URGENT

URGENT

Regular operating report from 16:00 hours, March 27 to 04:00 hours, March 28, 2001

l - Enemy Activities:

- At 14:30 hours a group of 12 uniformed persons were seen moving from the village Odzhachar towards the village Malina Maala.

- No special activities or movements of the terrorists were observed over the course of the night.

2 - 1K unit activities:

- Command and the 1K units, based on General Headquarters order (decision regarding the operation) str. dov. no. 07-35/123 from March 27, 2001, have completed all preparations for the execution of their designated tasks.

- At AP Krivolak shooting was completed with 6 service LFR 128 and all achieved excellent results.

3 - For the units and Corps engaged in providing d/g and training with the mobilized compositions, morale conditioning is necessary at the proper level.

4 - Requests:

-All requests are submitted with special documents.

JL/S COMMANDER Major General Giorgi Karakutovski

To be submitted to:

- Chief of General Headquarters of ARM

Report from the Commander of 1.AK (Karakutovski) for the level of combat readiness of the unit of operation MH-1

EXECUTING THE OPERATION

On March 28, 2001, at 05:00 hours, a group of officers arrived at command point 1.AK - Kumanovo.

My first order of business was to find out if all the units had arrived and occupied their positions according to plan. I was happy to find out that everything was in order and that the units were where they were supposed to be. I was particularly interested to know if the Third Infantry Brigade had closed the space, as per tactic 3.(TG3), from villages Belanovats - Zlokukianie and cut off the road leading to Stanchich Watchtower (to Kosovo’s territory). To find out about that I telephoned the Commander of 3.PBR, Colonel Chedo Krstevski, and briefly asked him: “Chedo, where are your units?” When he said: “We are now starting to head to our initial positions,” I could not believe it. “We were ordered to be at our positions at 06:00 hours,” he reported. It then became clear to me: the operation was expected to commence at 06:00 hours but these units had not yet arrived at their initial positions. They had not used the cover of night to take their positions. This meant that the units of 1.AK TG-3, which had the task of closing the Kumanovo-Kosovo corridor, had not done their job. And probably neither had the 1.AK military police battalion which, through the cover of night, was expected to pass through the village Otlia and take its position northeast of the same village and be ready to attack towards the village Strima and directly aid with the raids to be carried out at Red Kamen - Vukson TT - 1333.

I left the operations room where we had gathered with everyone in it, including the officers and commanders of the First AK, so that I would not cause a scandal. Colonel Gene Stanojkovski, who was with me in the capacity of Chief of OME, said: “General, come with me, don’t be nervous, calm down, you will have to delay the attack.” But before postponing the attack I had a talk with President Boris Trajkovski. In short I explained to him what had happened and asked him to postpone the attack for only 2 hours. This was enough time for the commanders to take their positions and issue instructions and orders to their subordinates. President Boris Trajkovski approved the change and the attack was now scheduled to begin at 08:00 hours.

The remaining units which were expected to close the space from the west and north eventually did. These were the TG - 1 battalion of the military police from General Headquarters and the landing forces. They were all ordered to begin the attack in all directions at 08:00 hours.

Besides all this, at 05:30 hours I received reports from all commanders that there were TV crews at all the intersections and roads that led to Skopje Tsrna Gora. Even though the attack was delayed by two hours I began to wonder if it was worth starting it if it was going to fail. Obviously our plan had been discovered; even the exact starting time of the attack was made obvious.

Appointed as commander of the operational tactical group (OTG-1) was Colonel Liuben Kostovski. Lieutenant Marian Giorgievski was appointed as his deputy and was tasked, with his units, to attack from the north towards the south, i.e. from the village Brest towards Lake Lipkovo. Commander of TG-1 was Brigadier General Adil Gazafer, I recognized his voice over the radio. I called Major General Giorgi Karakutovski and asked him: “Giorgi, who is in command of OTG-1?” He said: “Colonels Liuben Kostovski and Marian Giorgievski”. So I asked him: “What is Brigadier General Adil Gazafer doing there when you told me he was in the barracks in Kumanovo preparing the units?” He did not answer. He then stormed out of the operations room and in the hallway he contacted Brigadier General Adil Gazafer on his cell phone and said: “I told you to stay off the radio, you understand? Pande Maikal!” By that he meant that I was listening. When he returned I smiled at him cynically and said: “A war cannot be conducted this way!” We pulled out Brigadier General Adil Gazafer so that he no longer participated in this operation for his personal protection and to avoid consequences for his family, even though he was Commander of the First Brigade and, for that reason, his deputy Marian Giorgievski became involved with TG-1.

In spite of what was happening, even though I had earlier thought that we would not encounter serious resistance, I now felt that the operation was no longer a secret and that the terrorists, in time, would be escaping to Kosovo through the village Stanchich. But no

matter, the operation had to be realized. To do that, we would have to keep our eyes on all the routes leading to Kosovo from the Republic of Macedonia through Skopje Tsrna Gora. This way the terrorists would be isolated in the villages on the southern slopes of Skopje Tsrna Gora.

On March 29, 2001, at 08:00 hours, we began the combat operation. The landing in the “Tsrni Kamen” TT-1322 Region was completed with the forces of the Sixth Squad. The Military Police Battalion from General Headquarters started its attack in the direction of Ramno - Mulianka Mala, The OTG-1 (Operational Tactical Group -1) began to move from Malina Maala towards the village Goshintse and Lake Lipkovo, so that the area could be encircled from the west and north sides without much resistance from the terrorists. Operational - tactical group 3, whose task was to attack from the south and the east, in order to close the circle and begin the attack from Slupchane - Dumanovtse, from the east towards the villages Izvor and Belanovtse, unfortunately failed to close off this direction and as such the road to Zlokukiane and Stanchich was not closed. The Military Police Battalion of the First Army Corps (1AK) was to attack from the village Otlia towards the village Strima and later to assist the landing forces of the Sixth Squad and completely close off that direction. Because of the delay on the part of 1AK units in bringing certain areas under control in order to prevent the terrorist groups from escaping, I decided to make some adjustments to the original plan.

For me the village Otlia was strategically very important. The communication lines from Strima towards Otlia and Lipkovo were free for the terrorists. And because we were not able to close them off I ordered my units to continue attacking from the north and close off the villages Otlia and Lipkovo from the north side. At the same time we were to occupy the village Alasevtse and break the communication line between the villages Brest and Alasevtse and take control of Lake Lipkovo, then use the 25 Ministry of Interior police officers to secure the dam.

We implemented the correction to the plan, except we were unable to quickly close off the village Otlia from the north and the section of the village Stanchich in the direction of Kosovo.

Later, as it turned out, the largest part of the terrorist group escaped through Stanchich to Kosovo, and some parts of it hid in the village Otlia.

One group of about 20 terrorists, belonging to the wider region of the villages Glasnie and Dumanovtse, failed to extract itself in time and was defeated at Dumanovachki Rid.

At 21:00 hours that same evening, as usual, we had a meeting with the state leadership. Besides President Boris Trajkovski, present were Prime Minister Georgievski, Stoian Andov, Dosta Dimovska, Liuben Paunovksi, Iovo Andreevski and Zvonko Kashirski. I was up first and briefed everyone on the situation and on how the operation went. Right from the start I informed everyone that the operation had been compromised and that our plan had been discovered by the enemy. I then asked the President to conduct a full investigation of what really happened! I emphasized that, outside of us here who were present at this meeting no one else knew when and how the operation was going to be done, especially about the timing of the attack. I said: “How did the TV crews and journalists know to be present at 05:30 hours, in the general area where the operation was going to take place? How did it happen that the Commander of the military police battalion from General Headquarters, Captain Liupco Mirchevski, got lost on the road to the village Ramno - Mulinska Maala, especially after the units occupied Mulinska Maala and he was to take control? How did someone, after the units attacked, place mines on the road and not before or during the hostilities. Most of the terrorists left for Kosovo the day before and during the course of the operation only part of the group managed to flee to the village Otlia and another part fled for Dumanovachki Rid.”

Major General Iovo Andreevski, who never said anything, reacted and spoke out of turn. He said: “I knew that there were no terrorists there!” I then asked him: “How did you know there were no terrorists there? Was it because you thought you had defeated them all in the villages Tanushevtsi and Malina Maala?!” Major Rizevski, Assistant to the Minister of Defense, without being asked said: “The plan was no good, we, instead of chasing them to Kosovo, chased them to Prilep.” He mentioned Prilep because he was originally

from Prilep. I had had enough from everyone so I said: “Major, you need to focus on your own work! You are neither educated nor qualified for this job! We need to find out who the traitors are and who informed the terrorists of our strategy.”

President Boris Trajkovski promised to put a commission together to investigate the case.

The operation, nonetheless, was realized successfully and the villages on the southern slopes of Skopje Tsrna Gora were isolated. The roads leading to Kosovo were closed and the terrain in Chashka and Radusha vicinity were cleared of terrorists. The entire region fell under the control of ARM and the Ministry of Interior police forces. And as such the entire Skopje Tsrna Gora Region was fully secured and under our control. Police stations were set up in the following villages: Gorian, Baniani, Pobuzhie, Liuboten, Strachintse, Mateiche, Nikushtak, Lipkovo, Lipkovo Lake dam, Opae,Vaksintse, on the western part of Dolno Blatse, Kuchovo, Radusha and other places.

* * *

1K Command - Str.dov.no.200-248 - March 29, 2001 - KM -Kumanovo

Operational Report Period - 18:00 hours, March 28, 2001 to 04:00 hours March 29, 2001.

1- No specific combat activities were observed on the part of the terrorists during the evening and night.

- In the course of the night they probably mined essential roads and regrouped for further action after being surrounded by our forces

- Most probably they will regroup in the areas Lukar Maala, Maliok Maala in Goshintse, the building Demirski Rid and Muliska Maala in the village Brest.

On March 28, 2001 around 17:00 hours, while our forces were attempting to extract the dead and wounded members of our unit in

Kika (1512 mm) Region, the enemy attacked from all sides with infantry weapons.

2.1 - On March 28, 2001 around 16:45 hours, Captain Liupcho Mirchevski was killed when a planted mine exploded. Injured were Kostov Petre, Ilievski Blagoicho, Ivanov Tasho, Miloshevski Petso and Karaliovski Borche. This took place in Kika (1512 mm) Region.

All are members of ARM 3/2.bVP in General Headquarters.

They were extracted and transported by helicopter to the Skopje CVZU treatment centre.

2.2 On March 28, 2001 at 18.30 hours our units received air support from two combat helicopters during a skirmish in the area of Demirski hill (945 mm) and fire support from MFB 120 mm 2/3 mtbr in the same area.

2.3 - Around 19:00 hours an operational schedule for the forces to take their lines and decide on further action was produced by OTG-2.

2.4 - TG-2 forces continue to control the Kumanovo - Arachinovo road.

2.5 Around 20:00 hours the TG-1 commander informed that RRF 90 mm equipment and ammunition was seized and taken to the warehouse in the village Tanushevtsi.

Operating Report for combat actions on March 28 and 29, 2001

* * *

For as long as there was political will, the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia could have been entirely resolved in April 2001, with ARM and the Ministry of the Interior, by military and political means. But after the operation in Skopje Tsrna Gora, ARM, for the entire month of April, remained engaged in the positions it took in Tetovo, Shar Planina, Skopje Tsrna Gora and Karadak Regions. During the occasional meetings we had with top officials from the

Intelligence Agency headed by Dragi Grozdanovski and with Goran Mitevski, director of intelligence for the Interior Ministry, we were obtaining frightening information.

In May 2001, according to the information we received from the various Intelligence Agencies, in the April - May period around 50,000 terrorists were observed entering the Republic of Macedonia. This information was given to us by “friendly sources” - mainly by the British and Americans. I remember being in a meeting when Goran Mitevski, in front of President Boris Trajkovski, informed us that during the night 500-600 terrorists entered the village Loiane from Yugoslavia. He obtained this information from the British Intelligence Service. The day before, Lt. General Chaslav Krstich commander on the Yugoslav forces responsible for smashing the so-called OVPMB (Liberation Army of Presevo Valley - Presevo, Bujanovats and Medvedja), informed me that a group of 6 to 8 terrorists was seen moving from the village Miratovtsi (Yugoslavia) to the village Loiane. At the meeting when Goran Mitevski mentioned 500 to 600 terrorists I had in mind 6 to 8 because that’s we found out when we had it checked out. Besides this information we were continuously being bombarded with information that an uprising was being prepared in Gostivar, Kichevo, Debar, etc. Top government officials were certainly receiving this kind of intimidating “information” and being coerced to solve the conflict by negotiations and with compromises. This was done after ARM had already accepted the task of resolving the terrorist problem in the Republic of Macedonia by military means.

During the first Tetovo operation I received information that there were 200 to 250 terrorists at Kaleto, but the actual number was only twenty. In fact there were only 160 to 170 lightly armed persons in the entire region. There never were more than 7 to 8 masked terrorists observed on the move at one time. The groups crossing the border from Kosovo to the Republic of Macedonia also numbered about the same.

After the Skopje Tsrna Gora operation, small groups of terrorists hid among the population in the villages Otlia, Opae, Vaksintse, Slupchane and Orizare. These were small groups which, throughout

the month of April, did not take any action but were preparing the population for further aggression.

The public was well aware of what was happening on the political scene during the month of April 2001, but I am not authorized and am insufficiently informed to write about the overall political developments and the choices the wider coalition government made - I was only sure that, because of that, the security forces in the Republic of Macedonia were not used, except to retain the positions we took from March 25 to March 30, 2001.

In April 2001, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia was put through an intensive training program. The reserves were being trained in order to establish more units in case there was deterioration in the situation. As units were formed and trained, they were stationed in the entire area along the western border from Gostivar - Mavrovo - Debar to Struga and Kichevo and to the Strazha bend. In the western part of the Republic of Macedonia, the terrorist groups had little space to manoeuver because the entire area was under ARM control. The most difficult terrain in Shar Planina was covered with intelligence groups, above all Popova Shapka, Dupen Kamen and the villages Veitse and Bozovtse. Using part of 2AK (Second Army Corps), the border with Albania (from Strezimir to Korab and the villages Grekai and Ribnitsa) was closed. The space stretching along the villages Iazhintse - Radusha was closed off by the General Headquarters Investigative battalion. The zone along the Tetovo - Poroi - Iazhintse road up to the Iazhintse Watchtower was placed under the control of the Interior Ministry’s police forces (with about 400 officers). The area along the villages Iazhintse and Radusha and along the border of Skopje Tsrna Gora to the village Miratovtsi (the Shorta observation) north from the village Loiane was under the full control of our security forces. No terrorists appeared in these areas.