MACEDONIA LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATO ADVISORY TEAM - Part 03

controlled. This was accompanied by a feverish attempt to show the ability of Macedonia to stand by herself without aid from the central Yugoslav Government. Railways and roads were repaired with money raised in Macedonia and a grant from the central Government was left untouched in Belgrade. Schools were quickly re-opened with compulsory teaching of the Macedonian language and with Macedonian teachers, the top three classes of the gymnasia being released and enrolled for this purpose. Government offices were set up with Macedonian officials and many of the old Bulgarian officials stayed at their posts. Serbs trying to return to Macedonia were thrown into prison, and in order to avert the necessity of calling on Serbia for further technicians and officials, an appeal was launched for all Macedonians to return from Bulgaria.

4. Though some of the extravagances soon ceased and Tito’s leadership of the movement was recognized, these separatist tendencies, together with a dangerous propaganda campaign against Greece gave rise to serious disquiet in Belgrade and, as previously reported in Belgrade dispatch No. 74, Dr. Kardelj was sent late in December to the second extraordinary session of A.S.N.O.M. to deliver a warning against the prevailing mood of chauvinism and Macedonian nationalism. No immediate results were apparent from this visit though there was some slackening of the campaign against Greece. Probably, however, the visit achieved its object, which was presumably to prevent either an open breach between Macedonians and Serbs or any precipitate action by the Macedonians against the Greeks. Henceforth, greater stress was laid by Macedonian leaders on the role of Macedonia in federal Yugoslavia and on the central control of Belgrade. The Macedonian authorities continued, however, to make it impossible for Serbs who had been expelled by the Bulgarians from Macedonia to return. Matters came to a head once more with a meeting in a artillery brigade of 15 Corps which was ordered to the Srem front, but demanded instead to be allowed to march to Salonika and with a visit to Bulgaria of Pavel Shatev, an old member of the United I.M.R.O. and a member at the time of the Presidium of A.S.N.O.M., who speaks only Bulgarian and has lived nearly all his life in Bulgaria. His object in going there was to negotiate direct with the Bulgarian Government on the question of the re-establishment of the frontiers between Macedonia and Bulgaria which had hitherto been non-existent on the Yugoslav side.

These Macedonian activities called forth energetic action from Belgrade and General Vukmanovic-Tempo visited Skopje and roundly trounced the Macedonians for ignoring Belgrade.

5. The results of this warning were more immediately obvious, the Macedonian campaign against Greece stopped abruptly in early February, and it was clear from the instance of Macedonian officials that they could not express any opinion on foreign policy that they had been seriously frightened off their excursions into foreign affairs. It was rumoured that they had at one time considered setting up a department of the Macedonian Government responsible for Macedonian foreign policy. The Serbo-macedonian boundary was moved south to exclude the towns of Kacanik and Presevo which had previously been arbitrari1y incorporated by the Macedonians in Macedonia. Meanwhile, Belgrade began to set about the task of organizing a more effective control.

6. The Communist party, whose obedience to Tito is presumably beyond doubt, was put increasingly in control of the Macedonian Government. In the first Macedonian Federal Government set up in April the Prime Minister, Lazar Kulisevski, was the Secretary of the Macedonian Communist Party; both Vice-Presidents were Communists and all but two of the remaining Ministers. In the local National Liberation Committee, the Secretary, who is normally the most powerful member, is almost invariably a Communist. More and more of the key services were directly controlled by the central Government. O.Z.N.A., who appear to have the power to veto many decisions of the Federal Government, and the Corps of National Defense, who act as frontier guards, were moved in strength to Macedonia and are responsible direct to the Ministry of National Defense. The frontier with Bulgaria was re-established and control over passage between Bulgaria and Macedonia became strict, permission to cross it being granted only by Belgrade or Sofia. Mines and railways were placed directly under the Ministry of Mines and Communications in Belgrade and in these two services the Macedonians were obliged to accept Serbian technicians. Taxation, with the exception of small local taxes for local services, and the provisions to money to the Federal Government, is shortly to be co-ordinate under the central Government. Civil Courts have been established and the Public Prosecutor's service for Macedonia

will be responsible directly to the Minister of Justice in Belgrade for the administration of justice in the federal unit. Any important legislation envisaged by the Federal Government must be referred in detail to Belgrade before being put into effect. Skopje radio, hitherto independent, has been placed under the control of Belgrade. At the beginning of June the Macedonian military command was dissolved, and 5th Yugoslav Army was moved to Macedonia with headquarters in Skopje. Though this army consists mainly of Macedonian units, it is believed to contain at least one Serb division, and one Croat division is thought to be about to join it. It is under the command of Major-General Rodic who, with his Chief of staff, Political Commissar and the majority of his staff officers, is Serbian. It seems also that Belgrade is keeping Macedonia very short of essential supplies and though U.N.D.R.A. supplies are expected, they have not yet begun to arrive. This again may be a move on the part of the central Government to make the Macedonians realize how dependent they are on Belgrade. Finally, during the summer holidays the Youth organizations are being kept mobilized to undergo courses of political education from prominent Partisans.

7. From conversations with numbers of Macedonian officials it is clear that within the limits dictated to them by the central Government, the Macedonian Government intends to take all the autonomy it can. On the other hand, while maintaining effective control of Macedonia the central Government appears to have deemed it wise to make some concessions to re-awakened Macedonian nationalism. In Macedonian Government departments nearly all officials remain Macedonian, with a sprinkling of Bulgars. In a recent conversation, the Macedonian Prime Minister stated that the Government had no need for Serbian officials since there were sufficient Macedonian officials; the Serbian officials were corrupt and would in any case be unable to carry out their duties as all official business was transacted in the Macedonian language. As regards former Serbian colonists, the Prime Minister said that while many Serbian small holders who had helped the Partisan movement would be allowed to retain their land and some Serbian colonists had come back, he did not expect the return of the majority of the colonists who had left during the Bulgarian occupation. Most of those had in any case acquired their property illegally and this had been taken from them by the Bulgars. When the Bulgars had left, it

had been confiscated by the State as enemy property. He gave the impression that the question of whether those who had acquired their property legally would have it confiscated or returned to them, still remained to be settled, but said the uncertainty of their position would deter them from returning. There is, in any case, a serious shortage of land in Macedonia and it is clear from what has happened so far that the land of Serbian colonists is confiscated on the flimsiest pretext to satisfy landless Macedonians. The position appears to be that Serbs who return to Macedonia as technicians and officials in those organizations under the direct control of the central Government but will be excluded from the local services controlled by the Macedonian Government, and are unlikely to be attracted to return as private settlers. In this it seems that there is some conflict between Skopje and Belgrade, since the central Government has on several occasions categorically stated that former settlers should be allowed to return to their pre-war domiciles, end that the Macedonian Government is doing its best to steer a middle coarse between the Scylla of the centralism of Belgrade and the Charybdis of the separatist Macedonian aspirations. The conflict between the Central Government and the Macedonian Government may, however, be more apparent than real, though there is always the possibility that such prominent Macedonians as Dimitar Vlahov, who is President of the all-powerful National Liberation Front which controls all political activity and the press is Macedonian and can hardly be considered as a Yugoslav, may be playing their own, Macedonian game. The Central Government is forced to pander to strong Serbian opinion which is thoroughly anti-Macedonian and resents Macedonian autonomy and exclusion of Serbs, while the Macedonian Government relies largely for support on Macedonian nationalist feeling. A different stress is therefore laid on Macedonia's position by the central and Macedonian Governments, the Central Government emphasizing Macedonia's place in Federal Yugoslavia and the Macedonian Government stressing the autonomous aspect of Macedonia's position. In order to make this possible, concessions have had to be made on both sides.

8. The Macedonian Government is taking what advantage it can of the main visible concession to Macedonian autonomist feeling, namely the grant of full cultural autonomy. Though some schools for the Turkish, Albanian and, according to the Minister of

Education, Serb minorities, have been provided by the Government, in all other schools all instruction is in Macedonian. In some entirely Serb-speaking districts only Macedonian is taught and the Cincar-V1ach minority are alleged to have petitioned to be taught in Macedonian because they have no written language of their own. Macedonian school books and dictionaries are to be provided by the beginning of the next school year, teaching having so far been carried out under great difficulties with no books and few trained teachers. A great drive is being made to rediscover and establish a separate Macedonian literature and folk lore. Further, the Orthodox Church in Macedonia which late in April voiced a desire for 1ndependence from the Serbian Patriarchate, is at present administered by a Macedonian Church Counci1 and appears to be already enjoying a certain amount of independence. Its aims are described as a semi-autonomous status in the Yugoslav Federal Orthodox Church. This development is the direction of independent status appears to have been regarded with dismay in Belgrade.

9. Opposition

There is little prospect of organized opposition to the regime in Skopje from outside the Partisan movement. The Cetnik organization in Macedonia, always Great-Serb and a weak offshoot of organization in Serbia, has shown no signs of activity (see enclosure in Belgrade dispatch No.74). Arnaut villages contain certain irreconcilable elements, and mention has been made of sporadic unrest by armed bands. But attempts have now been undertaken to conciliate both Albanians and Turks by giving them their representatives in the Government, their own newspapers and committees. Never the less the Muslims, with alone in Macedonia England is popular, are believed to constitute an element fundamentally hostile to the new regime. They are, however, leaderless and are only likely to constitute real danger if other opposition elements come out actively against the Government.

10. Throughout the whole of Macedonia there is however widespread grumbling, discontent and disillusionment with the new regime, and this has even spread to some elements of the old Partisan movement. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Macedonia suffered little in the war and with the liberation expected

benefits of all kinds. Instead they found themselves for the first time conscripted into the Army or into labour squads. There were arbitrary arrests, though these were few compared to other parts of the country, wholesale requisitioning by the Army and economic and financial instability. The leva was changed at what was considered an unfair rate and there was a heavy levy on money changed. Trials by military and “honour” courts were thought, and are now admitted by the Government, to be most unfair. There is a lack of consumers' goods; the prospect of bad crops due to lack of rain; high wages and prices; premature attempts by the Government to brine business under government control without having the organization to direct it, a process which has gone further down the social scale in Macedonia than Serbia owing to the lack of big business and heavy industry; and there have been many mistakes by an inexperienced administration and the ham- handed O.Z.N.A. Some of these abuses the Government is trying to remedy. Requisitioning and forced labour, except in the Bitolj area, have ceased; civil courts are to be established, and an attempt is being made to control wages and prices though these still remain very high.

11. That the general discontent has not crystallized into active opposition is due to the firm hand of the police and the complete lack of leadership. Political parties, apart from the communist party are non-existent and opposition on pre-war party lines is inconceivable. Before the war the political parties in Macedonia were merely extensions of Serb political parties with Serbian leaders and as such have no support in present-day Macedonia. Metodije Andonov the president of the Macedonian Assembly and a pre-war Agrarian, who claims that the party had in Macedonia before the war, a special Macedonian character in so far as it was used by Macedonians to oppose the Government and keep alive Macedonian national feeling, stated categorically in conversation that the re-emergence of the old political parties in Macedonia was impossible. As elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the discontented elements expect the regime to change but do not contemplate playing an active part in bringing it down. They hope, therefore, for collapse from within or for outside intervention, and only in the event of the elections leaving the Government still firmly in the saddle, are they at all likely to become active.

12. Nevertheless, discontent is certain to increase while the majority of the youth idles in the Army instead of being harnessed to restoring the country, while priority is being given to Army over civilian needs as in the case of railways, which during the month of June were allotted exclusively to the Army, from whom the civilian authorities had to get permission to move goods for civilian consumption, and while the central Government cannot or will not give Macedonia what she needs to put her house in order. Unless also the food situation is remedied by winter the position may become most serious. The Ministry of Agriculture admitted in conversation that Macedonia, in view of the very poor harvests, could need large quantities of wheat and that he did not know where the necessary supplies would come from since before the war they had come from Kosovo Polje, whose wheat was now being sent to Albania.

13. .Amongst the intellectuals, traders and even some peasants, the hardships caused by the attempt of Macedonia to stand on her own feet has given rise to a wish to end at any price the experiment in Macedonian autonomy and return to some sort of security and stability. Since it appears only immediately possible to do this by going back under the control of Belgrade, they would welcome the return of Macedonian pre-war status.

14. Amongst the broad masses, however, hatred of Serbia still remains strong and has bean increased by the recent attempt to re-impose the domination of Belgrade on Macedonia. With this, pro-Bulgarian sentiment which has always been strong among certain members of the Macedonian National Assembly, has shown some increase though there is no widespread wish to try again the experiment of Bulgarian rule so shortly after its failure. Nevertheless, there are areas, particularly along the Bulgarian frontier, where a village in the Novo Selo area is reported to have petitioned recently to be reincorporated into Bulgaria, and in the Bitolj-Ohrid region, where pro-Bulgarian sentiment remains very strong. In Bitolj this has been accentuated by the overbearing behaviour of Serbian troops recently billeted in the town who have, treated the Macedonians with ill-concealed contempt. Nevertheless, the Government evidently do not consider the danger from pro-

Bulgarian elements to be really serious as they are allowing ex-Bulgarian officials to remain and encouraging more to return.

15. The Partisans on first achieving power exploited the strong separatist sentiment in Macedonia with their promises of autonomy and thus stole the thunder of the old extremists I.M.R.O. of Vanco Mihailov who was produced by the Germans at the time of the Bulgarian collapse to foster the movement for independent greater Macedonia. Mihailov had in any case forfeited his popularity in Macedonia as a whole, first by the active part he played in bringing about the fall of Stambuliski, who enjoyed much sympathy in Macedonia, and latterly by his wholehearted collaboration with the enemy during the war. Having won most of his potential supporters to their cause, the Partisans smashed the surviving elements of his party and arrested and sentenced to death all the leaders remaining in Macedonia. The party, as such, is therefore virtually leaderless. The Macedonian Government has not yet lost the support of the very strong separatist elements and their tight-rope walk between centralism and separatism, trying to preserve an outward semblance of autonomy while deferring to Belgrade in all essential matters, is at least in part occasioned by the desire to keep the separatists with them. The present press campaign against Greece fostered by the Central Government finds the separatists strongly behind it and the Macedonian Government are taking advantage of this to divert to some extent at my rate the attention of the separatists from Belgrade's increasing encroachments. That some separatist elements are dissatisfied and wish to have more drastic action is witnessed, however, by the fact that some 300-350 boys and girls were recently arrested in Skopje on charges of separatist activities on behalf of I.M.R.O. and are awaiting trial. Should the regime fail even to achieve for the separatists any concrete results in the satisfaction of their expansionist aims, the separatists will probably become a very dangerous element of opposition under the possible leadership of the Federalist I.M.R.O. which is at present strongly entrenched in Macedonian Government circles.

16. Relations with Bulgaria

There is at present little concrete evidence as to relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over the Macedonian question. At the time

of Bulgaria’s occupation and rapid change of sides it was generally assumed in Yugoslavia that she was ready to cede the Pirin province of Macedonia to Yugoslavia and unguarded statements to this effect came from both Dr. Smodlaka and Dimitar Vlahov. It was expected at the same time that Bulgaria would get some return for this and for supporting Macedonian claims to Greece, and it is suggested this return may have been Yugoslav support for Bulgarian claims to Eastern Thrace and certain frontier readjustments in the Caribrod and Bosiljgrad areas. In Macedonia the cession of the Pirin was thought to be virtually a fait accompli, and relations between Macedonians and Bulgars became very close. Macedonian officials traveled back and forth to Bulgaria and movement over the old Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier appears to have been in no way restricted. There were reports that an attempt was made by Bulgarian Macedonians from Federalist IMRO to set up an administration in the Pirin, independent of the Bulgarian Government, and that delegates were sent to Skopje to discuss the future frontiers of Macedonia. An appeal was launched for Bulgarian Macedonian to return to their liberated homeland. These appeals remained largely unanswered though a number of Bulgarian officials remained at their posts or returned from Bulgaria. These and other indications seem to show that Bulgaria may have begun to use this detente in her relations with Yugoslavia to play her own game in Macedonia and is working through elements friendly to her in the Macedonian government to try to increase her influence in Macedonia at the expense of Yugoslavia and to encourage separatist or pro- Bulgarian tendencies. The Macedonian government seem to have cooperated willingly in these plans and on at least one occasion the Macedonian government ordered and accepted supplies direct from the Bulgarian government while the Bulgars sent supplies to their former sympathizers in the Bitolj-Ohrid area. It seems possible that these tactics of the Bulgarian government may have been occasioned by the situation in Greece. Bulgaria's acceptance of the loss of Pirin was, it is suggested, based on the assumption that E.L.A.S. would gain power in Greece and that this would result in the establishment of a Balkan federation including an independent greater Macedonian state which would absorb Greek Macedonia. With the defeat of E.L.A.S., Bulgaria saw these hopes receding and began to draw back their earlier promises, not wishing to hand over the Pirin to a purely Yugoa1av Macedonia. At the same time

Bulgaria by sending back some Bulgarian officials, tried to safeguard her position in Macedonia. Metodije Andonov in conversation stated that the he thought Bulgaria was less ready than she had been to cede the Pirin, and that this area had been brought again under the strict control of the Bulgarian Government. The leaders of the separate administration of Bulgarian Macedonia are also reported to have been arrested by the Bulgarian government. However this may be, it seems clear that the Yugoslav government soon began to see through the Bulgarian game and to take counter measures. As mentioned above, the Yugoslav government ordered the Macedonian government to accept Serbian officials and close the frontier between Bulgaria and Macedonia, manning it with troops under the direct control of Belgrade. The Macedonian government were called to task for accepting supplies from Bulgaria and the Bulgarian dispatch of supplies to pro-Bulgarian elements was publicly denounced. Nevertheless, at the end of May, Dimitar Vlahov again launched an appeal for the return of Bulgarian Macedonians and even of pure Bulgarians with relations in Macedonia. This appeal appears to have been met again by refusal by the Bulgarian Government to disgorge any Macedonians living in Bulgaria and by a further influx of pure Bulgarian officials, some of these coming to Belgrade and on to Skopje under cover of the recent Youth Congress. At the same time Slav refugees from Greece coming into the Pirin were sent by the Bulgarian Government to Yugoslav Macedonia.

17. It seems possible that the Russians who, presumably, have firm control over the actions of the Bulgarian Government, may be favouring the idea of an independent Macedonia in a Balkan or South Slav federation and with this end in view ere trying to hold the balance between Bulgarian and Serbian domination of the projected state. In this connexion the recent Russian support for the formation of an autonomous Macedonian church is perhaps significant. Yugoslav intentions would appear to be to retain even a greater Macedonia inside Yugoslavia unless a Balkan or South Slav federation becomes a fact. It seems clear that the task of pressing Macedonian demands on Greece falls to Yugoslavia and it is to assist her in this task that Bulgaria has returned Macedonian refugees from Greece to Yugoslav Macedonia. Whatever Bulgaria's aims may be, she may, however, feel forced by her present weak

international position, to make some concessions to Yugoslavia, to preserve her friendship and support.

18. Relations with Greece

The renewed press campaign against Greece (see Appendix "A") which started at the beginning or June has raised acutely the question of Yugoslav intentions in Greece. It is clear that this press campaign has been carefully coordinated in Belgrade and is not, as in the case of the earlier campaign, largely purely Macedonian ebullience. It did not start in Macedonian press until the lead was given by the Belgrade press and recently all important Macedonian leaders have been in turn to Belgrade, presumably to ensure that the agitation in Macedonia is on lines laid down by the central government, and does not get out of hand as it did at the beginning of this year. This is borne out by the fact that on the return of the Macedonian leaders from Belgrade a plenary session of the Macedonian National Liberation Front was held in Skopje when the main subject for discussion was the situation in Greece.

19. As previously suggested, one of the main reasons for the campaign is to harness the separatist element to the Macedonian government. Another reason is probably that the Yugoslavs are now in a very difficult position with the Slav Macedonians on the Greek side of the frontier. They say that they recruited some 15,000 Slavs from Greece into the Partisan army, and when doing so presumably made them g1owing promises have not been fulfilled though probably there was some vague undertaking between E.L.A.S. and the Partisans that they should be, at least in part, if E.L.A.S. gained power in Greece. The Yugoslavs cannot now afford, without forfeiting the sympathy of the Slavs in Greece, and thus giving up their hopes of expansion there to appear to retract their promises and abandon to the Greek government all those who have thrown in their lot with them and many of whom have sons in the Partisan army. They must, therefore, if only vocally, keep up some sort of campaign on their behalf. That some terrorization is taking place on the Greek side of the frontier is undoubted. Two responsible American journalists recently interviewed a large number or refugees from Greece in Bitolj and the stories told by these refugees were too circumstantial to be entirely false. All the refugees agreed

that the most common atrocities were for Slav villages to be surrounded by E.D.E.S. and Greek gendarmerie working together and for Greek villagers then to be assisted in rustling livestock from the Slav villages. This was usually followed by the arrest and disappearance of a number of men from the Slav villages. Whether the Greeks have justification for the arrest of Slavs is another matter. Some of the refugees when asked for the reason of their persecution said that it was because they were pro-Tito and pro-Stalin instead of giving the prescribed answer, which was that it was because they were Macedonians. From the standpoint of the Greek government they undoubtedly form a dangerous fifth column which engages in active pan-Slav and anti-Greek propaganda. Moreover, the Slavs of Greek Macedonia must at least to some extent appear in Greek eyes to be war criminals, since like all Macedonian Slavs they certainly welcomed the Bulgarian occupation troops as liberators and at least at the beginning of the occupation probably worked closely with them and against the Greeks. The final reason for the renewed press campaign is, it is suggested, a desire on the part of the Macedonian and Yugoslav governments to ensure that the persecution of Slavs in Greece ceases though it is doubtful if in return they would be prepared to refrain from making pan- Slav propaganda amongst these people. The refugees, to whom, if they wish to retain their sympathy and support, the Yugoslavs cannot refuse sanctuary, are creating a serious economic problem. The Prime Minister of Macedonia, in conversation, said that there were some 7,000 civilian refugees chiefly in the Strumica and Bitolj areas and approximately the same number of troops, many of then pure Greeks from E.L.A.S. These have to be fed and sheltered and this aggravates the present food shortage in Macedonia and though the central government has just allotted 1,000,000 dinars for the care or refugees and has sent some of them (about 1,500) to the Vojvodina, this is not sufficient to solve the problem, particularly as more and more refugees are said to be coming over the frontier every day. The Prime Minister said that this must be stopped and that the minimum requirements must be granted by the Greek Government, namely that the Slavs should be allowed to use their own language and should have some cultural freedom.

20. This press campaign has had a deplorable effect both on the army and on the population of Macedonia. They have been led by

chauvinistic propaganda, particularly in the army, to expect an attempt to seize Salonika and parts of Greek Macedonia at any moment and feeling is tense on this account. Troops passing recently through Skopje and Stip are said to have stated that they are on their way to Salonika. An eventual conflict with Greece on this point is accepted as more or less inevitable since Yugoslav demands have been presented to them as irrevocable and no mention whatever has been made of trying to find a peaceful solution which might be acceptable to both Greece and Yugoslavia and would enable the two countries to 1ive on friendly terms.

21. Despite this, responsible members of the Macedonian government have stated in private conversation that there is no intention or trying to settle the question by force prior to the peace conference. Among them was the Prime Minister who was, nevertheless, extremely bitter about British intervention in Greece against E.L.A.S. whom he considered would lave been sympathetic to Yugoslavia's claims. He alleged the that owing to this at Trieste, England was very unpopular in Macedonia. The claims against Greece are fantastic and extend as far south as Mount Olympus, but nevertheless both Metod1ja Andonov and Pavel Shatev claim that these areas should be included in Macedonia, both on ethnical and economic grounds. The population figures on which they base these claims are those of 1912, before the First Balkan War, before which date they claim to have irrefutable proof that the population was 60% Slav, 20% Greek and 20% Turk. Their claim is that the changes in the balance of population after the Balkan wars are artificially induced by colonization and therefore cannot be accepted as valid. Colonization was tried in Yugoslavian and Bulgarian Macedonia but was not successful and the Macedonians succeeded in maintaining their national conciseness. In Greece, however, the influx of refugees from Asia Minor and the persecution of Slavs entirely changed the picture. Kulisevski stated that in the ten years after the Greco-Turkish war 700,000 Slavs from Greece emigrated to Bulgaria and Andonov gave the figures of 350-400,000. It is claimed that at present there are still some 250- 300,000 Slavs in Greek Macedonia and that there is still a Slav majority in the Kastoria and Florina areas and in the mountain area on the Greek side of the frontier stretching through Gumendja as far east as Djevdjelja. When discussing this matter they all gave the impression

that the claims of Bulgarian Macedonia would automatically fan into line if a satisfactory solution were found for the claim of Greek Macedonia. As for their claims against Albania, these could easily be settled, and the Prime Minister indicates that they would not be pressed. The presence of the Sixth Albanian Division on the Greek border in the Ohrid area of Macedonia seems to indicate that Albanian and Yugoslav action with regard to their respective claims on Greece is closely coordinated. Andonov admitted freely that Macedonia had no valid ethnical claim to Salo1ika which had never had a Slav majority, but added that Macedonia must have an outlet to the sea and suggested that for Salonika the best solution would be to put it under international control. He added that he was fully aware of the necessity of trying to live on terms of friendship with Greece and that with this in view Yugoslavia would be prepared to compromise on their extreme claims. He suggested as a possible frontier a line running from the north of the Grammos mountains to Kozani and running north-east to leave Greece a strip of land north of the Gulf of Salonika with Salonika as a free port contiguous to Macedonian territory in the north. The frontier would then run north of the Chalcidice and rejoin the coast to the east of it. There could then be transfer of Greek and Slav population north and south of the frontier.

22. The economic argument advanced for frontier revision other than necessity of Macedonian outlet to the sea, is that before the erections of the frontiers after the Balkan Wars, the winter pastures of large numbers of flocks in what is now Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonia were in the plains of northern Greece. The flocks in the summer pasture in the mountains of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia and in winter went down to Greece. With the erection of artificial frontiers this has ceased and the effects on the sheep rearing industry in Bulgarian and Yugoslavian Macedonia had been serious and great hardship and impoverishment had been caused to the peasants there. This had hit Bulgarian Macedonia particularly hard since there was no winter pasturage there at all and the sheep had to be maintained throughout the year on the poor summer pasturages. In addition to this, in the mountain areas of northern Greece, the valleys and natural trade routes led only towards the north and many of the villages and towns are completely inaccessible from the South. The establishment of the frontiers had

forced the population to send their produce south and had imposed very hardships on them. Some Macedonian towns, particularly Bitolj, had lost their former prosperity on this account. Further, on the Aegean seaboard the inclusion of such previously prosperous ports as Kavalla in Greece had rendered them virtually useless. Where before 1912 they had taken much of the import trade into Bulgaria this import trade was now sent through the Black Sea.

23. Andonov said that the tactics which the Yugoslav Movement proposed to adopt were to press their claims at the peace conference on the basis of the 1912 population figures. He and Shatev strongly disclaimed my intention to try to use force prior to this and expressed the certainty that a just solution would be found by the great powers at the peace conference. Presumably in this they base their hopes on Russian support for their claims. In the meantime they hoped that action would be taken to see that Greek injustices towards the Slav population of Greek Macedonia ceased. All indications are that the Yugoslavs are at present in no position to use force against Greece, and the control of the frontier by picked troops under the direct command of Belgrade, ensures that no incident can be provoked by irresponsible elements in Macedonia. The Yugoslav Fifth Army though large – possibly about 30,000 men and largely concentrated near the frontier - is not composed of the most experienced Yugoslav troops and is not well equipped. There are no signs of unusual military activity, though as air force of about 40 planes recently arrived in Skopje. Means of supplying the army on a war footing for operations against Greece are lacking. There is little motor transport and a great lack of rolling stock. The railway from Veles to Djevdjelja is completely out of action and is unlikely to be repaired even by the end of the summer since the track is to be re-laid on the other side of the Vardar. The narrow-gauge railway to Ohrid is incapable of taking much traffic and the railway from Skopje to Bitolj is broken by a destroyed tunnel south of Veles and on the line from Bitolj to Veles and to the Greek frontier there are only two engines in a poor state of repair.

24. Nevertheless, should British troops be withdrawn from Greece, there would be a strong likelihood that the Yugoslavs would be tempted to take the law into their own hands. If, further, Yugoslav claims remain unsatisfied at the Peace Conference, the Yugoslav

government may well find that they have no inflamed public opinion that unless they attempt to use force to satisfy their claims, or can play up some other success elsewhere, they will be left with a very dangerous internal situation.

Minutes - January 2nd, 1944

Please see attached minute No. M. 1255/4 of December 31st, from the Prime Minister.

The telegram to Washington and Moscow, to which the Prime Minister refers, shows that we are doing our utmost to preserve Greek territory intact and to prevent any threat to Greek Macedonia from developing. The news that we are taking such a strong line on Greece’s behalf would certainly gratify the Archbishop and other Greek politicians and might promote unity among them. On the other hand, we must realize that if the information is given to the Archbishop and if he is allowed to pass it on, it will immediately become public property. I am very doubtful that this would be advisable at least until we know whether the United States and Soviet Governments are in agreement with us.

There have been innumerable reports about propaganda which is being conducted in favour of independent Macedonia and of incursions by Yugoslav and Bulgarian partisans into Greek territory. Almost all reports state that E.A.M. are in close touch with these Slav forces, and there is enough evidence that Bulgarian units are taking part on the attack on Zervas. If E.A.M. are in fact assisting or even supporting these pro-Macedonian activities, they will loose a great deal of support even amongst their own members. For the moment people in Athens and most other areas of Greece have so much to think about that they cannot pay attention to events in the north, but once they have time for reflection the Slav danger to Greece should work strongly against E.A.M. and in favour of Greek unity.