IV. ABOUT THE BOOK “EGEISKI BURI” (AEGEAN STORMS) - Part 02

Mitrevski, then representative of the CPG Provincial Bureau for Macedonia, had two or three pre-meeting meetings with the NOF Secretariat Keramitchiev, Rakovski and Vera. He expressed his opinion and put forward a proposal to expand the NOF Secretariat to five members, to include Mitrevski, Keramitchiev, Rakovski, Vera plus Stavo Kochopoulos. Mitrevski later suggested to the Executive Council that another five to six people with their names ending with “opoulos” by admitted to the secretariat. The three existing members of the secretariat however expressed their opinion and told Mitrevski that they did not want NOF’s enemies to become NOF’s leaders overnight. It looked like a betrayal. It was acceptable for them to

enter NOF, but first as workers in the district boards, and only later the best of them would be picked to serve in the Executive Council and the Secretariat.

Mitrevski however was persistent and demanded that his proposal be adopted. There was a very sharp quarrel. Finally, Mitrevski said this was ordered by the Party...

Keramdzhiev and Vera reluctantly gave in. Rakovski said that, if this was ordered by the party, then they should have been informed right at the very beginning of the meeting, then there would have been no quarrels. He was hoping that Mitrevski was bluffing but he still persisted...

The absence of elasticity in Rakovski’s attitude was paid by the fact that his place in the Secretariat remained vacant. Namely, at the last moment, before the Congress voted, Rakovski was dropped off.

That was all. There was no dispute, no party veto and no request from the Communist Party of Greece through its Politburo Ioanidis and Strindos, to remove Aianovski, then “NOF organizing secretary for Aegean Macedonia”.

There were no pre-meeting meetings held at all at that time. Aianovski was removed about seven to eight months before he claims he was removed. It would appear he took the opportunity to insert himself into these later events so that he could write himself “a beautiful autobiography...”

13. Co-authors

I think it is of particular interest to also mention this: Aianovski’s biography is not just his own work and concern. There are also co-authors. Namely, on p. 117, volume 2, in the extensive collection of archival documents on the history of the Macedonian people -“Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”, among other biographical data about Aianovski, the following was also mentioned:

- “Aianovski was a communist from before the war...” (The fact is, before the war he had signed a police declaration condemning all Communists and communist activities as treasonous… He is silent about this too…)

- “When the Aegean Brigade was in the process of being formed Aianovski was appointed deputy to the Brigade’s political commissar...” (This is not true. In fact, he only participated in the brigade’s parade when it marched in front of the Political Commission on November 18, 1944, after which he was immediately withdrawn and sent to the field to do other types of work.)

- “Since the spring of 1945, he worked in Voden Region as TOMO secretary...” (This also is not true. His own reports from that time disprove him. Besides that, there is not a single document showing that Aianovski was a secretary to TOMO.)

- “He was secretary of the NOF Main Board for Aegean Macedonia for some time...” (He failed to become a secretary because immediately after the election he was suspended.)

There is no doubt that Aianovski deserves to be one of the sons of our people. But his friendly affection and tendency to beautify his own biography are obvious here...

This same tendency was shown, even more clearly, in “Chronology”, the trial edition of the National Board of Fighters. Here, the editor-in-chief of “Chronology” follows Aianovski’s every step in Voden Region. He lists everything including in which village he attended meetings... Everything is emphasized as if it was an important event, and not just ordinary routine work. This was done not only for Voden Region... but for other places as well. (On page 174 and 182, the authors of “Chronology” (The national liberation war in the Aegean part of Macedonia), make mention as if Aianovski was the “NOF organizing secretary for Aegean Macedonia”, whose was allegedly removed by requests first in November 1947, by the party assets of the CPG Macedonian Bureau, and second in January 1948, at a NOF Central Council pre-Congressional meeting.

These fabrications coincide and mutually reinforce Aianovski’s allegations about himself written on p. 253 in “Aegean Storms.” I will use this opportunity to remind you of a commonly known fact: Aianovski never crossed the Voden Region boundaries as “NOF organizing secretary”, that is, he never worked elsewhere, except as a regional activist in Voden Region...)

Naum Peiov, in his book “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece” (published by INI in 1968) wrote extensively about Aianovski’s activities in Voden Region emphasizing him as “the soul of the movement” altogether ignoring the real activities of the central NOF leadership...

But Aianovski’s boasting about himself, while ignoring others, did not gain its full culmination until “Aegean Storms” was published...

14. The real Macedonian cadres

Aianovski wrote: The CPG managed to break the unity of the Macedonian leadership thanks to the fact that the real Macedonian cadres, fiercely defamed and persecuted, were forced to leave the movement and cross into the People’s Republic of Macedonia... Unfortunately, one part of the old NOF cadres found no strength and succumbed to pressures from the CPG and DAG leaders, thus becoming their organs and performing tasks that were often against the interests of the Macedonian people... (Ibid. p. 339.)

Let us recall: From all the more important political cadres, activists of NOF, only Keramitchiev and Aianovski left for the People’s Republic of Macedonia. It is also well-known that, Keramitchiev left by permission, with an appropriate document in his hands.

So, when Aianovski talks about “the real Macedonian ‘cadres’ who were forced to leave the movement” he was not only talking about himself being important but also conceals the fact that he was the only one to flee without permission… meaning he deserted…

He was attempting to strongly emphasize his own importance when he said “the CPG managed to break the Macedonian leadership”, after his departure of course…

Yes, there is also Steriana Vangelova-Slavianka. She had no reason to leave the movement but Aianovski convinced her to go with him… The fact that Vangelova left without permission was verified by a letter she received from Vera, then AFZH president, in which Vera calls Vangelova a deserter. (Ibid. p. 320.)

It was also characteristic of Aianovski to say that the “best” of NOF fled and the “worst” of NOF, i.e. “one part of the old NOF cadres”, proved to be weak and “did not find the strength to resist… and succumbed to pressure”.

Indeed, it is amazing what he thought of himself and of others... He withdrew himself from the pressure and sees himself as a hero while he cast mud on all those who remained to work under pressure. Aianovski then goes on to blame the others accusing them of: “being organs of the CPG and DAG leaderships and performing tasks that were often against the interests of the Macedonian people.” And, as the most drastic example in this sense, he implicates NOF with the signing of the “criminal document, the so-called KOEM Resolution, which in fact was nothing more than a resolution drawn-up by the CPG Central Committee Politburo...” (Ibid. p. 382.)

“We have to keep in mind,” Aianovski wrote, “that that part of the NOF leadership (except Aianovski) which signed this resolution, was subjected to strong pressure and terrible threats. But it should also be understood that these people were prominent fighters who with their lives were able to resist the various reactionary regimes, the fascist occupiers and Monarcho-fascist persecutions. Unfortunately, at the most critical time, they succumbed to a counterfeiting game and took a position that was contrary to the interests of the people and their struggle...” (Ibid. p. 383.)

But that’s not all. When Aianovski later needed to say that the central NOF activists were arrested and sentenced to long sentences, he would only say: “They were arrested and subjected to lengthy interrogations…,” adding that:

“Treachery is loved by everyone and a traitor by none…” (Ibid. p. 406), by which he proclaims them all traitors...

Of course, with such an understanding and interpretation of events, one cannot help but wonder: is it possible that all those fierce fighters, who in Aianovski’s own words were not afraid and fought against the various reactionary regimes in Greece, the fascist occupiers, the domestic Monarcho-fascists, and now, suddenly, “at the most critical moment”, become cowards and traitors? How can he make such claims against the entire Macedonian military and political management assets? Maybe there is something else in the centre of all this?

These are logical questions which Aianovski has not asked and has downright ignored...

This is how the book “Aegean Storms”, full of insults, was launched by INI and allowed to circulate in public with Aianovski showing himself to be the most important bearer of the previously mentioned tendency to scorn and disqualify the leaders from that part of Macedonia.

15. Insufficient endeavors

So, according to Aianovski, everyone is a traitor except those “true Macedonian cadres” who abandoned the movement. This glimpse, of course, is too simplistic and excessively biased. Political activities are a complex matter. How a political worker behaves at any given moment is dependent on many factors...

In October 1943, the Greek leaders ordered the desolation of MAO, the Macedonian anti-fascist organization in Voden, and the abolishment of its Macedonian newspapers the “Red Star” and the information Bulletin. But, it was the Macedonian Communists, cadres and members of the CPG, among them Aianovski, MAO secretary, who carried out these orders. According to Aianovski himself such orders were carried out many times before. It was part of the discipline to execute CPG orders and carry out its decisions.

This time too a CPG order was carried out to dissolve MAO, and abolish its newspapers… (Ibid. p. 99.)

Does this mean that these Macedonians too did not find the strength to resist the CPG and succumbed to its pressure?

According to Aianovski, in this case, it was not about being weak at all. It was about the following: “Any opposition would have meant a split in the People’s Liberation Movement...” (Ibid. p. 99.) Again, according to Aianovski, it was well-known that it was a betrayal for anyone to cause cleavages...

One can choose to agree with Aianovski and accept his explanation, but he himself took part in the evacuation of the ELAS Voden Macedonian battalion in October 1944, which caused a cleavage. He caused another cleavage in December 1944, when he returned to the field and began to organize the resistance (TOMO-NOF) movement against the anti-Macedonian politics of the CPG Greek leadership...

And here is Aianovski telling us, on the one hand, that he was fully aware that everyone had to follow Party discipline so as not to cause cleavages, and on the other hand, he personally participated in causing cleavages, and on top of that he called himself a principled Macedonian revolutionary. This is how he represented things in his autobiography. The truth is, no one can always do what they want, but, at the same time, we cannot allow Aianovski to make wild accusations that the Macedonian Communists carried out “deliberate” anti-Macedonian acts based strictly on decisions made by the Greek leaders. Confrontation with the CPG at the time when we were weak was not possible… But in the second case, the conditions for an active resistance against the opportunist, hegemonic-nationalistic anti-Macedonian policies the Greek CPG leaders carried out, were right and we were strong and opposition was possible...

The so-called NOF-CPG agreement, submitted to the NOF leadership was clearly a CPG order not open for discussion. Sometime at the end of December 1946, in a conversation with Tsvetko Uzunovski-Abas, Rakovski said that he believed the Greek leaders were not honest. Rakovski believed that the Greek

leadership was attempting to replace the current NOF leadership with Grkomani (Macedonians loyal to the Greek cause).

In a reply to this, Abas said: “Do not address us no matter what happens because you will be disciplined. You will follow your orders, even as common soldiers, wherever they send you...”

The so-called KOEM resolution was proposed by CPG Secretary Zahariadis himself in the form of a Party decree. In attendance were Partsalidis, member of the Politburo and President of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, and Pariklis, head of the Second Bureau. We were asked by the KOEM active to adopt the decree and signed it. Everyone had to sign it...

There was no discussion or chance for a confrontation…

Not only because we were placed under the CPG… and discipline was expected from us...

Not only because any opposition to this would have led directly to a split; or to the disintegration of DAG units; or that some unit might fall under NOF leadership…

But above all, the NOF leadership should not have been held responsible for DAG’s defeat and the tragic end to the revolution in Greece. NOF should not have taken responsibility for that...

However, later, the NOF leadership was arrested under charges of being “agents working for the CPY and Tito in Greece”. Today no wisdom is required to see that convening KOEM “five minutes before the twelfth hour at midnight”, i.e. just before DAG’s catastrophic defeat, was just a provocation, a trap set for the NOF leadership, that is, a concrete practical expression of the intention to finally and physically liquidate NOF, and (in the spirit of the well-known Informburo resolution), blame Tito and the CPY and let them be seen by the communist public and the world in general, as the culprits, or triggers for the defeat of the democratic forces in Greece...

It was precisely the failure of this KOEM trick that pushed Zahariadis to invent another trick – the “stab in the back”.

If that is not perceived today – there is no benevolence.

Aianovski said a lot of unkind things in his book “Aegean Storms”. Namely, he kept quiet on some events, modified others, some he invented and garnished with something real to serve his purpose. In doing so, he not only threw mud on others but took credit for things he did not do. The uninformed in the general public, for whom he wrote, will admire him. Those informed, historians above all, with reservations, will have to carefully examine his work, despite everything interesting that it offers, and reach their own conclusions.

Otherwise, “Aegean Storms”, will be the most concrete practical expression and proof of the tendency: To disguise and disqualify the Macedonian leaders from that part of Macedonia.

Of course, it’s an ugly and undeserving job. Its bearers and perpetrators will have to understand one day that what they did was humiliating.

May the good gods help them understand this...