Introduction - Part 02

The situation where the United States, followed by the EC, showed refusal to accept and support the existence of an independent Macedonian state was a sufficient signal to declare to Macedonia’s historic enemies that it was now open season on Macedonia...

12. The Turkish Ambassador was the first to arrive in a fully independent modern Macedonian state. According to protocol, before being received by the Head of State, copies of the Ambassador’s credentials were to be delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, at the time, the Minister was away and there was no Deputy Minister. So the honour to receive the Ambassador’s credentials had fallen on myself as Undersecretary, the third person in the Ministry. But due to lack of experience, instead of the next day’s official event taking place in Gligorov’s (the President’s) office, all Macedonian foreign affairs journalists, cameramen and photographers appeared at the Ministry. A disaster was in the making which would cast a shadow on the main event, the next day. Fortunately, we succeeded in persuading the media to ignore the prior information given to them and concentrate on the President’s reception of the first Ambassador.

13. The first group of six EC members (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark) led by Great Britain took no less than two years to recognize Macedonia after recognizing Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The recognition took place on December 16, 1993, eight months after Macedonia’s admission to the UN. They only recognized Macedonia by its UN reference and not by its constitutional name. Following that, they immediately established diplomatic relations and sent ambassadors to Skopje. Other states followed suit.

14. The United States recognized Macedonia as an independent state on February 9, 1994, almost two years after it recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another year and a half passed before Washington decided to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia, which took place on September 13, 1995, immediately after Macedonia signed the Interim Accord with Greece, which was orchestrated by the United States. The U.S. had established diplomatic relations with the other three former Yugoslav Republics three years earlier! Why?

The American embassy was opened in Skopje in February 1996 and an ambassador arrived at the end of July, four years after the American ambassadors had arrived in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Sarajevo. Even though wars flared up all around the region, even though the Macedonian southern border was blocked by Greece for two years and destroyed Macedonia’s economy… the Americans were totally silent on the matter and continued to tolerate the destruction of the Macedonian state. They were in no hurry to do anything. Why? Obviously it was dictated by their long-term interest in the region.

14.1. The way the U.S.A. acted during Macedonia’s recognition process; its establishment of diplomatic relations; its opening of an embassy; its dispatching of its ambassador… these were all classic indicators of a real U.S. policy being implemented. A policy which is still in effect to this day. This is proof that Macedonia does not fit into America’s plans in the Balkans. Is there anyone who truly believes that Washington did not recognize Macedonia for a long time because it was willed by Athens? One has to be very naïve to believe that. You can be sure that America works for its own and only for its own and no one else’s interests, least of all Greece’s.

We should always remember that the Americans work for their own interests and approach that fact with our eyes wide open. Everything that has happened can be argued in half a dozen different ways but the fact remains that during and after Yugoslavia’s breakup, U.S. policy was aggressive and remains hostile towards Macedonia, pushing the country to the edge of a deep abyss. Given what was just said above and given that the U.S. is a big player in the Balkans, as well as a superpower, and it has the ability to do what it wants, it is only normal to conclude that the United States was and remains the main source of the problems that have faced Macedonia in the last 20 years. Had the U.S. exercised the same policy on Macedonia as it did on the other three ex-Yugoslav states, it would have recognized Macedonia then and there, together with the other republics. The fact is it didn’t! Let’s say for now that the Americans would have recognized Macedonia if they had had no other plans for it. The reasons why the Americans did not recognize Macedonia is because it would have been an obstacle to the realization of their long-term interests in the Balkans. More about this will follow.

15. It should be obvious to everyone that Athens couldn’t possibly have had a substantial role in American policies being implemented against Macedonia all these years. There are no facts or arguments upon which it could be argued that the U.S. had delayed Macedonia’s recognition because of Greece. Or that Macedonia’s admission to the UN and the imposition of the reference was in support of Greek fears of Macedonian irredentism. The same applies to the Bucharest NATO meeting in 2008. There is also the fact that in December 1993, Macedonia was recognized by six EC states, led by Britain, France and Germany, which immediately established diplomatic relations with Macedonia. As European countries, members of NATO and the EU, they had more than double the obligation to support Athens (U.S. only through NATO!). If anyone should not have recognized Macedonia because of Athens, it should have been these EC countries and not the U.S.A. However, they did take that step. But not the U.S.A.! In fact it took Washington over another two and a half years before it dispatched an ambassador to Skopje. Why?

16. A positive step in American policy towards Macedonia was taken in December 1992 with the arrival of UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR was a UN military peace keeping mission sent to the former Yugoslavia and to Macedonia. It consisted of about 600 soldiers of whom about three hundred were Americans. Later, on March 31, 1995, the mission became independent and was renamed UNPREDEP.

In the beginning it looked like the U.S.A. had changed its attitude toward an independent Macedonia, at least in principle. Bringing UNPROFOR to Macedonia was interpreted as some kind of security guarantee for the unrecognized Macedonian state. Soon afterwards however, it was discovered that the purpose of the operation was not to secure and stabilize Macedonia but to stop it from falling into Serbian hands. It turns out that the Americans did have secret information concerning Milosevich’s aggressive intentions towards Macedonia. So, the UNPROFOR mission was dispatched to Macedonia in order to prevent a Serbian invasion. Later we will see that this was part of U.S. policy implemented in support of the Albanians in Macedonia and in the wider region.

UNPROFOR, later UNPREDEP produced positive results. Even though Macedonia was not recognized by the U.S., the preventive mission’s presence curbed Milosevich’s appetite. However, in spite of the mission’s presence, Macedonia still remained extremely vulnerable. The Americans were certainly aware of that and, according to a number of facts based on events that followed, it can be said that it was part of the American plan all along: to save Macedonia from Serbian interference with all other options remaining open. We can say that UNPREDEP was an interim solution that hid America’s true intentions and postponed the real solutions.

17. Will history show why the Serbians did not intervene in Macedonia? The intervention did not take place probably because a) Milosevich did not have sufficient military capabilities because he was already fighting in Croatia and preparing to start a war in Bosnia; b) Milosevich believed that Macedonia would not be able to survive without Serbia and would return to Serbia on its own... His setback certainly was not because of UNPREDEP, even though U.S. troops were stationed on his border. If Belgrade had decided to go south, UNPREDEP would have been no obstacle. If anything like that were to happen UNPREDEP had its own, well-known exit plan. In fact UNPREDEP had no mandate to protect Macedonia, it was there to only monitor and report on the situation at the borders. It was there to act as an early warning system.

18. Milosevich was convinced that Macedonia would come back to Serbia on its own. Serbia’s influence on Macedonia was long and very strong. With regards to security, Serbia felt that Macedonia was incapable of stopping Albanian irredentism on its own. With regards to economy, Serbia was Macedonia’s largest trading partner... Personal and family ties were also numerous and deep...

According to some analysts, Milosevich’s assumptions concerning Macedonia were among his biggest mistakes and delusions.

19. Looking at the problem another way, with UNPREDEP’s dispatch in Macedonia, the Americans sent a clear message to Milosevich; stay out of Macedonia. Serbia’s story about “Vardarska Banovina” being Serbian, suspended on August 2, 1944, was no longer valid. But apart from that, U.S. policy towards Macedonia ever since and to this day (2013) has been unclear. A stable and prosperous Macedonia, it seems, does not fit into American plans. While telling Serbia to keep its hands off Macedonia, the U.S., it seems, had no similar message for Macedonia’s other neighbours. There was no such message for Bulgaria or Greece, or least of all for the Albanians, who enjoyed broad U.S. support and were treated as their best allies. The Albanian leadership inside Macedonia, in other words, took the lead from the Americans and started to look down on Macedonia and demonstrate little to no loyalty to the country that was their home.

Without a warning from Washington to keep their hands off Macedonia, like that issued against Serbia, aspirations towards Macedonia by its neighbours remain - “legitimate”.

20. All those who argued that, in the critical years and even today, the Americans are doing their best to guarantee Macedonia’s survival and that the U.S. is even Macedonia’s strategic partner, should be asked to explain a) why did Washington recognize Macedonia two years after it recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and b) why did it take four years for the U.S. to dispatch an American ambassador to Skopje? Was it because of financial difficulties? Was it because of Greece? Was it because Macedonia and the U.S. are “really” good “strategic partners”? Or was it because of “some other American interest” not yet obvious to us?

21. Some people believe that if the Americans did not want a Macedonian state to exist they would have easily extinguished it in the early 1990’s. But had the Americans done that, they would have expanded and intensified the wars raging in the region by far, which could have easily gotten out of control. It would have certainly involved all of Macedonia’s neighbours who had traditional claims on Macedonia. The entire Balkans could have gone up in flames with unforeseeable consequences, just like it happened in 1913. The risk was too great, even for the U.S., and as Macedonians say, “fear guards the vineyard”.

From that perspective, the peaceful conduct of Macedonia was the most desired option for the region. Macedonia is of great strategic importance for the entire Balkans and must not be allowed to catch fire. In return, Macedonia got nothing. Perhaps it is held in the present status quo situation as a (sacrifice!) means for resolving the other Balkan problems?

22. The United States has always and everywhere led its own American policies. The only time they pay attention to others is when their interests align. Greece does not play a significant role in shaping U.S. policy, regardless of what the Greek lobby says. America’s behaviour towards Macedonia has unambiguously revealed the true U.S. interests in the region, which have very little to do with helping Greece. On the contrary, U.S. policy in the Balkans, in the long term, is dangerous even for Greece.

Our first task in our diplomacy, politics and science must be to research, analyze and clarify U.S. policy in the region. If we don’t do that we will be going around in vicious circles.

23. When it was inevitable that an independent Macedonian state was about to emerge from the Yugoslav federation breakup in the early 1990’s, Greece became very nervous. It began to fabricate reasons why an independent Macedonian state would be a danger to peace and stability in the region and launched a massive propaganda campaign in order to keep Macedonia’s status undefined. Greece’s propaganda campaign of “crying wolf” had a strong impact and sounded convincing. But such claims, including the one that “if Macedonia was called Macedonia it would have claims on its northern region also called Macedonia”, were dismissed by the “Badenter Commission”. Even so, 20 years later Greece still uses the same rhetoric to deny Macedonia its place in the world. In the beginning no one was sure if such hazards existed but today everyone knows that “such dangers” do not exist. For the past 20 years Macedonia had proven over and over that it has no claims on Greece. Even if it did, Macedonia has no military might or Great Power backing to be able to attack Greece and “liberate the whole of Macedonia”...

24. In spite of all attempts on Macedonia’s part to alleviate all fears, these unsubstantiated “arguments” and manipulations were used against Macedonia at the UN to deny its entry by its constitutional name, of course as implementation of certain policies. Greece does not have that kind of clout on the world scene to push its agenda. Only major powers have that kind of pull! But because Greece initiated this process, i.e. “Macedonia must change its name”, Greece alone will have to answer to it and explain itself every time “why Macedonia must change its name”? This question must be asked every day, everywhere all the time… Someone should pose this question to the Americans continually as well because they have kept their fingers in this process and have managed it from the outset.

But if there are no real reasons for harassing and holding Macedonia back, then there should be an immediate stop to it. This shameful political tragicomedy must end now!

* * *

25. In the context of the post Yugoslav republic recognitions, it is interesting to note what Canadian political analyst Jonathan Paquin (Jonathan Paquin: “Managing controversy - US stability seeking and the birth of the Macedonian state”) has to say.

The delayed U.S. recognition of Macedonia, according to Paquin, was a result of American policy against “secessionist states that did not demonstrate a clear ability to maintain internal and external stability”! He bases his argument on the assertion that there was danger that a Macedonian-Greek military conflict might break out! In the same text, the author justifies the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1992, but without applying the same criteria as in the case of Macedonia – “sustainable stability”. He forgot to mention that when the United States recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina the country was already deeply divided, faced with dangers and completely dysfunctional. The war was at its doorstep, started soon and lasted nearly three years. Paquin, like Washington and Brussels, used double standards, which do not serve his honour, to justify Washington’s policy towards Macedonia, while falling into his own trap.

III – It was the U.S. and not Greece who challenged our name at the UN and overpowered us with a reference. The U.S. is also managing Nimetz’s mediations.

A. Admission to the UN

1. On July 23, 1992 the Macedonian government made a proposal to parliament for joining the United Nations. On July 29, 1992 the Macedonian parliament adopted a resolution to join the UN and on July 30, 1992 President Gligorov sent a letter of request to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, formally requesting admission to the world organization.

2. The fact that Macedonia applied to the UN for admission late was not by choice. Macedonia was held back by its non-recognition by the U.S. and the EC (Washington, London, Paris, Berlin...). These countries were not willing to recognize Macedonia and thus would not open its admission to the UN. They were the same countries that would eventually decide Macedonia’s fate (with regards to its admission to the UN). And thus Macedonia found itself in a vicious circle. The “Macedonian Question” was put in the hands of the EC and its Edinburgh Summit, held in December 1992, and it failed to find a solution. The problem was then shifted to the United Nations and ended up directly under American control.

3. By then the U.S. had pledged its support to the Albanians, which became obvious some time later. But that does not mean that Washington was not working on the case right from the start. The Americans, being engaged in the Balkans, simply could not stay out of Macedonia’s problems and sit on the sidelines, especially in critical times. Therefore, it is inconceivable to believe that Washington was not involved in the processes that were shaping Macedonia’s future. Washington’s delayed recognition of Macedonia proves that the Americans were active players in the game.

4. Even Macedonia’s late filed application for admission to the UN was not in accordance with the advice of the main factors. It was premature and that’s how it was treated. UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, kept it in his desk drawer for over five months and pulled it out only after a way was found to contest Macedonia’s name. The procedure for admission was then opened in January 1993. It was no “coincidence” that several years later Boutros Ghali was rewarded by the Greeks with some kind of prize which, if my memory serves me right, was one million dollars! This was Athens’s appreciation for Ghali’s role in Macedonia’s delayed entry. This was one of the key conditions designed to cripple the Macedonian state, especially after being slapped with a reference instead of its proper name.

Did Ghali keep our application for membership in his desk drawer on his own or with American blessings…? you decide!

5. On May 22, 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia were admitted to the UN without any problems. Even though there was a war starting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems that it was not a problem for the U.S. and for all the others. Macedonia on the other hand, which had none of those problems, was not recognized. Why? Let’s say it was not because of the delayed application, or because of some policy errors, or because of some concocted plot of Gligorov’s, as some critics now claim.

6. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the ultimate authority or governing body of the United Nations. Procedure dictates that the UNSC make proposals to the UN General Assembly as to which countries should be admitted. The UNSC consists of 15 members, of whom five are permanent and belong to major powers. They are the U.S., Britain, France, Russia and China. These members also have veto power. The other ten are elected members with a two year mandate and every year five are changed.

6.1. It was the UNSC that disputed Macedonia’s name and suspended its use. On behalf of the EC, Britain, France and Spain, as a non-permanent UNSC member, proposed that Macedonia be admitted to the UN with a reference. The U.S., at the time, did not get directly involved. However, do you think that if Washington had even the slightest concern about how Macedonia was treated it would have sat on the sidelines and done nothing? I don’t think so. If Washington had given its blessings to Macedonia’s entry do you think it would have entered the UN nameless? I don’t think so.

6.2. There is no doubt that the UNSC is and always has been dominated by the U.S., which is the main financier of this world organization. And there is no doubt that the U.S. had already made its position about Macedonia very clear while Macedonia was waiting to be admitted. In 1992-3, besides China which sat on the sidelines and weak Russia which was thrown into chaos before it went bankrupt, it can be said with absolute certainty that Macedonia’s entry into the UN was managed by the United States. Of course this was done in agreement with its EC proponents, whose “merit” in this should not be minimized. Greece, on the other hand, in spite of its posturing, had no direct role in this process because it was not part of the UNSC.

6.3. One of the key arguments that points to American involvement in denying Macedonia its rightful name is the flagrant violations of the UN’s normal admission procedures. Even though the UN Charter was precise in determining qualifications for membership, in Macedonia’s case two new conditions were added which the country had to meet before it could be admitted into the UN!? This was a classic move of unprecedented blackmail, forcing Macedonia to join the UN without a name! It was this illegal manipulation of rules that forced the so-called “name dispute” on Macedonia and pushed it into limbo. Macedonia was forced to deal with an imposed obligation to seek a solution to its own name, which was disputed and could not be used internationally.

6.4. No one, apart from the U.S., can permit itself to ignore the UN Charter and proceed with illegal procedures for the admission of a new member as it happened to Macedonia. None of the other UNSC members have that authority. Not Britain, not France, not Spain and not even all three put together. This dance, no doubt, was led by the United States. Greece was completely out of the picture.

6.5. Considering that the UN Charter of Rights was illegally tailored for Macedonia to deny its entry into the UN with its rightful name and to impose a reference on it, we can freely conclude without risk of making a mistake that it was done by none other than the coordinated effort of the United States. Everything else was technical and tactics. There are no facts or arguments to point to anyone else. If the United States was in favour of Macedonia entering the UN with its constitutional name, the reference would not have been imposed. If Washington felt that the reference proposed by Britain, France and Spain was not a good idea it would not have been accepted. This confirms that there were prior agreements of these three countries with the United States.

6. 6. There is no doubt that there will be a historical black mark left on the UN for the way it conducted itself in Macedonia’s admission. This also clearly shows that the political interests of “certain” powers are placed ahead of respect for the UN Charter of Rights, which is a gross violation of International Law. The UN was put in place to avoid actions such as these and protect the rights of the weak and innocent, not to ignore them. This is usually how terrorists operate, working outside of the law.

7. Boutros Ghali assured Gligorov that admission to the United Nations with the reference would be brief, for only a few months, but that did not happen, which goes to show that the problem was not with Greece alone but also with someone else, someone very powerful. Did Greece alone have the clout to influence Ghali to pull such a stunt and get away with it? Or was this someone else’s doing? No doubt it was not Greece alone. It had to be someone else in addition to Greece, someone much more powerful and experienced. So I ask you, how is it possible for a top international political organization to stoop so low and unscrupulously lie to a president of a country?

7.1. Looking at the problem from today’s perspective, was Boutros Ghali bluffing or was this someone’s plan all along? Ghali should have known, of course, that no solution, no matter how simple, could be realistically expected to be found in just a few months. So the question is why did Boutros Ghali make the promise to Gligorov? Was he convinced that Macedonia was not going to last long and would fall apart very soon? Was Ghali of the same mind, like that Greek extremist Samaras, who openly discussed Macedonia’s quick demise? We can now say, with enough certainty that many analysts and politicians then were of the belief that Macedonia was not going to last long. Why? What did they know that we didn’t?

Did the Americans have similar thoughts? Is that why they delayed Macedonia’s recognition? The probability of the U.S. having such thoughts was high. Why else delay Macedonia’s recognition for almost two years? Why tolerate Greece’s illegal blockade on Macedonia knowing that the UN had already placed sanctions against Serbia and had cut off Macedonia from its largest trading partner? Everything was set in place to “strangle” Macedonia.

8. Not knowing what was going to happen, many countries delayed their recognition and waited for a final outcome. Macedonia of course survived the critical period and evolved into a relatively successful country despite all the huge external obstacles placed in front of it. It survived its domestic divisions, in good part stimulated, orchestrated and paid for from abroad. And it also survived its own mistakes.

Thus the old story was confirmed that Macedonians are indestructible!

9. We would like, at this point, to take the opportunity to address some politically motivated accusations, demeaning Macedonians for accepting the reference as a condition for Macedonia’s admission into the UN in 1993. Was this treason or some kind of irresponsibility on the part of the Macedonian leadership? Let’s say, right at the outset, that what took place in the UN was not the Macedonian leadership’s doing and such accusations are baseless and only serve to further deepen the divisions among the Macedonian people!

9.1. News that a fully independent modern Macedonian state was about to emerge from the Yugoslav breakup had caused some alarm in the region. In August 1988 Greece was first to take measures to rename its “Northern Territories” to “Macedonia and Thrace”. This was done by decree issued by the then Greek Prime Minister. Of the 13 administrative districts in the country, three were renamed. The new names given were “Western Macedonia”, “Central Macedonia” and “Eastern Macedonia and Thrace”. This was the first time ever that Greece officially used the name “Macedonia”. Use of the word “Macedonia” was practically forbidden in Greece because it was associated with the Macedonians living there, who, as a minority in Greece, have never been recognized and since Greece’s acquisition of Macedonian territories in 1913, have been subjected to continuous oppression, abuse and several genocides. Greece understood that a discernible independent Macedonian state would inevitably affirm the Macedonians as a distinct people with their own language, culture and traditions... And, as it had done in the past, Greece did everything in its power not to allow a Macedonian state to emerge. And by renaming some of its districts to “Macedonia”, Greece made it clear that the name “Macedonia” belonged exclusively to Greece and no one else (i.e. Macedonia) had the right to use it.

9.2. In other words, it was not the name that was a problem for Greece - it was the people. So, right from the start the “existence of Macedonians” was a problem for Greece. But how could Greece openly challenge this problem without revealing its real motive and being accused of human rights violations? It used the next best thing and focused its objections on the country’s name instead. Because the real culprits behind Greece, as we have seen from our research, bearing their full weight, were first the U.S.A., then France, Germany, Great Britain... This was a coordinated effort with Greece visibly standing in the fore…

9.3. Left alone, and with all those wars raging on the territory of former Yugoslavia, Macedonia had no room to manoeuver. Washington, Paris, Berlin, London... all had sent Macedonia a crystal clear message: “If you want to join the United Nations, whose membership will open access to the IMF, the World Bank… you cannot do that with your Constitutional name. If you stay out of the UN then you will shoulder the responsibility for your people being isolated and all alone.” It was hard to imagine a greater threat of blackmail than this. Macedonia was already impoverished by the huge inflation generated by Belgrade. On top of that it lost the market it shared with the Yugoslav federation. It had insufficient production of energy and was depending heavily on imports from the outside. The biggest problem was the shortage of foreign currency to pay to import oil. Total state reserves were less than 30 million US dollars, not enough to pay the oil bill for three months. At the same time because of the illegal Greek embargo on one side and the UN sanctions on Serbia on the other, the northern and southern border were blocked making export and import - impossible.

9.4. Macedonia was left with little choice. The main international actors were determined not to allow Macedonia’s integration into the international scene. Given the circumstances, the question was not whether but how long Macedonia was going to last? Many figured weeks or perhaps several months maximum; certainly not years. At the same time Macedonia’s neighbours were discussing plans for its division... In such circumstances the normal thing to do was to look for an easier way out because the alternative would have been complete collapse.

9.5. Macedonia’s admission to the UN was illegally implemented with suspension of its Constitutional and historic name. Instead a temporary reference – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – was imposed. Macedonia never accepted or recognized the reference and never signed any documents with it. Macedonia never used the reference itself but simply swallowed it as it had no other choice. The reference does not oblige Macedonia in any way. This is a fact which must be constantly emphasized. Macedonia could not prohibit others from using the reference since this is how our country was registered in the UN. However we do have the right and it is our obligation to intervene each time the reference is used and to explain to people that it is an illegal reference imposed on the Macedonian people... and that our historical and constitutional name is and always will be Macedonia. If we keep silent and don’t intervene people will use the reference in ignorance thinking that it is our name, which we

chose for ourselves. We must do our best to not allow its use in anything. It is our joint responsibility to stop its use.

9.5.1. Our Macedonian diplomats in New York and Brussels (NATO and EU), after Macedonia’s admission to the UN, made a huge unpardonable error by allowing the reference to take widespread use, which is not only offensive to the Macedonian people but it has plunged our country into a bogus dispute. We literally walked into a Greek trap with our eyes wide open because the decision of the UNSC was that the reference be used only within the UN system.

When tackling this problem our diplomats abroad demonstrated diplomatic and political amateurism. They did not need any instruction to defend fundamental state interests.

9.6. We will now take a look at Macedonia, comparing its situation in the early 1990’s and today (2013) in order to fully understand why some things, including the reference, were tolerated.

9.6.1. In that respect there are no major changes looking at Macedonia from the outside. Like before, Macedonia today is open to the same heavy pressures, blockades and blackmail it was exposed to two decades earlier when it was trying to join the UN. Today Macedonia is pressured with the same ultimatums to change its name and give up its Macedonian ethnic identity in order to join NATO and the EU. But Macedonia today is not the same Macedonia that it was in 1993. If Macedonia continues on the same economic course that it is on today, it can hold out for the next 100 years without having to join NATO or the EU. Macedonia’s long-term interest is to join them but not at any cost. The situation in 1993 was completely different and much worse for the country.

9.6.2. As mentioned earlier, from an internal perspective things today are radically different in Macedonia than they were two decades ago. Macedonia is moving forward. The country’s economy is functioning relatively well despite the severe crisis that is shaking up the world. The foreign currency reserves are high, several billion euros… Macedonia has sufficient manoeuvering space to move forward and even to say “no” to outside pressures pushing it to change its name. Today Macedonia can say “No thank you!” something it could not afford to say in the 1990’s without consequences. Macedonia had no such options in those days because its survival as a state was seriously challenged. At that time Greece and many others, including some of the major global players, did not expect the country to survive. Now it is clear that Macedonia is here to stay and the Macedonian people are working hard to keep it that way, despite all the challenges it is still facing.

9.7. Macedonians are not proud that they were forced to swallow the name dispute and the imposed reference. In fact they were insulted and feel bitter about the whole experience! The New York experience was not only a major setback for the Macedonian people; it was an injustice to humanity and decency! It was an attack on global justice and democracy! It was a severe disregard for International Law. And these things were not done by rogue nations or dictatorial powers, they were perpetrated by states that call themselves democracies… the U.S., France, UK, Germany... They committed illegal acts in flagrant violation of the UN Charter of Rights. They took a helpless fledgling nation and, at its weakest moment, tortured it with intentions of extinguishing the life out of it. Why? Macedonia had no role in anything that was happening around it; not in the wars and not in Balkan politics. Why did these powerful states want to extinguish it? Macedonians should examine the facts and see the truth for what it really is and stop blaming each other for what happened to them in those critical times. The Macedonian leaders did what they had to do in order to survive. Their choices were limited because Macedonia was a victim of unscrupulous and dishonest Major Power manipulation, perpetrated purely for self-interest. Acceptance of the “real-politic” was probably the only move they could have made to assure the survival of our state. Everything else included unacceptable risk. Macedonia’s existence today is the best proof that the moves made then were the correct ones. In spite of all the obstacles placed before us, we not only survived but today we are thriving; exceeding all expectations.

Any attempts made to stay completely out of the UN in 1993 would have been dangerous for Macedonia no matter how we look at it. That, however, does not mean that, had we been a bit more persistent and stubborn, we wouldn’t have gotten some gains out of it? Macedonia had no idea and could not have guessed how far it was going to be pushed by the main factors leading its case. Perhaps one day, when the archives with all these secrets are opened, we will find out. Looking at the situation from today’s point of view we should stop arguing and have no doubt that in 1993 we acted reasonably and responsibly.

9.8. Looking at the situation from the outside in, today, like yesterday, the same factors are treating us no differently. The same forces a) ignore the Copenhagen Criteria which they themselves have implemented, b) ignore the judgment of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, c) are using force against all democratic rules and principles, just to prevent Macedonia from joining NATO and the EU, d) work, again and again, outside of international legal limits... in order to “rename” Macedonia... What does this tell us? It tells us that there is incredible concentrated effort, primarily by the U.S., of countries to attain their own regional aspirations at Macedonia’s expense. There is little that they will not do to achieve their goals. However, if 20 years ago we could not resist their will, today we can but it is certainly not going to be easy. It is no joke going against the will of superpowers. Our main weaknesses are a) the largest domestic opposition party has a slender spine and is ready to bend to outside pressure, and b) Albanian aspirations for a “Greater Albania”. Albanian leaders are ready to solve their “Albanian national question” which is not only supported by the U.S. but it is internally managed directly by Washington.

B. The mediation process

10. The UNSC Resolution 817/93, by which Macedonia was admitted to the UN, asked for mediation designed “to overcome the differences over the name of the state and to encourage confidence-building measures between the parties”. There is very little doubt that Washington was behind putting first Vance and later Nimetz in charge of the mediation process, which shows that the Americans were extremely interested in the outcome of this dispute. There are many indicators that point to the mediators as being only formally under UN patronage, and they were actually extended arms of the State Department, through which the U.S. implements its own policy towards Macedonia.

First, both Vance and Nimetz were top State Department people with their base and logistics located in the U.S. where they are still stationed to this day.

Second, from March 1994 to November 1997, while Vance was mediator, Matthew Nimetz was special envoy to U.S. President Bill Clinton in the mediation process, regarding Macedonia’s name.

Third, if it was really a problem between Macedonia and Greece then why did the American President need a special envoy to monitor it? Why was the United States so interested in this dispute? It was still between two neighbours, which did not put into question the safety of the two countries involved or the wider region, let alone the U.S.? If Washington did not have secret strategic interests in the Balkans, in which unfortunately Macedonia was embroiled, the American president would not have had a need for a special envoy in the mediation! There are all kinds of conflicts and disputes going on around the world every day without American president’s “special envoys” or the U.S. being directly involved. Why was it so closely involved in Macedonian affairs if it didn’t have interests in Macedonia? Which means…?

Fourth, in November 1997, the UN Secretary-General appointed Nimetz as Cyrus Vance’s deputy and when Vance resigned in 1999 Nimetz became special envoy. This shows that the mediation process between Macedonia and Greece, conducted on behalf of the UN, was actually in the hands of Washington all the time. Could this be only a coincidence? Do Americans get involved in other people’s affairs unless it serves U.S. interests? Do the Americans ever appoint special envoys in matters that don’t relate to their specific needs and plans? Records show that Americans don’t get involved unless it serves their interests! Twenty years or so later we still get the same result, which confirms that this is all part of the same scenario, part of the same Balkan regional U.S. anti-Macedonian foreign policy.

Years ago, at the OSCE summit in Vienna, the United States insisted that an American be assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina but the EU wanted the person to be a European, so the meeting ended without an agreement. A few months later there was a news release naming an American as functionary in Bosnia and Herzegovina! When the United States wants something and it is in its interests to get it, it will do anything, including ignoring international law, agreements, democratic principles, procedures, practices and even justice… to succeed.

Why would they act any differently about our name?

Fifth, Nimetz was a lawyer working for a law firm and, as a mediator, he was working alone. He did not have a team but the UN legal services were at his disposal. Now if he truly used the UN legal services, would it have been possible that UN experts would have advised him and guided him to illegally widen his mandate, on account of Macedonia’s fundamental interests, that practically was happening all these long years? There is no UN requirement that forces a country to change its name, rename its language and to erase the true identity of its people! There was no such thing written in the UN Security Council resolutions either. If Nimetz is an expert and an independent mediator who is trying to find a “just” solution to the dispute and if he indeed was pushed by his UN advisors into the forbidden and prohibited zone, then why did he listen to them? Why follow their advice? And if the UN experts did not supply him with his logistics then who did? Saying that his proposed solutions to the problem came of his own invention, is pure fantasy. He does not have the capacity to do that and he wouldn’t dare do it on his own, as well. He is well aware that his responsibility is huge. The fate and the future of an entire country are in his hands; not to mention the peace and stability of the entire region.

Sixth, although the problem, formally, is the responsibility of the UN, there is no budget for Nimetz. The function that Nimetz performs, on behalf of the UN Secretary General, is practically voluntary. His salary is symbolic, $1.00 a year. There are several explanations as to why this is: a) to minimize UN interference in his work, b) for the UN not to call into question his terms, and c) for the UN not to require regular reports of the achievements of the mediation. If the UN had to allocate annual funding for Nimetz’s work then his work would come under constant UN scrutiny. No UN funding, no UN poking its nose into his business! If the UN is not the real manager of the dispute then who is? The real manager of the dispute is the U.S., which has carte blanche to do whatever it wants. The question that remains open here is not whether Nimetz is being paid for his services, but who is paying for them? And, of course, who is paying for the experts that prepare his proposals? And whoever is paying - is his real boss. Even though Nimetz spends little time in his “mediation” role, someone is paying for it. And nothing comes for free in the United States.

Seventh, because of such financial arrangements, i.e. not being financially obligated to the UN, Nimetz was not obligated to send the UN Secretary-General regular progress reports. Normally, when the Secretary-General met with the Macedonian representatives Nimetz only informed him on current developments and that was it. Someone else paid his expenses and dealt with the headaches associated with the process. It cost the UN nothing… No money and no headaches…