an organized military force.

It is a fact that the top Zahariadis leadership was successful in destroying more Macedonian young people than the bourgeois government in Athens ever did. It was monstrous.

This was an unconditionally huge and real help for the opponent...

8. A different evaluation

There was a meeting held in Skopje some time ago attended first by the former Party Secretary of ELAS 30th regiment and later by Atanasios Mitsiopoulos-Stavros from DAG Kaimakchalan headquarters. After I informed them of my assessment of events, the latter said:

“That’s right... The Macedonian units were sent down to the Greek south... Away from the dangerous events taking place in Macedonia… so that they could be destroyed… that’s it…” but did not finish what he wanted to say.

What I understood from this is that he wanted to say he did not know about this at the time or it was not this way at all.

There is also another opinion: Some people believe that DAG General Headquarters predicted its opponent’s moves against the partisans associated with the 1947 spring offensive. DAG General Headquarters anticipated that the opponent would push the partisans to Greece’s northern borders and force them to move to the neighbouring popular democracy countries. If the opponent did this, at least in part, the Athens government would have “reasons” to justify to the world and to the Greek public why it would be impossible to liquidate the partisan movement. How could partisans be liquidated if they were fleeing to the neighbouring countries where, besides seeking asylum, they would reorganize, arm themselves and return to the Greek territory to fight? DAG General Headquarters understood Athens’s intentions and, in order to deprive Athens of its coveted “reasons”, in early February 1947, ordered the battalions to relocate to the south of Greece. All battalions stationed in the Paiak, Kaimakchalan, Karakamen and Vicho Mountain Regions were ordered to go to Thessaly and move south into Greece proper. On top of that, this move to the south also had other aims according to DAG General Headquarters, it was made to bolster the guerrilla movement in southern Greece, which at that time was lagging behind the one in Macedonia. However, none of these operations were explained to the Macedonian fighters or to the Macedonian population in the Paiak, Kaimakchalan, Karakamen and Vicho Mountain Regions and left the people to wonder and,

given past Greek intentions against the Macedonians, to fear for the worst. But looking at the timing of this, the orders to move the Macedonian battalions south into Greece were issued just after the Macedonian and Greek partisan units were unified. Moreover, once these units arrived in Greece proper, the Macedonian leaders were immediately replaced with Greek leaders, which caused bitterness among the Macedonian fighters. Some of the fighters who openly manifested their disagreement were shot, as was the case with Giorgi Milev from the village of Tsakoni, Meglen Region. Some of the DAG fighters and officers who could not bear the humiliation deserted, as was the case with Major Adramanov from the village Pateli, Lerin Region. Adramanov was a DAG major and served in Kaimakchalan. He deserted in April 1947 while serving in Thessaly and surrendered to the regular units.

I decided to “expose” this opinion, about which Hristo Andonovski had written on page 219 in his book “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia” Misla edition, 1971, because many Macedonians, including NOF activists, believe it to be the truth. But, I can assure you that there is a lot more to it and the historical truth is surely different.

This unfounded opinion, above all, ignores some basic results that were achieved by the Macedonian battalion move to the Greek south, such as:

a) After they entered purely Greek territory in the south of Greece, the Macedonian battalions ceased to exist as an organized military force and the Macedonian national liberation movement lost its armed forces, that is, it was disarmed. Afterwards NOF no longer had any such units within DAG, even though thousands and thousands of new Macedonian fighters were, according to NOF’s directives, recruited into DAG’s ranks. The Macedonians continued to fight as DAG units and much blood was shed, but... for foreign affirmation. It is true that the 18th brigade, formed later, consisted of only Macedonian units, but this was another of Zahariadis’s maneuvers to fool the Macedonian people and to calm down the spirit of the Macedonian fighters. Even though it consisted of Macedonian units, the 18th Brigade was not led by Macedonians.

Zahariadis made sure its leaders were carefully chosen and consisted of anti-NOF and anti-Macedonian elements.

b) The presence and activities of the Macedonian battalions in Macedonia bolstered the Macedonian people’s armed struggle. Each battalion served and acted in the region where it originated. It had a revolutionary centre in which much of the youth from that region gravitated. When the Macedonian battalions were removed, the revolutionary centres, where much of the mobilization of Macedonian youth took place, were liquidated.

Moving the Macedonian battalions out of Macedonia essentially resulted in the suppression of the Macedonian revolutionary struggle. This was done in the spirit of Zahariadis’s directive to the Provincial Bureau: “There will not be more than two thousand fighters in Macedonia…” (Taken from the discussion regarding what was said at the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum held in April 1957. See: Neos Cosmos, number 4-5 (April-May), 1957. Hristo Andonovski, “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Misla 1971 edition, p. 196.)

c) Naturally there were also other significant consequences such as: - The terrible compromises made by the CPG and DAG. - The massive defection of villagers from the villages to the cities and to the camps of the opponent. - The utter perplexity of orders given demanding that Macedonians not speak and sing in their own language and present themselves as Greeks... These are well-known things… and no one should keep silent about them.

Above all, it is wrong to think that:

a) The move of Macedonian battalions, as the main strike force, south into purely Greek territory was made to “bolster the partisan movement”.

According to P. Mavromatis, when in 1946, the Provincial Bureau informed Zahariadis that 20-25 thousand partisan fighters could be recruited in Macedonia within a month, the Bureau was ordered “to stop, because the armed struggle was conceived as only a bluff, as a

fake tactical maneuver for political needs, that is, to achieve political goals…” (Taken from the discussion regarding what was said at the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum held in April 1957. See: Neos Cosmos, number 4-5 (April-May), 1957. Hristo Andonovski, “The Truth about Aegean Macedonia”, Misla 1971 edition, p. 198.)

The suppression of the Macedonian people’s revolutionary struggle and the liquidation of the Macedonian battalion in the 1947 spring and summer were obviously measures that were executed in the spirit of Zahariadis’s policy. There is nothing wrong with using a bluff to prevent an armed struggle from becoming a tactical reality. It is a basic tool in politics. But when we take into account what was done in Macedonia, that is, taking measures that were not feasible, it becomes clear why the battalions were sent south to purely Greek territory.

If Zahariadis and the CPG truly wanted to “bolster the partisan movement” in Greece, they would have acted accordingly. Namely, they would have sent Greek units to implement their plans, and not Macedonian units to give the impression that they were “foreign” units. They would have left the Macedonian battalions to continue with their work in (Greek occupied) Macedonia, that is, to spread and strengthen the armed struggle in (Greek occupied) Macedonia.

The most basic and significant results DAG achieved by sending the Macedonian battalions south into Greece was to have them disarm and have the Macedonian revolutionary movement deprived of NOF and its elite fighters. Of course, this did not happen by accident. It was carefully planned and systematically implemented. That was DAG’s main goal for sending the Macedonian battalions south.

It is also wrong to think that:

b) All these “operations” were performed without preparing the Macedonian fighters and the Macedonian population so that “it would have negative thoughts regarding DAG and the CPG leadership’s intentions in relation to the Macedonians…”

Things, however, were a bit different. Preparations were carried out in Macedonia with the participation of several Macedonian NOF

main and regional leaders. But these Macedonian leaders were quickly replaced with Greeks the moment the battalions arrived on a purely Greek terrain.

There were also those Macedonians who were shot and killed for publicly daring to oppose the removal of the Macedonian leaders. I already mentioned Giorgi Milev as an example of this. Giorgi was a good acquaintance and a neighbour of Hristo Andonovski. These people were killed to prevent the Macedonians from finding out the real Greek intentions, but no prior “preparation” could stop them from finding out the criminality and treacherous character of these measures, as well as the purpose for which they were taken south into Greece.

c) DAG General Headquarters ordering the battalions to go south into Greece, far from the northern border, just to rob the Athens government of its “excuse”, mentioned earlier, was also hard to believe.

It is hard to believe because everywhere in the world where partisans struggled and fought they were often squeezed into a ring against a larger opponent, but they always knew how to break into its opponent’s head and come out winners. In 1948 our partisans were pressed against a border in Malimadi, above Kostur, by an opponent ten times larger but did not see it necessary to end the battle and flee across the border. They fought back and defeated their opponent. Another instance of this took place in 1949, and then too the partisans did not see it necessary to flee across the border even though they were pinned down and endured heavy blows from the opponent’s military machine until they were crushed. Only after they were defeated did the survivors retreat across the border and end the battle. They were then disarmed and disbanded. All this proves that in this battle DAG was inferior to the government army. There was also no evidence of Greece’s neighbours interfering in Greece’s affairs, as the Athens government often claimed.

So, this could not have been the only reason why the Macedonian battalions were ordered to go south. All the events and situations mentioned earlier are interconnected and finding out how they are

interconnected will lead us to the right answer. So, as far as we are concerned, things are not always what they seem…

Let us go back and revisit the main events.

9. Markos’s removal

Things were not going as expected and time seemed to work against the bourgeoisie and the English in Greece. Namely, economic and political instability was chronic despite the help Greece received from England, and the people’s resistance and DAG were getting stronger and more dangerous by the day.

Zahariadis and his top CPG leaders did the best they could and,during the CPG Central Committee 3rd Plenum, held in September 1947, offered the following: “The stronger, more decisive and victorious the people and DAG will be in the struggle against the foreign occupiers and their domestic servants, the more certainly they will be forced to agree on a democratic solution to the Greek question, as EAM proposes…” (CPG 1931-1952, p. 167.)

We need to acknowledge here that this verbal acrobatics was masterfully performed. Instead of forcibly taking power from the bourgeoisie and the English in Greece while he could, Zahariadis basically left it to them to make the final decision by giving them another chance to strengthen the counter-revolution. He basically said we will struggle “not against England, but with England... to solve the Greek problems by forcing England to consent…”

So, once again, we hear Zahariadis say: “Don’t fight against England, Greece’s ‘good friend’…”

In other words, instead of removing the Greek bourgeoisie and its patrons from power when the time was ripe and the situation had matured, Zahariadis and his top CPG leaders crowned the bourgeoisie and “foreign occupiers” by giving them responsibility in the basic conflict between the Greek bourgeoisie, headed by the monarchists and their Anglo-American patrons, on the one hand, and by the people’s democratic masses, headed by the CPG, on the other.

Again, instead of jumping at the chance of bringing victory to the people, Zahariadis and his top CPG leaders decided to remove Markos from his command, especially when DAG was proving to be victorious. Namely, Zahariadis removed General Markos from his position as supreme commander of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). The reason for this was because Markos was in favour of partisan warfare. Partisan warfare at the time was most suitable for a small rebel army such as DAG, which was able to achieve success against even a superior, modern-armed power. DAG units were everywhere and nowhere at all times and very difficult to pin down. They had initiative and the ability to deliver surprise attacks very quickly. With their favourable attitude, unexpected and rapid concentrations, the partisans were capable of attacking an opponent ten times larger and still bring tactical victories.

This is how the People’s Revolution in Yugoslavia and China were won.

Had Zahariadis coordinated DAG’s growth and fighting style with the general strikes, demonstrations and street fighting in the cities, he would inevitably have brought down the reactionaries. The will of the people to fight was there but the CPG did not take advantage of it… it looked the other way.

After removing Markos from his command, Zahariadis ended DAG’s guerrilla style warfare and pinned DAG’s main forces down to fight frontal and positional warfare.

This, naturally, was the beginning of the end for the uprising and DAG...

10. DAG’s destruction

General Markos: “DAG could not be turned into a regular army through giving speeches and writing articles about it or by simply desiring it to be a ‘regular army’. Zahariadis’s idea of turning a hit and run rebel army into a frontal attack army not only put DAG into a stationary defensive position but also created a terrible danger for its very existence and the existence of the democratic armed

movement in general...” (Neos Cosmos, No. 4-5 (April-May) 1957, p. 60.) Markos was absolutely right because at all times the opponent knew exactly where DAG’s basic forces were and always had the initiative and ability to attack them. The lightly armed rebel army was now faced with defending itself against a ten times larger opponent heavily armed with modern arms, aviation, heavy artillery and tanks.

Shortly after DAG was defeated, one of the generals from the opposition said the following: “The good God of Greece (meaning the bourgeoisie) wanted Zahariadis to win over Markos…! Otherwise today Greece (meaning the bourgeoisie in Greece) would not exist!”

That is correct. It is not difficult to recognize the many known dark, earthly forces hiding behind the good God of the bourgeoisie. There was a very strong smell behind all this and it smelled of the Intelligence Service and the CIA...

How did DAG’s defeat come about? The decisive blow delivered against DAG was carefully planned and prepared for a long time both on a military and a psychological basis. After holding its meeting on January 15, 1948, the military counsel sent Stefanos Giouzelis, a member of the CPG Central Committee, to implement Zahariadis’s line in the Peloponnesus. At that time, DAG controlled two thirds of the territory in the Peloponnesus that included 1,200 villages and smaller towns such as Kalavrita and others. DAG achieved this success because of its tactics, about which Nikos Beloianis, one of its commanders and national Greek heroes, wrote: “The tactics based on continuous movement, maneuvers and unexpected attacks were nicely adapted to the local conditions and peculiarities. Instead of concentrating in one place where the opponent could encircle them, the partisans were constantly on the move, suddenly appearing in various regions occupied by the enemy, inflicting losses on them and forcing them to run…” (Demokratikos Stratos, number 6, 1948, eg 200, Kiriakidis, cited work, p. 288.)

With its hit and run tactics, DAG’s main task was to keep the enemy forces in the Peloponnesus busy and where they could be constantly

attacked and wasted. DAG was very successful in doing this. Obviously, the situation DAG was in, both militarily and psychologically, was a major advantage for it and prevented the enemy from delivering a decisive blow against it, especially in Vicho and Gramos where its major forces were located. The Peloponnesus was a real psychological second front for the opponent.

Upon his arrival, Stefanos Giouzelis, immediately united the smaller separate partisan units into brigades and assigned them the task of liberating a number of cities.

This led to the concentration of DAG fighters in several places which gave the opponent the opportunity to surround them and, with its much larger forces, slowly but surely destroy them... (Kiriakidis). This took place after the heroic month-long resistance in June 1949.

There was also the February 1948 incident. The plan here was to destroy a column of over 1,000 fighters which had both military and psychological significance. About 1,600 newly recruited DAG fighters were dispatched unarmed from Rumeli to Gramos. They were to be armed upon their arrival in Gramos and then engage in the fighting against the government forces. The column was dispatched from Rumeli on February 18, 1948 without enough provisions to last the trip. The trek led the fighters along a difficult terrain and over almost impassable mountains coated with half a metre of thick snow. They arrived exhausted and starving in Pieria in mid-March where they were welcomed by the 16th brigade, which had traveled by a different but equally difficult passage around Grevena to get there. The 16th Brigade was initially tasked with initiating an offensive near Solun to distract the enemy but later received new orders to join the column of new fighters and go back to Gramos. To stave off starvation the Brigade redistributed its food supplies and supplied the unarmed fighters. The two columns left Pieria during the night on March 15, 1948 and headed for Gramos. But, as it turned out, the enemy was aware of this plan and knew what path the columns were going to take and greeted them with an ambush while they were still in Pieria.

The partisans ran back to Pieria, regrouped at the peak of Mount Pente Pirgi (1770 m above sea level) and at the adjacent heights and organized a defensive position. However, being short of food and ammunition they could not hold out for long and the number of wounded and frozen grew from day to day.

About six days later, during the night of March 21, 1948, the 16th brigade, which now included the unarmed fighters, decided to run. The fighters hid the two mountain cannons and a set of heavy machine guns and set off along the Pieria main cliff. The road was frozen and covered with a layer of snow a metre deep. They eventually reached the peaks of Mounts Arvanitis (1,995m) and Flamburo (2,199m), and with all their might descended down on the enemy and broke the ring. But they still had to make their way to safety which exposed them to enemy tanks and aerial attacks. Finally, during the night, they managed to cross the Solun-Larisa highway and arrived in Amarbey. But as soon as they thought they had escaped they were attacked again. The enemy caught up to them and, on March 25, 1948, attacked them again near the village Sina Kerasia. At this point the brigade was running out of ammunition and would have been decimated if it were not for Ipsilantis’s Brigade which arrived just in time to rescue it. The whole incident was a real drama.

I should point out at this point that during the 38 days of marching most of the losses the unarmed column sustained were not due to the enemy attacks but rather due to hunger and cold which, in my opinion, was due to the treacherous activities to which these unarmed DAG fighters were intentionally exposed... (Demokratikos Stratos, number 4, 1948, pages 137-138. Kiriakidis, quoted work, p. 291.)

Another thing that I need to mention here is the loss of the partisan light artillery which in DAG’s hands was very effective and devastating against the enemy in the hills.

On December 24, 1948, DAG’s artillery was ordered to assemble somewhere near Solun and bombard targets inside the city where there were large concentrations of enemy units. But just as the attack began the enemy units disbursed and were on the move. But even

though the targets were gone the partisan artillery was not allowed to retreat and, according to its orders, continued with its bombardment. This, according to Kiriakidis (p. 327 of his cited work) continued well into the next day, December 25, 1948, until the enemy units surrounded the artillery and seized all cannons and artillery pieces.

DAG was hard hit by this both militarily and psychologically, especially psychologically...

There was also the battle for the city Lerin, which had been intentionally and openly prepared for a long time.

Everyone talked about it; fighters and civilians. Even the enemy was well-aware of it and the details of the planned attacks. The DAG attacks were anticipated and wherever they came from they were welcomed with well-prepared counter-attacks and ambushes.

The enemy commanders knew everything… all the details. According to the accounts of a Vlach from Lerin, now my relative: “exactly that evening of that February night in 1948, our unit was informed that the partisans would be attacking from there, from there and from there... Many partisans were killed. We recognized many of the women fighters; they were from the Prespa villages...” At the time the Vlach was mobilized in the reserves by the enemy as a non-commissioned officer. Later he married a Macedonian, a relative of my wife’s. I learned more about the battle for Lerin from him when he and his wife came to visit us in Skopje on their way back to Greece from Germany.

Here is what Hristo Andonovski had to say: “All NOF cadres were mobilized into DAG in 1948. Even the wives of the Macedonian fighters in the liberated territory of Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia were forcibly mobilized into DAG. Children, ages 14 and 15, evacuated to the people’s republics, were mobilized and returned to fight at the fronts… It was a criminal act directed against the Macedonian people to force children to fight against the fully trained battle seasoned Monarcho-fascist soldiers from a regular army, or to force the wives of the Macedonian fighters, who have been in the ranks of DAG for many years, to abandon their

homes…” (Hristo Andonovski, The truth about Aegean Macedonia, p. 237.)

But that’s how it was and Andonovski is certainly correct to point it out.

It was amazing how the Macedonians fought and under the most difficult conditions. Even when they felt completely hopeless they did not surrender and fought on to their last breath!