OPERATION “RUGINTSE”

OPERATION “RUGINTSE”

Rugintse Region, with its village Rugintse, is located north of the village Slupchane and west of the village Vaksintse. That space was not controlled by ARM because located north of Rugintse are ARM’s defensive positions and the watchtower Strazha. About 30 to 50, mostly elderly people, live in several neighbourhoods in the village. We did not observe any terrorist movements there.

On May 17, 2001 we captured a terrorist in the region about 1 km south of Strazha. From what he told us, we discovered that he belonged to a group of terrorists stationed in the village Rugitse, in three houses behind the mosque.

We immediately planned an operation to break up the group of terrorists in that village. We then watched the village for a day and from our observations we confirmed that indeed there was a group of armed terrorists numbering 15 to 20, located in the three houses at the end of the village.

The plan called for a secret operation to take place in the early morning hours while the terrorist were sleeping. The task fell on the Sixth Squad. The only people that knew about this operation were Colonel Stoiche Zengovski and Major Zoran Blazhevski as well as General Risto Galevski who was expected to prepare criminal technicians from the police and de-mining specialists, who on May 21, 2001, at 06:00 hours, were to report to Petrovats Airport to be transferred to the designated area by helicopter.

We decided to execute the operation on May 21, 2001. Because of the secrecy of the operation, on May 20, 2001 we landed three teams from the Sixth Squad at the Strazha watchtower who, during the night of May 20/21, 2001, were expected to get close to the three houses in the village Rugintse and be ready to attack. The attack itself was to begin at 04:00 hours. The units in the village Alasevtse were ordered to close off all accesses from the villages Rugintse in the direction of Slupchane, especially the Slupchane River. This was to be done on the night of May 20/21, 2001.

The entire operation was kept secret and was done with the approval of President Trajkovski. The only other person that knew about it was Defense Minister Vlado Buchkovski.

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Military Secret - Strictly confidential Attack order - to destroy the terrorists

1. - Located in the second and third house behind the mosque in the village Rugintse (see attached schematic) is a group of 25 terrorists armed with AP “Kalashnikov” of Chinese origin and other light weapons. About 25 civilians are located throughout the village. The group is logistically supported by the local population. The terrorist group has positioned strategic monitors who are tasked with watching in the direction of the villages: Strazha - Slupchane -Rugintse: Alashovtsi - Rugintse: Belanovtse - Slupchane, as well as watching our forces in these directions.

2. The 6th Detachment, with artillery support from Alashevtse Region and the units from the points Strazha and Belanovtse, are to execute training exercises and land the 4 teams in their designated places and then monitor the terrorists in the village Rugintse. The teams are then to attack and destroy the terrorists at the most opportune moment. Combat support helicopters hub 105 mm, battery MF 120 mm and PLRF. The means to act and perform the tasks will be decidede by the 6th Detachment Commander. Landing time 07:00 hours, May 19, 2001. Deadline to break the terrorists May 20, 2001.

3. -While executing the designated tasks, civilian casualties must be avoided. Prisoners are to be treated according to the Geneva Convention.

4 - All other measures and activities are to be taken under the aforementioned regulations.

SP/TA - bornar 1805

ARM Chief of Staff of General Headquarters Lt General Iovan Andreevski, signature

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On May 20, 2001, Colonel Stoiche Zengovski submitted a report with a schematic diagram of the houses which the terrorists had entered in the village Rugintse in the evening. After that confirmation was given the operation was approved and scheduled to commence at 04:00 hours on May 21, 2001.

EXECUTING OPERATION “FIRE”

The action began at 04:30 hours with multiple 128 mm rocket launchers targeting the three houses in the village Rugintse and lasted until 05:00 hours. The assault began with the four teams from the 6th Detachment attacking. At the same time, other units started demonstrative attacks in front of the villages Slupchane, Orizare and Vaksintse, assisted by artillery attacks for legitimate purposes.

By 07:00 hours on May 21, 2001, the landing of the 20 police officers and crime technicians, to examine the terrain, was successfully completed.

The captives from the village Rugintse were taken to Kumanovo by helicopter.

The operation was performed at lightning fast speed both in time and space. It was implemented exactly and as accurately as planned. Two sport utility vehicles with terrorists were sent from the villages Slupchane - Rugintse as reinforcements. They were allegedly military police of the so called NLA - that’s what was written on their jeeps. The two vehicles fell into an ambush and were stormed and smashed with the vehicles being completely destroyed. A number of the terrorists managed to escape into the forest towards the village Slupchane, leaving their vehicles behind without any resistance. The actions in that entire region lasted until to 14:00 hours. Our units covered the villages Slupchane, Orizare and Otlia

without entering them. Among the arsenal captured were five films showing the terrorists. That day we managed to push the terrorists to uncover themselves because for days they had disappeared - so at 15:00 hours a group of them appeared to be coming out of the village Vaksintse to provide assistance to those in the village Rugintse. We attacked this group at TT - 764.

A warehouse full of ammunition, fuel and other equipment was destroyed in the village Rugitse and captured were three M 48 automatic rifles and a lot of ammunition.

It was obvious that the terrorists knew we were coming but what was unclear to me is who tipped them off. Thirty minutes before our arrival at the village Rugintse the terrorists had left the three houses where they were staying overnight. We seized a large quantity of food and a lot of equipment from those houses. We also found food being prepared and cooked for May 21, 2001 and stoves burning, etc. From the people expected to be there, all we found was one armed terrorist. After investigating what had happened, we found out that the group had left an hour before the attack. It fled in the direction of the village Slupchane.

Despite taking all precautionary measures and secrecy with this operation, the terrorists had been informed anyway, an hour before our attack. Only a small circle of people were familiar with this operation, and even less people were familiar with its schedule.

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER MAY 25, 2001?

As expected, after May 25, 2001, after the “Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac” was dissolved, part of its fighters spilled over into the Republic of Macedonia - most of them went to Karadak Region to the 114 Brigade which had about 175 fighters, equipped with 82 mm and 120 mm mortars, 2M arrow type anti-aircraft missiles, etc. They somehow had transferred this equipment through Skopje Tsrna Gora, probably with the help of the “humanitarian” organizations.

By holding the people hostage in all villages, except in Loiane and Vaksintse, with about 15 to 20 armed men and by using the

“humanitarian organizations” the terrorists managed to maintain themselves in the villages Orizare, Slupchane and Otlia. The village Lipkovo was their so-called “NLA” command and administration centre. The security forces did not act in the village so as not to endanger, among other things, the hospital in the village. At one point there were 12,000 refugees in Lipkovo gathered from all the other villages. According to information we received, in addition to the hospital being in danger, there was also a real danger that the Lipkovo Lake dam could be damaged. But still, in spite of all that, it was not a particular problem for conducting military action.

Mateiche was the last village where terrorists appeared and that was after May 25, 2001. There was a police station in the village Mateiche which was responsible for the whole area with a mixed population of Albanians, Serbians and Macedonians. Besides the usual number of regular policemen, the police station was reinforced with extra police. We had strong forces in Novo Selo, Umin Dol and Nikushtak to control the road from the village Arachinovo to Mateiche and Kumanovo.

After May 25, 2001, terrorists began to appear north of the village Mateiche, near the Mateiche monastery. The Vuksantse River was a suitable place for them to hide while traveling along the main road Otija - Mateiche and the road to Monastirska Voda.

At one point the Macedonian residents living in the village Mateiche were evicted. There was no logical reason for evicting these people since the village was quiet and problem free, our security forces never had to act in it, yet the residents left.

On several occasions, the commander of the police station in the village Mateiche wanted us to take action in the area of the village where Albanians lived because, according to him, the Albanians were allegedly hiding terrorists in their houses. Normally I would not accept such a request but I decided to further investigate the matter and take action if necessary. If there were terrorists then the commander had a strong enough force of his own to capture them or break them up. If he couldn’t do that with his own forces then he should identify the houses they were staying in and we would make

a plan of action and arrest them - but naturally this was of course a police matter.

An Albanian person was killed by the police at a check point on the road Otlia - Mateiche. After that incident the police withdrew from the mostly Albanian populated northern end of Mateiche. ARM was not informed about this withdrawal. The withdrawal was justified as fear of retaliation and so the police retreated to the police station and then demanded that they be reinforced with tanks even though they had never been attacked.

The police attitude here “sowed fear” and managed to start a mass exodus of the non-Albanian population because they feared an “alleged ARM offensive on the village Mateiche.” After the non-Albanians started leaving, many robberies took place and people began to loot the properties of people they knew. I informed President Boris Trajkovski and the Internal Ministry of this.

After the Macedonian population was displaced, we increased our pressure by engaging ARM in the village Mateiche. Initially I rejected their requests because I was not convinced that there was need, because the village already had 100 police officers. But still the requests kept coming. So, ARM strengthened the police with one tank and one mechanized platoon.

Immediately after we added the ARM forces, without informing me, the police began to plan and execute actions to clean the part of the village where Albanians lived (the north part of the village Mateiche). They sent the one tank along the way from the south to the north of the village and to the mosque. About 30 to 40 metres behind the tank they filled bags with sand and made shelters, in other words they built a check point. Then, because supposedly there were terrorists in the mosque, they started to act. In this action, a police officer hit the tank with a weapon “zolia” - certainly not intentionally. The driver of the tank was wounded and the tank was set ablaze in front of the mosque. When we investigated the destruction of the tank and the wounding of the tank driver, we revealed the truth - at that time there were terrorists in that place. Why did someone want the village Mateiche to be covered by military actions (as opposed to police actions) was not clear to me?

But in several cases after that, unbeknownst to ARM - the police abandoned certain check points. They left the check point in Lipkovosko Lake (27 officers), leaving it to the Army units that were in position at Alashevtse (east of the dam).

After the formation of a new Government in the Republic of Macedonia, under a broader coalition, conditions for resolving the crisis completely changed. After Vlado Buchkovski was appointed Defense Minister, many things changed. After Minister Liuben Paunovski was removed - that function (Minister of Defense), for a while, was taken over by Prime Minister Georgievski, and essentially there was no Minister of Defense until Buchkovski was elected. So, in addition to President Boris Trajkovski and Prime Minister Liupcho Georgievski attending the top state leadership meetings, after the formation of the Broader Coalition Government, there were also Branko Tsrvenkovski, Vlado Buchkovski, Ilinka Mitreva, Liube Boskovski as representative of the Interior Ministry, Zoran Verushevski as Director of the Interior Ministry for counter-intelligence, General Risto Galevski, myself (Pande Petrovski), and other military and political personalities as they were required.

In other words, after the formation of the coalition government, a lot of things, in terms of the goals that the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia had generated for solving problems, became much clearer to me, primarily because of the fact that everything was done not to resolve the crisis quickly with military-political means when the Republic of Macedonia was fully capable of doing exactly that.

During my first meeting with Minister Vlado Buckovski and Branko Tsrvenkovski we talked about MANU’s idea, before the “exchange of territories and division of the Republic of Macedonia’s territory” became public. We talked about many things regarding the situation in the Republic of Macedonia, especially about the purpose for triggering the crises. In addition to that, Branko Tsrvenkovski (then leader of the SDSM party and a Member of Parliament) informed me about the proposed division of the Republic of Macedonia; the relocation of the population; who advocated that idea; and who wanted to implement it. Besides all that he said: “This idea will quickly become public knowledge”. And so it was. He emphasized that the broader coalition was adopted primarily to prevent such an

idea advocated by individuals... At my insistence, Iovo Andreevski, as Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, was invited to be present and to also be informed by Branko Tsrvenkovski. After Iovo Andreevski joined us, Tsrvenkovski, once again, went over what he had told me, but with a much more dramatic tone. Iovo Andreevski was silent all the time, showing no outward expression. Branko Tsrvenkovski, in front of Andreevski, then mentioned the names of the individuals who were advocating the idea of dividing the Republic of Macedonia and who intended to implement it. Prime Minister Georgievski and President Boris Trajkovski were quickly informed of this conversation and so was the Cabinet of the Defense Minister.

I picked up many things from this: in terms of the government’s ultimate goals; in terms of the sincerity to resolve the crisis by military means; in terms of establishing full control of the territory by military means, etc. After my conversation with Branko Tsrvenkovski, most government figures changed their attitude towards me in terms of their confidence in me as the leader of ARM.

It was very strange and illogical, when at the beginning of the crisis our leadership did not properly interpret the aims of the so-called NLA - but immediately called them terrorists - when the so-called NLA’s goals were obvious. The West called these people “Ethnic Albanian armed groups” fighting for their national rights.

I repeatedly tried to define these goals for the state leadership, but it seems I was not understood. I personally thought then and I still think today that the military crisis was purposely staged, strictly controlled, externally supported and planned with the knowledge of the political structures that were then in power in the Republic of Macedonia. Later, during the political negotiations, with respect to the Framework Agreement, this was confirmed. The faction that had interest in this was the same faction that represented the so-called NLA’s interests in the negotiations.

The whole scenario surrounding the military crisis, from the beginning, was well-known to some of the people in the ruling government. To them it was not important to find a way of resolving the crisis, to them it was much more important to find a way to

justify their political exploitations in front of the Macedonian people. But when we began to address the military crisis with serious military means, when there was “danger” that the “ethnic Albanian armed groups” would be broken up, in order to prevent this, some Western countries activated the finale with a political agreement. Among other activities to control the crisis, was the formation of the “wider coalition” whose aim was to reach a political resolution.

Even though Tetovo and Kumanovo Regions were fully under the control of the Republic of Macedonia’s security forces, and even though the terrorists in Kumanovo were completely smashed, the political factors still treated the so-called NLA like some kind of important military factor in order to keep the tension going. Namely, no measures had been taken, in terms of military means, by the so-called NLA to justify itself to the public that it was a legitimate force in the crisis worthy of political consideration. Something more serious had to be done, the so-called NLA had to invent some kind of operation where it “dominated” the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia in order to continue the crisis and so that it could be resolved by political means. By this time the extraction of civilians from Kumanovo Region was in the final stages and the terrorists were defeated. Terrorists had not appeared in Tetovo for months because conditions there were not viable due to the presence of ARM.

So, no time was wasted in inventing a means to force out the Macedonian people from the Shar Planina villages and that was done quickly. Then a media campaign was started. Accusation were made such as “how the Army does not support the police”; “how the police are insufficiently armed with armoured personnel carriers and artillery”; “how the police should take over command for conducting military actions”; “and that the Interior Ministry should form its own special units,”; etc.

Among others, in that period, without the knowledge of ARM and the Interior Ministry 30,000 “Kalashnikov” type rifles were imported from Bulgaria and stashed in the ARM warehouses in Kochani, and later distributed to the population, especially to people in Tetovo. This was the beginning of the turning of the crisis into

chaos in the Republic of Macedonia, with aims at sending it out of control.