EVENTS AFTER THE CEASEFIRE

EVENTS AFTER THE CEASEFIRE

What happened in the Republic of Macedonia after July 6, 2001, after it entered into enforcing the unconditional ceasefire - through the personal envoy to the NATO Secretary General?

As of July 5, 2001, ARM stopped all advances and remained in the current positions it occupied. We received information that a terrorist group was preparing the ground in the area of Suva Gora (villages Grgurnitsa - Sedlarevo) for a long stay because it had no opportunities to expand in Tetovo due to the strong army and police presence there. The so-called NLA’s attempt to take Popova Shapka and establish its General Headquarters there failed twice because it was defeated both times. Police forces were deployed in the village Rasche and the entire region was completely under their control. But given that we had a lot of ground to cover, especially the sources of water in Rasche and the wider region, we decided to strengthen the combat units that defended the city Skopje (KOG) by adding the 8th Infantry Brigade from Veles and deploying it in the village Rasche and the wider area. With the deployment of the entire 8th Infantry Brigade, all major facilities around Skopje fell under the control of KOG - Skopje. And thus the wider region fell under the distant control of ARM (Air Defense and Artillery); even in the Iasen hunting region we had a position with a battery of 122 m/m to support the units in that space and reduce the opportunities of the terrorists to expand in Suva Planina. An attempt by the terrorists to occupy the intersection of the road leading from the village Merovo to Sedlarevo was immediately repelled.

On July 3, 2001 a KFOR helicopter (UH - 60) was flying from the village Drachevo towards Vodno in the region TT - 416, a trigonometric point above the settlement Pintia (EM 390 442), near Skopje, activated its missile defense system (IC decoy) and then fired their bursts of machine gun fire.

In response to our inquiries, we were told that it was an act of the terrorists, which was not true because there were no terrorists acting in that region. Of course this was a direct action by NATO forces, or by KFOR forces, before the signing the ceasefire Agreement, although KFOR had no mandate for such actions.

The ceasefire Agreement was completely disregarded by the other side before the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed. According to daily reports compiled by our commanders on the ground, 139 direct attacks were carried out on positions occupied by the Macedonian security forces. In Tetovo 117 attacks were carried out, 12 in Kumanovo and 10 in the Skopje crisis area. At the same time Republic of Macedonia security forces were hit 74 times; 60 times in Tetovo, 7 in Kumanovo and 7 in Skopje Region. In July 2001, 5 security forces personnel were killed, 25 wounded and 81 civilians were kidnapped (79 in Tetovo and 2 in Kumanovo). Only 61 of the kidnapped were freed during the same month.

From the above figures it was evident that the terrorists had expanded significantly in some parts of Tetovo Region. Such an expansion was not possible in the areas where ARM units were deployed; such as the town and villages north of Tetovo. That is why the villages with Macedonian populations were selected -where the police were deployed.

Why did the Macedonian people leave the Shar Planina villages?

The very idea of Macedonian residents leaving the Macedonian or mixed villages where both Macedonians and Albanians were living was totally wrong. The people being told to move away, was a deliberate act on the part of individuals who were then part of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

The thesis or idea was that “we Macedonians and Albanians cannot live together because we Macedonians have always had problems with the Albanian factor, and because of that we need to cleanse Tetovo Region of the Macedonians and Kumanovo Region of the Albanians”. But this thesis was unrealistic and false because Macedonians and Albanians have lived together for a long time without any problems such as these.

These tensions, in Tetovo in July 2001, unfortunately came into being after the ceasefire Agreement was brokered and some individuals decided to employ dire methods to evict Macedonians from their homes. After the formation of the wider government

coalition in the Republic of Macedonia, there was gradual doubt created about ARM taking serious military action against the aggressors. There were rumours that the “ARM Chief of Staff of General Headquarters was heavily influenced by Vlado Buchkovski and Branko Tsrvenkovski, the leaders of the SDSM party!” These rumours and doubts created a rift between the forces belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and those belonging to the Ministry of Defense. This doubt began to filter down to management and command levels and interfered in the ability to carry out joint military actions against the terrorists. Initially these doubts did not affect the execution of military operations.

The first signs of doubt appeared during the operation in the village Vaksintse on May 25, 2001, in Kumanovo. After ARM’s successful action in Vaksintse, the “Tigers”, a Special Police Forces unit belonging to the Ministry of the Interior, commanded directly by Liube Boshkovski, Minister of the Interior, disobeyed orders. After it arrived at the entrance of the village Vaksintse, it turned around and went back to Skopje without completing its task. After that, the Interior Ministry took measures to make certain changes in the unit’s command staff, which was within its rights. But while providing information to the public it placed some untruths about the change it made. There was speculation that the unit “was internally divided along party lines”. There was something not right about that, especially the political manipulation of the security forces, when a war was raging on and they were carrying out military operations on a daily basis. It is my belief that all this was happening because of the political leadership’s attitude, at party level and in the wider coalition, regarding which method to take (political on one side and military on the other) in order to resolve the military crisis. These kinds of attitudes caused repeated police station shutdowns and entire police units being sent home. These events were taking place without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defense, which proved to be disastrous for the ARM security forces in the crisis regions - resulting in civilian casualties and civilian evictions.

The different views regarding the handling of the military crisis caused major tension in the Coordinating Body. Some ministers stopped attending the meetings. The Minister of the Interior called

the Coordinating Body a “debate club”. Right from the start the Coordinating Body had difficulties coming to an agreement, even with some of the important issues, on how to resolve the crisis. This disunity was openly expressed by the constant squabbling between the ministers of VMRO-DPMNE and those of SDSM. Later, after the ceasefire took effect, the Coordinating Body’s primary functions were to solve technical issues, mainly about rehabilitating the crisis regions.

The different views expressed on how to resolve the crisis put a lot of pressure on me personally because I too was being pulled apart, in three different directions, by two Macedonian parties, SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE and by NATO, especially by NATO.

On June 28, 2001, a short while before the ceasefire Agreement was signed, we had a long meeting at the request of the NATO Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia and at the request of the Commander of NATO in the Republic of Macedonia. The topic of conversation, certainly, was the situation in the Republic of Macedonia.

During our meeting, among other things, the NATO ambassador noted that NATO in Macedonia was very disappointed with the opinions expressed by the public and stressed that: “We removed the terrorists from Arachinovo because we are on the Republic of Macedonia’s side and now we intend to disarm them and persuade them to stop shooting… this is why we ask you to use proportionate force against them… it is very important. I assure you that we are now having talks to persuade them to stop using arms and start using discussion and dialogue. NATO is ready to help, even with weapons, we will even bring in observers, if only to find a way to hinder further actions, etc.”

Also attending our meeting was General Lange, NATO Commander in the Republic of Macedonia, who expressed his opinion. He said: “The public is misinformed about NATO’s role; it is misinformed by the highest officials in the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. We want to disarm the ethnic Albanian rebels and make efforts for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The rebels have no other choice and that is why their last resort is to disarm and

surrender the arms - they claim that they will do that without changing the status of the Republic of Macedonia.”

At that time, June 28, 2001, I was still not informed that the President had sent a written request to the NATO Secretary General to involve NATO in assisting with the resolution of the crisis. I learned about that later, after July 5, 2001, when Peter Faith sent a letter to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in response to the President’s request. Not knowing about this, my reply to this gentlemen was: “Dear God, I am only the executor who works for the defense and interests of the Republic of Macedonia. Only the President and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia can decide on the matters you are discussing with me. What I ask from you is not to arm the terrorists, and for the KFOR troops not to allow them passage from Kosovo into our territory. I have information that the Turkish battalion belonging to the “South” Brigade, entrusted with securing the border at Shar Planina and Restilitsa, is allowing the terrorists to pass through over Lake Karanikoli.” As always, “they” (the NATO personnel) pretended to be surprised by what I said and assured me that they would investigate my “allegations”. Further on in our discussions I stressed: “Regarding your request for ARM to use ‘appropriate’ force against the Albanian rebels, we will use all means which will bring us success in breaking the terrorists, without endangering the civilian population and by minimizing casualties. I welcome your assistance for a peaceful resolution to the crisis and to disarm the terrorists if this indeed is your true purpose, as you say.”

After the ceasefire Agreement was signed, I had several meetings with foreign military and diplomatic representatives accredited to the Republic of Macedonia from almost all the countries involved. But one meeting, most memorable to me, was that with Mr. Perdue and with Colonel R. Lynch, US military attaché. It was styled to provide directions on how ARM should behave. At one point Perdue said: “Any violations taking place, while the ceasefire is in effect, in any of the spaces, will be on you…” He then said: “You can uphold this ceasefire or let it fail. This is a big responsibility for you personally and for your country, that is why we are all looking at you!” Without wasting any time I promptly replied to Mr. Perdue. I said: “I am not a factor here, not by the Constitution or by any of the

Laws of this country and nor do I make the decisions for what ARM does and does not do, my role here is to carry out the orders issued to me by my Supreme Commander, the President of the Republic of Macedonia and by the Macedonian Government!” Perdue looked at me and said: “We already know that, but we want to see what you think and what you are prepared to do to bring a peaceful resolution to the crisis. We trust you…” concluded Perdue.

During the same meeting I expressed doubts that the other side would respect the ceasefire Agreement. I said: “You can be sure that ARM, as an institution, will respect the signed document regarding the unconditional ceasefire. And, as it had done until now, it will continue to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Commander.” That’s when Perdue expressed his doubt. He said he was not sure that the other institutions would respect the ceasefire and a peaceful resolution, referring to the Interior Ministry. And then he said: “But that’s why we are here… to help.”

In the conditions created for a ceasefire, I personally did not expect that aggressions would immediate stop but I was sure of one thing, that the so-called NLA had neither the capacity nor the ability to take on something more serious, because militarily it was in a difficult situation, especially in Kumanovo and Tetovo. Actually, the so-called NLA at that point was in a state of deconstruction.

Before signing the ceasefire Agreement and after Arachinovo, the so-called NLA, for days, had not made any appearances anywhere in those regions. This was a problem for ARM because it had difficulty locating the terrorists and could not figure out why they were hiding, especially since we had orders, for exclusively “legitimate” purposes, to track them and their actions. I then thought of engaging our authorities to monitor the areas in Macedonia where previously no military action had taken place, for the slight chance that they might appear there, in places like Gostivar, Debar, etc. But still we could not find them.

All previous statements made, directions given, precautions taken, regarding the solving of the military crisis, above all with direct involvement of NATO and other international institutions, was not going as it had been planned because “someone” in the internal

political structures wanted the crisis to be resolved in a different way, i.e. to create chaos in the Republic of Macedonia, a repeat of what took place in Bosnia. But since there were international forces inside Macedonia, especially NATO forces, it was made difficult for that “someone” to start something.

In terms of the Macedonians displaced from Tetovo and who gave the order and for what aims, there were several versions of that story circulating in public. My knowledge about that was based on certain facts that were circulating in that region.

Up to July 5, 2001, that is until the signing of the ceasefire Agreement, the road Tetovo - Iazhintse was guarded by the police forces of the Interior Ministry, except for the Iazhintse Watchtower which was secured by ARM. The road was free for movement and the border at Iazhintse was operational. The whole area had regular police stations, reserve police stations and police stations with very strong forces, manned by about 450 active police reservists.

In the beginning, I personally had no official information regarding the displacement of the Macedonian population in that region “where the terrorists had regrouped and were terrorizing the Macedonian people.”

I contacted Peter Faith and informed him that terrorists had taken over the road Tetovo - Iazhintse and if they didn’t release it, as per our ceasefire Agreement, we would be taking military action.

Faith asked me not to take military action, but to give him 6 hours to go to Prizren and consult with Ali Ahmeti. I also informed the President about all this and he accepted Faith’s request to give him the 6 hours. On top of our conversation I also wrote an official warning letter.

The letter said:

“With this letter, we once again confirm that the Macedonian security forces are instructed to strictly comply with the provisions of the ceasefire Agreement signed on July 6, 2001.”

Later they received instructions to cooperate with the arrangement for demilitarizing the road and villages along the road Tetovo -Iazhintse, not to enter those villages and to refrain from entering the demilitarized zones, unless otherwise instructed.

“In regards to the Tetovo - Iazhintse road, the Macedonian security forces will abide by these arrangements as discussed with the President of the Republic of Macedonia.”

Chief of Staff of General Headquarters Signature: Pande Petrovski

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