VII. ON THE GROUNDS OF ONE DOCUMENT

VII. ON THE GROUNDS OF ONE DOCUMENT

We are talking about a text document written for INI by Theodoros Papa-Panaiotou (Alekos) former Commissar of DAG Kaimakchalan Headquarters and now a CPG official. The text has been circulating for six years in the work and reading rooms of the INI archives in Macedonia. The text was a critique of my (Pavle Rakovski) work “In the Deep Night Dawn Is Born” purchased by INI. Anyone reading Aleko’s document would be left deeply surprised by the author’s anger mixed with gross untruths and distortions of events...

Of course, this is yet another unscrupulous effort to misinform the uninformed reader...

Another moment:

Here is a quote from Aleko’s document: “According to Rakovski’s work the CPG is not only not a revolutionary communist party, but rather an avant-garde of the Greek bourgeoisie that defends its interests among the working people and minorities and, therefore, not the bourgeois class, but the CPG is the main enemy of the Macedonians and their national liberation movement, and that there cannot be a Macedonian revolutionary movement in Greece unless it turns its attacks against the ‘Greek’ communist movement...”

Alekos here clings to these general and naked accusations with unfinished phrases. It is not by chance that he omits the facts. The facts will show that all this does not at all fit the truth. Human-cadres made the decisions to be carried out and are responsible for them. Human-cadres come and go, and in no case is the working-class movement at fault, that is, for what the leaders of its vanguard, the party and its Marxist principles have done.

Here we have Siantos and those patriots around and behind him calling for and committing to “national unity” with the bourgeoisie in the “national liberation front” for the country’s “national liberation” and “strategic” security at its borders, as was declared by the CPG in January 1944 during the CPG Central Committee’s plenum. (See: Σαραντα χρονια του ΚΚΕ, CPG Central Committee Edition 1958, p. 505. Or: Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, Χρονικον της εθνικης αντιστασης, 1940-1944, εκδοσης ΠΛΕ. Chronicle of the national resistance 1940-1944, PLE edition, 1967, 21.) One cannot deny that committing to a partnership with the bourgeoisie, the enemy of the people, was not a war against the people and against the CPG itself. Here, in general, was how that special war was carried out:

The CPG did not force an armed struggle for the first two-and-a-half years during the fascist occupation. In its famous capital edition “Sta armata, sta armata” (To arms, to arms), the Party, in connection with this, concluded that: “One cannot fail to notice that the armed struggle was neglected. It was insufficiently organized and promoted, even though there were many opportunities and favourable conditions available…” (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα ..., p. 24.)

The people were directed to focus their anger against the foreign occupiers in countless ways and actions like strikes, demonstrations and uneven street struggles... actions that were harmless to the Greek bourgeoisie and to British interests. But as we now know, no matter how large the crowds were it would have been impossible for them to overcome the occupying forces on their own and take power in the country. Liberating the country still remained in the hands of the allied armies… And when the allied armies came from the West and from the South the Greek government fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie...

People were forced to flee to the mountains because of the unbearable terror that was constantly perpetrated against them. The people who fled to the mountains organized themselves into resistance units eventually creating a people’s resistance army (ELAS). Partisan units began to see action as early as mid-1943 and ELAS grew rapidly both in numbers and in combat actions... Just as ELAS was becoming the dominant force in Greece, the CPG placed it under English command and control. Before that, the people’s revolution movements around Greece (Greece’s neighbours) had

offered the CPG close political and military cooperation, but the CPG rejected those offers. (In June 1943, Tilemahos Ververis, representative of the CPG, and Andreas Tzimas, representative of ELAS Headquarters, contacted representatives from the Yugoslav and Albanian Communist Parties and reached an agreement to cooperate politically and militarily in the liberation war. See document, in French, located in the Macedonian Archives in Skopje.) In a letter, dated July 25, 1943, Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo, the Yugoslav representative, wrote a letter addressed to the Communist Party of Macedonia in which he said: “I am writing to inform you that the delegates of the main headquarters of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia have reached an agreement on the creation of a Balkan headquarters…” However, soon afterwards Tempo wrote another letter, dated August 25, 1943, in which he said: “I met with the secretary of the Greek party and I discussed with him the overall situation regarding the decisions made... They voided all agreements regarding the creation of the Balkan Headquarters and the cooperation between our parties, especially in relation to Macedonia…” (See: Sources of the Liberation War and the Revolution in Macedonia 1941-1945, Volume I, Book II, Skopje 1968, p. 169 and 236.) All ELAS headquarters were staffed with English liaison officers. This is what Vasilis Bardzhotas, member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, said about that: “Large units, divisions and groups of divisions were put in the hands of the Intelligence Service...” (Βασιλης Μπαρτζιωτας, Η πολιτικη µας στελεχων του ΚΚΕ στον καιρο της Εθνικης αντιστασης Νεος Κοσµος αρ. 9/1950, Neos cosmos, 9/1950.) Stefanos Sarafis, supreme commander of ELAS, in his famous book “O ELAS” (1945) wrote: “ELAS as an allied army is under the command of Middle East English General Staff. All operation ELAS undertakes must be ordered by general staff…” (Ibid. p. 120.)

This is what Christopher Montague Woodhouse (Chris), then intelligence agent, deputy chief and head of the British military mission in Greece, said: “If there were no British officers as part of the resistance movement in Greece, not only Greek, but also European history would have gone in a completely different direction... The presence of the British military mission in Greece prevented the Communists from putting their absolute control over Greece in 1943-1944. If the Communists took power in September

1944, when the Germans were withdrawing, it would have been very difficult for us to take that power away in the eyes of the then world public…” (See: Secret Wehrmacht Archives, “To Vima”, July 11, 1963 Or: Hristo Andonovski, “Macedonians under Greece in the struggle against fascism”, 1943-1944, p. 214.)

These significant historical outcomes were a direct result of Siantos’s maneuvers - putting ELAS under English control and rejecting an alliance with the Balkan people’s revolutions.

There is no doubt that the EAM coalition, i.e. the political left led by the CPG, managed to unite the Greek people under the widest national unity ever achieved. Never in their long history have the Greek people been so united and unanimous as they were under the political left’s leadership... Unfortunately the same political left leadership persistently and systematically demanded “national unity” with the bourgeois government in exile which was created and financed by the English. The CPG even took steps to make sure the English were popularized in Greece and their authority was accepted by the Greek people...

The political left managed to attract and mobilize millions of people with its numerous strikes and demonstrations in the cities and all throughout Greece. According to a German report, 90 percent of the Greek people were hostile to the occupiers and were ready for an armed uprising. (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 27.) Under these conditions the CPG had the opportunity to create a huge revolutionary army and inflict heavy blows on the occupying forces. If this were to happen, the English would not have dared to invade Greece and enter an exhaustive, long and dangerous war. Unfortunately the CPG decided not to take advantage of the situation. I wonder why? Had the CPG taken advantage of the situation it would have amassed millions of soldiers instead of the seven to eight tens of thousands of ELAS fighters. With this kind of force the CPG could have repelled the English invasion. But instead, the CPG surrendered ELAS to the English who then dissolved it. According to Sarafis, page 276 in his book “ELAS” (1945), at the very moment of liberation, ELAS numbered 48,940 fighters, of whom 5,240 were officers. “These numbers did not include the ELAS forces in Athens and those serving in the islands of Crete,

Mitilini and Samos.” According to Hugas, ELAS had around 80,000 fighters in total. A similar account was given by E. Fotiadis and K. Dzholakas… (See: Andrikopoulos: “1944 κρησιµη χρονια”, volume II, pp. 715-716.)

By the Lebanon Agreement, signed in May 1944, the CPG recognized the bourgeois government in exile as the legitimate national government of Greece. But there was more to it than that. The CPG accepted that ELAS would not be Greece’s national army, and that a new “non-party” army needed to be created. In the meantime ELAS and its dissolution were left to the authority of the government in exile and to its patrons the English. Imagine that!

The Caserta Agreement, signed in September 1944, which brought all resistance forces under the control of the Greek government in exile, opened the way for the English to invade Greece unconstrained. As the Germans were leaving the English entered Athens unimpeded because Germany and England had made a prior agreement to stay out of each other’s way. An official German archival document was published in Greece which revealed that Churchill and Hitler had agreed to the free withdrawal of German forces from Greece. The Athens newspaper “Ta Nea” wrote: “The British fox scored twice as much - strengthened the German forces against the Russians (and against Yugoslavia) and seized Greece unhindered!” (See: “Τα νεα”, January 14, 1978, p. 12.) ELAS, on the other hand, was placed under English control to prevent it from taking important strategic positions, such as Athens, for example. General Skobi, a British general, was accepted and proclaimed Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in Greece to make sure ELAS was restrained. In this way ELAS could not make any moves on its own, except as ordered by Skobi... (The following was written in the document “Theses for the 40th CPG anniversary”, adopted in August 1958, during the CPG Central Committee Ninth Plenum: “The Caserta Agreement called for the Greek armed forces to be placed under the command of English General Skobi. ELAS was excluded from penetrating into the big cities and the most important strategic regions such as Athens, Central and Eastern Macedonia, Epirus, and so on. These regions were assigned to EDES, PAO, and so on.” (See: Σαραντα χρονια του ΚΚΕ, 1918-1958, p. 715.)

The provoked armed conflict in Athens in December 1944 was a well timed and tested occasion for disarming, dissolving and liquidating ELAS. This was the great work of Georgios Siantos, CPG Central Committee first secretary, and Mitsos Partsalidis, member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo. They signed the Varkiza Agreement on February 12, 1945, which surrendered all ELAS units throughout Greece except for a few reserve units stationed in Athens which were defeated by a combined force of English and domestic reactionaries. This is what the party edition “Chronicles of the struggle 1878-1951”, had to say: “Georgios Siantos and Mitsos Partsalidis, then representatives of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, signed the Varkiza Agreement which violated the requirement for a general unconditional amnesty that was set by the Politburo to protect the democratic forces …” (“Chronicle of the struggle, 1878-1951”, Party Edition, p. 49.) In other words, the two signed the agreement behind the Politburo’s back. They signed an agreement for which they were not authorized because the English government needed them to. This allowed the terrible pogrom that followed against the ELAS fighters and members of the party who were persecuted and killed as criminals, to be conducted legally...

The CPG implemented a policy of general abandonment in regards to the Macedonian people living in Greece. It flagrantly violated its own official party line on the national question of “full equality for minorities”. Namely, the CPG Central Committee held five plenums as well as its Second CPG Conference during the fascist occupation and during the national liberation war. The Macedonian people, the CPG’s natural ally in the people’s revolution in Greece, were never once mentioned in any of the adopted documents. The only mention of Macedonians made was in the January 1942 resolution taken during the CPG Central Committee’s Eighth Plenum where the plenum spoke about some sort of “Slavophone Macedonians”... (Σαραντα χρονια του ΚΚΕ, p. 147.)

Who are these Slavophone Macedonians?

Let us not forget the time the party newspaper “Laiki foni”, published the well-known interview given by ELAS general Evripidis Bakirdzis, who told the world that the Macedonians were

“Bulgarophone” Greeks… (“Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war”, vol. I, Skopje 1971, document number 191, p. 522.) Let us also not forget about General Stefanos Sarafis, Supreme Commander of ELAS, who wrote in his famous book “O ELAS”, that the Macedonians fighters and the Macedonian people in general were “Slavophone” Greeks. (Stefanos Sarafis, “O ELAS”, Athens 1945, p. 331.) Let us not forget what “KOMEP” (abbreviation of Communism epithets - Communist review), the CPG’s central theoretical authority, implied about Macedonia when it wrote: “Greek Macedonia became as Greek as any other Greek region of old Greece…” (KOMEP magazine, CPG central theoretical authority, number 16, August 1943, p. 333.) This was then followed by “Rizospastis”, the CPG central newspaper, which wrote: “After the exchange of populations, Macedonia became as Greek as the Athens district of Attica!” In other words no one could even possibly imagine that any other people outside of Greeks could exist in Attica, never mind Macedonians. That is why, in the spirit of all this, no rights or freedoms for the Macedonian people were foreseen in the EAM and ELAS program documents. Simply put, for them, no such people existed in the Greek state. Even the National Council of Democratic Greece, which convened in May 1944 in the Koreshades liberated area, ignored the Macedonian people and treated them like they were Greeks, especially after it proclaimed the “Greek character” of Macedonia. (Στα αρµατα, στα αρµατα, p. 328. Or: Aegean Macedonia in the national liberation war, vol. I, Skopje 1971, document number 104, p. 407.)

Accordingly, Siantos and all those who stood behind and around him, that is, the leaders of the CPG, EAM, ELAS, PEEA… firmly stood in line with the domestic bourgeoisie in regards to the Macedonian national question: There are no Macedonians in Macedonia, and therefore there cannot be a Macedonian national question for Greece.

However, declaring the “Greek character” of Macedonia was no guarantee that there would be no unpleasant surprises. The presence of the Macedonian national liberation movement was felt everywhere among the Macedonian people, and it was smoldering... The need to defend the “Greek character”, i.e. the need to give the appearance that there were no Macedonians in (Greek occupied)

Macedonia, imperatively required undertaking a number of various preventive and suppressive measures at all costs to prevent the initiation of a Macedonian national liberation movement, that is, to prevent the creation of Macedonian political organizations and partisan units. I presented specific facts about these measures in an article which was published in the Skopje magazine VIEWS 8/1980 (p. 161-178). Here I will point out the very nature and purpose of these measures which led to a Greek armed attack against the ELAS Macedonian partisans...

Who was Siantos, the very person who managed all this?

As we now know, Siantos had a heart attack and died on May 20, 1947. Zahariadis however said that Siantos was liquidated by the intelligence service because they feared that, had he been arrested, he would have talked and revealed that he was one of their agents. (Xenocracy - Επικαιρα, p. 103.) Three years later, during its Third CPG Conference, the CPG analyzed Siantos’s policies carried out during the fascist occupation and decided to declare him a traitor. (Neos Cosmos, number 10/1950, or: Το ΚΚΕ ΑΠ ТО 1931-1952, basic documents, CPG Central Committee Edition 1952, p. 219.) On April 3, 1973, Dimitrios Vlantas, a DAG general and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, brought the case to Solun when it was discovered that Coporal Siantos was a spy and a whistleblower during his military service. This is what Vlantas said: “Siantos was a traitor... He had a long history since 1932. I was then secretary of the Communist Youth of Macedonia and member of the CPG District Committee. One day the District Committee secretary asked me to find a house in which to hold a secret meeting. For various similar occasions, I used the house of a craftsman - a bartender in Solun whom I could trust. I asked him if we could have a meeting with seven people. “Do you know them?” he asked me. I said “Yes I know them”. At one point after we started to get together I looked at him and he looked upset. I asked him what was wrong and he said: “Did you bring comrades to my home or traitors?” “What traitors are you talking about?” I asked. “That one there!” he replied pointing at Siantos. “We were together in the same company serving as corporals. He was a spy and a whistle blower!” he added. Siantos was always a provocateur and, in my opinion, an agent of the Intelligence Service. Thus he managed to play his part - to

suppress the national resistance movement during and after the occupation, and after that during the December events! (Xenocracy, p. 105.) It is also worthy to note one more important fact: The Metaxas fascist dictatorship with help from its people inside the ranks of the CPG managed to catch all the leading CPG activists. This statement was made during the CPG Central Committee Sixth Plenum, held on July 1, 1941. This is what was said: “... By bribing the people with a tainted conscience and by infiltrating its own agents in the governing bodies, the dictatorship (referring to the Metaxas fascist dictatorship 1936-1941) delivered heavy blows to the party.” And as is well-known, the two hundred most prominent CPG activists were instantly shot in Athens ten at a time. (Το ΚΚΕ απο το 1931-1952, p. 104.) As is also well-known, the Asfalia (Greek security service) held these communists in small and large groups at various different camps and prisons and were handed over to the Gestapo for liquidation after the Germans arrived. The Asfalia however allowed a certain number of CPG activists to escape. The most important among them was Siantos who led the CPG during the fascist occupation and during the people’s liberation war.

Let us not forget the patriotic “Greek Axis” adopted in June 1945 by the CPG Central Committee at its 12th Plenum, which called for Greece to turn towards the Mediterranean pole with England at its centre and called England Greece’s “great friend” whose presence in Greece was proclaimed indispensable “to ensure our borders and our positions in the north are secure…” (As per Zahariadis’s introductory speech at the CPG Central Committee 12th Plenum adopted in June 1945. The above quote was taken from: Αποφαση της 12-ης ολοµελειας και του ΚΚΕ, Εισηγη οη και τελεικός λογος του Νικου Ζαχαριαδη (Decisions made during CPG Central Committee 12th Plenum, Nikos Zahariadis’s introductory and final speech, 1946 Athens, p. 21. Or: Saranta hronia, p. 645.) Let us also not forget the actual CPG line adopted which stifled the revolutionary movement and systematically suppressed the popular uprising as well as DAG, and eventually brought about their destruction. CPG Secretary General Nikos Zahariadis was punished for doing all this and was thrown out of the party. After all Zahariadis was the person who justified the English presence in Greece which weakened the people’s resistance and undermined DAG’s victory. Because of this Zahariadis was despised and died a

lonely man in 1973. (Xenocracy. p. 259.) At the same time, this same CPG line suppressed and destroyed the Macedonian people’s movement...

There is also the fact that no Athens bourgeois government ever managed to liquidate so many Macedonian people en masse and destroy so many Macedonian villages as Zahariadis and his comrades did in the defense of the “Greek character” of Macedonia. On p. 174-175 and 179-184 in the famous INI edition “Macedonians and the Civil War in Greece” by Naum Peiov, all these villages were identified by name and region and by the number of inhabitants who remained or disappeared. So, according to a population census from 1951, 46 Macedonian villages completely disappeared, the residents left without leaving a single soul behind. While in another 179 Macedonian villages the population was halved or significantly reduced. Soon after DAG was destroyed, obviously not by chance and not without reason and foundation, the slogan: “We lost the war but that is why we did not lose Macedonia!” was coined... From this slogan alone it should be clear that the real CPG and DAG leadership objective was to safeguard the integrity of Greece at any cost including suppressing and destroying the Macedonian liberation movement. In other words DAG had to “lose the war” so that Greece could keep Macedonia...

These were the events and facts on which my book “In the deep night the dawn is born”, were based. In his “review” of my work, Alekos decided to ignore all this and literally turned things upside down. He made it sound like it was impossible for the workers movement and for its vanguard, the CPG, to have served the domestic bourgeoisie despite the fact that some of the CPG leaders acted as ideological exponents and official agents of the bourgeoisie. The future undoubtedly belongs to the working class. Through suffering and anguish, through rises, betrayals and defeats, the working class will defeat the bourgeoisie. The Macedonian national liberation movement did not clash with the “Greek” communist movement, but was attacked by the anti-Macedonian politics of those in the CPG who overstepped the official party line “full equality for minorities” and, instead, implemented an ultimately chauvinist-liquidation policy against the Macedonian people... This

is the historical truth, highlighted and argued in my book “In the deep night the dawn is born”.

Further on, in his review of my book, Alekos completely missed the mark. Instead of talking about the book itself, which he was asked to review, he talked about me, inflicting upon me a series of disgusting untruths. In general the entire “review” was nothing more than pure untruths which, by mistake, ended up in INI…

* * *

In connection with Pavle Rakovski’s work: “IN THE DEEP NIGHT THE DAWN IS BORN”

I only read one part of Pavle Rakovski’s book “In the deep night the dawn is born” up to page 147. I am talking about an incredibly anti-communist creation of the lowest level. No one deserves to be engaged in this type of writing. Unfortunately INI, appreciating the author as “very original” and his writings as “very useful”, registered his materials in its documentation. And by doing so, without realizing and without wanting to, it gave our opponents fodder to feed their famous propaganda with new data. In fact, this obliges us to take a more responsible attitude towards the author and his work.

1) Pavle Rakovski’s main idea here is that the CPG is not only not a revolutionary communist party, but rather it is an agency of the Greek bourgeoisie, which aims to defend its interests among the working people and the national minorities, and therefore not the bourgeois class, but the CPG is the main enemy of the Macedonian people and their national liberation movement. Pavle Rakovski’s idea is that there cannot be a Macedonian revolutionary movement in Greece, if that movement does not turn its attack against the “Greek” communist movement. Pavle Rakovski uses every means possible to persuade the reader that things are the way he portrays them. If he were to write about the Union of Communists in Serbia for example, he will quote a single Serbian communist who does not “recognize” the Macedonian nation, (one such person can be easily be found today among the hundreds of thousands) and will “prove”

that the entire Serbian Communist Party policy in connection with the Macedonian question is fraudulent and full of betrayals.

Many books have been written against the CPG by many more refined anti-communists and renegades. Pavle Rakovski knows this and even knows very well that no “Greek” communist cares about his writing. Then why does he write these things? It is very clear to me that Pavle Rakovski actually wants to attack and has attacked not the CPG, but rather the CPY, (SKY and the SKM) about which he wrote that in 1944 it prepared a military intervention in order to liberate and join Aegean Macedonia to Yugoslavia, turn NOF into a branch of OZNA and the military intelligence service, and did everything after Varkiza to sustain the Civil War in Greece. It is also clear to me that Pavle Rakovski, if he finds himself in Greece, he will reveal his anti-Communist passion and write the most incredible things against SKY and SKM...

2) Pavle Rakovski started out as a Grkoman (Macedonian loyal to the Greek cause) and learned that he was a Macedonian in the ranks of the CPG. He then learned how to be a true Macedonian and a revolutionary in the ranks of the CPY and CPM. The main task of that “true Macedonian and revolutionary” was to liquidate the Aegean Macedonians who followed CPG policies and got in the way of the “revolutionary awakening” of the Aegean Macedonians and their “true Macedonian ideals”. All these things are written by Pavle Rakovski and repeated on every occasion. One thing he avoids to be clear on though is: What are those “true Macedonian ideals” that he keeps in his head? But it is not difficult for the reader to understand which direction Pavle Rakovski wants to take and what he actually wants to do publicly: Of course, I can categorically argue that I see more hesitations towards his old Grkoman (reactionary) feelings, and less towards his Vancho Mihailov sentiments. A more careful look at his book gives us many elements in that direction.

I stopped on these two main questions (or simply put, on these two sides of the same problem). An older text such as this is a useful tool to understand what is happening with Pavle Rakovski today and with his letter writing of a six page mutilated letter he wrote to the CPG Politburo demanding that, on October 3, 1949, he be given the opportunity to actively participate in the “front lines in the struggle

against the clique of the Belgrade fraudsters”, with articles such as “Tito’s traitorous cliques and the Macedonian People”. He also expressed his regret that he had not done this before. Further down the letter he wrote: “You may not believe me, but that is true. Despite all the things that happened, I was never calm when I was across the border (in Skopje-Bitola). I have always felt like a water frog in a dry place. I always had the feeling that I was out of my element, I was worried. But, influenced by the international reputation and the majesty of Tito’s clique, I thought that the remnants of my Greek-ness certainly did not allow me to feel comfortable among the Yugoslav leaders. But there was also a different reason. It was my dissatisfaction and the strong indignation I felt in many cases. I will mention only a few: 1) They deceived me and the late Dzhodzho to take the Macedonian battalion from Kaimakchalan across the border into Yugoslavia… I always felt like they did not appreciate me, neither me nor the others. They treated us like ordinary organs that needed to listen and obey. They called on us and we were there in our homeland, as if passing from one room of the house to another. And yet, they were the hosts, and we were the ‘refugees’ who lived with their ‘help’ and at their ‘mercy’. Without admiration, I was thinking of the great Yugoslav thesis: ‘The Macedonian people will receive full affirmation only within the framework of the Yugoslav federation. And yet I worked in the spirit of this line’…” Pavle Rakovski is actually deeply disappointed and indignant not at the CPG, which he raised and kept in the highest possible position, but at SKY and SKM, because his painful passions and unlimited ambitions completely and definitely collapsed here at the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Pavle Rakovski was ill for a long time and not only bodily. Of course, no one can forbid him from writing at home. But I do not think that permission should be given to him to circulate his writing, because it is very harmful primarily politically as well as for SKY and SKM.

I also think that INI has a greater responsibility to purchase Pavle Rakovski’s material and register it in its documentation. His colleague Tosho Simovski, who recommended him to INI, has almost the same views as Pavle Rakovski, and is too far away to grasp such problems, since personal passions prevent him from coming closer to the real problems with regards to the revolutionary

movement in Greece and Aegean Macedonia. If INI, which knows what we are dealing with here, asked for an opinion from us, we would be very careful when we give it. This example poses the need to re-examine all the memoir materials for Aegean Macedonia, purchased by INI. I think this will help us to learn more useful lessons and better orient our work toward the direction of collecting memoirs from the fighters...