NOTES - Part 03

e) The Greek borders should include all unrepresented Greek populations in the Dodecanese and Cyprus which, historically, ethnologically and socially, are part of the Greek people... (See: Athens newspaper “Eleftheria”, February 6, 1945, also see: Hristo Andonovski: “Macedonians under Greece in the fight against fascism”, INI, 1968, pp. 154-155)...

119 ST ARMATA... p. 330-332, according to Naum Peiov: “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece”, INI 1968, p. 187 and so on...

120 An official German archival document was published in Greece: “The Churchill-Hitler Agreement” regarding the free and uninterrupted withdrawal of German forces from Greece. About that the Athens newspaper TA NEA wrote: “The British fox has achieved a double goal - it left the German forces to fight against the Russians and seized Greece unhindered…” (TA NEA, January 14, 1978, page 12, column “To vivlion”)...

121 As a thesis for its “40th Anniversary” the CPG, during its CPG Central Committee IX Plenum, held in August 1958, recognized that the Greek Armed Forces, with “The Caserta Agreement, were placed under the command of English General Skobi”, and “that prohibited ELAS from entering big cities and important strategic regions including Athens, Central and Eastern Macedonia, Epirus, etc….” (See: SARANDA HRONIA TU KKE, CPG Central Committee 1958 edition, p. 715)...

122 It was characteristic for Siantos and Partsalidis to have signed an agreement which they were not authorized to sign. As it was

well-known the CPG Central Committee Politburo had authorized these two to sign the agreement which called for the dissolution of ELAS, but it was supposed to be done under “unconditional general amnesty”, which was intended to protect all from prosecution including themselves, members of the CPG and ELAS fighters. According to “Hronikon tu agona”: “CPG Central Committee Politburo representatives Georgios Siantos and Mitsos Partsalidis... have violated the condition for a general unconditional amnesty, which was set by the Politburo. The Varkiza Agreement which called for disarming the movement in fact turned out to be unconditional capitulation…. On the one hand it gave the English the opportunity to restore the Monarcho-Fascists in Greece so that they could completely break down the people’s democratic forces and consolidate their power in Greece and, on the other, created a serious obstacle to the rapid political and organizational consolidation for the people’s democratic forces…!” (Party edition of HRONIKON TU AGONA (Chronicle of War) 1878-1951, p. 49.)

123 See: TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952, p. 219. OR: NEOS COSMOS number 10/1950.

124 See: TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952, p. 110...

125

126 The Resolution reads: “The Plenum proclaims that with our presence and with support from our two great friends - England and Russia, our peaceful development depends on the Greek brotherly agreement and democratic cooperation with the northern Balkan democracies...” Here Russia is mentioned after England. But this was just diplomatic courtesy designed to blur and conceal the truth. Namely, in his opening statement Zahariadis, as I already mentioned, was very specific about the English presence in Greece as being necessary “to ensure our positions and our borders in the north…” (see: Brochure APOFASIS TIS 12 Olomelias, telikos logos Nikos Zahariadis - 12th PLENUM DECISION, opening statement and conclusion by Nikos Zahariadis, CPG Central Committee 1946 edition, p. 21. OR: FORTY YEARS OF CPG, p. 645)...

127 NEOS COSMOS 4-5 / 1957. Or: Hristo Andonovski, THE TRUTH ABOUT AEGEAN MACEDONIA, 1971, p. 226.

128 NEOS COSMOS 4-5 / 1957. Hristo Andonovski, THE TRUTH ABOUT AEGEAN MACEDONIA, p. 197...

129 CHRONOLOGY, Aegean Macedonia at the national liberation war, Republic Board of the Union of Fighters edition, 1974, p. 141...

130 NEOS COSMOS 4-5 / 1957. Hristo Andonovski, THE TRUTH ABOUT AEGEAN MACEDONIA, p. 226...

131 On October 18, 1944, Georgios Papandreou left Cairo and arrived in Athens with the government in exile. After two reorganizations, one on October 24 and the other in November 2, 1944, his government fell. The next government, headed by Nikolaos Plastiras, also fell after two months in power. It was replaced by an “administrative government” headed by a naval officer named Petros Vulgaris. After reorganizing on August 11, 1945, Petros Vulgaris was forced to withdraw from power on October 17, 1945. Archbishop Damaskinos, the regent, comes to power after that but only for two weeks. On November 1, 1945, Georgios Kanelopoulos managed to form a new government, but only for three weeks. After that it fell too. There was great need to legitimize and strengthen the power of the reactionaries but it had to be done through “elections”. For that reason the British, on November 22, 1945, chose their own candidate and party - the Liberals… headed by Themistoklis Sofoulis. At this critical juncture the CPG (Zahariadis), on November 25, 1945, during public meetings, advised (see COMEP 12/1945), both the civilian citizens and those serving in the armed forces, that they had the right, by all means possible, to prevent a coup d’etat instigated by the political right by observing and following Sofulis’s directives. By doing this the CPG gave this government the general support it needed to carry out its own “election coup” by “forging” the March 31, 1946 election... The CPG-EAM’s lack of participation in the elections, which no doubt was a staged and significant maneuver, held back huge masses of people from voting and allowed the British and the domestic reactionaries to gain victory and to develop legitimacy, which “was granted to the Monarchists of the Populist Party, and

“LEGALIZED” the way to restoring the Monarchy and strengthening the power of the counterrevolution in Greece; a prerequisite for finally breaking the Left. This was the Anglo-American game played by the CPG, especially by Markos and Zahariadis... the events speak for themselves... we were betrayed by the CPG leadership…!

132 TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952, p. 271...

133 Ibid, p. 149...

134 “Those who were not mobilized were left behind to build fortifications, or were left behind due to illness. With this order, practically ALL MACEDONIANS FROM LERIN and KOSTUR REGIONS were mobilized…” said General Markos (Kliakich, 250).

135 The following was said during the CPG Central Committee V Plenum, held in January 1949: “The Slavo-Macedonian people in Northern Greece gave their all to the struggle with great heroism and self-sacrifice which aroused our admiration. There should be no doubt that when DAG comes out victorious and we win the people’s revolution, the Macedonian people will accomplish their complete national establishment as they wish, for the blood they are shedding today…” (TO KKE AP 1931-1952, p. 195. Or: DEMOCRATIKOS STRATOS, No. 2/1949.)

136 This was also expressed during the CPG 3rd Congress held in December 1924! (KKE, episima kimena - CPG, official texts, vol. I, 1918-1924, PLE 1964, p. 515)... After the CPG Central Committee 5th Plenum was held on January 30-31, 1949, the NOF Central Council II Plenum was held on February 3-4, 1949. Zahariadis, who personally led NOF affairs at the time, “proposed” a Resolution which was then adopted by open vote (raising of the arm). Among other things, the Resolution said: “The Second Plenum has decided to convene a Second NOF Congress in March 1949... The Second NOF Congress will proclaim the new NOF programming principles that represent the century-long aspiration of our people. The second congress will announce the unification of the Macedonian people in a single independent state in the framework of a People’s

Democratic Balkan Federation…!” (See: NEPO, Turkish and KOREN, February 15, 1949)...

137 As is well-known, the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece passed a law on August 27, 1948, to allow the formation of a high military council which then took over the military leadership and DAG’s other activities. Markos was suspended as supreme commander. On the same day a special Decree was enacted, on the basis of which eight divisions were formed from the overall DAG forces. Three divisions, the 9th, 10th, and 11th were formed in Western Macedonia, where the Macedonian people were a large majority. The rest were formed as follows: The 8th was formed in Epirus, the 1st in Thessaly, the 2nd in Rumeli, the 3rd in the Peloponnesus and the 6th in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. It is true that the divisions in Western Macedonia had a certain percentage of Greeks in their ranks but the divisions in the neighbouring areas such as Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Thessaly and Epirus, especially in Epirus, also had a larger percentage of Macedonians in their ranks. The case of the 8th Division in Epirus was characteristic: The command of this division was forced to order the Macedonians not to speak their own language, not to sing or play Macedonian songs, not to dance Macedonian folk dances, and to represent themselves as Greeks... because this was, they were told, in the interests of the struggle! Namely, because the uninformed population in Epirus, under enemy influence, was fleeing from the formations believing that they were “international Slav brigades” that allegedly penetrated Greece from the territory of its northern neighbours. This shows indisputably that this division was composed mainly of Macedonian fighters. Therefore, the truth is that Macedonia became the main focus of the revolution, and the Macedonians fighters and people represented DAG’s main strike force...

138 TO KKE AP TO 1931-1952, p. 272...

139 I used quotation marks here because this was the title of a text belonging to Dr. Risto Kiriazovski. It was very similar to the title “Attitudes and Practice” of the CPG leadership from Naum Peiov’s text...

140 A few months after I offered my booklet for publication to “Glasnik”, an INI organ, it was rejected and returned to me. However, some five or six months later, I read a column on “new books” in “Nova Makedonija” and there, among them, was the title “The Macedonian Revolutionary Press in Aegean Macedonia” by Risto Kiriazovski...