EXECUTING THE TETOVO OPERATION

EXECUTING THE TETOVO OPERATION

March 25, 2001 was a peaceful day. Tetovo was peaceful that Sunday morning. It was also the day when the clocks were changed; the time was shifted one hour forward to take advantage of daylight savings time. So the attack was actually scheduled to start at 6 A.M. by the old time to coincide with 7 A.M. in the new time. Because of the practicality of the plans, all activities were ordered to move 1 hour forward. Therefore, instead of 6 A.M., artillery preparation began at 7 A.M. and lasted 1 hour, strictly for selective purposes. While the artillery was preparing, the units moved to their initial attack positions and began to form a wide ring of encirclement. The simultaneously planned invasion began with the first wave leaving the airport so by 8 A.M. they took their positions in a circular form that was made into a wide ring. All the villages expected to hold terrorists were within the wide ring. These villages were: Dzhepchishte, Giermo, Brodets, Shipkovitsa, Popova Shapka, Gaire and Lisets, and certainly in the middle of all this was Kale.

By 09:00 hours in the morning the encirclement was complete except for some horse trails to Lake Karanikolichko over Shar Planina towards Kosovo and from the village Germo towards Kobilitsa to Kosovo. These paths were not fully secured because

they were controlled by helicopters, with aims at preventing the terrorists from possibly being reinforced from Kosovo, and to prevent their withdrawal to Kosovo.

The first phase of the encirclement was fiercely resisted from the villages Gaire and Shipkovitsa vicinity and thus the attack in that direction was temporarily stopped. The path to Popova Shapka was blocked by obstacles.

The special unit belonging to the Ministry of the Interior was engaged in that direction with its armoured vehicles, which at the very beginning was stopped. In addition to blocking the way, the terrorists opened fire with their infantry weapons from the last houses in Tetotovo near the cemetery. Then I remembered what Major General Iovo Andreevski had once said to me. He said: “Pande, the entire town will be shooting at us”.

I figured that if we did not continue the attack in that direction, it would affect the morale of the others attacking from the other directions, so at 9 A.M. I ordered the reserve tank company to move in.

With our strong attack on the way to Tetovo, the terrorists in the village Shipkovitsa were scattered and we cleared the road obstacles and, as planned, surrounded Shipkovitsa. Our forces broke through the Shipkovitsa monastery above Kale. At the same time I ordered the use of tanks along the river Pena, along the road to the village Seltse. Our offensive was formidable in all directions, especially the special unit assault in the north of the village Germo, which was tasked with attacking Kale in Tetovo. The other three directions concentric to Kale also attacked as planned. There was general panic in the terrorist camp because they were simultaneously attacked from all directions. However, their escape route over Kobilitsa to Kosovo and Shar Planina was cut off at the very beginning.

Sabotaged, the terrorist groups were on the run with an unplanned withdrawal.

Some of the terrorists were able to withdraw to Lake Karanikolich in Kosovo over Kobilitsa along the forest paths towards Kosovo. Most

certainly they were from the Protection Corps, part of which retreated to the villages Poroi and Dzepchishte, took off their uniforms and threw away their arms. Most likely they were residents of the local population from the above-mentioned villages.

During the entire campaign the helicopters hampered their escape to Kosovo. After taking the Shipkov monastery we were overlooking Kale, the pillar of the terrorist defense. The terrorists in Kale gave us fierce resistance, were determined and well-fortified. The Kale configuration itself provided long and fierce resistance - It was difficult to take without losses on our part so more thinking was needed on how to win without any losses.

I decided to install two rings around Kale. So, around 14:00 hours, March 25, 2001, two rings encircled Kale but only in three directions. We failed to encircle the east side because the unit that was going to do the encircling was still engaged in its attack on the village Dzheptishte in the Vtosino locality. It had not finished its task because it had gone in the wrong direction, toward the village Germo. When we directed them to Vtosino, where they were expected to be, they were met with stiff resistance and were stopped, and did not cut a path to the villages Germo and Poroi. Because of that some terrorists fled towards the village Poroi.

Before nightfall Kale was completely surrounded and the terrorists were holding only the top of Kale. At 20:00 hours, part of the “Wolves” unit (a Special Forces unit of ARM), was sent to blow up the top and Kale facilities with bombs.

After Kale was taken, in March 25/26, 2001, the terrorist groups were completely smashed in that zone of combat in accordance with the operational plan for that day.

The success of achieving this operation during the first day was based primarily on the complete surprise of its execution, and of course on the great courage and professionalism of all the participants in the operation.

Besides that, corrections to the initial decisions were made in time to properly guide the units in their tactical procedures.

At 22:00 hours on March 25, 2001, I was called to go to Skopje and meet with the state leadership. At the meeting, besides President Boris Trajkovski, were Prime Minister Georgievski, Stoian Andov, Dosta Dimovska, Major General Iovo Andreevski and others.

President Boris Trajkovski immediately gave me the floor and asked me to bring everyone up to date with the situation at the front and to recommend what more needed to be done.

On March 25, 2001, Prime Minister Georgievski was in Tetovo and came to our command headquarters where he stayed for 2 hours, observing the operation. We familiarized him with all the details and he was particularly pleased that no one had been killed the first day; only 3 had sustained light wounds. That day Chief Iovo Andreevski stayed in his office and “followed the entire situation” from there. His greatest concern was that casualties on our part be maintained to a minimum.

After we were done with the first day’s operation, I proposed that we proceed with the plan of operation for the second day, clean up the entire terrain and take over the most significant tactical structures in the zone of operation.

On the night of March 25/26, 2001, I assumed the terrorist groups would attempt to find a way to slip through the ring and head for Kosovo or for the villages that were not cleaned up by our action and from there return to Tetovo.

President Boris Trajkovski was very pleased, especially since we had no losses and, with an honest expression, said to me: “General, last night I was very angry at you.” I then, in my own style, replied: “Mr. President, I understand perfectly. It is easy to sign an order to use military units - we have started a war on our own territory. The first step is always the hardest to take in everything, let alone start a war. I hope that further actions will be easier for you to approve.” (See Appendix 1). On March 26, 2001 our units captured all the tactical structures that we had planned to take and from there to control the entire area. Then, in collaboration with the police, we started cleaning up the terrain in Shar Planina and in all the villages.

When we cleaned up the area we found large quantities of weapons, clothing, food and other resources. Then and there I became aware of the drastic measures the terrorists had taken for a lengthy hold on the terrain. They had built underground bunkers, shelters and trenches for fighting and for rest. Kale itself was well-organized with trenches and shelters, which meant that the terrorists were planning to be there a long time and to wage long-term warfare.

In all this it is surprising that this entire defense system was built away from prying eyes. Such a project could not have been kept a secret. All this work that that took days and days to complete could not have gone unnoticed… especially the construction and the machinery, etc… And yet the competent authorities of the state had no information on this… This is inconceivable! Tactically speaking, the defense system we found was similar to or a copy of the Anglo-American military tactical systems for that level of defense.

Most of the civilian population evacuated the combat zone before the campaign started, many of those who remained left during the execution of the operation. But most of the population from the villages Seltse and Germo remained there, which led us to believe that the terrorists were certainly among those people.

On March 26, 2001 we blockaded the village Seltse and asked that it be monitored. As it turned out, there was a group of around 30 to 40 armed men hanging around the village mosque among the civilians, but were not attempting to act. Because of the presence of civilians we did not want to act either or to perform a classic attack. We did however maintain a ring around the village with nearby positions under strict military control.

On March 27, 2001 we gradually tightened the ring. Then, supported by ARM units, the police began a gradual advance on the road towards the village. After entering Seltse, the police completely cleared out the civilian population and we captured part of the terrorist group. In Seltse we found large caches of arms and ammunition, lists of terrorists who participated and other documentation. Thus, it became obvious to me that the village was a command post. (The terrorist command post for Tetovo Region was the village Seltse. After we took Seltse we seized a number of

documents, among which we found lists of the so-called “KLA” participants. The lists found here were kept in computer diskettes. In total we found 170 fighters designated for this region. The entire seizure of materials was delivered to the Ministry of Interior in Skopje.) With the successful completion of this action we managed to take over the entire area. Then from the village Germo I sent the NATO commander’s driver to Tetovo to offer the terrorists a voluntary surrender. In other words, release the civilian population from the village - which was immediately done.

The only places that still remained out of our reach in this region were the villages Poroi and Dzhepchishte, in which part of the terrorists on the first day of our operation managed to shed their uniforms and hide among the civilian population. Besides that, we had information that a foreign TV crew and foreign journalists were present in the village Poroi. Because of that, on March 27, 2001 at a meeting with the top state leadership, I proposed that we perform a clean up of the terrorists in those villages. I proposed that the cleaning be done by the police while ARM maintained a circle around them to prevent them from escaping. My proposal was immediately accepted and specific tasks were issued and delivered during the same day; March 27, 2001. Because of our initial successes, at the same time I suggested that we continue with the cleaning of Skopje Tsrna Gora. The proposal was fully accepted and consisted of the following:

a) Continue with the cleaning of the villages Poroi Dzhepchishte in the Tetovo battle zone, with most of the forces switching their focus to Skopje Tsrna Gora and terrain covering the villages Chashka, Krivenik/Radusha. I also informed my staff that my work in Tetovo was done and that no more work would be done and that Colonel Josip Boshevski and his command would continue to secure this sector. With this I committed myself to personally be engaged in Skopje Tsrna Gora Region.

My first order of business was to have the police investigate and clear out the villages Poroi and Dzheshchishte while ARM blockaded the villages. Dosta Dimovska, then Minister of the Interior, and Zvonko Kashirski, Director of Public safety, who were present at the meeting, fully agreed with my proposal. With the

proposal fully approved, Colonel Boshevski was given the task to surround the villages Poroi and Dzhepchishte and secure them after the police action was completed.

The action was to be carried out on March 27, 2001. That same day I was engaged in preparing the combat operation “MH - 1”involving the Skopje Tsrna Gora - Karadak zone.

On March 27, 2001, around 10:00 hours in the morning, Colonel Josip Boshevski called to tell me the following. He said: “General, the police are prematurely pulling out of Poroi; they were ordered to do so.” I said: “Well, I don’t know why they are retreating. I will inquire and get back to you. You are to continue with your task, as agreed.” I called Zvonko Kashirski and said to him: “I have information that the police are pulling out from the village Poroi, is that true?” He immediately said: “I received orders from my boss Dosta Dimovska, Minister of the Interior, to withdraw from the village.” I then asked him: “Zvonko did you do something stupid with the civilian population?!” He again immediately replied and said: “No, not at all! Those were my orders!” So I said: “Okay then, we will find out what happened at the meeting this evening!”

In the evening, during the top leadership meeting, before I began my presentation of the Skopje Tsrna Gora proposal, I asked for an explanation. I said: “Who ordered the police to pull out prematurely from the villages Poroi and Dzhepchishte? I do not know whether the President of the Republic of Macedonia was informed of this but I am sure that the Prime Minister was.” Everyone present went silent. Dosta Dimovska approached me and quietly said: “General, what do you want, a civil war? We did not act in these villages during the combat operation because these citizens supported us during the operation.” Because no one else responded, I no longer wished to discuss this so I said: “Yesterday evening you did approve this action wholeheartedly!” And I ended my inquiry with that. And as such, Poroi and Dzhepchishte remained bastions for the terrorists.