UB CA

UB/CA Commander of OTG - 1 Brigadier General Josip Boshevski

The following report, sent to me by Brigadier General Josip Boshevski, outlines the cooperation between ARM and the Interior Ministry in the Tetovo region.

From August 7, 2001, str.dov. 07 - 89/275

“I would like to familiarize and inform you that the last time I asked ARM for help, i.e. to support the law enforcement officers in carrying out combat actions, ARM was charged with not responding and not providing appropriate assistance.”

“On August 6, 2001, around 23:00 hours, small arms weapons fire was heard coming from the police post station at the stadium. Someone was firing in the direction of the Drenovets settlement where several hand grenades and tear gas missiles had exploded. The explosions were felt in the barracks and in parts of the urban settlement.”

I personally contacted the ARM unit which, according to the Chief of General Headquarters, was stationed near the police station at the stadium at a distance of about 10 to 15 metres, so I asked: “Is there any action in the direction of Drenovets?” I received the following response: “The police are performing actions but there are no direct threats to us.”

Immediately after that I got in touch with the duty officer at the Interior Ministry Headquarters at SVR Tetovo. I was interested to know about the situation in the field. I was told that several shots were fired in Drenovets or in Poroi. I insisted that the police not act unnecessarily if the units were not directly fired on.

Around 06:30 hours I received information from the Tetovo Interior Ministry duty team that the posts in the villages Ratae and Zhilche

had been attacked. Strong and intense detonations were heard, probably caused by the action of the police with RPGs and RRFs. I insisted that I needed more accurate information about the actions taking place, about which I later received unrealistic information claiming that the actions were taking place in Dzhepchishte Region towards the village Neproshteno and that those positions were attacked from the villages Trebon and Erebino and required artillery response action. After that an official from the Ministry of the Interior appeared and said: “Where the action now took place, go right for about 200 metres.” And even though this was not the action of OTG - 1, we found no action at all had taken place, no fire at all was opened, which led me to believe that there was a lack of understanding about what was going on.

I personally insisted that the actions be stopped so that we could get more accurate information as to where the terrorists were located but I was told that: “The Internal Ministry leads and commands these forces and they are all volunteers with aims to protect the Macedonian population in the villages Zhilche, Ratoe and others.”

I believe their intent was to involve ARM in a situation that was not a threat to the security of our forces. I also believe that the kind of operations conducted by the Interior Ministry forces were outside of the mandate for performing operations and which, down the line, would adversely affect the future and ongoing political maintenance of the security situation in the area.

UB/BSH Commander Brigadier General: Josip Boshevski

- R - 1378/831

These and similar kinds of reports, in those days, i.e. at the time of the ceasefire, were coming out from all the ground force commands, particularly from Tetovo Region. Tensions grew as ways to resolve the war crisis were sought. And as Minister of Defense, Vlado Buchkovski, at an official state level, kept pointing out these incidents, this kind of information of course filtered out to the OSCE and to Peter Faith who stood behind NATO, misrepresenting the

situation in the Republic of Macedonia, in order to cause general chaos. All this was well-known to President Trajkovski but he was in no position to do anything. He was under constant pressure from his party partners who wanted to initiate the idea of “Dividing the Republic of Macedonia and creating some larger state within some other country!”

I often received calls from the President issuing requests to order ARM to perform actions in certain areas at the request of the Internal Ministry. Many times I had to remind him that we had no knowledge of disturbances in those areas and no action was necessary. But then he would say: “Okay, do as I ordered, I will talk to you later.” Then, 10 to 15 minutes later, when he called me again, he would say: “I had to tell you that because Liupcho Georgievski and Liube Boskovski were here, in the meantime you do your job just the way we had agreed.” By that he meant that I had to control the situation and comply by the ceasefire Agreement and not allow police provocations to destabilize the situation. Very often the President would come to General Headquarters to discuss issues related to the situation, and how to resolve them. On one occasion he said to me: “I invited B. Gerovski, a journalist for discussion. I believe he was right in what he said to me. He said: ‘Mr. President, everyone is now spitting at you, but you must hang on to your ideas and support the plan for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and, later, when our children peacefully go on holiday in Ohrid we all will be grateful to you’...” Of course, the President was threatened in various ways, pushed to act differently, even threatened with the liquidation of certain individuals.

Despite the Agreement we had signed to end the crisis just like it was agreed, tensions kept escalating and people were pulling in opposite directions, which made it harder to control the situation on the ground, especially after the special police units - volunteers -“Lions” became involved after the ceasefire Agreement was signed and since the negotiations in Ohrid were started.

I repeatedly asked for unity in the command and management structure of the security forces, as was regulated under the defense act during a state of war. I wanted all the security forces in the zone where military actions were taking place to be placed under a single

command in order to successfully achieve planned objectives - i.e. under the most senior commander of ARM. That principle is present in all armies and countries. In the Republic of Macedonia, however, from the outset of the military crisis, the President was the Supreme Commander who commanded ARM and the Prime Minister commanded the police, as regulated by peacetime law. But because of varying political objectives there was lack of unity in the management and command system. In fact, the disunity at the top level increased with time until it became dysfunctional. Fortunately there was agreement and coordination at the lower levels between the commanders of ARM and the police, especially the active segment of the police force.

While negotiations were taking place in Ohrid, the situation on the ground was getting tighter and harder to control. In Tetovo, especially in Polog and in the Macedonian Shar Planina villages, there were provocations taking place, hour to hour. The road Poroi -Iazhintse was often closed with barricades put there by the inhabitants themselves. Armed and uniformed groups then began to appear, placing illegal police checkpoints and hindering movement. Even humanitarian convoys and the local population were blockaded. With the withdrawal of the police forces from that space, opportunities for terrorist expansion were opened, especially in the countryside at the villages Poroi, Dzepchishte, Neproshteno, Barbara, or more precisely where ARM used to previously act and had positions. In the Kumanovo - Karadak Region, the situation was relatively calm with few attempt at causing incidents and even less serious provocations.

The weapons given to the civilian population in the Tetovo area by list, about which the terrorists knew, were eventually taken away from the Macedonians by the terrorists (as reported by the residents who had fled).

To avoid friction between the forces, I asked for the police units to be vacated from common positions where ARM units and the police existed in close proximity, especially in some of the places in the city Tetovo. I also did this so that we didn’t have situations where someone may say: “ARM does not help the police when it’s attacked”.

At one time, during the negotiations in Ohrid, Liube Boshkovski jokingly said to me: “Legend, the communists have pressured you to hold me back!” “No!” I said to him. “It is not like that, we have allowed the terrorists to spread by using our mistakes. Someone is intentionally doing this.”

I said to him: “I have information from the Macedonian refugees, from discussions that took place with President Trajkovski, that you gave the refugees arms to defend themselves when the police abandoned the countryside villages.”

But Liube Boshkovski, in his own way and style, denied it.

Right from the start I was quite close to Liube Boshkovski, Minister of the Interior. When he was appointed Minister of the Interior Ministry, he often and almost always attended the command post with me. He even sought my advice and, on several occasions, followed it, especially in tough situations. I could openly discuss many problems and issues with him. He always tried, wholeheartedly, to follow the guidelines set out by Prime Minister Georgievski. At one time the President of the Republic of Macedonia asked to have Boshkovski removed. During one of our discussions Boshkovski said to me: “Hey Legend, this guy (referring to the President) has intentions to let me go but let me say this… I can have him out much faster than he can have me out… so nothing will happen...” All this, i.e. attempts to create general chaos in Macedonia, emerged when the negotiations in Ohrid started. By all means, many attempts were made to involve ARM in taking a greater military role in the operation but the time was not right especially since conditions were put on these operations - the negotiations were underway and NATO was already fully involved in resolving the crisis. The OSCE too, with its observers, was there every day on the ground in areas where ARM units were stationed.

President Trajkovski was under constant pressure to give orders for ARM to get it more involved. The rationale was that “this would give us an advantage at the negotiations.” But before that, at a time when the military crisis could have been solved by military means, they would not allow ARM to do its job, and now that NATO was

invited inside, they wanted our army to get involved. Why? So that Macedonia would fall into chaos, a repeat of Bosnia? The greatest complaints made about the whole situation and about who was putting obstacles were about the Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski and General Pande Petrovski. They were the “guiltiest of them all” they said because they “did not want to use ARM”. But if we examine Article 28 of the Law on Defense, we will find that it says: “The President of the Republic of Macedonia is in command of ARM through the Minister of Defense”. And General Headquarters is only a professional body in the Ministry of Defense. This Act was passed or amended when Liuben Paunovksi was defense minister. Therefore all orders issued by the President had to go through the Ministry of Defense. So, I can’t see how I was to blame for “not wanting to employ ARM”? Later, after the crisis was over, that part of the Defense Law was amended.

Using the general condition after the ceasefire and NATO’s engagement in the military crisis resolution, the so-called NLA Command wanted to relocate from Prizren to the Republic of Macedonia.

The so-called NLA made attempts to conquer and secure Popova Shapka as a suitable place for its command post but failed. It, however, did not give up so it went looking in Tetovo Region and selected Shipkovitsa as its municipality.

We did not act in Shipkovitsa but held Shipkovsko tekie. The population of that village had evacuated on March 25 and 26, 2001. After the ceasefire, the population, i.e. the displaced people from the wider region made an agreement with NATO to be allowed to return to their abandoned homes. Among the first to start returning were the residents of Shipkovitsa.

On July 21, 2001, from 16:45 to 17:05 hours, a KFOR SH-47 helicopter was observed landing in Shipkovitsa and unloading equipment and people, at the same time (16:45 to 17:05 hours) a KFOR SH-47 helicopter landed in the village Brodets as reported by the ARM commander of air defense.

In the coming days I received a report from Josip Boshevski, Commander of OTG-1 by which I was informed that there was a group of armed and uniformed men in Shipkovitsa. I was also informed that the OSCE often frequented Shipkovitsa. On one occasion even the commander of the Kosovo KFOR “South” Brigade was seen in Tetovo. On July 25, 2001, from 13:53 to 14:30 hours and from 16:00 to 16:30 hours, a KFOR SH-47 and a KFOR SH-53 helicopter landed in the village Brodets. All these KFOR helicopter flights and landings were not registered by NATO. This is the explanation we received from General Lange, NATO commander in the Republic of Macedonia. Above all the complaining we did, we also sent them a warning letter, through the Centre of contact with NATO-KFOR, warning them that if these things continued to take place we would be forced to perform combat actions.

Basically what took place, in regards to the presence of these helicopters, was KFOR making preparations to accommodate the relocation of the so-called NLA Command from Prizren to Shipkovitsa. But in a response I received from KFOR, as a result of enquiries I made, I was told that they were installing a set of certain systems so that they could liaise with the observers during the implementation of the “Harvest” project, i.e. the collection of weapons. I often ran into General Lange, primarily because he was appointed commander of the “Harvest” project in the Republic of Macedonia. From the very beginning when we had met, since April 2001, Lange left me with the impression that he was an honest and sincere person and that he wanted to help the Republic of Macedonia. He retired after his mission in Macedonia. In one of our conversations when I pointed out some facts that KFOR transferred the so-called NLA Command from Prizren to Shipkovitsa, he said: “You are right, but please know that I am a professional and I am looking forward to going into retirement.”

As the talks in Ohrid were unfolding, the situation on the ground was getting more complicated by the frequent military actions. The President and his advisers started to call me more frequently, by telephone, giving me tasks to update them on terrorist whereabouts and activities. They even demanded to know why I hadn’t given orders to attack them, etc!

I had no idea exactly what was happening in Ohrid, but from what President Trajkovski was telling me, I was in agreement. The president was under strong pressure to order ARM to take more extensive measures for the sake of “giving our side more of an advantage at the talks” But at the same time I knew that the President, ever since the beginning of the crisis, was against the use of force in resolving the conflict. With regards to the terrorists on the ground, as far as I was concerned, there was nothing unexpected, at least on the ground where we had ARM units deployed. Our units were well armed and had solid combat experience and our system of management and command were fully operational. On top of that NATO and the OSCE, with their presence on the ground, and our constant contact with Peter Faith and he with the ethnic Albanian armed groups, were deterrents for any escalation of violence. Also the Ministry of Defense and General Headquarters were always in direct contact with the President of the Republic of Macedonia. Peter Faith was well informed regarding all events in our government and its relations with the President. I was one of Faith’s direct contacts and made sure he was kept up to date, especially on the situation and actions of the Internal Ministry.

On August 5, 2001 I was unpleasantly surprised - when over the television on TV A-1, at 17:00 hours, a “state secret” was announced on the air (DT 07-70 / 08.05.2001).

The “state secret” called for:

1. “APM, with the necessary structure and number of forces, was to enter Tetovo to prevent the capture of the city by terrorist groups of the so-called NLA and to provide security to the Tetovo residents and their properties.

2. ARM is to secure the road Tetovo - Iazhintse with aims at ensuring the safety of traffic and to stop the penetration of terrorist groups from Shara to the villages in Polog. Security in that direction must be continuously maintained until the next order.

3. General Headquarters is to make a plan, prepare and implement the tasks as outlined in points 1 and 2 of this order within 3 days of receiving the order.

4. The Chief of Staff of General Headquarters is to provide information and updates on actions taken in the latest 24 hours before the expiration of the previous point.”

At first I could not believe it; I thought it was pure provocation! Imagine a document labeled “state secret” being exposed on television! Or a secret order issued by the Supreme Commander to the Chief of Staff over public television!? But then I began to have doubts because the order called for an operation to take place in Tetovo, but against whom? Our ARM units were in Tetovo, not only in the barracks but also all around the city. Another thing: there were people living in the city, both Macedonians and Albanians, and the city was functioning normally. There were police stations and military checkpoints inside the city. Full of anxiety, I called Colonel Sime Spaskovski, Chief of my cabinet, and sent him to the Parliament building to ascertain whether or not such an order really existed as was reported on television.

He went and soon returned with a piece of paper, sent via fax from Ohrid. It was signed by the President with content numbered items 1 to 4.

I still did not believe what I was seeing: I had several telephone conversations with the President that same day and not once did he mention anything about this order. This order did not look right; it was not something that ARM could decide to do so lightly! This called for a military operation involving ARM in Tetovo, a populated city! I tried to get hold of Vlado Buchkovski, the Minister of Defense, but he was away in Ohrid and was not available.

One thing I was sure of, besides the order being signed by Boris Trajkovski, it was not done under his free will because of its content and the style looked like it was written by one of his advisers -which I later confirmed.

But, regardless of what I thought, above all, here in my hand I had a written order from my Supreme Commander; and it was not a joke. I called a General Headquarters meeting and issued directions to start planning the operation to secure Tetovo and the road Poroi -Iazhintse.

The preliminary part of the decision I made read:

“In the coming days you are to prepare and facilitate the operation for securing Tetovo and the road in the Tetovo - Iazhintse direction by grouping the main forces in the city. The auxiliary forces are to secure the road in the Tetovo-Iazhnitse direction in order to prevent the capture of the city Tetovo by terrorist groups from the so-called NLA and to provide protection to the Tetovo residents and their properties. The anti-terrorist units, in collaboration with neighbouring units, artillery and air support, are to ensure the safety of traffic on the road Tetovo - Iazhintse and to prevent penetration of terrorist groups to the Shar Planina villages in Polog”...

Readiness for the attack: August 8, 2001.

The following units are to be engaged in this operation....... etc.

A plan of operation, without consideration from an order from the Supreme Commander, had to be approved by the Security Council. For that I scheduled a meeting to take place in Ohrid on August 6, 2001.

I continued trying to contact Vlado Buchkovski but without success. The journalists too, still in Ohrid, tried to get a statement from him because he had not received such an order from Boris Trajkovski either. He was only informed from the television report, which needed to be verified.

The next day, August 6, 2001 at 07:00 hours, Minister Vlado Buchkovski arrived in his office. I took with me the orders I had received by fax the previous day and went to see him. I said to him: “On the basis of these orders, we have prepared a plan of operation and I expect that today you will call us to the Security Council meeting.” He took the paper, looked it over, looked at me angrily

and immediately picked up the telephone and began dialing. He wanted to know directly from the President why his department, the Ministry of Defense, was bypassed and why the order had been sent directly to the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters. Minister Buchkovski was correct in his assertions because what happened was not in accordance with Article 28 of the Law on Defense. From listening to his side of the conversation with Trajkovski, I got the impression that the order was prepared by Nikola Dimitrov, the President’s national security adviser. Among other things, Buchkovski said: “Mr. President, Nikola Dimitrov instead of walking the streets of New York, will be spending his time in Idrizovo Prison because he gave a state document deemed top secret to the media!” At that time Nikola Dimitrov was appointed Ambassador to the United States.

The media and the press somehow picked up on what Buchkovski said to Trajkovski and that sentence was interpreted as a threat, i.e. Buchkovski threatening Trajkovski with prison. I later found out that the “state secret” was leaked to the TV A1 television program by Liubomir Frchkovski because the Ministry of Defense had raised an indictment against him.

“Thanks” to that press release announcing the secret order to the public, innocent soldiers were killed in Karpalak on August 8, 2001, about whom we will present more information later.

As I expected, the same day we were invited to attend the Security Council meeting in Ohrid. That day I was ready to resign if the Council decided to implement the Tetovo operation because I knew the intentions and purpose of this military operation, especially because of the way the order was issued by the Supreme Commander. Sending orders via the public medium is unheard of in military history… it is simply not practiced, especially in modern times with all the technical means available to us.

The meeting was scheduled late in the afternoon. Besides the President, the meeting was attended by the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, the Ministers of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, myself, Branko Tsrvenkovski as leader of the SDSM party, Professor Dr. Vlado

Popovski and Professor Dr. Traian Gotsevski as members of the Council, who in previous meetings on such issues had not been invited.

Right at the start of the session Dr. Vlado Buchkovski, Minister of Defense, took his turn to speak. He reacted sharply and demanded to know why the issued order by-passed his department, quoting Article 28 of the Law on Defense which was violated. During the discussions, from a legal aspect, various interpretations were offered to justify what had been done, but to put an end to the idle chat, I interrupted and said: “We are not going to follow the order because it was not issued legally. The Supreme Commander may now issue a direct order to use ARM, under the Constitution, and that is why I prepared a plan for an operation, if that is what you truly will allow.” They were a little surprised, but I pulled the card showing that the plan was ready and it was now entirely up to the President to approve it. Immediately after I completed my report, people began to ask questions, wanting to know from the President if there was going to be a lot of civilian casualties and if there was going to be much destruction, etc.”

I asked the president a short question. I said: “Mr. President, you know that Tetovo is an urban city and that the road Poroi -Dzhepchishte - Iazhintse is entirely built up with residential homes on one side of the road. I obtained an order from you and prepared a plan and if you approve my plan I will make sure that it is implemented, but the population of these villages has to be moved so that there will be no civilian casualties.”

Trajkovski looked at me and said: “General, your plan is no good, make a new plan. I will not sign this plan!” I then said: “This plan was drafted in accordance with your orders; I don’t know how to draft another plan without knowing what you want us to do!” He then suggested that I: “Send the tanks on a trip down the road from Tetovo to Iazhintse.” I then said: “Mr. President I am a professional and I will not risk losing my tanks and members of my forces… if, like you say, there are dangerous activities going on in Poroi.”

President Trajkovski asked for a break to calm the situation down. During the break Prime Minister Georgievski followed me and said:

“General Pande, please explain your plan one more time.” I went to the map and, in specific details, explained the plan to him. I then went out to the balcony to light a cigarette. Vlado Popovski came out with me and said: “The plan was good, don’t worry.” Why he said that I do not know - but I suspect that they all thought that I was dragging my feet when it came to deploying ARM.

After the break the Prime Minister immediately took his turn on the floor and said: “President Trajkovski, the plan is okay and if you don’t want to sign it, I will sign it.” Liube Boskovski was sitting beside me and immediately jumped up and said: “And I will sign it too… and let them take me to The Hague.”

I looked at them both and thought to myself; what does this look like? On one side we have support for the framework agreement and on the other side they want to launch an operation in a sensitive part of our country. When they put a stop to the military operation in the village Dzhepchishte on March 27, 2001, Dosta Dimovska said to me: “And what do you want, General, for the people to rise against us?!” I was considering resigning right then because things were not working. When we had the opportunity to resolve the crisis by military means they would not allow it! And now they insisted on a complex operation in Tetovo, at any cost. Why? But in every case I worked with him, the President was absolutely sure and conscious of what an operation meant. This time, however, I suspected that he was forced to sign the order.

I was determined to find a compromise to the current approach so I made the following suggestion. I said: “The units planned for this operation will be stationed in Erebino - in our facility, 2 to 4 km away from the road Porod - Iazhintse. If for any reason the road is closed then we will open it by military actions. On August 7, 2001 we were planning to move some of our units to the areas of operation (Erebino and beyond) and from Skopje through Giorche Petrov to Erebino”. This proposal was accepted by all and Trajkovski’s earlier plan was not signed. And this is how the meeting ended at the villa in Ohrid. All that remained now for August 7, 2001 was for our units to March to Erebino and prepare for an eventual operation in the Tetovo - Iazhintse vicinity.