Introduction - Part 03

Eighth, the fact the Nimetz delivered proposals that were absolutely unacceptable to the Macedonian side, or to others, proposals that were well-aligned with American interests, which were in turn perfectly aligned with those of Greece, certainly explains who Nimetz’s boss was. Every proposal Nimetz offered was fully compatible with American policy towards Macedonia and the wider region. Who else then, if not the U.S., guided and encouraged Nimetz to spread his mandate and call into question the Macedonian people’s national identity and their language?

Ninth, the simplest logic compels us to believe that the architect of Nimetz’s proposals was none other than Washington. Either the State Department or possibly a panel of experts were appointed and paid for by it! What other plausible explanation is there?

C. There are no negotiations taking place in New York

11. The terminology we use to describe this basic problem which involves the future of our state is embracing. The vocabulary we use hardly describes the issue or at minimum describes it incorrectly. In the beginning all politicians called it “negotiations”! Now only a handful of so-called “experts” and frequently journalists call the mediation process in New York “negotiations”. Fortunately there are no “negotiations” taking place and there never were. Who in fact can, or is given the authority to “negotiate” the name of the state which is immortalized in the Constitution?

11.1. Without going into too much detail, we would like to emphasize that a) there was no mention of the term “negotiations” in the UN Security Council documents. Who could compel a sovereign state to negotiate its own historic and constitutional name with another state? The language used in the UN Security Council document was “to encourage the parties to continue to cooperate” to “achieve a quick resolution to their differences”; b) at issue here is the classic mediation process. The question must be closed the same way it was opened – on a multilateral level. The solution does not depend on a bilateral agreement between the parties involved; c) both sides have delegated representatives who in diplomatic circles are called “liaison officers”. Being in charge of the process and proposals, the mediator communicates through them with the two governments; d) the mediator, through them, filters his ideas and tries to come up with a proposal that would be acceptable to both sides; e) the “liaison officers” (on the Macedonian side represent Macedonia’s President) take those ideas to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and wait for a response. When they receive a response they take it back to the mediator. And here their role ends; and f) the mediator assesses received information and tries to formulate an acceptable proposal for both sides…

And this is what has been happening in New York for almost 25 years…

11.2. Those who consistently speak of “negotiations” and “negotiators” owe an explanation: a) who is negotiating with whom? b) are the liaison officers negotiating with Nimetz, or among themselves? If it is both then it is some kind of trilateral deal, not mediation; c) if they have indeed “negotiated” something then what have they “agreed” on? d) if the “negotiators” are “negotiating”, then why does Nimetz come up with proposals that are usually unacceptable to both governments? Who is responsible for that? The “negotiators”? Nimetz ...? Who? Following the logic of how things work, if someone is negotiating something and brings home a resolution that does not correspond to the interests of his or her country, then that resolution will be immediately revoked and, if necessary, the party making the decision will be punished; e) If the “negotiators” “negotiate” then how is it possible that they don’t know what Nimetz is going to offer? If they “negotiated” something and presumably “agreed” to that, how then did the “negotiators” not know what that “something” was? Does Nimetz disregard their “agreement” and surprises them with his own proposal? f) whose suggestions did Nimetz put forward, theirs, his, or someone else’s?! If the liaison officers “negotiated” something then that something must be what is offered by Nimetz, not something else! g) in order to “negotiate” at an international level, a previously prepared and agreed upon platform for the “negotiations” must be put in place at home. This is an old and obligatory practice used by countries which are serious and committed when entering such a process. Otherwise everything would be done irresponsibly, unprofessionally and ultimately illegally, which will be harmful to the country. Is there proper protocol applied in these so-called “negotiations”?

There are more questions to be asked but what was put forward up to now is sufficient to show that the use of the terms “negotiation” and “negotiators” in the New York process is improper. It only shows the low political level and “professionalism” of the users.

11.2.1. That fact that it is exactly like that was proven in a statement made by Nimetz (“Dnevnik”, November 22, 2012), after a meeting in New York: “The two sides have expressed willingness to overcome the issue, I believe that it is not just rhetoric. The situation in the region requires that this problem be solved. The intermediates will bring these ideas to their governments, to see if they can be useful to go forward.” Isn’t everything crystal clear now?

11.3. Let us also not forget that this terminology serves Athens to the maximum because it puts Macedonia in a subordinate position where it has to “negotiate” its own name. More will be said about this in the Interim Accord section.

11.4. After any successful negotiating process there usually is the signing of an agreement between the parties involved. This is also not in Macedonia’s interest. This process, for us, has a multilateral character and this is how it must remain to the end. The process works the opposite for Athens. Athens wants a multilateral solution, as she has a stronger international position, but will finalize it with a bilateral agreement in order to impose its interests.

D. An agreement with Greece is not only impossible but absolutely unnecessary

12. At first glance, hidden in Nimetz’s mediation process is a minor but serious and extremely important segment of American policy towards Macedonia. It is the persistent insistence that any solution found to the problem must have direct agreement from Greece, which is utterly unacceptable to Macedonia. Macedonia has no problem with its own name and therefore has no need of such an agreement, nor was such an agreement a requirement in the UN Security Council documents.

12.1. If Macedonia were to enter into a bilateral agreement with Greece, then every outstanding issue on both sides must be addressed and resolved. One of the greatest outstanding issues is the situation of the Macedonian people living in Greece. The

rights, not only of those Macedonians living inside Greece but of all those exiled and their properties confiscated since 1913 must be addressed... And that’s only one issue… It seems that no one, least of all Greece, cares about issues that are important to Macedonia. So it goes to show that this one-sided problem has only been concocted in order to exterminate Macedonia, not to help her overcome age-old issues created by Greece.

That is why this entire process must end where it started: at the UN Security Council.

If a final agreement with Greece is signed, covering only a solution to our name, ipso facto, it will mean that all other outstanding issues between the two countries simply – do not exist. That is how it works in diplomatic practice. In other words, if we don’t manage this process properly we could end up losing out on all outstanding issues that Macedonia has with Greece. It would mean that there is no Macedonian national minority living in Greece, that there is no problem with the rights of Macedonians exiled from Greece…

Therefore, under no circumstances we should sign such a one-sided agreement with Greece.

12.2. Even though it will be very difficult, better to say impossible, to get the desired results, we still need to participate in a mediation process. A solution should and must be sought only through a multilateral process and never bilaterally. From the outset, this problem had been internationalized by Washington and Athens because it suited them that way. The US and Greece together have more clout in tackling the problem and at the same time Greece is avoiding being fingered as the main culprit in this issue. This way, from the very beginning, the dispute lost its bilateral character and became the subject of many multilateral bodies. First the EC, then the UN... and more recently NATO and the EU...

12.3. However, after the Americans achieved what they set out to do on the international scene (suspending Macedonia’s name and imposing a reference in the UN, blackmailing and blockading her entry into NATO and the EU…), effectively after Macedonia was crippled, Washington decided that the country, once again, has to look for a bilateral solution - with Greece. So, Athens again has a leading role ready to impose its aspirations. At the beginning, having wide international support, Greece was stronger on a multilateral level. Now they are much better positioned if Macedonia has to search for a solution and tries to sign an agreement with – Athens! Nowhere is Macedonia at greater disadvantage than there.

The well-orchestrated U.S. policy towards Macedonia has come to the fore. American insistence on Macedonia signing the Interim Accord in 1995, among other things, paved the way for signing future and perhaps the final agreement with Greece, which Macedonia cannot afford to sign. No such demands, however, have ever been made on Macedonia by the UN Security Council in any of its documents. According to the Security Council, the problem was opened by the Security Council and therefore it should be closed by the Security Council.

12.3.1. As we have said earlier, the Interim Accord with Greece has no organic connection to the UN Security Council resolution for admitting Macedonia into the UN. It is purely a bilateral agreement, even though it is connected to the same issue. The logic is clear – after a temporary agreement a final agreement must follow! In the analysis of the agreement, which will be provided later in this text, it is not foreseen in this dimension of the Interim Accord – Macedonia’s obligation to sign a final agreement with Greece. The fact that the U.S. is insisting on a final agreement with Athens was confirmed by Nimetz in an interview that he gave to Voice of America before the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest (details to follow later) when he announced that the Interim Accord no longer applied and a new agreement was required.

12.3.2. The Interim Accord is an American diplomatic vision, which has taken the UN Security Council resolution out of place and settled Macedonia with new and difficult commitments! It opened the way for Macedonia to be obliged to negotiate with Greece, which is utterly unnecessary and insulting for the country. To negotiate about what? About Macedonia’s own name?! To ask for permission when, where and how to use its own name? Obviously, the idea is for Macedonia to willingly capitulate!?

12.4. The aim of a permanent agreement with Greece may have a dual purpose, a) to force Macedonia into a humiliating situation where it accepts the unacceptable, and or to b) put Macedonia into a deadlock because Athens will not yield to anything that Macedonia wants. There is no doubt that an agreement with Athens is not possible. The only way Greece will agree to anything is if Macedonia is willing to capitulate. Is that what the U.S. really wants and is that why it is playing that card?

12.5. In continuing the mediation process, our efforts should now be concentrated on putting the talks under the UN Security Council mandate. We should not allow any more excursions to take place outside of it, as was the case for many years. As was the case with Nimetz’s final draft which he produced in April 2013, for which he had no authority. Such indecent proposals we should ignore or tear apart immediately. If we don’t do that it would mean that we accept discussions for our own elimination as a nation.

12.6. In the near future our goal should be to convince the mediator to conclude that attempts to “overcome our difference” with Greece, regarding the name of our state, have failed despite 20 years of trying and persistent effort. When this is done, and I am sure Washington will not agree, Nimetz, nonetheless, will have to inform the UN Secretary General and tell him that the ball is now in his court. And such a development would be most beneficial for Macedonia.

12.6.1. In parallel, while we are convincing the mediator to end the process, we have to go back to the United Nations and initiate new procedures to register our official, constitutional and historical name, which the old process illegally denied us. First, we have to come up with a precise strategy for this, supported by facts and arguments of which we have plenty. In this strategy, among other things, we must emphasize exactly what the UN Security Council’s Resolution 817/93 directed us to do: “…difference should be resolved in order to preserve the peace and good neighbourly relations in the region…” which to this day has been done without our difference being resolved. In spite of the “difference”, peace in the region has not been disrupted in the last 20 years. The “difference” was not resolved either and it does not look like it will be resolved anytime soon. As far as neighbourly relations are concerned, if “relations” are measured by one state challenging another state’s name while ignoring the people, then Greece is absolutely a terrible neighbour. Not Macedonia.

12.7. We promised the UN that we will “cooperate with the mediator to get a quick resolution in order to overcome the differences on the name of the state”. This in no way implied that we needed to have an agreement with Athens. The “difference” can and must be overcome by another means without an agreement. It can be done by a new UN Security Council resolution. There are hidden dangers in that procedure also, but for Macedonia it is much worse when Greece is involved in the process. Being forced into an agreement with Athens puts us in an inferior position. If there is no agreement with Athens then Washington too would have no means of forcing us to change our country’s name, which for them is far worse than bridging the “difference”. There is no doubt that Nimetz, certainly at Washington’s request, has illegally and unjustifiably included our identity in his proposals. Under the current circumstances, Washington’s insistence on an agreement between Skopje and Athens does nothing else but add pressure on Macedonia to capitulate or to start waving a white flag. There is no third option.

12.8. The U.S. is absolutely aware that an agreement with Greece, which would incorporate minimum Macedonian interests, is not a realistic option. Athens will never agree to anything less than erasing the Macedonian people and removing them from the global ranking of nations. Greece will not be content with just renaming our country and Washington knows that very well. Renaming Macedonia is no gain for Greece if the Macedonian nation “survives”. If the U.S. is well aware of this, and it certainly is, then why do they insist on Macedonia’s agreement with Greece? How can we agree with Greece? To accept capitulation? To eradicate our own nation?

12.9. For anyone, including the UN and the U.S., emphasizing that Macedonia must seek a solution through an agreement between Skopje and Athens is absurd, counterproductive and places Macedonia at a great disadvantage. There is no requirement from the UN Security Council for Macedonia to have an “agreement” with Greece, so why look for one? We could have had such an alternative but before the country’s name was suspended at the UN putting Macedonia in a totally unequal position. Before we could consider different ways to look for a solution. Only then could we sign a bilateral agreement with Greece in which all open issues that really exist between the two countries would be included. Also, an arbitrator could then be invited and proceed like Croatia and Slovenia did, or even take the case to The Hague. As things are today, there is no way we can work on an equal footing with Greece because we are held hostage, blockaded and blackmailed by NATO, EU… Now, forced to search for understanding in Athens, Macedonia is being left without options and sacrificed for the interests of others. Is that the kind of democracy favoured by Washington and Brussels? There are rules, procedures and principles even in politics, like there are in boxing for example. Boxers box by category; those are the rules. No heavyweight is allowed to box with a lightweight because we all know what the outcome will be well in advance. The rules, it seems, don’t apply when it comes to Macedonia. Macedonia, being illegally handicapped, cannot be forced to negotiate the survival of the country and the nation with somebody who is not touched by the problem, not interested in its solution and a privileged user of wide, unprincipled international support.

12.10. Washington’s insistence on “agreeing” with Athens has placed us in a precarious position where we have to beg for mercy from the torturer.

12.11. So it seems that our “partners” or those who we perceive to be our “partners” are pushing us into self-destruction… for us to crash and burn… at the hands of Athens who can’t wait to see us disappear. And as long as we are here the U.S. will do anything in its power to help Greece achieve its greater aspirations; see our country crash and burn and the Macedonian people disappear from the face of this earth. And that, my friends, today is America’s real-politic towards Macedonia.

12.12. In the end, what is interesting about all this is the fact that Washington has no clear stance on the Greek position in the dispute. Washington, it seems, supports Greece for no apparent reason. The Americans insist that we “find a name” and that we make some “tough decisions”... (Reeker), but never once have they mentioned what the other side (Greece) is expected to do, if anything. The fact is, however, that Washington wants to achieve this goal differently than Greece. While Athens insists on an instant solution immediately with erga omnes, Washington offers bait on a hook: “a new name for external use as a substitute for the reference”! This too is erga omnes but in stages and with a slight delay. But then, a few years or so later, it will become erga omnes because we will need to change our passports, customs documents and a whole slew of other things... and in the end, our Constitution. And as such, we will be renaming ourselves step by step.

But by now it should be clear to everyone that whoever supports Greece holds the idea of sacrificing Macedonia and the Macedonian people. Why else would Washington publicly advocate for Macedonia to change its name, intending that the Macedonian people would have to abandon their identity?

E. Could the name issue have been resolved in the early 1990s?

13. Some time ago a thesis was launched that implied that it was possible to solve Macedonia’s name problem in a favourable manner in the early 1990’s and it was possible for Macedonia to have smoothly joined the UN. One of the main advocates of this thesis was Denko Maleski, first foreign minister of an independent Macedonia. As undersecretary, I worked with Maleski in the then Ministry of Foreign Relations for about a

year or so. There was no Deputy-Minister, meaning that I was second in line, after the Minister.

13.1. There is no doubt that Maleski was involved (though not completely) in the events of our country’s foreign policy of that time and his testimonies undeniably carry considerable weight. However, the main role was played by Gligorov, who controlled all levers of foreign policy by his own hands. The duty of the minister then was to strictly carry out Gligorov’s instructions. However, regardless of what Maleski claims, his ideas, given the circumstances, have no merit.

13.1.1. Speaking to the media, Maleski, many times reiterated that in 1992 there were other options open to Macedonia to join the UN. Maleski claims British Prime Minister John Major, at a meeting in Downing Street, proposed that we use the name Republic of Macedonia (Skopje). Source: Utrinski, April 9, 2013, story devoted to the 20th anniversary since Macedonia’s accession to the UN. This time, as he did other times, Maleski conveyed to the media that he believed that the U.S.A. stood behind Major’s proposal.

In a column published in “Utrinski” on June 5th and 6th, 2004, Maleski claimed that John Major’s message was for us to accept the addendum (Skopje)… “Then they (Britain) and the U.S. will issue a joint declaration in which they will conclude that the problem was solved”!? “Ride the wave and solve the problem now while the tide is high because the great powers will lose interest in your problem,” was supposedly the message from the British!?

13.1.2. However, in his book “Bebeto od Katran”, Maleski, while describing the meeting he and Gligorov had with Major in Downing Street, in London on September 3, 1992, does not mention anything about the U.S. From his and Gligorov’s conversation with Major, documented in great detail on pages 405 to 409 in his book, there is nothing conclusive that would suggest that there were “other options” available. The fact is that Major proposed that we immediately change our country’s name to “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” because he said “it would have increased our chances of joining the UN”. (This is more proof that Macedonia’s admission to the UN was blocked!) Major said that without this change “it would be difficult for your friends to help you”. When Gligorov asked what Great Britain’s position was on this matter, Major openly said: “I can not give you a definite answer!” He then added: “The EC cannot reach a consensus because Greece will not agree to anything”. Major frankly admitted that: “I am afraid that the same will happen even with any compromise you offer!” So, according to Maleski’s own notes, Macedonia would have been blocked no matter what alternatives it was prepared to offer. When Gligorov insisted that Major give him an answer, Major said: “If you accept the name with ‘Skopje’ then you will give us a chance to help you”. When Gligorov asked for guarantees, Major clearly said that he could not guarantee anything. Major’s last words ended with: “I can understand your reluctance to change the name of your country!”

Where Maleski found these “other options” is not clear.

Maleski not only does not mention the U.S. in his book but obviously has pulled this other information of some sort of joint US-British declaration on our behalf, from his sleeve! And to those who have firsthand information about this it is clear that such a thing in diplomacy is unthinkable! Titans don’t stick their noses in tiny waters. It is hard to believe that Maleski thought that if we accepted the addendum (Skopje), Athens would be placated? Such a thing neither was, is, nor will be possible under current circumstances.

Only Maleski knows why there is such a vast difference between what he wrote in his book and what he wrote for the column. And about some “other options” that he spoke about he will have to explain what he means by those himself.

Speaking of the column, Maleski made another unforgivable mistake when he concluded that: “In the general euphoria, let us not forget that over the last few decades Macedonia’s constitutional name has been changed three times; People’s Republic of Macedonia, Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the

Republic of Macedonia, while our identity has remained unquestioned”!?

How is it possible that a professor of international law, without regards that he was a foreign minister or not, did not know that we did not change the name of our state, which has always been Macedonia, and that only references were added to reflect its current political status which has no connection to its name? We today will have no problem calling our state “Democratic Republic of Macedonia” or “Parliamentary Republic of Macedonia”... and thus the problem is solved. That, however, has nothing to do with the identity of the people, the language...

But these possible and acceptable changes to us are not acceptable to Washington, Brussels, Athens... Because they do not achieve their goals! Because they do not take into consideration changes to the Macedonian people’s identity, which is at the core of this problem.

13.1.3. With the addendum (Skopje) we were expected to unilaterally concede, as a gesture of goodwill, without getting anything in return, which in diplomacy rarely, if ever, happens at all. Major suggested that we voluntarily make a change to our name and accept the consequences at own expense just to attempt to join the UN… with no guarantees… But before we changed our name we would have to change our Constitution, which enshrined the name of our state. Was Major expecting Gligorov to act on his own in this regard? And who had the authority to arbitrarily change the Constitution without committing a crime. Taking such a step was unimaginable back in Macedonia.

At minimum it would have been an unpardonable mistake to accept Major’s suggestion which was not even a formal proposal. During the Edinburgh Summit in December of the same year (1992) Athens rejected an identical proposal made by Robin O’Neill without even giving it a second thought. Thus it would be only logical to assume that Major was not aware that our problems with Greece were much deeper than our name. Major may not have been aware that Greece wanted no less than to obliterate everything Macedonian and nothing less that was offered would have been acceptable. However, the fact is that Major, and Britain as a whole, had some sympathy for our efforts and sincerely wanted to help us. This I also confirmed through my personal experience, while I spent time in London as Ambassador (1993-1997). Unfortunately, the British too had no room to manoeuver to do anything more for us.

13.1.4 The meeting with Major took place in September 1992, during which time Gligorov had already formally submitted our application for membership to the UN. The application was submitted at the end of July of the same year. This is another proof that Boutros Ghali did not process the application because Macedonia’s entry into the UN was blocked by somebody.

13.1.5 Ambassador Robin O’Neill was the one who came up with the idea of adding “Skopje” to the end of our name. He represented the United Kingdom while chairing the EC Presidency when he proposed this solution. O’Neill was familiar with our problems with Greece and I had several opportunities to meet with him and discuss them during his visits to Skopje in the second half of 1992. O’Neill was also supportive of our aspirations and remained a true friend of Macedonia.

13.2. So, it would appear that the necessary conditions for solving the name issue in the early 1990’s were simply not there. Then why was the government blamed for this debacle? The government was blamed because people had no understanding of what was happening behind the scenes and that Greece had already made up its mind a long time ago that it did not want a Macedonia or Macedonians to exist. The only reason this problem surfaced when it did and the way it did was because Greece was caught by surprise when Macedonia was about to declare its independence. What people also did not know and unfortunately many still are not aware of is that Greece is not alone in this… the U.S., Germany, France... are behind Greece. Many just don’t understand that the “Macedonian Question” has been reopened with the obvious intent of closing it forever. Everything else that was done was done to tie and bog down the Macedonian people and make them turn against one another. Right from the start, everything was technique and tactics wellmanaged from the highest level, from the world’s only superpower, the United States itself. Let’s put it another way, if the Americans wanted to solve this problem in Macedonia’s favour, with minimum eligibility and without calling into question the identity of the Macedonian people, the problem would have been solved a long time ago and it now would have been part of history. American interests, unfortunately, were quite different from Macedonia’s.

14. The “Macedonian Question” which practically was the essence of the problem, or rather Greece’s need for Macedonia and the Macedonian people to disappear from the face of this earth, at least in those early years, were not known to the majority of European politicians. The best confirmation of this was Lord Owen’s visit to Skopje and Athens in January 1993. Owen was meeting with President Gligorov when he first heard the Macedonian story which left him incredibly optimistic. It was obvious that he had come to the wrong conclusion, assuming that the problem was with us and thought that if this was the case then he should be able to solve the problem in Athens!

Included in Lord Owen’s delegation was also renowned German Ambassador Geert Ahrens. While continuing on his way to Athens, Owen left Ahrens in Skopje. I knew Ahrens personally; we had both served in China in the early 1970s. He told me that Owen left him in Macedonia so that he could liaise with Gligorov and, through him, finalize the details of the deal that Owen was expecting to hammer out with Greece!

Of course, nothing like that ever happened. A cold shower revived Owen in Athens. The plans for meeting in Skopje were cancelled after his return from Athens. Instead of having a formal meeting in Skopje, we met him at Petrovets Airport. During the talks nothing was mentioned about why Owen had come to this region. The meeting went about as if nothing had happened in the previous few days. Our conversations had no theme! He told us nothing about what had happened in Athens. Obviously, he got the point that the problem was there and not here.

In question was not his naivety but his ignorance! 65 IV – Renaming Macedonia and addressing the “Albanian national question” are two parallel processes separately coordinated by Washington - Or - The name dispute, Kosovo and the 2001 war are part of the same scenario

1. To fully understand America’s role in the Troubled Macedonian Journey to International Recognition, after the Yugoslav breakup, one would have to uncover all organic connections that exist between the so-called “name dispute” and the resolution of the “Albanian national question”. One would also have to understand American policy in the Balkans, events that took place in Kosovo in 1999 and the 2001 war in Macedonia.

2. We have already shown that Macedonia’s entry into the UN, by its official name, was denied and the name suspended from international use by the UNSC. We have also shown that all this was orchestrated by Washington. Careful analysis of the puzzle has revealed and confirmed that the denial of Macedonia’s name is closely connected and imbedded in American strategic interests in the Balkans. What we don’t know is who initiated the name issue first, Athens or Washington, but it has become quite clear that the U.S. used it as a tool to implement its regional plans in the Balkans. We have also demonstrated that, when it came to Macedonia, the U.S. was willing and prepared to violate the UN Charter of Rights, ignore the International Court of Justice ruling in The Hague, not to mention international principles and procedures, to rob our country of its name and our people of their identity...

This is how America behaves not only in Macedonia and in the Balkans but worldwide. America always exercises its global policy in its best national interests. Macedonia is only in its way because we don’t fit with its main goals. So, given America’s desires and superpower status in the world, it is only natural to conclude that American desires supercede those of Greece. So, it is only natural that the U.S.A. is using Greece to achieve its own aims. For Macedonia it is crucial to understand that the U.S.A. is the main (if not unique) factor in all efforts to rename Macedonia

and to deprive the Macedonian people. It means that the key for the solution to the problem is in Washington, not in Athens.

3. It is extremely important for Macedonians to understand that what the Americans are looking for is not an isolated and arbitrary concession from Macedonia. In question is the realization of American interests in the region. Our name is a means for America to achieve its goals in the Balkans. The main role for American strategy is played by the Albanians. Greece and Bulgaria are just additional tools that are needed to achieve its goals. Serbia no longer has a strong role because it has already been sacrificed for other American plans.

4. Along with the name problem, and in correlation with it, runs the process for solving the “Albanian national question”. There can be no doubt that the manager of this process is none other than Washington. There can be no mistake that the U.S. used military force in order to create Kosovo as a second Albanian state. This goes to show that American interests are directly aligned with Albanian interests and the U.S.A. will do anything in its power to protect those interests even if it has to erase Macedonia and its people from the world map. So, the Americans have latched onto existing disputes, such as the one with Greece about the name, and have taken them to new heights. The name is not a problem but the Macedonian identity is. Solving the so-called “Albanian national question” heavily depends on removing the Macedonian identity, which Washington has no qualms about doing. U.S. Balkan policy heavily depends upon strengthening the Albanian position in the region. This is an important American project in the long-term which unfortunately has negative consequences for Macedonia and the Macedonian people. Not just for the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation but also for the entire region. The first victim of this policy was Serbia. Now the U.S. is focused on Macedonia. In the long term, this American policy is absolutely contrary to Greek strategic interests, as well. Blinded by anti-Macedonian hysteria and historical emotions, Athens does not recognize those dangers.

4.1. I had an interesting personal experience during my tour as Ambassador in Tirana (1998-2002). Sometime in June 1998, I received information that the Albanian Academy of Sciences, at the request of the country’s President, Redzhep Meidani, was preparing a platform to address the “national question”. I immediately informed the ambassadors of France, Germany, Italy... and, of course, the U.S.A. stressing that such a document was not in the interest of peace and stability in the region. Nobody reacted and the “Platform for the solution of the national Albanian question” was published in October of the same year. The document, openly or indirectly, advocated for a greater Albanian state. Or, in other words – for all Albanians to live in one state!

4.2. When he was asked what the American position on this document was, newly appointed American Ambassador Limpreht first ignored its significance. When we insisted that this document promoted a “Greater Albania”, which included territories belonging to three or four of Albania’s neighbours, Limpreht thought for a moment and said he would read it again. His final judgment was that there was nothing contentious in it and that it did not call for use of force to achieve Albanian national objectives. At that time it seemed the Americans had no problem with Albanian nationalism and extremism. But soon it became evident and proved that Washington was strongly behind it. That the “Greater Albania” project was directly supported to serve American interests in the Balkans! At that time we did not know that the U.S. was already deeply involved in secret Albanian military preparations in Kosovo and that the document was just another tool in their overall strategy.

Limpreht was assured that his judgment of the document was not correct with a special analysis prepared on three pages listing the facts of the “Platform…” leading to different conclusions. It was true that it did not directly call for using force but it was accurate as well that the aims put in the “Platform…” could not be achieved – peacefully! The very near future, the wars in Kosovo in 1999, and in Macedonia in 2001, proved who was right.

This episode clearly reveals the real U.S. policy towards Albania and the Albanians and Washington’s support of Albanian objectives and national aspirations. During the period when these conversations were taking place, American military experts were secretly engaged in the recruitment of KLA operatives and their preparation in secret camps in Albania. Naturally, the use of force followed not only with extensive U.S. support but also with sophisticated American weapons. So, it soon became clear why the U.S.A and Ambassador Limpreht stood behind the Albanian document calling for a resolution to the Albanian National Question... This did not happen by accident; clearly it happened with American blessings. Events that followed absolutely confirmed that!

5. Washington never had any great trust in the “Slavs” in the Balkans or in the Greeks. The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed turned the Albanians into a major U.S. partner. Credit for this, of course, must be given to Milosevich and his extreme policies, which took the region hostage for almost a decade. During and after Yugoslavia’s breakup, America’s main opponent was Milosevich. Albanians, on the other hand, were traditional enemies of the Serbs and were directly confronted by Milosevich. Thus, the way was now clear for a new partnership to open between the Albanians and the Americans. At the same time, the Albanians were willing to die for the realization of their dream, a “Greater Albania”, for which the Americans were more than willing to oblige them. So, with interests aligned a great partnership was in the making.

6. The U.S.A. in the Balkans was playing the Albanian people’s card and not particularly Albania’s as a country. But, even avoiding support for Albania, by supporting the Albanian people, Washington gave its direct support to Tirana which constantly advocated on behalf of all Albanian people, wherever they lived even though Tirana had no mandate, much less the right to represent Albanians outside of Albania. Albanians live in Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, southern Serbia, Greece, etc... even in the United States. The same was also practiced even by the Albanian ambassadors to Skopje. They often used unacceptable vocabulary, speaking for “Albanian territories” in Macedonia, for example, or in the name of the Albanians living in the country. Unfortunately, all these provocations were ignored by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6.1. During Albania’s 100th anniversary celebration, a six metre Albanian flag was hoisted in the village Greshnitsa, in Kichevo Region inside Macedonia, with Ahmeti’s blessings. Source: “Nova Makedonija”, November 20, 2012. The flag-raising was illegal but its purpose was to show that the Albanian celebration was possible in all so-called Albanian territories. This part of sovereign Macedonia is considered “Albanian territory” by the Albanians. According to Ahmeti: “The Albanians will not allow any daring black hand to reach for it (the six metre flag) and take it down...”

The Albanian Ambassador to Macedonia in Skopje said: “The dimensions of this unusual flag in the ‘Albanian territories’ today is an expression of respect...” If the Macedonian government could do nothing about Ahmeti, it should have at least expelled the Albanian Ambassador for making such a disrespectful comment. This, unfortunately, was not done...

6.2. Because no one in Macedonia reacted to this incident, the famous Jason Miko took it upon himself to react (“Flaw in the Framework Agreement”, “Dnevnik”, November 29, 2012). He quoted a statement made by Bujar Osmani, DUI spokesman, in which he said: “As a sign of mutual respect, all Macedonian citizens should share the Albanian joy and should not raise the question whether it is legal to fly the Albanian flag, because the Albanians will interpret it as a provocation?!?” Ascertaining that: “You Bujar, obviously do not understand the concept of the rule of law!”

The highly respected Jason Miko was absolutely right, but no doubt everything was clear to Bujar also. The statement is an expression of DUI’s hypocritical policies; it was a severe provocation and direct insult for the Macedonians.

And nothing happened. The only conclusion is that Bujar was right!

6.3. It was common practice for Tirana and for Albanians everywhere to use the term “Albanian lands” when referring to regions outside of Albania which is nothing less than open and classic irredentism.

7. As was already mentioned, events in Kosovo, which culminated in 1999, were secretly prepared by the U.S. and the UK special services. Their military instructors, private military companies, like the MPRI, trained the KLA (in Kosovo) military operatives in secret camps in Albania. The U.S. and the UK were instrumental in providing them with arms and ammunition. It should not be underestimated though, that the arsenal that was robbed from Albanian military depots during the chaos that took place in Albania in 1996/7, also ended up in their hands. These activities were carried out to fulfill the prerequisites of two primary American goals: a) the destruction of Milosevich and b) the unification of all Albanians.