Introduction - Part 01

Introduction

1. It should be obvious by now that the Albanians were and still are the main target of American policy in the Balkans. The violent breakup of Serbia and the creation of Kosovo, as a second Albanian state, is the best confirmation of that. When the Americans needed a loyal partner, the Albanians were there and ready to act. They were ready to settle their national issue and the Americans were willing to support them. Yugoslavia’s disintegration was seen as an opportunity for all Albanians to unite and, in their view, correct historical injustices, for which they were ready to plunge into a war. Thus, their greatest aspiration fit perfectly with American regional plans in the Balkans. The Americans needed a trusted partner for Milosevich’s overthrow, and they found that in the Albanians. The Americans were also involved in the creation of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and in its secret preparations for war. The Albanians were and still are a great asset to the United States not only because they are loyal partners but also because they are widespread over many countries in the region. The Albanian population in the Balkans is larger in number than that of the Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosnians and Croatians and smaller than that of the Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians. They also have the highest birth rate in Europe.

1.1 The Americans, as we all know, are involved in both Macedonia and Kosovo. So, it would be theoretically impossible for American policies towards Macedonia not to overlap with those towards Kosovo. We know that the Americans always follow their own interests and those interests should be, at least in theory, complementary to those of the countries in which they are involved. As a result, Macedonia and Kosovo are part of the same American regional policy formulated to make full use of a) over the border entanglements between the nations, b) historical mistrust and confrontation between the states, c) Albania’s eternal dream of achieving a Greater Albania, d) centuries claims and “pretensions” on Macedonia and on the Macedonian people by the neighbours, and e) all of the above combined with traditional deep divisions and confrontations among the Macedonian people... 2. Once we take into consideration that Macedonia and Kosovo are part of the same American regional policy and America’s involvement and partnering with the Albanians it is only logical then to substantiate that the KLA (in Kosovo) and the NLA (in Macedonia) (National Liberation Armies) are part of the same story. And how did this happen? Well, when Milosevich initiated a campaign to “deal” with irredentism in Kosovo, the Americans found their historic opportunity to penetrate the region and create conditions for a new strategic partnership. And since the Albanians were a “traditional” enemy of the Serbians, thanks to Milosovich’s “tough guy” policies, the Americans found a willing partner in the Albanians. Then, after Yugoslavia’s breakup Albanian-American interests became aligned to the maximum.

3. With American determination to create an independent Kosovo, two objectives were achieved. One, Milosevich (Serbia) was punished and two, the Albanians were rewarded for their involvement. While this process was coming to fruition, appetites became increasingly larger and attempts were made to separate Medvedja, Preshevo and Bujanovats from Serbia. These were three municipalities with a predominantly Albanian population which, the Albanians viewed as eastern Kosovo and not as southern Serbia. Albanian attempts, however, failed. It proved to be too much of a bite for them because they would have entered the valley of South Morava and taken part of Corridor 10, the main north-south Serbian communication link. Serbia would have retaliated harshly.

4. After their victory in Kosovo, naturally the next logical place for the Albanians to want to acquire lands was western Macedonia. And thus Macedonia became the next destination for Albanian expansionism which was to be achieved not only with American blessings but also with American help. Enter the 2001 war. The process by which the “Albanian national question” in Kosovo was resolved was an unexpected success which, theoretically, in their minds, could possibly work in Macedonia. But by then, this was nothing new. The process in Macedonia had already started soon after the breakup of Yugoslavia with the Albanians boycotting the referendum for independence and the new Constitution, with “Illyrida” and with paramilitaries... in the early years when the modern independent Macedonian state was being formed. These, however, were only small tremours announcing serious political earthquakes which would follow.

4.1. There is no need to prove that Macedonia was both a target of American interests and Albanian chauvinism. All we have to do is look at every daily act perpetrated against it. Is there anyone who is not aware of Macedonia’s roots being systematically pruned? For years Macedonian lands have slowly, painstakingly and irreversibly been taken away from the Macedonian people. And now, more recently, just like it was done in Kosovo, it was about to be done in Macedonia with the war of 2001.

5. From what we know today, the NLA and the war of 2001 in Macedonia were a result of American regional policy. Nevertheless, with their success in Kosovo and having their own military capabilities, the Albanians developed appetites for expansionism into Macedonia as well. But even so, how could they have directed their military campaigns in Macedonia and started the 2001 war without a clear signal and direct support from the Americans? Supposedly being a “friend” of Macedonia, shouldn’t the United States have stepped in and said “NO!” to Albanian aggression in Macedonia? This unfortunately did not happen, which means, and this will be proven in later chapters, that the Albanians not only had clear permission from the Americans to attack Macedonia but enjoyed concrete and direct military support as well.

5.1. It was not hard for American planners in Washington to connect two exclusive opportunities that had emerged: one, Greece’s problem with Macedonia’s name and two, Albanian aspirations for establishing a Greater Albanian state. These opportunities were combined with American efforts to destroy Milosevich and spread American influence in the Balkans. After World War II the United States had no influence in this part of the Balkans because Albania was closed and not very attractive. Yugoslavia was uncommitted and alternated between East and

West. Bulgaria and Romania were Soviet allies and Greece was never a loyal and willing American ally...

5.2. What about Greece’s problem with Macedonia’s name? If the “name issue” was an exclusively Greek initiative, without the USA’s involvement, then there is no doubt that Washington would immediately latch onto this opportunity and manage the entire process in accordance with its own regional interests. Naturally, it did it to combine its interests with those of Greece. The best evidence that proves this is American involvement in minimizing Macedonia’s chances of joining the United Nations in 1992/1993. It would have been impossible to pre-empt Macedonia’s entry into the UN without active American involvement. No one in the Security Council, other than the Americans, could have ignored or disregarded the UN Charter the way it was done for Macedonia. No one would have dared to impose two new and never before seen conditions on Macedonia’s admission. No one could have suspended Macedonia and forced it to use an imposed reference for a name, but the USA. This was theoretically impossible for Greece to have done on its own. It had to have had outside help from a powerful supporter in the Security Council. And that supporter was the United States.

6. Christopher Hill, the first U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia, was dispatched to Skopje in early July 1996. In the four years before that, since August 1992, his colleagues, the first U.S. ambassadors, already operated from Zagreb, Ljubljana and Sarajevo. In other words, Macedonia was completely forgotten, unrecognized and left stranded by Washington. Of course, this was not done by accident. American actions were dictated by American geopolitical interests in the Balkans.

Hill came after the wars in the former Yugoslav Republics had ended but at a time when the Kosovo scenario was being prepared, which would lead to substantial geopolitical changes in the region. His coming may not have been directly associated with this event, but at the same time it can’t be rejected as not being linked to it. In any case, it is worthwhile investigating it because it is an undisputed fact that, during the key years 1998/1999, when Hill was ambassador in Skopje, he was also a special envoy to Kosovo! That was the time when American interests centred in this part of the world and were focused in Kosovo. That was the time when the KLA operatives were being recruited and trained to lead the war in 1999. That was also the time when all the changes on the southern part of the Balkans, including Macedonia, were planned and would eventually lead to hardship and suffering in the wider region.

6.1. Hill however was “socializing” with the Albanians long before that. In the beginning of the 1990’s, during the dramatic communist regime collapse in Albania, Hill was working at the Embassy in Tirana. According to unofficial reports, coming from top Albanian politicians, Hill was the architect behind Berisha gaining power.

Hill was involved in the Rambouillet conference (along with Reeker!), when everything was done to prevent Serbia from signing the agreement with Kosovo in order to open the way for bombing it.

About that event, legendary Henry Kissinger said: “The text of the Rambouillet Agreement, which asked Serbia to allow NATO troops to freely enter Serbia, was a provocation, which was to pave the way for the bombing. It was a terrible diplomatic document, what must never again be presented in such a way!”

6.2. Hill was one of those people in the circle of American ambassadors who were sent to trouble spots. After his tour in Macedonia he was sent first to Poland (for a deserved break) and then to South Korea, to solve local hot issues. His next appointment was ambassador to volatile Iraq, where dozens of people were killed every day.

Hill was hired to serve as deputy to the famous American bulldozer, Holbrooke, during the preparation and signing of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given his experience there, we can conclude that Hill was more than qualified for the events surrounding Macedonia, which were to follow – the war in 2001. 7. This has been only a small attempt to throw some light on actual policies implemented by the United States in Macedonia, in all its years of independence. More details will be given in later chapters.

* * *

8. The United States is not only a military superpower; it is also an impressive innovator of cutting-edge information technologies; they are leading in the film industry, in music, literature, artistic and other works...

Through a system of competition, the USA has fostered a dynamic society that allows the best in each field of competition to rise to the top. The end result is high creativity. The United States of America, in essence, has been a leader in almost every sphere of human activity. This is indeed inspiring and deserves recognition from all of us. No one comes even close to what the U.S.A. is achieving, which serves as an example for all of us.

9. It is true that in the last 20 years or so, since Macedonia became independent, the United States has contributed significant assistance to its development, which some say exceeded a billion dollars, a practice which has continued to this day. The Americans have funded a number of extremely important projects for Macedonia for which the Macedonian people are very grateful.

10. It is therefore important at this point for us to mention that this write-up carries no malice towards the United States. It is only an attempt to clarify American policies towards Macedonia. It is a fact that American diplomacy has never been “flawless”. On the contrary, with a foreign policy like that of the United States, where many divergent interests intersect, it is impossible to have flawless diplomacy.

11. It is also important to mention that providing direct aid to Macedonia does not change the substance of America’s political attitude toward Macedonia. It could only sound controversial. Providing aid has a broader purpose. First, it creates an image of “friendliness” giving the impression that the Americans are Macedonia’s friends. Second, it allows the Americans to penetrate deeply into Macedonia’s various segments of society. Third, the Macedonians who directly benefit from American aid tend to become strong supporters of American policies. Fourth, much of the aid provided by the U.S.A. is paid to American experts who are sent to Macedonia to manage it. Fifth, everything that the Americans invest is done for sustained and lasting influence, without regard for what happens to Macedonia and what is left of it...

America’ assistance to Macedonia is obscuring the true policies Washington is executing towards Macedonia. At the same time the aid is beneficial to the country, as well.

I – Yugoslavia’s breakup and the situation in Macedonia

1. Because Macedonia in the Yugoslav federation was a small country with limited resources, it found itself in the margins within that federation. The blame for that was in us and not in Belgrade. We made very little effort to change our situation. We felt as if we were bigger Yugoslavs than the rest and (consciously) neglected our Macedonian-ness. We read Belgrade’s “Politika” newspaper and watched TV Zagreb... We criticized and were ashamed of everything Macedonian. Then, and even today, we bought mostly imported products because we felt that ours, made in Macedonia, were not good enough. In other words, we thought we deserved better than what we could produce ourselves!

2. We had no experience in running a state because most of us avoided politics in the federation. At home we had no serious think - tanks that would research in-depth political and geo-strategic issues, economics, diplomacy, security... The other republics did have and, as a result, built expertise in those fields. In practice, we did not produce any specialists because our people refused to take them seriously. We did not want smarter people than ourselves among us. This may be a Macedonian trait? To most people the “Party” was more important than the state. Loyalty, not quality was the key criterion... The situation was the same in the other republics, but we were the most “disciplined” in this regard.

3. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia we found ourselves completely unprepared and surprised, even after it became clear to us that the process was irreversible. The Slovenians, for example, had elaborate plans for a post-Yugoslav period. They even had arrangements with Croatia to form a confederation...

We were last in everything. Almost no one was aware or cared about what was happening all around us. We refused to look at the evidence that the federation was disintegrating; even when it was clear that is was inevitable.

4. The then leadership failed to realize that the Macedonian people’s future lay in a fully independent Macedonian state. Unlike the other republics, Macedonia took no immediate measures to secure its future after the Yugoslav breakup. Macedonians were accustomed to not getting involved in essential matters regarding joint state affairs. The political dignitaries in Macedonia felt there was no need to manage the separation process so they left it alone. The institutions in Macedonia, responsible for taking steps for the separation, were not even informed, let alone ready to act. The citizens were involved even less. The largest part of our citizenry did not even know what to expect let alone what was waiting for them down the line. With regards to official propaganda, Yugoslavia was a solid state and something undeniable.

5. Events were unfolding so fast that it was difficult to follow them, let alone understand them. The former local system did not build experienced politicians, let alone statesmen, probably because they were not needed. Fortunately for us, Kiro Gligorov came back from Belgrade. Gligorov had spent many years close to Tito, one of the political geniuses of the 20th century, and had learned from him. Gligorov is criticized for what he did but, given the situation, had Gligorov not returned to lead Macedonia through the storm… who would have? Or, more accurately, any different solution would have been much more risky for the country’s future.

Today many people are saying that Gligorov worked very hard to preserve Yugoslavia and that he and Izetbegovich (Bosnia) remained loyal Yugoslav Musketeers to the end. Of course there is some truth to that. It is also true that the September 8, 1991 referendum question had a double meaning. But the fact is that Gligorov was always in favour of an independent Macedonia. That needs no proof. Gligorov was in favour of an independent Macedonia even during World War II when, through ANOK, he advocated for that.

5.1. At issue here are Gligorov’s wise tactics. Gligorov was well aware of the dangers that hung over Macedonia and was very careful not to create waves during Yugoslavia’s disintegration. In addition to dealing with both politicians and the general public in Macedonia, Gligorov also had to deal with the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and its significant military capabilities. The JNA was in fact an overwhelmingly Serbian dominated army stationed in Macedonia. One short signal from Belgrade and, in just a few hours, the JNA could have taken down the government in Macedonia and dictated its own terms. The international community would have said little or next to nothing outside of condemning the takeover as a “barbaric act”. Gligorov also knew Milosevich’s intentions. We know today from Mitsotakis and Samaras’s talks with Milosevich that they were planning to divide the Republic of Macedonia between Greece and Serbia. This confirms Gligorov’s fears and justifies his restraint. The U.S.A. reacted as well because the danger for Macedonia was coming from Serbia. The result was; several hundred UNPREDEP troops were dispatched to Macedonia in December 1992. The purpose for this American intervention was not to “help” Macedonia but to prevent it from falling into Serbian hands so that eventually parts of it could become part of the “Greater Albania” project.

5.2. Gligorov, it appears, according to some experts, if indeed this was his idea, was not the first to ask the UN for peacekeeping troops. Izetbegovich had asked before him but his initiative was ignored. However, given the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the war breaking out, the UN decided not to repeat its mistake and responded positively to Gligorov. At least that was the official story. But then it is difficult to believe that the UN (an umbrella for the U.S.) actually waited for Gligorov to ask and then immediately sent troops to Macedonia. Where and how did Gligorov obtain this “secret information” telling him that Macedonia was in danger from Serbia; information which Washington couldn’t have gotten on its own? Yes, troops were sent to Macedonia at Gligorov’s request because without it there would have been no mission. However, it is likely that Gligorov acted on instructions from the Americans. The mission was certainly beneficial for Macedonia.

On the other hand, what kind of troops could Izetbegovich have been asking for and where was he going to place them? Around Sarajevo? And what could have been achieved by that? The war was fought everywhere. In fact, if such forces were to be dispatched, without Serbian consent, it could have sparked more hostility.

5.3. If we are to look into Gligorov’s politics a little deeper, in the period from 1991 to 1995, we will find that a key point in his politics was revealed in a statement that he made in Kranј, on April 11, 1991, after the Yugoslav Republic presidents’ meeting (“Nova Makedonija” July 16, 2012, “President Gligorov and Vice President Georgievski”). Gligorov then said: “Macedonia is interested in being part of the Yugoslav community, but if any of the republics breaks away we will not remain in the Federation.” Maybe someone in his circle did not share this opinion and believed that Macedonia would remain with Serbia, but Gligorov was explicit: everyone in the federation or a federation without Macedonia.

5.4. Gligorov had what it takes in terms of wisdom and statesmanship. We have to give him credit for that. Macedonia did not initiate the Yugoslav dissolution, Gligorov made that very clear. Macedonia left because others left first. So, Serbia had no valid reason to take its anger out on Macedonia. Let us not forget, Macedonia was awarded to Serbia by the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest. Let us also keep in mind that Serbia would never have willingly given up its share of the Bucharest “booty” and allowed the creation of a modern Macedonian state if it were not for the communists in 1944. As strange as it may sound, it was communist ideology based on proletarian internationalism that made that possible. Let us also not forget that Serbia did agree to a partial revision of the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest in favour of creating a modern Macedonian state.

Serbia’s case proves and confirms that the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest is not cast in stone and can be changed but only with the consent of other interested parties. Is this possible when Bulgaria and Greece are on the other side, judge for yourself.

5.5. Of course it is also important to mention that Tito himself, for whatever reason, was a supporter of a federation with six republics, which included Macedonia. The final step to formulating a policy regarding this federation was taken at the AVNOJ Second Session on November 29, 1943 during which time the seed for a modern Macedonian state began to germinate. This was an important date that marks an historic turning point for the Macedonian people.

Tito never did reveal his motive for supporting the creation of a Macedonian state. Some believe he did it because he feared Serbia. Serbia, being the largest, strongest and most dominant republic in the federation would have been even stronger with Macedonia being part of it, as before the Second World War. Serbia would have dominated all state functions and treated the other republics like minorities. That, however, was less of a possibility if Macedonia were to be separated from Serbia and given its own status as a republic. Tito’s reasons, for us are not important. What is important is that we were given a historic opportunity to fulfill an age-old desire to have our Macedonian state. Let us, once and for all, dump the “thesis” that “Tito fabricated” or “invented” the Macedonian people. All this is nonsense perpetrated by our enemies to keep the truth about Macedonia hidden!

5.6. Considering what was said above, we need to ask: had Macedonia been involved in the initial stages of the Yugoslav breakup, alongside Slovenia and Croatia, would Serbia have intervened in Macedonia? And would Serbia have demanded Macedonian lands being given back with references to the Bucharest and Versailles Treaties? Given that it would not have been totally legal, could the JNA military have taken control of the Macedonian government and installed a quisling government in Skopje, with pro-Serbian policies...? What would have happened to us then?

5.7. Would the question of the referendum in Macedonia, having no double meaning, have encouraged Belgrade to intervene? Gligorov was consistent regarding all these issues and the message was the same: we remain interested in Yugoslavia but, you know, only if it stays as it was. But of course, at that time it was clear to everybody that there was no turning back. Gligorov made sure, however, that Macedonia was not going to lead the dance against Serbia.

5.8. Various interpretations by people that Gligorov, cooperating with Izetbegovich and using the double meaning referendum question in Macedonia, were in support of Yugoslavia first, and in support of an independent Macedonia second, are pure manipulations. Those two key moves that Gligorov made during the dramatic period when the Yugoslav federation was being dissolved were in no way symbolic of his personal and state priorities. At stake here was the ultimate and classic pragmatism: to avoid a war. He aimed to achieve his objectives without confrontation. The price of confrontation would have been much too high. And sure enough, Gligorov did exactly what he set out to do.

5. 9. In the critical period, Milosevich did everything he could to drive Slovenia out of the federation but not together with Croatia. After a brief clash he ordered the JNA to withdraw from Slovenia and gave Ljubljana carte blanche to separate. Unlike in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia, he had no Serbians he could count on in Slovenia. So the steps that Gligorov took, when considering that Slovenia and Croatia were determined to oppose Milosevich when they were separating, reveal the true dimension of his genius. He achieved his objectives without unnecessary exposure and risk to Macedonia.

Perhaps Gligorov was not a good bluffer? Perhaps he never played poker, but he had the instinct for politics. Whatever he was, for Macedonia he was a good statesman with the nerves of a politician who had the ability to look far with regards to Macedonia’s interests, especially during the period from 1991 to 1995, and worked very well indeed for the country.

6. Today we can assess that Gligorov’s foreign policy, in the period from 1991 to 1993, had long played the Yugoslav card. This is because Gligorov was worried about the wars in the other Yugoslav Republics and did not want to rock the Serbian boat. However, given the circumstances, it was not possible, let alone easy, to predict how long his strategy was going to hold out. It was very difficult to find the right time to tighten his policies while there was the real danger of the war spilling into Macedonia. There was also the internal problem with the Albanians, who, in the chaos, were seeking to exploit the situation in order to resolve their own national question. Gligorov was faced with maximum restraint and extreme caution in every political move he made. On top of that there was also the unwillingness of the international community to recognize Macedonia. Even though Macedonia did everything in its power to maintain peace and avoid war, the International Community left it in isolation and with very little room to manoeuver. Facts and arguments listed in this write-up will clearly show that the main culprit for this was and remains the U.S.A.

6.1. Today we can still argue: had Gligorov taken a more forceful approach on Macedonia’s behalf towards Yugoslavia’s dissolution, would Macedonia’s position have been any stronger? Would it have speeded up Macedonia’s recognition? But in essence what we are doing, by arguing, is speculating and widening the gap in our own divide. Had Gligorov expedited the process, today we could have been re-occupied by Serbia and erased from the world map. The only thing that is safe to conclude is that even though we did everything “by the book” and demonstrated to the International Community that we managed the post Yugoslav crisis in the period from 1991 to 1993, without spilling a single drop of blood, it did not bring us the desired results. And, with regards to our position in the International Community, our “good will” and “cooperativeness” proved to be extremely unproductive.

6.2. In general, however, we must admit that Gligorov’s tactics in conducting Macedonia’s foreign policy, which in those years was totally in his hands, certainly contributed to Macedonia’s stability. In other words, no matter how much inside and outside pressure was put on it, Macedonia did not destabilize or become prey to an outside entity. Macedonia avoided all pitfalls and not only became independent but it accomplished that by preserving the peace at home. Gligorov made some very valuable contributions which will be well remembered by history.

7. If there were any errors to be attributed to Gligorov’s foreign policy they would have been that he was too tolerant. During the Greek embargo against Macedonia, for example, when Greece was attempting to extinguish the life out of Macedonia by not allowing anything, not even life-saving energy to cross the Macedonian-Greek border, Gligorov allowed Greeks to freely cross in and out of Macedonia at will. According to official data collected from customs, more than 100 Greek trucks and over 200 Greek wagons freely crossed the Macedonian borders on a daily basis, carrying a serious quantity of goods. If we were to stop them we would have caused a scandal and most likely the Greeks would have looked for some kind of solution. By allowing Greeks to go through our borders without obstruction, we in fact damaged our economy enormously. We don’t know exactly what would have happened had we reacted differently. But logic holds that had we had shown our teeth to them, they would have acted differently. How differently we don’t know. However, it is sure that in such a situation the other side would have had an interest in finding an exit.

It is indisputable that our behaviour to not reciprocate gave the Greeks an advantage which they used to the maximum. Even though what we did may have not been appropriate in general terms, we must admit that this policy for tolerance proved to be successful because our state survived when expectations were that it would fall apart. Such behaviour out of Macedonia was not adequately valourized by the International Community because of other geopolitical interests, notably by the U.S.

8. In the beginning of the critical 1990’s, Stoian Andov, belonging to the leading Macedonian political class, also had some political pedigree. For many years he was a minister in Belgrade and had plenty of opportunity to learn the game of politics. There were also politicians from the “old school” that could have helped. Unfortunately some were not in the game, while others remained in Belgrade. Almost everyone else was inexperienced. The first two Prime Ministers (except for Nikola Kliusev, who led the technical government) were under the age of 30 and this was their first job! Instead of being trainees, which would have been normal in any other society, in Macedonia they had to undertake the leadership of a country and at a time when the country was faced with a wide range of unsolvable problems. The results are visible...

9. While the Yugoslav federation was falling apart, Macedonia was not sure what to do. The referendum for independence produced great results despite the fact that the people were not well enough informed concerning the time conditions and future opportunities. One of the kinks in this exercise was the Albanian boycott of both the referendum and the parliamentary vote on the new constitution which, we must admit, had its drawbacks. Part of the population did not undertake its obligations to do its stately duty and thus reserved its options for the future. It was the first strong indicator that building an independent Macedonia was not going to be easy. Also, International Community plans and intentions regarding Macedonia and the wider region were still unknown and no one knew what dangers lurked in the future. Unfortunately the situation is not much better today.

9.1. So, why did the Albanians boycott the referendum and the parliamentary vote on the new constitution? Such acts cannot be purely random, innocent, or domestically concocted. Macedonia had no “such” problems, to speak of, with its Albanian population especially like “Illyrida” and attempts to establish an Albanian paramilitary... All of these occurrences had to be connected and were part of a new scenario. In the meantime strategic planners in Western capitals, particularly those of major world powers, were exploring their options for a desired outcome in Macedonia. And, naturally they did everything in their power to influence the processes to go their way, in accordance with their own long-term interests. So, at the time, Macedonia was flooded with spies and secret agents who were fully engaged in working for their country’s interests and certainly no money was spared to achieve their goals. Unfortunately, much of what had happened in that time is still unknown to us to this day (2013).

Looking at this problem from the inside out, the Albanians in Macedonia had no real capacity for such geo-strategic planning and coordinating steps for such boycotts, paramilitaries and “Illyrida’s”. So, there is no doubt that their actions in Macedonia were part of broader international logistics. Bombing Serbia and creating an independent Kosovo eliminates any doubt and confirms our suspicions that the Albanians were helped from the outside. Please read on.

9.2. Now, at the end of 2013, new and “most secret” information is emerging that the United States was present in Kosovo before the Yugoslav collapse. According to some sources, the reason was to monitor and, if possible, to influence the situation in Albania. If that is true, then it becomes possible that the U.S. did participate in the events that began to unfold in Kosovo during the 1960’s? All events that took place ending with Kosovo’s independence, through demonstrations and fictional propaganda of pupils’ poisoning... objectively speaking, were not possible without “foreign aid”. Was the U.S. involved in the “Kosovo Project” from the beginning, from 50 years ago? This needs to be further investigated.

II – The U.S.A. immediately recognized all new countries except Macedonia

1. Three federations broke up during the early 1990’s. They were the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. From their decomposition, a short time afterwards, 22 new fully independent states emerged and 20 of them sought to enter the international political scene. With the exception of Macedonia, they were all immediately recognized by the world’s major factors. No other new country was opposed except for Macedonia.

1.1. On December 25, 1991, the day the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States recognized the 14 new countries that emerged from it. About three months later, in March 1992, the U.S.A. opened embassies and sent ambassadors to the capitals of all of them. The Russian Federation, by agreement, secured status for the successor state of the USSR and as a result they did not need to be recognized. Moscow also assumed all the debt for the entire Soviet Union.

1.2. January 1, 1993, the day Czechoslovakia dissolved, Washington recognized both new emerging states, the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Very soon afterwards, Washington opened an embassy in Bratislava.

2. Because of the deep political crisis that the Yugoslav federation was experiencing during its breakup, and because there was confrontation between the republics regarding the future of that country, Yugoslavia’s breakup was much more complicated. Unlike Moscow and Prague, where the breakup was executed by agreement, nothing was harmonized in Belgrade. This naturally caused confrontation between the republics and resulted in wars breaking out. The ensuing wars produced many casualties, including millions of refugees and enormous destruction... The main culprit, of course, was Milosevich, followed closely by Croatian (Tudjman) nationalism and Slovenian selfishness (Kuchan), which certainly also played a role. The main victims were Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina still bear part of the blame for the war that followed. Montenegro fully supported Serbia’s policy and remained with Serbia and because Serbia was the inheritor of Yugoslavia, it did not need or ask for recognition.

3. In late 1991, while Yugoslavia was disintegrating, the European Community (EC), (forerunner to the European Union), formed the so-called “Badenter Commission”, consisting of five presidents and judges of constitutional courts from European countries. Their task was to investigate each of the new countries and identify for the EC if they passed a certain set of criteria which would qualify them to be recognized by the EC. The Commission was led by Robert Badenter, President of the Constitutional Court of France. Also included in the Commission was Roman Herzog who later became president of Germany (1994 - 1999). Such a report was also compiled on Macedonia in which the Commission recommended that Macedonia be immediately recognized. In fact, from all the resultant countries from the Yugoslav breakup only Macedonia and Slovenia qualified and were recommended for recognition.

4. Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia early, in December 1991. This was contrary to the Badenter Commission’s proposal which was to be released at the beginning of January, 1992. There was an agreement reached in Brussels that recognition of post-Yugoslav states was to be done on January 15, 1992. But during a meeting, from extreme pressure from Germany (through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frantz Dietrich Genscher) the EC too recognized Slovenia and Croatia and immediately opened diplomatic relations with them. Brussels ignored the Badenter Commission’s recommendations and Macedonia was left out unrecognized and empty-handed.

5. Soon afterwards, on April 7, 1992, the United States recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then a few months later, in August 1992, the U.S. established diplomatic relations with all three countries and immediately dispatched its ambassadors. Because of the war, the American embassy for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the beginning was located in Vienna. Later it was moved to Sarajevo. Macedonia was not on the American list for countries to recognize.

In April, 1992, under pressure from the U.S., the EC recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6. It is important at this point for us to have a comparative look at American attitudes towards Bosnia and Herzegovina versus those towards Macedonia.

6.1. By any estimate the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extreme. The people of Bosnia, Muslims, Croats and Serbs, even though the Serbs were first to start causing problems, all must bear blame for the start of the war that followed. It is a fact that all political factors were deeply involved in confrontations with each other (on both ethnic and religious grounds) and that was the reason why the war was inevitable. Despite all this the U.S. still recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina and sent its ambassador.

6.2. But when it came to Macedonia, the U.S. did the opposite. It ignored all peaceful steps, compromises, cooperation, flexibility and all other valuable contributions the Macedonian government demonstrated in order to prevent a war at home and to avoid the escalation of conflict in the region. And what was Macedonia’s reward? Certain isolation! Isolation that began then and has continued to this day! Two decades later Washington still puts up obstacles, delivers ultimatums and uses blackmail to hinder Macedonia from functioning like a normal state. In parallel, the U.S. did everything in its power to bring down Milosevich’s forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, the Americans did everything in their power to make sure that Bosnia survived. In the meantime, they were doing everything in their power to push Macedonia down a slippery slope. Two quite different and opposing policies for two post Yugoslav republics! Why?

7. Unfortunately, early American recognition did not help Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary! There are some who will argue that American recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina made the situation worse and accelerated the war. It is possible that some of the opposing political forces in Sarajevo interpreted the recognition as an act of provocation because there was no agreement on the future of the country. The Serbs were absolutely against Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence. Supported by the JNA, irregular Serbian troops occupied 2/3 of Bosnia’s territory and carried out ethnic cleansing soon after the recognition. Over two million people were forced to leave their homes and over 200,000 died in the war that followed.

7.1. The U.S., most likely, wanted to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina from Milosevich and that was its reason for the quick and early recognition. But, according to Badenter, the country failed to meet even the minimum requirements for recognition. In that respect, the recognition did not deliver on its objectives. U.S. recognition did not hinder Milosevich’s plans and it is unknown, to us, if the recognition, and to which extent, influenced further development of events, which is very likely. But someone else will have to answer this question.

8. The main international actors, led by the U.S., left only Macedonia unrecognized as an independent state. They left it unprotected. Serbia and Montenegro remained in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the successor of the old federation international recognition was not necessary. Re-admission into the United Nations came in 2000.

9. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, an early recognition of Macedonia by the U.S. would have stabilized the situation in the country and in the surrounding region. If Macedonia was recognized, then Mitsotakis, Samaras and Milosevich would not have had discussions about dividing it. Age-old Bulgarian appetites to make Macedonia Bulgarian would not have had a future. Albanian aspirations would have been curbed... and the Albanians would have behaved differently towards Macedonia. They would have not gone against official U.S. policy, highlighted by the recognition of Macedonia. But the U.S. decided to leave Macedonia wide open… it undertook nothing to help. There can only be one reason for this: “different interests”.

10. The period from 1991 to 1993 was extremely difficult for Macedonia. It was financially bankrupt (before the breakup Serbia and Slovenia had virtually robbed the financial system), economically drained (with huge inflation, mainly generated by Belgrade), left in a security vacuum (the JNA when it withdrew took the entire armament stationed in Macedonia) and threatened by its neighbours (who were making arrangements for its division)... So, in place of giving it its support, if for no other reason than for being the only successor of Yugoslavia to behave peacefully, Washington, supported by Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels, left Macedonia in the lurch. Why?

11. In the meantime some states began to recognize Macedonia. On January 15, 1992 Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia. Immediately afterwards Sofia started to hesitate and did not establish diplomatic relations. They missed the opportunity to score some points. There were some calculations regarding Macedonia’s future upon which Bulgaria wanted to capitalize. What if Macedonia did not survive? Where would the “sheep”, who had not yet realized that they were “Bulgarians”, go? According to Bulgarian logic, the simple act of recognizing Macedonia was like recognizing a second “Bulgarian” state.