ARACHINOVO - AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BY POLITICAL MEANS

ARACHINOVO - AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BY POLITICAL MEANS

I was wounded in the village Mateiche on June 3, 2001, and until June 12, 2001 I was in the Military Hospital in Skopje getting treatment. Three days after being submitted, I received a call from President Boris Trajkovski who, among other things, asked me to think about Arachinovo. I informed him that I had no accurate information about what was going on in Arachinovo, other than what had been said on television and in the media and that most of that information was exaggerated or propaganda. According to media reports “there were about 4,000 terrorists in Arachinovo and they were preparing for an attack.” I gave the President a short reply assuring him that all that was propaganda and that there were no more than 1,000 to 1,500 terrorists in all of Macedonia and that a large part of those numbers were probably terrorists who had escaped from Karadak Region where they could no longer operate. I said: “From a military aspect, Arachinovo is not a threat because it is blocked.”

On June 12, 2001 I got out of the military hospital and went to ARM General Headquarters. After examining the situation I issued some tasks to start preparations for a possible ARM involvement in Arachinovo.

I could not figure out what would be the purpose for creating a crisis in Arachinovo. Arachinovo was close to Skopje and to Petrovats Airport, and NATO forces were stationed in Petrovats! Ever since May 2001, Arachinovo was half surrounded by ARM and police forces. From a military aspect it posed no threat and future actions seemed to be unnecessary. In March, April, May and June 2001, there were no offensive actions or operations on the part of the so-called NLA that would demonstrate strength or readiness. On the contrary, all this time we tried to provoke the terrorists to show themselves, to get them to start something, but all this time they were absent.

I figured it was some sort of bluff - to divert our attention away from Tetovo and Kumanovo Regions. There were threats of uprisings in Gostivar, Debar and even Kichevo but no terrorists emerged there,

except for a small group which appeared in the village Ribnitsa and which was quickly broken up. What’s up now with Arachinovo and in Skopje where everyone knew we had strong security presence? There were indications that a terrorist group extracted from Kumanovo and some which came from Preshevo Dolina may still exist but all this did not fit into what was going on with the whole military system and with the situation in the Republic Macedonia.

In any case, the police completely blockaded Arachinovo where no one could enter or exit the village. Everything was under control in terms of in or out movements. And, regarding the number of terrorists present in Arachinovo, all that was misinformation coming out of the Macedonian media. The media seemed to compete over who would say more about what was going on, and that information was certainly coming from someone who had aims to raise the issue to the highest level. In other words, if an operation is not undertaken in Arachinovo then the Republic of Macedonia would sink. Basically Arachinovo was meant to manoeuver the Macedonian political body away from military actions and towards political negotiations. In other words, stop all military actions and sit at a table to discuss this. And to point out that in other regions, such as Tetovo and Kumanovo, for example, the military option obviously did not succeed.

At our usual meetings I made sure I emphasized that Arachinovo was nothing special from a military point of view, and that we needed to finish our work in Kumanovo. But Prime Minister Georgievski, at the top level of the state leadership, had different ideas. His position was that: “We should not allow a free territory to be declared in front of Skopje.” I insisted that Arachinovo was not a problem because it was blocked by police and military forces and that we had deployed ARM units in the zone Nikushtak, Umin Dol and Grushino, and police forces in the villages Moiantse, Orlantsi and Brniartsi. From a military point of view this meant that we controlled the entire wider environment around Arachinovo. In other words all direct entrances and exits were controlled by police without any special problems.

On June 14, 2001 I had a meeting with the Deputy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. Among other things, he

reiterated American views on the matter and stated that the US was very concerned about the situation in the Republic of Macedonia. He then said: “The Republic of Macedonia has absolute support for its territorial integrity.” He then added: “We want this situation to be resolved politically and not by military means, to give political dialogue a chance like in Preshevska Dolina…” Later he spoke to me and said: “You need to use proportional force, and not destroy villages just to kill several insurgents!” He then continued: “This week, and for a period following, we will turn our attention to the Republic of Macedonia, we will close the Kosovo border with greater intensity and we will increase our patrol units from 11 to 19, supported by surveillance helicopters... etc.” The deputy then said: “Our and NATO’s opinion in terms of the overall situation in Macedonia and the way to overcome the crisis is changing.”

I immediately understood why Arachinovo was going to be the turning point of the crisis in the Republic Macedonia.

After the wider Government coalition was formed, a coordinating body was appointed to deal with the crisis - something similar to what was done in Kosovo. After it was formed the Coordinating Body scheduled a meeting for June 15, 2001. Appointed as head of the Coordinating Body was Ilia Filipovski, Vice President of the Government. Included among the others appointed to this Body were Vlado Buckovski, Minister of Defense; Liube Boskovski, Interior Minister; Bedredin Ibraimi, Minister of Labour and Social Policy, Izet Memeti, Minister of Justice; Nikola Gruevski, Minister of Finance; Dr. Petar Miloshevski, Minister of Health; Ilinka Mitreva, Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself (Pande Petrovski) Chief of Staff of General Headquarters. If necessary, and depending on the issues discussed, Ilia Filipovski could call on other experts from other ministries.

The Coordinating Body met on June 15, 2001. The main purpose of the meeting was to consider the Arachinovo situation and come up with suggestions on how to solve the critical situation in this village. But the items raised during this meeting were; why were weapons shared with the residents in Tetovo - i.e. residents of villages with a Macedonian population; and why was the humanitarian convoy sent to Lipkovo Region... etc. However, in the established body of the

Government there were two ministers of Albanian ethnicity and there was political opportunity to clarify some of the activities of the so-called NLA. But every case and point brought up had a positive role, especially the reconstruction of the entire area where armed action had taken place. Later some of the VMRO ministers called the Coordinating Body a “debate club”.

After my return from the Military Hospital I had the opportunity to catch up on the situation in the Republic of Macedonia and then issued tasks to my colleagues to prepare a proposal for an operation in Arachinovo; i.e. how it was going to be performed and when was the earliest it could commence. I also asked to immediately get an estimate of the number of so-called NLA forces and their capabilities. I wanted to know the status of ARM and its availability for use in maintaining an armed struggle. I wanted NATO’s role to be evaluated in terms of future actions as well as the behaviour of the armed forces of our neighbouring countries if we were to take a final offensive to break the so-called NLA. In essence, my intention for preparing such an analysis was so that I would have relevant information before I proposed a final offensive in late June 2001 to completely break the “Albanian armed terrorist groups” in the Republic of Macedonia.

Written in a report, among other things, was: “The regulars of the so-called NLA consist of Macedonian Albanians and experienced fighters from Kosovo and Albania. It is estimated that over 150 are former OVPMB (Kosovo Protection Corps) members who joined the KLA after May 25, 2001. The NLA is making an effort to expand hotspot points because it is unable to hold a front from Tetovo to Kumanovo and it cannot do it expediently. The NLA is unable to bring synchronized action against ARM. Ali Ahmeti, political director of the so-called NLA, had trouble controlling the local commanders in early May 2001, so he appointed G’zim Ostreni as general commander of the so-called NLA to improve command and control of the organization.”

According to the same report: “The appointed so-called brigades in the chart were tasked with numerous small tasks, recruiting volunteers who needed to be trained, build shelters, to be equipped, etc.”

At that time the so-called NLA had no staff and no capability or logistics to keep fighting, let alone with greater intensity. All reserves in Kumanovo were exhausted and they had no opportunity to continue their actions. Their so-called 114th Brigade with about 250 fighters, reinforced with international professionals and mercenaries, began to gradually concentrate in Arachinovo. Their so-called “Ismet Iashari” 113th Brigade located in Karadak Region had no chance of surviving. It was broken up and functioned in the villages in small groups of 10 to 15 terrorists.

In terms of strength, the terrorist forces in Arachinovo and the surrounding region posed no threat of attack against Skopje, unlike some of the Macedonian authorities and ministers were professing.

On June 16, 2001 we received a lot of misinformation, placed there by “friendly services” and received by Goran Mitevski, Director of Counterintelligence of the Interior Ministry who then passed it on to the state leadership during our regular meeting. Among other things Mitrevski, during the meeting, said: “In the coming days a brigade will transfer over from Albania and will attack the sentries at Strezimir and Radika. It will then start an uprising in the Debar -Gostivar Region.” No brigade materialized and no attack took place. The only thing that took place was the appearance of a small group of terrorists in the area around the village Ribnitsa (Korab). Our forces from 2 AK went on the offensive and chased it into Albania.

Before Arachinovo, the situation in Kumanovo - Karadak Region was relatively peaceful with the International Community putting pressure on us on a daily basis not to act, but to deliver humanitarian aid to the “population”. For days the 113 and 114 Brigade “fighters” did not appear outside, blending themselves into the village civilian population and holding it hostage.

Tetovo Region - Shar Planina was completely under control -without any movements.

The road Tetovo - Gostivar - Kichevo and Gostivar - Debar as well as the Torbesh Most area, were secured by the units of 2AK. At that time, ARM in its ranks had about 20,000 soldiers and officers

deployed in Struga - Debar - Gostivar - Tetovo - Skopje -Kumanovo. It had a respectable aviation, 8 Squadrons of 122 m/m artillery of the type “Grad 128’, about 60 tanks with trained attendants and was experienced in combat, etc. And thus the emergence of terrorists in Arachinovo was not a factor. We had established a Defense Command to defend Skopje even before the terrorists emerged in that village. There, in our composition as of June 16, 2001, we had mobilized 3,300 soldiers each equipped with a personal weapon, artillery, a tank company and other resources. And, as such, no surprise attack was possible, especially an attack on Skopje. At that time all vital facilities around Skopje were secured.

Unfortunately at that moment I could not assess NATO’s real intentions, declaratively however, its role and that of the international community was clear. I was sure of one thing and if the propaganda indicated an “attack against Petrovets Airport and other diversionary actions” then I was sure that that would not take place because NATO forces were located near the airport and those forces strictly controlled the terrorists (military and political) primarily for their own protection and because of “other” reasons.

Then, given all that, however, I concluded that: The so-called NLA in Macedonia was not a serious threat from a military point of view, for as long as it was not supported by any other state or by any of the international factors. But what I could not surmise was why was it necessary for the political factors in the Republic of Macedonia to engage themselves in this? But, regardless of my own conclusions, President Boris Trajkovski, on June 14, 2001, sent a letter to the NATO Secretary General and asked him for his help in resolving the crisis - about which I only found out on July 5, 2001.

Also, at about the same time, some of the Western countries came up with a thesis to explain why ARM was unable to break up the ‘armed ethnic Albanian groups’ blaming it on poor training and lack of equipment and sophisticated tools. This propaganda was intended to prevent us from making a final decision and exact a final offensive on the entire region. These “friendly” Western countries in the meantime knew exactly what ARM’s capability was and the kind of equipment it had in its possession. They also knew the

capabilities of the so-called NLA and the means by which their hostilities were conducted. These “friends” of ours openly put political pressure on the Ukraine to stop supplying the Republic of Macedonia with military equipment.

Obviously, if all these things were perpetrated, why not then invent Arachinovo and “prove” that ARM could not possibly deal with the terrorists by military means. Therefore why not take the next step and cease all military actions. The political structures and media were inherently in favour of such a solution and, perhaps unwittingly, had an unrealistic view.

On June 17, 2001 a meeting of the top government officials took place, during which, among others, Zoran Verushevski, an otherwise experienced intelligence agent, relying on his sources, spoke. He said: “The terrorists are experiencing great anxiety. They lack confidence in their leadership because they lost territories they had held and a great number of good caliber weapons. They experienced many losses and nothing had been done to improve the situation...” He continued: “They were all ordered, in all regions, to concentrate in Arachinovo, and to mimic their presence in the other regions...” This, at least for me, confirmed that the so-called “Ethnic Albanian armed groups” were about to collapse in June and would have failed to make it to the table for a political agreement. The problem now was how to convince the Macedonian people who needed convincing that a ceasefire was necessary and that political talks needed to take place. An example was needed to show that the Macedonian army could not provide a solution to the crisis. Therefore Arachinovo was invented. The fact that President Trajkovski, who at the meeting with top officials, in front of everyone, said: “George Robertson has given us only two days to conduct the operation,” confirmed that ARM was being set up to fail. Why only two days? Going from house to house and properly taking and inspecting over 2000 houses in Arachinovo in two days was not possible. Arachinovo is an urban city. One cannot cover it in such a short time especially since it was declared “a free territory”. Even if we managed to do the inspection, who then would have administered this so-called “free territory” all isolated and surrounded by our forces from all sides?!

Before the Arachinovo operation I had several meetings, including some with General Pull, Commander of KFOR in Kosovo, with General Lange commander in the Republic of Macedonia, Colonel Conan Ken, a NATO representative and his team. All was done in accordance with President Trajkovski’s plan for resolving the crisis. In all my talks with these NATO - KFOR representatives there was one common theme: “for us to stop our military actions and for the crisis to be solved by political means.”

On June 18, 2001 we ran into some difficulties during the meeting of the Coordinating Body for dealing with the crisis. The question was: “Should the President of the Coordinating Body propose the decision for Arachinovo to President Boris Trajkovski?”

I decided to take the floor and make my views known. In short I emphasized that: “Arachinovo, from a military standpoint, represents nothing particular, but obviously politically it means very much to someone. If ordered by the Supreme Commander, ARM will perform the operation. I believe neither I nor this Body is authorized to make any kind of decision in the manner of which the Arachinovo problem is to be solved.” (Minutes of the Coordinating Body meeting). Ilia Filipovski, president of the Coordinating Body, then stressed the complexity of the whole “Arachinovo problem” and what needed to be proposed to the President of the Republic Macedonia.

The Albanian representatives in this Body, who were also Ministers of the Republic of Macedonia (Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and the Minister of Justice), suggested that “a peaceful resolution to the crisis was needed with help from international organizations and a media campaign”, etc. Some of the Ministers in the Macedonian bloc supported the idea and proposed that “the leaders of the Albanian parties convince the terrorists to quietly withdraw from Arachinovo.” During further discussion at the same meeting it was suggested that the terrorists be extracted with help from the OSCE and from other international community organizations if, of course, the so-called NLA was willing to accept such help.

Then it occurred to me: “Why were such discussions taking place, even though no terrorists had appeared in Arachinovo. No one had ordered us to achieve these goals and yet here we were discussing them. There were those who were ordering that the terrorists be convinced to leave without a fight - to leave peacefully; which meant that they did not want a fight!” Why?

Whether we were going to have an operation or not, considering the whole situation and on account that the units were prepared for June 19, 2001, I directed my colleagues to arrange for our forces to be ready for June 21, 2001, i.e. to be ready to attack, to perform reconnaissance missions, to observe and record, etc.

The thinking process at the top state leadership level, regarding the approach to take towards Arachinovo, varied. Namely, the ministers and leader from SDSM wanted to organize cautionary actions while those from VMRO - DPMNE wanted a full scale combat operation. Many hours were spent analyzing the situation and how to go about extracting the terrorists from Arachinovo without any unnecessary casualties because there was really no reason for it and, at the same time, we needed to show that we were a serious state and capable of resolving such problems.

With everyone present at the meeting I said: “There are many residents who have not left Arachinovo. There are more than 2000 houses in the village where a good foothold can be established. We are either going to have a proper operation or not bother starting one!” I also emphasized that: “We do not have enough special units to fight inside the settlement but because we have a strong ability to fight from a distance, and depending on how the terrorists respond, we will act accordingly even against strong resistance and quicken our pace until they surrender. I am assuming that the terrorists in Arachinovo have some reserves for a long-term struggle. We will surround them, block them and our actions will strengthen hour by hour.”

“Arachinovo itself is suitable for this kind of operation. The village is located in clear space, requires no prior action to arrive there and thus there would not be many casualties, but we will let them know that we are serious,” I added.

At that point the President of the Republic of Macedonia spoke up and said that we have limited time to perform the operation. We are limited to two days. I did not understand why only two days, I said we will decide how many days it takes. We will fight until they all surrender. President Trajkovski’s reply was: “That’s how many days George Robertson gave us!” (George Robertson was NATO’s General Secretary).

Despite that, the President of the Republic of Macedonia decided on a solution - I mean a real solution, at least it seemed real to me - he decided that we start the operation and include international factors for mediation. Unfortunately Interior Minister Liube Boskovski was absolutely against this approach...

The President of the Republic of Macedonia was well aware that there would be many casualties on both sides if we went from house to house - but that was not our aim. “Who were we going to free the houses from? From their own home owners who lived there?!”

Eventually we came to a compromise: we were to plan a combat operation and if a political solution was not found we were to adopt a combination: military - political solution. For me as a professional soldier it meant “hot and cold”. This was our task and there was nothing more to discuss. Then, while going over the combat operation I realized that prior arrangements with NATO must have been made, where, after the second day, NATO would enter Arachinovo and extract the terrorists. And that was exactly what happened. If that was the agreement then no damages would take place! The international community after all that would pay and there would be no unnecessary deaths, for which no one needed to pay.

And how was the decision for the attack worded?

Decision:

In the coming days to prepare and perform an operation in order to: block, break and destroy the terrorists in a circular form: Nikushtanski Orman; village Orlantsi; village Buchintsi; village

Aivatovtsi - the farms Belimbegovo - village Strachintsi. The main forces are to engage in the direction of the villages: Mrshevci -Arachinovo, and the auxiliary forces are to engage at Nikushtanski Orman - Arachinovo. The special units set up to combat terrorism, in conjunction with the units of the First Army Corps, the Defense Command of the city of Skopje (KOG) and the units of the Interior Ministry, with support from the artillery, BB (Military Air Force) and the PVO (Anti War Defense); are to block and then approach in the destruction of the same and create conditions for cleaning the village, which should create opportunities for the functioning of a government. (St. Dov. No. 07 - 35/272 from June 21, 2001.)

In order to perform this task we need to engage: - Special units to combat terrorism, -2 haub. battalion 122 m/m, - 3 units PCF (More barreled rocket launchers) of 128 m/m, - 1 battery MF 120 m/m, - 1 tank regiment from KOG - Skopje - Military police battalion and the investigative battalion with part of its units.

The units of the 12th Infantry Brigade are to secure Petrovats Airport and to close all the paths that lead from Pchinia to Petrovats.

The area north of Aracinovo, the villages Moiantse, Gofa - Brnartsi is to be secured by the police in conjunction with the 16th Infantry Brigade and with the forces of the First Infantry Brigade.

The road Arachinovo - Kumanovo is to be secured by units of the First Army Corps.

Five days before the operation, all security units are to form a wider ring, and the forces that are tasked with the attack are to be brought there during the night of June 21/22, 2001 as follows:

- On the road Singelik - Arachinovo north of the road the attack will be carried out by the Interior Ministry’s special police and by the KOG tank platoon, south of the road the attack will be carried out by the Sixth Squad with a tank regiment; in the direction Bel Kamen -Arachinovo the attack will be carried out by the terrorism combat

units; From the south side TT - 241, through Glaveno Pole, the attack will be carried out by the First Tank Company without the First Platoon which was designated to interact with the Special Unit of the Interior Ministry.