IMPORTANT

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No.781A [of March 13th: Yugoslav- Bulgarian relations].

Principle object of our representations is to avert the danger of joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian pressure on Greece to surrender western Thrace. Sa1onika has been traditionally coveted both by Yugoslavia and by Bulgaria and this division of interest has made it easier in the past for Greece to resist pressure from either side. Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact would remove this safeguard and enable claim for Salonika to be put forward as a general Slav interest. If the pact included, as seems possible, an undertaking by Bulgaria to cede territory to the Yugoslav Macedonian State, there would be an added danger of a strongly backed demand for the satisfaction of traditional Macedonian aspirations at the expense of Greece. These dangers would be intensified by actual federation; and it must also be borne in mind that a pact would be likely to be a first step towards eventual federation.

2. We are also concerned to see that Greece’s reparation claims on Bulgaria are satisfied. Consequence of Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact would probably be that priority would be given to Yugoslavia’s claims over those of Greece. This is indeed already happening and the tendency would be increased by the conclusion of a formal pact. It will be an incentive to Bulgaria to give satisfaction to Greece if the Great Powers make it clear that Bulgaria cannot be granted any favours or be allowed to progress on the way to rehabilitation, until she shows a genuine willingness to carry out all the Armistice terms including the payment of reparation to Greece and the restitution of Greek properly.

3. Lastly the position in the Balkans is still far too confused to make it desirable that any adjustment of the relations between the Balkan States should be made at this stage. Pacts and treaties, especially those of an exclusive nature, should wait until conditions are more

settled and the balance of relations between the Balkan States is more stable.

O.T.P.

From Salonika to Athens - March 12th, 1945

His Majesty’s Consul-General.

No. 145

I returned yesterday from four days tour of eastern Macedonia and Thrace, in the course of which I visited Serres, Drama, Cavalla, Xanthi and Komotini. I was accompanied by United States Consul-General.

2. General impressions are satisfactory. Reasonable order prevails throughout the whole region. E.L.A.S. have been eager to disband and hand over arms while present officials appointed by E.A.M. influence have invariably expressed anxiety to hand over as soon as possible to Greek Government nominees. Present anti-Government propaganda is principally based on delay in sending Government officials and security forces.

3. We were well received throughout by both officials and people and the population are undoubtedly happy at breaking down of barriers with the outside world. Although in urgent need of clothing and grain, economic recovery should be rapid as Communications and public utilities east of Struma have not been destroyed. There is also eight and a half million kilogrammes of tobacco ready for export with United states a keen buyer for this and other quantities that become available.

4. Leva is only currency at present in use and the introduction of drachma is likely to cause considerable dislocation as leva retains internal value out of all proportion to real worth.

5. There is considerable activity at Cavalla, M.L. and U.N.D.R.A. personnel returned there on March 8th, a convoy of 50 trucks arrived on March 10th and the first supply ship on March 11th. The newly appointed Governor-General was also due to arrive yesterday and the first National Guards on March 13th. Communist influence in Cavalla has suffered severe setback and their leaders have lost confidence. They are particularly sensitive to any accusations of collaboration with the Bulgarians.

6. Situation at Drama is less satisfactory than elsewhere on account of an E.L.A.S./Nationalist bands complex. Disarming of the latter is however proceeding pari passu with E.L.A.S., but early dispatch of government forces very desirable. Meanwhile presence of company of Indian troops is moderating influence.

7. It is clear that every effort should be made to complete occupation of all Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by Government officials and troops as soon as possible taking advantage of present disposition of population. The only danger I can foresee are delays and aggressive conduct on the part of the National Guards as they arrive, especially in districts where communist influence is in no case strong.

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign Office - February 12, 1945

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall No. 197 10th February, 1945

My telegram No.182, paragraph (a).

The following is translation of message to Mr. Churchill, left here today.

[Begins]

Delegates of 500,000 Macedonian émigrés in Bulgaria, called together in their first free Congress at Sofia, send their greetings to you, and through you to the Democratic, British people, whose armies together with the Red Amy and American Army, are killing the Fascist beast and ensuring the freedom of much-suffering Macedonian people in its, free Federal State within the boundaries of Democratic Federated [grp. Under] Yugoslavia. Signed: -President of Congress, LAMBREV. [End],

2. I have no acknowledged message.

Foreign Office please pass to Belgrade, Washington and, Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 19, 23, and 36 respectively.

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign office - January 16th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell No. 74

Your telegram No. 451 to Washington.

If Marshal Tito has indeed expressed his views frankly to the Bulgarian representatives, the present spate of pro-Yugoslav propaganda here and organization of discursive voluntary relief for distressed population of Yugoslavia (see my telegram No.72 and Major General Oxley’s No. M/467 to the war office) may be designed to allay his misgivings by demonstrating Bulgaria’s good faith and their determination to dissociate themselves, once and for all from past, perfidy towards the Yugoslavs. Moreover reciprocal mistrust of the Serbs may still be prevalent in some quarters here. There is therefore no essential inconsistency between Tito's attitude as reported, and our interpretation here of the present Bulgarian activity as preparation of Bulgarian public opinion for the eventual accounting. Whatever the ultimate outcome this ostentatious laying of the olive branch on the altar of Balkan harmony can hardly fail to go to Bulgaria’s credit

One thing is certain: the Bulgarian Government can do nothing to promote closer relations with Yugoslavia without at least the tacit approval of the local Soviet authorities and hence presumably of Moscow itself.

Foreign office please pass to Washington and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 11 and 15 respectively.

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign office - January 19th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell No. 86

Belgrade telegram No.47.

When I mentioned this article to Minister for Foreign Affairs and recalled to him that Lieutenant General Terpeshev had attended the meeting (my telegram No. 21). he said although of course a Cabinet Minister could never make a speech unofficially in a foreign country Bulgarian government as such had not been represented on that occasion Lieutenant General Terpeshev had expressed a desire to go to Skopje in order to take greetings to Asnom from the Bulgarian Workers (Communist) Party; he had accompanied Mr. Harizanov representing the Patriotic Front (Dr. Harizanov had in the past been a keen student of the Macedonian problem). As this was by no means the first occasion on which Terpeshev had made irresponsible statements of this kind (c.f. military mission telegram M/467 to the War Office), I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to look into the matter and as he had already told me that his colleagues had bad no authority for saying any such thing, I suggested some further effort ought to be made to restrain the General' s oratorical exuberance. He promised to make enquiries. He remarked that as Bulgaria was now so democratic and all in favour of self-determination and so on he supposed that, if eventually the people of the Pirin area wanted to join their brother Macedonians, it might be difficult to stop them but the time was not ripe for considering anything or that sort yet. Before we left the topic he said it had been pointed out to him that, whereas the Bulgarian Government had not been represented officially at the meeting of Asnom, His Majesty's Government had sent a representative. I said I had heard it had been reported in the newspapers that an officer of the Military Mission at Skopje was present at the meeting but that he could not be regarded as representative of His Majesty’s Government.

Please pass to Belgrade as my telegram No.7.

[Repeated to Belgrade as Foreign Office telegram No. 67].

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign office - January 24th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell No. 108