Front Matter - Part 02

I never wanted to be a teacher. But the circumstances forced me to become one. I convinced myself that this would only be the first stage of my career and I that would achieve something more in life. Having no opportunity to further my education in an institution, I decided to educate myself, through reading books. I read quite a few. I even dreamt about following Gorky’s path and leaving something behind to help the next generation improve their lives. The article I mentioned earlier, about the intellectual who killed his wife, is an example and a tangible expression my dreams. I still have that article today, it has been preserved. When my mother visited me here in Skopje in 1964, she brought it to me. I translated it and I have it ready in the Macedonian language under the title “Vampires”.

Things in the school went well. Both the students and adults accepted me and liked me. The 1938-1939 school year ended successfully. Then, sometime in July 1939, when Italy was threatening to invade Greece and a preventive mobilization was taking place, I met my future and first wife Niki Kachorova from the

village Sorovich. But soon after Greece and Italy signed a “non-proliferation treaty” I was demobilized. The new 1939-1940 school year began normally. Then I got an urgent invitation to go to the district office in Subotsko and see officer Korinas, a Vlach by origin, born in Sorovich. By then I had married Niki in Sorovich and he knew me. He led the 2nd Bureau information service of the Greek Army stationed along the border sector. He asked me to enlist everyone in the village Tsakoni and Bidzhovo Maalo, particularly Hristo Andonovski, now a resident of Skopje, Kosta Markovski, now a resident of Kavadartsi, Vangel Tsakonchev, now a resident of Skopje, and Georgi Baltakov killed a few years later. The first three were students and intellectuals, the last one was a businessman in the village.

I agreed and went on my way to look for them.

I individually informed the first three that Officer Korinas was looking for them and that I was to “deliver them to him”. They were grateful for that. But, unfortunately, I could not convince Baltakov. I visited him at his home. He offered me rakia and snacks and left me there alone... He escaped. I then asked one of the other three, I think it was Andonovski, to give him the message that Officer Korinas was looking for him...

Life flowed calmly but tensions were high. King Gligzburg and General Metaxas’s fascist regime was stubbornly pursuing the democratic forces all throughout the Greek state, especially in Macedonia. Terror was raging everywhere. Mass arrests were carried out in the surrounding villages. In the neighbouring village Poliani, for example, 70 people were arrested and taken away the same day. By bribing the “corrupt conscience” of certain individuals (the terms borrowed from a Party document), they managed to infiltrate the Party’s governing bodies. The fascist regime was able to take over almost all of the more important officials and active members of the CPG, which caused “heavy blows to the Party”. The ruling bourgeoisie, that is, the Gligzburg-Metaxas axis and their patrons the English imperialists, were more and more afraid of Greece’s inner enemy, than they were of the Rome-Berlin axis...

There was no Party organization in Tsakoni and Bidzhovo Maalo. Generally the left leaning people there laid low and anxiously awaited their fate. But there were no betrayals and no harm came to them. No one was arrested. On October 28, 1940, fascist Italy attacked Greece and I found myself on the frontline.

The CPG leaders and activists imprisoned in the Acronavillon prison made a proposal to the Metaxas government to allow them to take measures to strengthen themselves both on the battlefront and on the inner front. Namely, they demanded that they be allowed to go all the way to the front and, on the inside, stop the prosecutions against the CPG and the democratic forces in general.

Metaxas and the English, however, turned them down.

In April 1941, the Germans invaded Greece and the Greek leadership capitulated... The Asfalia handed over all Communist prisoners to the Gestapo to be physically liquidated.

After Greece capitulated to Germany, the front in Albania was abandoned along with the Greek army. I had to walk home on foot to Lerin all the way from Albania. With the fall of Crete on May 31, 1941, Greece was under complete occupation. It was now divided into three occupation zones - German, Italian and Bulgarian.

When I returned I was informed by the education services in Lerin that the schools all throughout Greece were still functioning, so I went back to my old job.

By then the occupiers had confiscated almost all available vehicles and large amounts of food. Large city and town centres were left without food. Hundreds of thousands of people were left to starve. The villages were flooded with city people looking for food. They were prepared to sell the clothes off their backs for a handful of corn or beans.

There were no students attending classes and the schools did not work at all. Everyone was afraid of being arrested and physically liquidated. The local reactionary elements took it upon themselves

to rise and carry out treachery against their own people in aid of the Gestapo and the Gestapo had no problem with that.

There was a great need to defend the people. I knew from before that Hrisostomos Hilipoulos, director of the school in Poliani, Nikos Evdoridis, director of the school in Dolno Pozharsko and Georgios Georgiadis, a teacher in Subotsko, were Communists. Many people were afraid of being betrayed so they spent the nights away from their homes. After contacting the people I knew well, we decided to defend ourselves against the spies by creating what we called “party cells” each consisting of three armed individuals. Each cell was tasked with organizing resistance. They were to begin collecting the abandoned weapons the soldiers, returning from the Albanian front, had left behind. They were also tasked with liquidating dangerous spies, collecting food and medicines and finding secure shelter for those who were abused and tortured and in danger of being killed by the occupiers and the local reactionaries.

My first associates in Tsakoni in this relationship were Hristo Andonovski, Kosta Markovski, and Vangel Tsakonchev. Each created their own separate cell thus widening and expanding the Party network. Hiliopoulos, Evdoridis and I, in the meantime, acted as the Party’s governing body in our region and oversaw their functions.

Sometime in April-May 1942 Comrade Nikos or Psileas (which means a tall man in Greek) arrived, and our Party organization was subordinated to the CPG Voden Region District Committee leadership.

Shortly afterwards, Comrade Vasilis, member of the District Committee, an incredibly fat person, responsible for issues in the ELAS reserves, ordered me to create an ELAS reserve unit based in the village Piperia. The population there knew me and trusted me, so it was no problem for me to become a commander of an ELAS reserve unit. Later the unit I created and led participated in the attacks and destruction of the quisling police stations in Meglen Region.

As a gesture of recognition, the District Committee gave me a new directive. My orders were to go to Ostrovo, to the neighbouring district, and take over command of the ELAS reserve battalion, which at the time, I was told, was based in the village Ostrovo. It was November 1943, and bitterly cold, my trip was difficult. But, as it turned out, I was a commander without an army. Such a battalion did not exist. It was my job to create it...

The Macedonian population there was unsure of what was going to happen. It stood on the sidelines waiting. This was the first time I found out that a Macedonian national organization (SNOF) had been formed in the neighbouring Lerin district. I became very curious as to why we in Meglen Region were not informed and knew nothing about this? Why did SNOF exist only there, and not here and everywhere where Macedonians lived?

After several hours of rowing with the help of a young fisherman named Pando Georgievski from Ostrovo, now a resident of Skopje, I made my way across the lake in Ostrovo and arrived in the village Patele in Lerin Region. There I made contact with the SNOF activists... After returning to my own district I wrote a letter and sent it to the CPG District Committee for Voden Region in which I pointed out that the Macedonian population in Voden Region was left unguarded and at the disposal of the enemy and its propaganda. EAM and ELAS were Greek national organizations whose programs did not envisage any rights for the Macedonian people. This has created distrust and reservations among the Macedonians. I suggested that SNOF be expanded here in Voden Region... I was well aware that by doing this I openly declared myself against the CPG’s anti-Macedonian policy applied here. I also wrote that I, of course, could not have taken into account all the contributing factors that the CPG used to draft such a policy and, possibly, I could be wrong. I then asked them not to leave me wondering and, if I was wrong, they should point it out...

They completely ignored my request. SNOF was not expanded and no one said that I was wrong about anything. About a month later, in May, 1944, they disbanded and destroyed SNOF everywhere, wherever it existed in Lerin and Kostur Regions...

I stayed in Ostrovo District for about seven months. Even though I failed to create a complete battalion, I was able to create two complete units which I can proudly say were were well-organized and capable. I was told this by my ELAS comrades who had military experience. One of my units took part in the ELAS combat actions against the colaborist Kolaras in the village Muralar. I was ordered to make the unit ready and available.

In the middle of May 1944, the District Committee ordered me to go back to Meglen Region. They also handed me a letter to deliver to Barba Traiko (Nikos Papasermitsis) who then was secretary of the Macedonian district committee based in the village Tresino. After reading the letter, Barba Traiko showed some respect for me and gave me special attention. Together we visited the Macedonian villages in the region, spoke at rallies and agitated and explained our position to the people. But we did not prevent the appearance of the Bulgarian unit, led by Bulgarian officer Dimchev, in Voden which, I believe, I was sent to prevent. Around June 15, 1944, I suggested to the regional committee that in order for us to stop our people from joining the Bulgarian unit, it was important that we establish separate Macedonian military formations within ELAS. My suggestion was taken seriously and Macedonian formations began to appear. Secretary Barba Tpaiko explained this and received approval from the District Committee. (6)

About a month later, Blazhe (Georgi Atanasov) and I began mobilizing fighters in the Macedonian villages. Mobilization for the ELAS Voden Macedonian Battalion began on July 16, 1944.

Unfortunately, the District Committee in Voden, for some reason, thought that these formations were the work of the Macedonian Partisans from the Yugoslav part of Macedonia. (7) Regarding this, Oche (Vangel Aianovski), a CPG activist, wrote that Dzhodzho Urdov, then organizational secretary of the District Committee, was given the task to go to Kaimakchalan and lead a raid against them and disband this “newly created Yugoslav Army”. And if he encountered resistance, to use all necessary force... (8)

But before any harm was done, Barba Tpaiko arrived in Voden District and explained to the Committee that these were “our local

Macedonian formations”… and that there was no need to attack them.

We were very careful on how we presented our Macedonian unit. We made sure people understood that it was a Macedonian unit. It represented the material strength of the Macedonian national idea. We made sure the people heard us and not our enemy’s propaganda, which professed that it was a Greek partisan unit disguised to fool the misguided Macedonians. Our ideological and political work was done through leaflets and announcements. We were also planning to publish a newspaper but it did not materialize. We gave up using the Cyrillic alphabet, because it looked like the Bulgarian one, to avoid Greek propaganda. We also stopped using the Greek alphabet for similar reasons. I had to invent a special temporary Macedonian alphabet. (9)

Petros (Hristos Moshos) representative of the ELAS 10th division was one of the first people to pay us a visit to see what was going on. It was explained to him that this Macedonian unit, these volunteer fighters, were here because they were invited to join the Macedonian unit in accordance with a decision made by the Tresino Macedonian regional committee to create a Macedonian unit. He could not even refrain from hiding his fury. He yelled out: “Why did this have to be done now and separately? Why was this not done at the very beginning and as part of the ELAS units?” He then stormed out leaving us to wonder what had happened… The fate of our Macedonian unit seemed to be completely uncertain right from the start...

Two and a half weeks later Barba Tpaiko returned. Barba Nikos (Tahis Papadopoulos), first District Committee secretary, Dzhodzho Urdov, second District Committee secretary, and Petros (Hristos Moshos), who was there earlier, came with him. By then about 300 volunteers had already joined the battalion. As a gesture of recognition for my previous work they offered me command of the battalion. But I graciously declined. The reason for suggesting that I take command, I believe, was to recognize my contribution in putting together and organizing the ELAS reserves, for coming up with the idea of forming a Macedonian unit, something the District Committee had tried in Voden but failed, and for the military

exercises I organized and conducted with the unit... In my explanation for declining the offer I said: “I don’t think I can take responsibility for the fate of the entire battalion, I don’t have the experience…” Even then, I had no doubt that as a commander I would be given orders that I would not agree with, as well as dangerous missions that would have put the battalion in great danger; I could not live with that. So Dzhodzho Urdov, a CPG representative, was appointed head of the battalion. His military sub-commander, or second in command, was a Greek man from Crete named Levteris Foundoulakis. I was appointed third in command, responsible for the ideological and political needs of the fighters.

Foundoulakis did not speak Macedonian so he had no contact with the fighters. And even though Dzhodzho Urdov had good common sense, he lacked the vocabulary and avoided making contact and speaking in front of the fighters. So, as a command representative, I was constantly with the fighters, which meant that the battalion was practically in my hands. This explains how I was able to convince the battalion to cross into the Yugoslav part of Macedonia.

Many years later, General Markos will confirm this: “The Voden Macedonian battalion withdrew to Kavadartsi, Republic of Macedonia through Kozhuv Mountain. It did this to escape the danger of being attacked and disarmed…” Of course by Markos’s orders. “By doing this the Macedonian Voden battalion, unlike the Macedonian Lerin-Kostur ELAS battalion, avoided an attack.” For more details about this see my INI text entitled “The dawn is born in the deep night”... (10)

In November 1944, the “Aegean Brigade” was formed in Bitola. (11)

The “Aegean Brigade” was disbanded in April 1945, by the Political Commission for Aegean Macedonia. Created in its place was a new five-member founding NOF Bureau for Aegean Macedonia. It was comprised of Paskal Mitrevski, head of the Bureau and members Dzhodzho, Keramidzhiev, Koroveshov and Rakovski (author of this book)... Until November 21, 1946, NOF for Aegean Macedonia was run by the CPM Central Committee, i.e. by the CPY, first by Dimitar Aleksievski-Pekar and then by Nikola Minchev. From that

date forward NOF for Aegean Macedonia was subordinated to the CPG Central Committee Politburo leadership, i.e. to CPG General Secretary Nikos Zahariadis. The three NOF battalions were merged in DAG and placed under Markos’s command.

Of course, it was wrong for the CPY and its Central Committee to interfere in the CPG’s affairs in Greek occupied Macedonia just as it was wrong for the CPB to interfere in the CPY’s affairs in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia. But, on the other hand, the Macedonian people in the People’s Republic of Macedonia had full rights to be interested in the fate of the Macedonian people in the neighbouring countries. It was their duty! Bulgarian interference, however, was an entirely different affair.

According to Dragan Kliakich, Markos Vafiadis’s biographer, while compiling his biography, Markos said: “It should be openly said that the CPG Central Committee’s position on the Macedonian Question was wrong and very harmful to the Movement... Zahariadis had taken that direction because he was under Georgios Papandreou’s influence. Papandreou’s program for ‘national unity’ had no room for the Macedonians and for him ‘no Macedonian Question existed in Greece’…” (12) Georgios Papandreou was Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou’s father.

Of course, it was not only Zahariadis who worked against the Macedonians. The CPG Central Committee also took a similar position during its VI Plenum on July 1, 1941 and carried it to the end without Zahariadis, who at the time was in Gestapo hands.

The VI Plenum Resolution (13) is of significant importance for determining the CPG line towards the Macedonian National Question, as well as the historical moment when this line was adopted. With its establishment and implementation, as a generally “patriotic” line, it proved to be one of the most crucial events in recent Greek history. The road the CPG took for the sake of “national unity” with the domestic bourgeoisie and its parties, while struggling for the “national liberation” of the country and for the “strategic border security” it took against its neighbours, was a road to a special war fought against the very forces that fought for the democratization of the country and for the “social liberation” of the

people in Greece, which in itself was a war against the CPG itself. This is how history will see the line the CPG took during the VI Plenum Resolution.

Here are some facts:

- Goebbels said: “Europe will die so that Germany will live…” (14) Greece was monstrously robbed and left as a wasteland filled with death. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people of all ages experienced a terrible slow death due to hunger. There were also mass exterminations and destruction all throughout the Greek state. According to a German report dated July 6, 1943, regarding the political situation in Greece: “Ninety percent (90%) of the Greeks were unilaterally unfriendly towards the axis forces and were ready for an open uprising...” (15) But, in fact, there was no such open uprising. The CPG and EAM leaders skillfully directed the masses to take their anger out against the foreign occupiers in countless strikes, demonstrations and uneven battles in the streets. These forms of struggle, however, were harmless to the domestic bourgeoisie and to the policies of Greece’s patrons, the English imperialists.

- The atrocities committed by the occupiers slowly, steadily and massively drove the people to the mountains to organize a resistance movement. By mid-1943 there was a massive popular struggle brewing all throughout the Greek state. It was at that crucial moment that the National Liberation Army of Greece (ELAS) and the CPG-EAM-ELAC leaderships were placed under English command. Both General Headquarters as well as all other military Headquarters were staffed by British officers who executed the orders given to them by the British General Staff serving at the Middle East Headquarters. Large units, divisions, groups of divisions, etc., were in fact placed in the hands of the English Intelligence Service. This was verified by Vasilis Bardzhotas, DAG chief of staff and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, in an article published in NEOS COSMOS. (16)

- THE TASK, set out by the CPG Central Committee during its VI Plenum, held on July 1, 1941, before Party, that is, in front of “Every Special Communist”, was to ORGANIZE THE PEOPLE

FOR A NATIONAL UPRISING. This TASK, however, was silently neglected, and yet, when the atrocities committed by the occupiers forced the people to rise, despite being placed under English control, the CPG Central Committee, with its proclamation, on the occasion of the dissolution of the Comintern, declared that: “The Party of the Proletariat, the Communist Party of Greece, is fighting for national liberation today, and then, after the war is over, it will fight for a People’s Democracy…!” The struggle for the social liberation of the people was unfortunately suspended… “Postponed” for after the war! (17) This proclamation was practically a preventive measure to suppress ELAS’s public tendencies, in whose ranks the Communists played the main role, from turning the “national struggle” into a socialist revolution.

- The program task initiated to ensure possible cooperation with the other nations fighting against the Axis powers, and the coordination of the Greek people’s struggle with the people’s struggles of other nations, was not realized as expected. In fact what happened was completely inconsistent and downright scandalous. In mid-1943, CPG-ELAS representatives Thilemahos Ververis and Andreas Dzimas contacted communist representatives of the national liberation war in Yugoslavia and Albania and initiated talks about forming a people’s revolutionary union. An agreement was finally reached but only on a military and political basis. Among other things, according to a document written in French, of which I have a photocopy, the three (Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania) envisioned establishing a joint “Balkan Headquarters”. (18)

But, instead of following up with what had been agreed to with their neighbours, our Greek comrades in the CPG, EAM and ELAS went with the English… Ververis and Dzimas were, of course, criticized for this… But it was not difficult to see why the “patriotic” left leaders changed their minds… Had the people’s revolutionary union been formed as planned then this union would have to not only fight against the occupiers but it would also have to jointly participate in the class struggle in each country and eventually;

a) Confront the domestic bourgeoisie and, in Greece, its patrons the Anglo-Americans;

b) Bring change to the class and social character of the revolution, particularly in Greece; and

c) Create favourable conditions for developing a strong Macedonian people’s liberation movement. In other words, if a people’s revolutionary union was formed it would have created the right conditions for resolving the Macedonian National Question in favour of the Macedonian people, which would have meant that such a union would;

a) Deviate from or violate the already established CPG Party line for “national unity” and the “national front”. It would violate the non-confrontation agreement the Left, particularly EAM, had made with the domestic bourgeoisie and with the Anglo-Americans;

b) Deviate from or violate the already established Party policies for a “national liberation” through a “national struggle” in “national unity” with the bourgeoisie; and

c) Deviate from and violate the Party policy which demanded the suppression of any kind of Macedonian movement and from disabling the start of any anti-fascist Macedonian national liberation movement...

These were some of the reasons why the Greek Left “annulled all agreements regarding the creation of a joint Balkan headquarters and ended cooperation between the communist parties in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania regarding this matter.” (Tempo)... In the interest of objectivity and the truth let us, at this point, say that on September 21, 1943, Tito sent Tempo, the Yugoslav representative in this matter, a message with a directive “not to create a Balkan headquarters” because it had become “politically incorrect”. Regarding the “struggle for the Balkans” (1981, 134) Tempo wrote: “Comrade Tito felt that there should be guiding military centres in each country, and the necessary coordination of operations against the occupier should be provided from an allied base, through the military or political representatives at national headquarters!”

Like I said earlier, our Greek CPG, EAM and ELAS comrades, instead of developing a “socialist revolution” together with their

neighbours, went with the English and turned the people’s revolution into a “national struggle”, a struggle for “national liberation” working against a socialist revolution.

- Let us now look at one little minor fact.

Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo, a delegate and CPY Central Committee representative, stayed in Greece for about twenty days in the summer of 1943. He had meetings and lengthy talks with Georgios Siantos, then CPG secretary, and other CPG, EAM and ELAS senior officials. It is interesting to see what he had to say about that. On September 1, 1943, Tempo wrote:

“The Communist Party of Greece, together with EAM and ELAS, run their policies by relying mainly on English support. This, of course, does not mean that the CPG does not popularize the Soviet Union and the Red Army. But the entire National Liberation Movement today is tied first to England. In all their gatherings they (CPG/EAM/ELAS) primarily popularized England first and then its allies, the Americans and the Soviet Union in that order. This is done in order not to colour the national liberation movement too much. The say they lead policies which are in support of England because the English headquarters is closest to them and because they want to use English weapons to arm their entire army which, they say, will later be used against any imperialist who tries to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece.

But in reality, they already allow the English to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece. The deal they made with the Middle East English headquarters is actually a good example of English interference in Greece’s internal affairs. On the basis of that agreement, they also agreed to allow Zervas (from the domestic bourgeoisie) the right to organize his army on the entire liberated territory. On the basis of that agreement, the English succeeded in preventing the realization of the Balkan Headquarters.” (19)

Allow me to continue…

Christopher Montague Bunthouse (Chris), a well-known Service Intelligence agent operating in Greece, a deputy chief and head of

the British military mission, in other words a competent and authoritative individual, wrote: “If there were no British officers in the resistance movement in Greece, not only Greek but also European history would have gone in a completely different direction... The presence of the British military mission in Greece from 1943 to 1944 prevented communists in Greece from taking absolute control of that country. If the Communists took power in September 1944, after the Germans withdrew, in the eyes of the world, it would have been difficult to deprive them of that power!” (20)

By putting ELAS under the command and control of the British, a maneuver of historical significance, our Greek CPG, EAM and ELAS comrades rejected an alliance with the people’s revolutions in the Balkans...

The EAM Coalition, i.e. the Left headed by the CPG, on its own, had already managed to achieve a very wide and unanimous Greek people’s national unity never before seen in Greek history. And yet the same Left persistently and systematically propagated the idea that it needed “national unity” with the Bourgeois parties and politicians, including those who supported the Germans and others who supported the English, against the EAM. The united Left wanted “national unity” with a government that was in exile, created, supported and financed by the British. Why? Why was the Left persistently popularizing the authority of the British among the Greek people?

Then, with the Lebanon Agreement, signed in May 1944, the CPG, EAM and ELAS voluntarily and officially gave up any claim to power when they recognized the Greek government in exile as the “legitimate government of Greece” and as the “government of national unity”. But there was more than that... The Left also acknowledged that ELAS was not a national army and agreed to creating a national army in the near future and placing it under the authority of the English created puppet government and attaching it to the Middle East command run by the English General Staff. In other words, the Left took advice from the British, its enemy, to dissolve ELAS, its own army, and replace it with a “national” army not of its choice. (21)

The Caserta Agreement, signed in September 1944, paved the way for British troops to invade Greek territory right after the Germans left Athens. If fact there was an agreement reached between Churchill and Hitler that the British would not attack the Germans leaving Greece, provided they did not destroy the road infrastructure. I read the following comment in the Greek press: “With this agreement the British fox achieved a double goal. It left the German forces untouched so they could fight against the Russians and, it took Greece without firing a shot!” As it turned out, British troops hurriedly came to Greece only to prevent ELAS from taking important strategic positions such as Athens and other places. On top of that, as per the Caserta Agreement, the Left accepted and proclaimed British General Skobi as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in Greece! In other words, no ELAC unit could act or move without orders from Skobi! (22)

But, it would appear that the British were not comfortable with an active ELAS in Greece so an armed conflict was provoked in Athens in December 1944. It was a well-staged provocation which called for disarming, dissolving and liquidating ELAS. There is no doubt that Georgios Siantos and Mitsos Partselidis, CPG Central Committee Politburo representatives, were the main culprits in this... It was they who signed the Varkiza Agreement on February 12, 1945, and with those signatures almost all ELAS units throughout Greece were disarmed and disbanded. The only units that remained active were those in Athens, which belonged to the ELAS territorial reserves. These ELAS units were combined with the domestic reactionary units and handed over to the British. What is most characteristic about this is that Siantos and Partsalidis arbitrarily went behind the Politburo’s back and signed an agreement for which they were not authorized. By doing so they violated the requirements for an unconditional general amnesty, which was set by the Politburo in order to protect the ELAS fighters and democratic forces from persecution.

When we take into consideration the number of strikes and demonstrations that took place against the occupiers in cities all throughout Greece and the millions of people mobilized to do this which, as mentioned earlier, encompassed about 90% of the Greek

population, according to a German report, then it becomes clear that the conditions were right for creating a huge revolutionary army which would have inflicted a heavy blow against the occupier, as was done in Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, etc., and which could have prevented the British from invading Greece... However, in this case as the old Macedonian expression goes “the mountain just bore a mouse!” From the millions that participated in the mass demonstrations against the occupier, our comrades the EAM coalition, that is, the Left headed by the CPG and its top leadership, managed to convince only several tens of thousands to join ELAS and then quickly placed them under British control to be clandestinely liquidated...

Yes, the people who genuinely fought for Greece’s liberation and who aspired to fight for democracy and social rights, were in fact isolated and liquidated. This liquidation was carried out by the same people who the Left, mainly the CPG top leadership, recognized as the authority in Greece and allowed it to take power, when it could have prevented it. Here is what Averof, head of the opposition, had to say years later, in the Greek parliament in January 1984: “During the first round of fighting between 1942 and 1944, EAM and ELAS were capable and could have easily become the sole master of Greece and would not have had to make compromises... During the second round of fighting, around December 1944, it could have also again taken power. It could have easily become master of Greece in the early days and between December 14 and December 18, 1944, had it not undertaken major military actions against EDES forces in Epirus, 500 km away from the main battle in Athens....” On December 14, 1944, ELAS 8th Division achieved great success against the English forces in Moshato-Kallithea. During the night of December, 17 and 18, 1944, ELAS 2nd Division violently attacked Kifissia and captured about 500 English airmen and 50 officers along with their commander. The same night the 3rd Athenian Brigade captured the Averof Prison and seized several hundred politicians, generals and occupier collaborators... Why did ELAS have to take action against EDES instead of going directly to Athens? And why were some of the most elite ELAS units and most talented commanders engaged against EDES, an insignificant force?

It is important to also mention that the CPG missed out on another chance to take power. Had the CPG really abandoned the tragic collision in December 1944, it could have truly occupied a prominent position, and perhaps a dominant position, in the political life of the country. At the end of 1944, it came very close to taking power. It had allies in all layers of the population... It had penetrated into all the pores of society, and its opponents were weak and dissorganized. It commanded political order which provided many reliable and concrete advantages, which over time could have been decisive...

So, forgive me if I find it difficult to understand why the CPG missed all those chances and never did come to power! (23)

On August 18, 1982, the Greek parliament adopted a law to recognize the contribution of the Greek people who fought in the 1941 to 1944 liberation war under the leadership of the CPG, EAM and ELAS. They were recognized as a national resistance force which fought against the fascist occupation. While speaking in parliament, Evangelos Gianopoulos then Minister of Labour, among other things, said: “History as it is known today has been very much twisted and criminalized. The Right over the years has poisoned the Greek population leading it to believe that the national liberation war was some kind of preparation for the CPG to seize power! It is time that we correct that perception by presenting our testimony. Being part of ELAS as a commander of a battalion, I can personally testify about that time. If EAM, in other words ELAS, wanted to grab power on October 12 when the Germans left Athens, even before 1944, they could have been in power within 4 hours!”

Minister Gianopoulos’s comments, of course, were published in the Greek press. The above quote was obtained from the Athens newspaper “Elevterotipia” number 2114 published on August 19, 1982...

There is no doubt that the CPG leadership was dominated by Greek “patriots” led by Georgios Siantos, who in turn led a special and successful war against the people’s forces; the very people who fought to liberate Greece and to bring democracy to that country, the true warriors of the national liberation struggle and the socialist

revolution. The CPG failed to take power not because it couldn’t but because it did not want to. And, like Minister Gianopoulos said, if it wanted to, it would have done it within four hours...

The line the CPG adopted in its July 1, 1941 CPG Central Committee VI Plenum towards the Macedonian people and the line it adopted towards “national unity” with the domestic bourgeoisie, have actually and inevitably become and will remain in history as the most consistent anti-Macedonian lines. Without any exaggeration, it can be said that Secretary Georgios Siantos and those behind and around him, have accepted and implemented the same “national unity” program supported by the domestic bourgeoisie and by Georgios Papandreou and for them “there is no Macedonian National Question” in Greece.

The Macedonians closely watched the politics the Greek “patriots” in the CPG leadership played during the national liberation war, in other words during the time EAM and ELAS were active, and have written about them. Some of these observations were later published in “Pogledi” number 8/1980, in “Glasnik” no. 2 / 19-82 and in “Istoria” no. 1/77 and 1/78. This information, now resting in the archives, may be easily accessible to the researcher but it is difficult for the ordinary reader to get. That is why I will try to briefly describe the basic elements of those politics...

There is no information about the Macedonian people or non-Greek people in the VI Plenum resolution, not a word. It is clear why. To speak of such people, Macedonians for example, would mean that the CPG would have to acknowledge that Macedonians existed in the Greek state and as such their human rights must be recognized before the Greek and international public. In other words, the CPG would then have to create the conditions for a practical solution to the Macedonian National Question. But none of this need be done if the “non-Greek” people living within the Greek borders are ignored under the pretense that they don’t exist. But, by not mentioning the Macedonians in its resolutions the CPG placed them at a complete disadvantage regarding their human and democratic rights. This, however, was not done out of simple neglect. It was carefully avoided in the spirit of the “accepted” concept that “for Greece there is no Macedonian National Question”, that is, in the spirit of the

“patriotic” general line of “national unity” between the Left (EAM) and the domestic bourgeoisie who did not tolerate the existence of so-called “Slavs” in the Greek state.

The CPG Central Committee held its Second CPG Conference and four more plenums during the national liberation war against the fascists in the period from October 1941 to 1944. According to official documents the Macedonian people were not once mentioned anywhere as existing or taking part in that conflict. Even though the Macedonian people were their natural ally in this war, in the worker’s movement and in the social revolution, the leftists were very careful to avoid mentioning them by their rightful name, i.e. Macedonians. The only exception to this was the VIII Plenum Resolution. The CPG Central Committee VIII Plenum was held in January 1942, and mentioned in its resolution, among a few other words, were the words “Slavophone Macedonians”. (24)

Who were these so-called “Slavophone Macedonians”?

In publishing the famous Bakiris interview, the Party newspaper “Laiki Foni”, among other things, explained that the citation made was referring to the “Bulgarophone Greeks”. (25)

In his book “O ELAS” (1946, 331), General Stefanos Sarafis, then ELAS Supreme Commander, referred to Macedonians as “Slavophone Greeks”.

Naturally, two weeks later, the CPG Central Committee’s organ KOMEP No 16, August 1943, beautifully explained:

“There is no longer national confusion in Greek Macedonia... The Slavic and Turkish populations have been evicted according to the conventions, and the Greek population has been collected from all countries in the Balkans and from Asia Minor and brought to Greek Macedonia... which has become as Greek as any other area in Old Greece…” (p. 331).

At about the same time, in the summer of 1943, “Rizospastis”, the CPG’s central organ, began to publish the famous saying: “After the

population exchanges Macedonia is as Greek as the Greek district of Athenian Attica...”

Well, one cannot even imagine that Macedonians or any other non-Greek people would exist in old Greece or Attica at that time... And, according to our Greek friends and CPG, EAM and ELAS leaders, or at least according to their official documents of that time, there were no Macedonians in Macedonia... the Attica of “Rizospastis”, but only “Slavophones” who were part of the Hellenic (Greek) people...

It is important at this point to mention that the CPG supported a policy of “full equality for minorities”. This policy was adopted at the CPG Central Committee III plenum in March 1935 and confirmed at the CPG VI Congress in December 1935. If there were no Macedonians or any other non-Greek people living in Greece, then what “minorities” was the CPG supporting?

The CPG during its VI Congress, regarding the Macedonian National Question, underlined: “The Party will not stop declaring that in the end the Macedonian Question will be resolved in a brotherly way with the victory of the Soviet government in the Balkans, which will break all dishonest settlement agreements and take every practical measure so as to eliminate or correct the injustices perpetrated by the imperialist... Only then will the Macedonian people achieve their full national status!” (26)

So, according to the statement mentioned above, made at its VI Congress, the CPG in fact indirectly recognized the distinctiveness, that is, the national distinctiveness of the Macedonian people. It recognized that such a people did exist in Greece. Unfortunately these were just nice words and empty phrases. These people (the CPG cadres) were the decision makers and architects of what was said and what was done. These same people who on the one hand verbally claimed to be supporting the Macedonians, on the other, committed anti-Macedonian acts. In May 1944, the National Council (“Ethnikon Simvoulion”) of Democratic Greece was summoned exactly after the CPG disbanded SNOF in Greek occupied Macedonia by completely ignoring the Macedonian people’s wishes and desires and, with a special act, they lumped the

Macedonian people under the Greek nation and thereby proclaimed the “Greek character” of Macedonia and concluded that “Macedonia was Greek”. (27)

So, here are some of the more important facts in this regard:

I) Instead of allowing the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia to form and maintain their own Macedonian organizations, the CPG imposed on them Greek national organizations such EAM, ELAS, EPON, EA and others and urged the Macedonian people to join their ranks and fight for “the national liberation” of Greece and for its “strategic security” along the borders with its neighbours.