MACEDONIA LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATO ADVISORY TEAM - Part 02

40. Thirdly, the area of Salonica is essential to the defence of Greece. Greece’s strategic interest is to have an adequate hinterland serving as a screen for Salonica and for the routes to Florina, Kastoria, and Thrace, against any enemy of less than Great Power strength. It is also to Greece’s interest that Bulgaria should not be extended (as in 1941) to include Yugoslav Macedonia, and that a single Slav Power, holding all non-Greek Macedonia and dominating the Balkan Peninsula, should not be created.

41. (c) Bulgarian interests.-The acquisition of most of Macedonia has been a traditional aspiration of the Bulgarian people. Until 1919 Bulgaria could appeal to the sentiment of the majority of the Macedonian Slavs. After 1919 the Bulgarian-minded population of Greek Macedonia was reduced to a small remnant, and most of that of Yugoslav Macedonia appeared gradually to exchange their hope of annexation to Bulgaria for that of autonomy in a Yugoslav or Balkan Slav or Balkan Federation.

42. Bulgaria’s main economic interest in Macedonia lies in the acquisition of an adequate outlet to the Aegean Sea, which Bulgarians declared was closed to them before 1939 by the ill-will of the Greek authorities. It may be true that Bulgaria will only find markets for her produce in Central Europe; but, should the world find its way back to freedom of international trade, Bulgaria will need to import goods from countries overseas. The best outlet for western Bulgaria would be Salonica; or, failing that, Kavalla. Alternatively such an outlet could be found not in Macedonia, but at Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis), in Thrace. Apart, however, from the certain opposition of Greece and Turkey to a cession of any part of the Aegean coast to Bulgaria, it should be remembered that Bulgaria has a considerable coast on the Black Sea.

43. Bulgaria’s strategic interest appears to be twofold. First, the possession of the Vardar basin would enable her to separate Greece from Yugoslavia and reach a common frontier with Albania; a situation which, were Yugoslavia to disintegrate, would leave Bulgaria dominant in the Balkans. Secondly, a more modest share of

Macedonia, but one including a port on the Aegean Sea, would release Bulgaria from dependence on the Black Sea-Dardanelles and Danube routes of supply and support. Again such a port might be found in Dedeagatch. And again the opposition of Greece and Turkey to the cession of an Aegean port to Bulgaria is certain. (In regard to paras. 43 and 44 see Territorial Issues between Bulgaria and Greece, (Foreign Officer print: ”Balkan States,” June 20, Section 1.) paras. 12-16).

44. (d) Albanian interests.-Albania might advance an ethnic claim, whose validity it would be difficult to assess, to the districts of Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo, and Ohrida. But the first three of these districts lie within the basin of the Bardar and belong geographically to Macedonia. Ohrida is over the mountains, in the basin of the Drin. On economic and strategic grounds a frontier giving Ohrida to Albania would appear justifiable (see The Albano-Yugoslav Frontier, (Foreign Office print; “Balkan States,” August 26, Section 1.) paras. 18 (e) and (f), 20 (e), 21, 25).

45. (e) Revolutionary Movements.-In contrast with all these “traditional” interests, there have developed, especially since 1941, in and around Macedonia, powerful currents of revolutionary sentiment, which appear to cut across the historic boundaries and national antagonisms of the Balkan Slavs. Amongst Serbian and Macedo-Slav “partisans” and Bulgarian Leftists there appeared in 1943 to be more zeal for a social revolution than for national States. In Greece and Albania there were similar tendencies. The strength of these movements in relation to the forces representing the traditions of the nineteenth century, and the outcome of their conflict with those traditions, will at some stage depend on the policy adopted towards them by Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. These movements have gained prestige by their active opposition to the German forces. But until the policy of the Greater Allies in relation to the Balkans, is known, it is difficult to assess the relative strengths of the conflicting forces in Macedonia, beyond the view that the Greek character of Greek Macedonia appears established.

Possible Solutions

46. The solution originally advocated by IMRO was the independence of Macedonia as a whole, based on the equal rights and treatment of all its inhabitants irrespective of race. Provided that Macedonia were genuinely independent, Bulgarian resistance to this solution would probably not be widespread, particularly after a lost war. An intransigent opposition, however, would be shown by the Serbians, who claim that Yugoslav Macedonia is a part of Serbia; unless power in Serbia passes in the future into the hands of new and much less nationalist elements. But, even so, the idea of an independent Macedonia is obsolete. Such a State could not exist without its natural capital, Salonica; and Greece would not willingly surrender that great Greek city, nor would the Macedonian Greeks accept separation from Greece. Moreover, it would isolate Greek Thrace from the rest of Greece and probably stimulate Bulgarian, Macedonian, and perhaps Turkish claims to that province.

47. Secondly, there are several forms which it might be suggested that Macedonian autonomy might take, within a Federation. (a) The autonomy of Macedonia as a whole, within a Balkan Federation. This would include Greek Macedonia in the autonomous State; and would encounter the same objections, on that account, as were raised to the preceding suggestion. (b) The autonomy of non-Greek Macedonia within a Federation of the Balkan Slavs, which the advent to power of new elements in Serbia and Bulgaria might make possible. As between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria this has long seemed the best way to put an end to the mutual antagonism of the two States, which has its roots chiefly in the Macedonian Question, and thus to make possible the creation of the Great Federated Southern Slav State which is the ultimate ideal of a considerable part of the more enlightened and less chauvinistic Balkan Slavs. Such a solution for non-Greek Macedonia might have the approval of the U.S.S.R.; but the creation of a Slav Federation extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea would arouse the apprehensions of both Greece and Turkey, and might be opposed to British interests. (c) The autonomy of non-Greek Macedonia within a Balkan Federation. This solution would combine self-government for a population conscious of its separate identity with economic freedom in a wider area and free access to Salonica. Yet a Balkan Federation, for its harmonious operation, would require a degree of mutual confidence

and co-operation between all the Balkan nations of which as yet they have given little evidence.

48. Thirdly, a return might be made to some form of the proposal made by the Entente Powers to Bulgaria in 1915 for the cession by Serbia to Bulgaria of several districts east of the Vardar; subject to an exchange of those portions of the population of Yugoslav Macedonia which preferred to cross the new frontier line. Such a proposal might be welcomed by Bulgaria as a final settlement of her claims in non-Greek Macedonia. But it would entail the removal of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier from mountain ranges into a river basin; it would be held by the Yugoslavs to endanger their main line of communication with Greece and Salonica; it is improbable that many of the peasantry would avail themselves of the option of exchanging their nationality, or that the two States would put pressure to emigrate on populations which each considers hers, with the result that irredentism would not cease; it seems wholly improbable that the Serbians would consent to cede to Bulgaria territory for which they have four times fought in 30 years; and, lastly, the proposal would almost certainly arouse the opposition of Greece.

49. Fourthly, were anti-traditionalist, left-wing forces to become predominant in both Serbia and Bulgaria, a possible solution for non-Greek Macedonia might be found in the combination of a south Slav Federation, including Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see para. 48 (b) above), together with, not the autonomy of non-Greek Macedonia, but the cession to Bulgaria of several districts of eastern Yugoslav Macedonia (see para.49). Elements of the population, which so wished, would then be free to transfer themselves across the internal frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria, and the Serbo-Bulgarian feud might be expected to come to an end. This solution would not provide the advantages of local autonomy (for which it may be argued that non-Greek Macedonia is too small and poor); and, like the solution indicated in para. 48 (b), it would arouse the apprehensions of Turkey and Greece.

50. Fifthly, it is possible that, if the Balkan peninsula passed under the control of a Great Power, that Power might end the local feuds and reconcile the races of Macedonia and of the whole peninsula in

a common subjection to herself. The only Power able and conceivably willing to perform this function would appear to be the U.S.S.R. This solution would arouse strong opposition from Turkey, Greece and large portions of the other Balkan peoples. It would also raise wider issues in the international field.

51. Sixthly, there is the restoration of the pre-1941 status quo, with the inevitable continuance of intransigent nationalism in Macedonia. That situation might, indeed, be somewhat mitigated, were adequate Free Ports created at Salonica and Kavalla, and were those Free Ports and the communications between them and the chief centres of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia placed under international control. Such an arrangement might prove economically beneficial, and the presence of international officials might possibly serve to raise the standard of local official conduct, provided there were an effective International Authority, entitled to intervene in restraint of injustice on the evidence of its officials. It would, however, be naïve to expect much political assuagement to follow from these measures, and it must be frankly recognized that, while this course may be the only practicable one in view of the political situation, it will not provide a final solution either to the Macedonian or to the Balkan problems.

52. Lastly, however, the Balkan situation includes such uncertain factors (see para. 46) that some other solution, which cannot at present be foreseen, might come to appear practicable.

Research Department, Foreign Office, Whitehall, 26th August, 1944.

Macedonia - Appendix A - National Liberation Front (NOF)

Mrs. Beaton applies the term "Macedoine" to a dish containing a conglomeration of fruit or vegetables, sometimes loosely bound together by jelly or some such unstable medium.

The term is well chosen. MACEDONIA is a geographically indeterminate area which, for two millenniums, has contained an ethnographical conglomeration of different races and creeds.

On a “1066 and all That” level, it is generally associated with (a) Alexander the Great, and (b) an appeal to St. Paul for help. Probing more deeply into its history, the average mind reels under the impact of successive waves of Romans, Huns, Vandals, Byzants, Turks, Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks.

The object of this Article is to simplify, not to obscure, the present issue. It begins therefore in the second half of the nine- tenth century, when for 400 years MACEDONIA had been under Turkish domination; ruled as a feudal state, by Moslem overlords who, (rather on the one time British practice whereby the "lesser breeds" were divided brutally into Dagos or Dutchmen) I recognized no difference of race or nationality, but classified all unbelievers within this part of their Empire, as "Greeks".

The War of Greek Independence, 1821-32, had detached the whole of ATTICA and the MOREA from an Ottoman Empire already weakened by corruption and decadence, and by internal schisms. Elsewhere in the BALKANS, Greeks predominated numerically in Southern MACEDONIA; Bulgars in the north and north-east. In the north-west, Serbs had moved southward in the hope of gaining access to the Adriatic; while Albanians had encroached southwards into the EPIRUS. Over the whole are were scattered isolated pockets of Vlachs and Greeks.

Colonies of pure Turks had also been planted in Macedonia even before their conquest of the Balkan Peninsula; but, although with the gradual shrinkage of the empire they had been reinforced by refugees, they had at no time formed the majority of the Macedonian population.

The general spirit of unrest in EUROPE, an the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, lead to resurgence of nationalism in the BALKANS, which infected most of the races and tribes of the Macedonian conglomeration in particular the Bulgars, the Greeks, and the Serbs.

The amalgam (or jelly) which bound together the “Macedoine” of the Christian communities during the years of Turkish rule, was the authority of the Greek Orthodox Church – the only “Hierarchy” tolerated by the Turks – at the head which was the Ecumenical Patriarch of CONSTANTINOPLE. The first move to break this tie had been made by the Serbs in 1831; and now, in 1870, it was further weakened by the declaration of the Bulgarian Exarchate, also independent of the ecclesiastical authority.

The territorial ambitions of the Bulgars became evident in 1878, when the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, which ended a short Russo-Turkish war, became public. Had it not been for the intervention of the Great Powers under the leadership of Lord BEACONSFIELD, Bulgarian territory would have been extended, with Russian approval, to include the lion’s share of MACEDONIA. As it was, however, the terms of the Treaty were never put into effect, and, in its place the Treaty of BERLIN was signed in July 1878.

By this treaty, ROUMANIA, SERBIA, and MONTENEGRO were declared completely independent of the Porte; while the grandiose scheme for a Greater BULGARIA was reduced to the grant of a relatively narrow strip of territory between the Danube and the BALKANS, as an independent state, but still under Turkish suzerainty. MACEDONIA thus remained intact within the Turkish Empire.

GREECE’s modest (1) claims to CRETE, THESSALY, and the ERIRUS, together with part of MACEDONIA, were for the moment disregarded.

The period between the Berlin settlement and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, is taken up with intrigues, revolts, end

reprisals, and a growing antagonism between Greeks and Bulgarians, competing for ultimate supremacy in MACEDONIA when the final disintegration of the Turkish European Empire took place. The latter, during the last years of its existence, fell into such a state of corruption and mismanagement that, in 1905, GREAT BRTAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, AUSTRIA and GERMANY, were forced to intervene and set up an International Commission to supervise the administration of MACEDONIA. The peasants were everywhere ruthlessly oppressed and, as a result, BULGARIA, from 1895 onwards, became the self-appointed champion of their rights.

What she had been prevented from gaining by the Treaty of BERLIN, she now tried to get by propaganda and other means. Various societies and committees were formed, which wore ultimately welded into the formidable IMRO (Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization), with its own civil administration, police courts, and "muscle men", known as Comitadjis. Thus were the Christian population pressed to declare themselves BULGARS.

To counteract this state of affairs the Greeks began, in 1903, to form bands of Andartes (the name appears for the first time), to fight the Comitadjis.

This state of chronic insurrection and unrest continued with periodic outbreaks of counter-terrorism by the Turks, until the latter wore finally ejected from the BALKANS as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

Without overloading this Article with historical detail, it is impossible to do more then summarize the course and consequence of these important wars.

Very briefly, the actions taken by the principal participants were as follows.

The Bulgarian army crossed the frontier of THRACE and, after one weeks hard fighting, drove the Turks in full retreat on CONSTANTINOPLE, - but leaving ADRIANOPLE still in Turkish hands.

It remained so until the Bulgars finally took it, with the aid of the Serbs, five months later.

The Greeks marched north and entered SALONIKA, (shortly before the arrival of the Bulgars), FLORINA and PREVEZA. Farther west, they occupied ARGYROKASTRO and KORCE. Finally they took IOANNINA by storm. At sea, the Greek fleet Annexed, practically without fighting, all the AEGEAN Islands, except CYPRUS and those occupied by the Italians.

The Serbs, advancing with three armies, sent one column down the DRIN valley into ALBANIA, while the other two captured PRISTINA and USKUB, OHRID and MONASTIR, respectively. A detachment was also sent to support the Bulgars at ANDRIANOPLE.

The results may be summarized as follows;

The Bulgars, who bore the brunt of the fighting, and who sustained by for the greatest proportion of losses, failed, in spite of their military successes, to achieve their main political objective, viz, a major port on the AEGEAN.

This was largely due to their own fault. On the defeat of the Turks, they had been awarded the whole of THRACE and Western MACEDONIA up to the STRUMA, but their desire to augment their gains at the expense of their recent allies, led to a short war between themselves and the Greeks and Serbs, as a result of which they were deprived of KAVALLA and all of Western MACEDONIA, West of the NESTOS.

The Greeks, at comparatively small cost won territorial gains which were not only vast in extent, but of the highest commercial and strategic importance, namely, SALONIKA, IOANNINA, Southern MACEDONIA, the greater part of EPIRUS, CRETE, and the Islands. The Greeks also entered a fruitless claim to part of ALBANIA.

The Serbs obtained Central MACEDONIA, including OHRID, MONASTIR, KOSSOVA and large stretch of territory to the north,

which brought them into immediate contact with the Montenegrins. But they, too had failed to achieve their main ambition - an outlet to the ADRIATIC.

ALBANIA was e established as an independent state.

This settlement, in which the Great Powers took a strong hand, did little towards achieving stable conditions in the BALKANS.

The Great War gave the Bulgarians a chance, for a short time, to occupy the whole of Eastern MACEDONIA, though the peace settlement of 1919 left them worse off than ever, while the Greeks added Western THRAC to their pre-war territories.

The Greek campaign in ASIA MINOR in 1922 was followed by an exchange of population between GREECE and TURKEY. Of the 1,500,000 Greek immigrants, a large proportion settled in MACEDONIA -to the great benefit of the country. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, treaties were also made with BULGARIA for the exchange of populations and, as a result, 92,000 Bulgars and Slavophones in GREECE, and 42,000 Greeks in BULGARIA, opted to emigrate. In Greek MACEDONIA thereafter the racial question almost disappeared, 90% of the population being Greek.

A number of Turks end Bulgars also left Yugoslav MACEDONIA but no general exchange was arranged for the remaining SLAVOPHONE population the whole of which was claimed by YUGOSLAVIA as Serb. Material prosperity increased, and efforts were made by YUGOSLAVIA to Serbize the population, by severely repressing Bulgar national feeling and by banning Bulgar schools.

The policy of BULGARIA in regard to MAOEDONIA has varied in form, but not in object, over the past fifty years. For a time, she aimed at the realization of a Greater BULGARIA as mapped out at San Stefano. When this failed, she devoted her energies to the emancipation of MACEDONIA and the Establishment of an autonomous principality under a Christian governor, As such it was

hopped that MACEDONIA would become the nucleus of a BALKAN federation, eventually to be annexed by themselves.

The technique adopted by the Bulgars was one of penetration backed up by terrorism, through various agencies viz; up to the time of the Balkan Wars, through the Comitadjis, working in collaboration with local Slavophone elements; after World War I, through a revived IMRO; and from 1941 onwards through all organization known as OCHRANA which was founded by the Bulgarian Army, and used far the purpose or conducting a deliberate campaign of extermination against the Macedonian Greeks.

NOF now comes into the picture. Starting, during the Axis occupation, as SNOF, the movement was aimed primarily at liberating Macedonian territory from alien control -but with the ultimate object of establishing an autonomous state. It was made up exclusively of Slav-speaking individuals inhabiting Western MACEDONIA and the district of EDHESSA. According to the Greek census of 1928 there were some 80,000 Orthodox Slavs living in the are adjoining the Yugoslav frontier who had been unwilling to leave their homes during the general exchange of population. The Bulgarians claimed them as Bulgarians but the Greeks maintained that all elements with Bulgarian affinities had already emigrated and that all those remaining must be regarded as Greeks.

During the latter part of the German occupation they worked with and under, EAM, though always with the object of achieving Macedonian autonomy. In order to maintain their connection with KKE after the defeat of GERMANY they dropped their "S", in order to disguise their pro-Slav sympathies, which would have estranged a large proportion of patriotic Greek Communists from their cause. Since the war they have, in fact, taken their orders, not from KKE, but from NOF headquarters at SKOPJE, until the split occurred between TITO and the COMINFORM. There is reason to believe that there is at present a divided allegiance within the party, a few remaining loyal to TITO, while the majority have transferred their allegiance to SOFIA.

Recent events are once again confirming the fact that the aim of this small Slav-speaking group, (now forming part of the Greek rebel

movement), is to detach large sections of territory from. GREECE -this time under orders from international Communism: and that their presence in the frontier areas constitutes one more source of trouble in the relation of GREECE with her neighbours.

Macedonia - Background

The Free Greek Radio broadcast at 1st March announced that the following Congress of N.O.F (Slavo-Macedonian guerrilla movement) would declare “the union of Macedonia into a complete, independent and equal Macedonian nation within the Popular Democratic Federation of the Balkan Peoples”. The statement has been widely (and we think correctly interpreted in the West as meaning that Cominform policy is now directed at the formation of an independent Macedonia, composed of parts or Bulgarian, Greek and Yugoslav territory, as part of a Balkans federation, under Dimitroff . Hitherto Tito, as suzerain of the existing People’s Federal Republic of Macedonia, has held that the Greek and Bulgarian sections of Macedonia should be united with Yugoslav Macedonia. The Present development whereby Bulgaria resumes her traditional role, of sponsor of Macedonian autonomy, is therefore as much a part of the Soviet “war of nerve” against Tito as an attack on the territorial integrity of Greece. In fact, when read in conjunction with apparently deliberately fostered rumours of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans, the former hypothesis appear the more likely. This move however the disadvantage, from the Cominform point of view, of alienating the Greek Nationalists in the rebel ranks and the Greek Government have been quick enough to make an appeal to these nationalists of whose views Markos was the chief propagandist A number of former communists have recanted and their recantations are being used by the Greek Government to encourage further desertion from the rebel ranks.

The Cominform appear to have realized that the move was not a very astute one and since the broadcast on March 1st there has been much back pedaling, including denials that any form of Macedonian State was intended and the suggestion that the original broadcast was merely intended to unite the Slavo-Macedonians behind the Greek democrats "in their struggle”. The N.O.F. Congress announcement for March 15th may or may not have taken place; no publicity has yet been issued over the Free Greek Radio.

On Tito's side there has been a vigorous reaction, in particular an article in the Nova Makedonia describing both the Balkan and Greek Communists as chauvinists and stating that the Cominform’s

decision o reverse the situation in the Balkans by causing a Macedonian State might be a casus belli.

Suggestions for what might be said in the house

A draft reply to a possible parliamentary question on the subject of the N.O.F. broadcast was recently prepared with a view to warning the Cominform not to proceed with the provocative subject of proclaiming a Macedonian State. Sir W. Strung directed that this form of words, which we constructed with the legal adviser, should be put into cold storage for suitable opportunity. The text runs as follows “I have noted this proclamation, which appears to threaten the use of force to detach territory under the sovereignty of an existing State with a view to creating a new political entity. I agree that such a proclamation if made or supported by any State would constitute a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations.

I should however add that subsequent broadcasts from the same station suggest that the ill-advised enthusiasm or certain Macedonian elements among the Greek rebels may have been tempted by wiser counsels.”

It may also be desirable to point out the discrepancies of the Soviet attitude towards nationalism. Thus while the nationalistic tendencies of the Greek and Yugoslav communists are condemned by Moscow, the Kremlin makes no bones about sponsoring Bulgarian expansionism and the national tendencies of the Macedonians whose claims to self determination have for the last 80 years been the sport of power politics rather than the serious study of ethnologists.

The New Macedonian State is a link in Balkan Unity

M. Harizanov returns from Skopje

M.Ivan Harizanov, member of the National Committee of the Patriotic Front, has returned from Skopje, where he went to bring the greetings of the Patriotic Front Bulgaria to the new Macedonian State.

On this occasion H. Harizanov made the following statements:

“My impressions are excellent. What was a dream is now a reality. The Macedonia of the Vardar is free. She has her own Government, her own language and her own Constituent Assembly. She has her own face in every respect. The visitor immediately feels that. Everything is in effervescence and in creation. Everyone is conscious that a great historical deed is being done, which had been the dream of many generations.

Q. What are the feelings towards us, M. Harizanov?

A. It must be confessed that they have been very hostile until now. This is due to the occupation, to ill-treatment by our officials, and especially to the wrong and fatal policy of our Dynasty and its governments.

Q. What are the faults of the former Bulgarian policy, in your opinion?

A. The former rulers could not grasp what Macedonia really was. In this respect, we Bulgarians are very guilty in regard to the Macedonian people. When the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization of Gotse Delchev and Sandanski was struggling heroically for the freedom of Macedonia, the Great-Bulgarian chauvinists of the Bulgarian dynasty and its governments did all in their power to destroy and to suppress it.

The leaders of the revolution opposed this, and therefore the most eminent members of the organization were eliminated by the agents of the dynasty.

These leaders were the first to proclaim before the world the great covenant: “Macedonia must be autonomous and instead of being an apple of discord must become a link for the unity of the Balkan peoples.”

And this is exactly what is going on now.

Macedonians going to Yugoslavia - Ottawa, July 28, 1947

(Front page missing)

There are no indications that Macedonians were among the expatriates who sailed on the S.S. RADNIK for Yugoslavia in May, 1947. The Bulgarian-language weekly NOVO VREME, which reported the news of the repatriation, made no mention of even one of Macedonians returning to Yugoslavia on that boat.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 of the Canadian Ambassador’s letter No.289 - More detailed information on the financial transactions of the Macedonian War Relief Committee in Canada can be obtained from Lt.-Col. P.L. Browne, Director of Voluntary War Relief Division, Department of National Health and Welfare, Old Supreme Court Building, Ottawa. According to information available to this Branch, the campaign for a "relief for suffering Macedonians" was conducted in Canada in the Summer of 1949. It was closed on October 11, 1946. The collected money reached the sum of $15,295.87. We understand that the Macedonian committee was refused permission to transfer the collected funds abroad. There are indications that part of the collected funds were used for other purposes than relief, i.e., financing the trip of Yugoslav and Bulgaro-Macedonian delegates to the All Slav Congress held in Belgrade in December, 1946.

3. With reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Letter No. 289 -Letter of Col. Petse Traikoff, Commandant of Skopje (published in NOVO VREME of April 26, 1946) was written to Nicola Goushev of Kitchener, Ontario. NOVO VREME adds that the Macedonian Government intended to send Col. Traikoff to Canada to assist in the collection of Macedonian relief funds. In his letter Col. Traikoff relates also his life's story: On January 21, 1935 he was put into a concentration camp, presumable after the German break with the U.S.S.R. In 1941 he was again arrested and put into a concentration camp, "with many other Bulgarian progressive leaders". He did not stay long in the camp but in 1943 he was re-arrested and sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. He was liberated on the 8th September, 1944, made a Colonel and appointed the organizer of the GOTSE DELTCHEV BRIGADE of the "people's liberation army",

numbering, according to his statements, 12,000 men. In his letter he praises the "people's hero-leader of Yugoslavia, Comrade Marshal Tito", and expresses the hope that Macedonia will become a "free federal member of Tito's democratic Yugoslavia", the beloved leader Marshal Tito" and the "Great Soviet Union". The contents of the letter and its publication in NOVO VREME on the eve of a fund collection campaign indicate that it was written with the purpose of assisting in the money collection.

4. Reference paragraph 7 of Letter No. 289 -The number of Macedonian associations in Canada is reasonable within proportion to the number of persons of Macedonian descent. It has to be borne in mind that many individuals are members of several societies and that the membership of associations is comparatively small. Macedonian Canadian People's League and other associations affiliated with the League are closely linked up with the Canadian Council of South Slavs and when celebrations or mass meetings are arranged, they are attended by all Slavs of Communistic affiliations, to give the impression of numerical strength. Memoranda to the Paris Conference or United Nations can be sent by private persons or a parish association; there are no restrictions in this respect in Canada, and apparently the small Macedonian associations in Canada achieved their aim -not to be ignored but to be given attention.

5. Re paragraph 8 of Letter 289 - There were only two delegates of the Macedonian Communist group from Canada who attended the All-Slav Congress in Belgrade in December, 1945. They were Andrew Palmeroff, Secretary of the Macedonian People’s Council, and Nicola Kyriakopoulos, former Deputy of the Greek (Revolutionary?) Parliament, and member of the Macedonian-Canadian People's Council. Andrew Christoff, the Editor of NOVO VREME (New Times) represented the Bulgarian Canadian Communist group.

6. Re paragraph 10 of Letter 289 – Mr. Grouios of Leamington is not known to us. His statement that “this spring thousands of persons in Canada and the United States are preparing to come to fight as guerillas for the independence of Macedonia against the Greek Government can be taken as pure boasting. The number of all

persons of Macedonian descent in Canada does nor exceed a few thousands, children, women and old people included. If a person applies for a passport to go to Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, he would be known to Canadian authorities. American authorities discontinued issuing visa to Yugoslavia for the present, according to the American press.

7. Re paragraph 11 of Letter 289 – It is possible, but not likely, that among the 500 repatriates who left for Yugoslavia on the S.S. RADNIK in May, 1947, there were a few who intended to join the partisan forces to fight against Greece.

8. Re paragraph 13 of Letter 289 -Postal censorship does not exist in Canada and, therefore, it may occur that persons writing to Europe have included small amounts of money in letters to their friends or relatives. But these sums are insignificant and could hardly be classed as financial support of insurgents. Any amount of money sent through the medium of a Canadian bank requires a clearing from the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board, and until recently all collections of relief funds required a permit from the Voluntary War Relief Division.

Macedonians in Canada: Their Estimated Numbers and Division

Macedonia is a country divided between three states: (a) Bulgaria; (b) Yugoslavia; and (c) Greece. Macedonian Canadians originate from these states. There is no separate classification in the Canadian census for Macedonians. Their figure has to be worked out through deduction. According to the Census of 1941 there were in Canada:

3,260 persons of Bulgarian origin 11,692 persons of Greek origin 21,214 persons of Yugoslav origin

Of these 36,166 persons, about 6,000 originated from Macedonia and belong to the Macedonian ethnic group. Politically they are divided into federalists and autonomists. Federalists show Communistic leanings and are pro-Tito, and seem to work in close co- operation with and under the guidance of the Council of South Slavs who determine their policy. This policy is directed from Belgrade, as can be traced from its actions, and this group can be estimated to be 3,000 strong, men, women and children. The autonomists are striving for complete, independent united Macedonia. The headquarters of this group is in the United States where they publish their newspapers. A small number of Canadians of Macedonian descent do not take an active interest in European-Macedonian affairs.

There are very few intellectuals among this ethnic group. Most of them are in the restaurant business in Eastern Canadian cities, in the trades, as labourers in various industries and as truck farmers.

Memorandum for Mr. George - January 14th, 1949

M. Blais

I attached dispatch No. 5 of January 3rd, 1949 from the embassy in Athens, requesting information on certain alleged activities of Bulgarians in Canada.

2. File No. 102-ZR-40c dealing with the activities of Bulgarians in Canada has been in abeyance since December, 1945. The documents last filed refer to the creation in Toronto on December 2nd, 1945, of the Bulgarian-Canadian People’s League of Canada, of which the general objectives were to work for better relations between Bulgaria and Canada and to support all progressive movements against fascism. The Secretary of the Central Executive Committee was the Mr. Andro Hristov, Editor of “New Times” (Novo Vreme). Dr. Kaye, of the Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, informs me that this newspaper is still published and is following Cominform lines.

3. I do not know whether this organization is still in existence, and if so, whether it is cooperating with the Greek Communist Party. I shall appreciate it if you can furnish me with any information that may be sent as a reply to our Embassy’s request.

European Division

Memorandum for Mr. MacDermot - January 19th, 1949

J. George /JS

The article in “Estia” reported in General LaFleche’s dispatch NO. % of January 3 is, of course, and old complaint and I do not think it need now be taken very seriously as we have kept the Greek Government fully informed of our difficulties in suppressing pro-Bulgar and pro-Macedonian propaganda in Canada. We have not, however, told the Greek Government that the Macedonian Canadian War Committee, a front for the Bulgarian Canadian peoples’ League (both with headquarters in Toronto) collected about $ 15,000 in 1946 and then used the money, quite improperly, to finance a delegation of eleven to the Slav Congress in Belgrade which was, as I recall, held in December 1946. It is quite likely that the balance of the funds collected were given to Macedonian organizations in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which were assisting the Greek Communists. The Macedonian Canadian War Aid Committee was not registered under the War Charities Act and although the matter was reported by the R.C.M.P. to the authorities responsible for administering the War Charities Act, nothing was done. During the past two years, we have no knowledge of any funds being sent from Canada to the Macedonian or Greek Communists, but it would be a comparatively easy matter to send money in the mails and this has always been the practice of Bulgarian immigrants, both for legitimate and illegal purposes.

The principle Macedonian organizations active in Canada are still the Macedonian Canadian People’s League and the Bulgarian Canadian People’s League. Nothing has been heard recently of Hristov (Christoff). Both organizations are inclined towards Communism but may now be divided in their attitude towards Marshal Tito.

The old Independent Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) is a smaller organization of terrorists from the Balkans who hope to “liberate” Macedonia by terrorist methods. They are no longer important but are still active. When Tito came to power at the end of the war they looked to him to establish their promised land

but are now disillusioned and most of them have become instrumental in raising funds for the Greek Communists.

G. G. Crean Defense Liason.

Memorandum on the present situation in Macedonia - July 24, 1945

The task of harnessing the Macedonian resistance movement to the general Partisan movement throughout the rest of Yugoslavia was one in which the Partisan leaders only achieved a moderate measure of Success. Due to this the task of bringing the new regime in Macedonia into line with the regime elsewhere has proved, and is proving, one of the main difficulties of the new Government. This task has not been made easier by the fact that the Partisan movement in Macedonia, until the period immediately before the liberation, was comparatively weak.

2. To put the present position in its proper light it may help to recapitulate two main causes for this. In the first place, nearly all Macedonians had welcomed the arrival or the Bulgarian army of occupation as a means or achieving their independence after more than 20 years or Serb domination, and though most Macedonians quickly became disillusioned by the oppressive measures taken by the Bulgarians, conditions did not become bad enough to drive them to open opposition. Moreover, to most Macedonians the domination of Sofia appeared, if anything, slightly preferable to that of Belgrade. The Partisan movement, drawing its inspiration from Serbia, did not therefore find much support in Macedonia until its programme promised Macedonian autonomy. Many of those who joined the movement on the announcement of this programme, and among them a large number of the present leaders, gave a far wider interpretation to the promised autonomy than appears to have been intended by the Partisans. In this belief they may well have been encouraged by General Vukmanovic-Tempo, who for two years was Tito's personal delegate in Macedonia and who was completely out of touch with Partisan General Headquarters. He expressed himself in the summer of 1944 as seriously worried as to whether he was interpreting Partisan policy in Macedonia correctly, end on his return from a visit to General Headquarters, gave the impression that he had been brought into line. Some units formed near the Greek frontier which appear to have had shadowy allegiance both to the Partisans and E.A.M./E.L.A.S., certainly fought until the end largely for the creation of a fully or virtually great Macedonia. The Partisans appear to have seen the danger and made some attempts to

co-ordinate the Macedonian Partisan movement with the development elsewhere and to overcome the traditional antagonism between Serbs and Macedonians by making Serb and Macedonian units fight along side and on each others territory, and putting Serbs from the Kosovo in Macedonian units. This, however, was not on a large enough scale for any widespread results and was partly offset by other units which co-operated more closely with Greek, Bulgarian end Albanian Partisans, and whose leaders tended to conduct their own peculiarly Macedonian foreign policy with them. Secondly, Bulgarian military control of Macedonia was strong and in those areas near the Albanian frontier most suitable for Partisan warfare the Partisans encountered a hostile population. The Macedonian Partisans could, therefore, only operate on North-Eastern, Eastern, and Southern fringes of Macedonia. This hampered the spread of Partisan ideas through Macedonia and the distance of the main Macedonian centers of resistance from the centers of population made it difficult for recruits to join the Partisans.

3. When with the collapse or Bulgaria it was clear that the Partisans would inevitab1y came into power, there was a large influx of recruits, including many officials who had worked whole-heartedly with the Bulgarians. These could not be absorbed into the Partisan movement or indoctrinated with Partisan ideas before final liberation took place when many of them, coming from the small educated class, were immediately given jobs of responsibility in the new Macedonian administration.

There were, therefore, left within the Partisan movement when it took over the government, large undigested masses who looked on the liberation merely as an opportunity to establish an independent greater Macedonia and most of whom still preferred Bulgarian to Serbian dominion. In many parts of Macedonia, the liberation celebrations made little mention of Macedonia’s place in federal Yugoslavia, speeches merely stressing the achievement of autonomy by Macedonia, paying no more than lip service to Tito’s leadership and dwelling on aspirations for greater Macedonia. Macedonian nationalism for a time ran riot and relief at release from the Bulgars was least equaled by satisfaction at the end of Serb dominion. The Macedonian boundary with Serbia was set up further to the north than was warranted either historically or ethnically and was closely