Introduction - Part 07

of self-arming. With a little bit of skill on weapons manufacture, learned from the Armenian Revolutionaries, IMRO set up a number of munitions factories in remote and secluded areas, capable of producing homemade bombs and other explosives. Unfortunately, in 1900 during a raid at one of these factories, Dame Gruev was arrested by the Ottoman authorities and imprisoned in Bitola. He came back to active duty in April 1903. In spite of all efforts made to obtain them, the Macedonian "Cheti" lacked arms but had plenty of courage to make up for it, which in time put fear in the Ottoman hearts. As IMRO grew beyond its ideological stage, it began to recruit, equip and train fighters. Volunteers were recruited mainly from the villages, young men who were willing to fight for their freedom. Those who were in trouble with the law (brigands) were armed and recruited into active duty. Those were men who flourished by attacking Ottomans and stealing from them. They were admired for their courage and ability to live free. They were men who practiced the art of war, knew how to live in the open, how to ambush and how to hide. They were the men who taught the young Macedonian recruits to fight and win. The rest were reservists and lived at home, only called to duty as required. Each reservist was expected to purchase and secure his own rifle and ammunition. Recruitment was carried out in utmost secrecy. Even women were enlisted in the Macedonian revolution, but their role was limited to cooking, washing, mending and nursing the wounded. The primary role of a fighter was to defend the people from the Ottomans and brigand attacks. The Cheti consisted of about five to ten men, organized for rapid mobilization and quick response. The goal was to have one Cheta responsible for one village (preferably their own) in all of Macedonia. The leader of each Cheta was chosen for his abilities to lead his men, and more so, for the peoples' confidence in him to protect their village. To respond quickly, the Cheta had to be familiar with the village's terrain and escape routes. To maintain secrecy, all orders were given by word of mouth. The IMRO mobilization managed to elude the Ottoman authorities for a long time. However an unfortunate discovery of some explosives accidentally uncovered the secret and led the Ottoman militia on wide "search and destroy” missions. The militia's conduct, unfortunately, was less than honourable when the soldiers began torturing innocent people and burning properties in order to obtain confessions. The Cheta's responsibility was to ambush the militia, using guerrilla tactics, before they entered villages and prevent them from doing harm. This, however, did not

always work so some of the Cheta Chiefs resorted to retaliations and reprisals for crimes already committed. Although poorly armed and vastly under-manned (sometimes as low as 1 Macedonian for 10 Ottomans), the Cheti fought fierce battles and gained legendary reputations among both the Ottomans and the Macedonians. Unfortunately, as the Ottoman authorities became aware of IMRO's intentions the Ottoman militias began to swell up with soldiers. If that was not enough, at about the same time the Exarchate, suspecting IMRO affiliation, began to dismiss Macedonian teachers en masse. Even though most Macedonian teachers despised working for the Exarchate, they used the schools as a means of promoting IMRO's aims. They frequently gave lectures, taught Macedonian patriotic songs, canvassed house to house etc. This was a blow to IMRO. A more severe blow however, came in April of 1897 in what was termed the "Goluchowski-Muraviev Agreement". This was an agreement drawn up by Tsar Nikolas II of Russia and Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria regarding the future of the remainder of the Ottoman Empire. In part, the agreement stated that, at some future time the Macedonian territory would be divided equally between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. In other words, when the Great Powers got their fill of the Ottoman Empire and abandoned it, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria were welcome to take their turn. This indeed was bad news and, as history showed, was devastating for IMRO and disastrous for the Macedonian people. In about 1898 the Bulgarian Exarchate, instructed by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, created a Vrhovist organization inside Macedonia. Based in Solun, known as the "Revolutionary Brotherhood", it in turn began to form its own Cheti. While pretending to be part of IMRO, the purpose of this organization was to carry out terrorist activities and, in the eyes of the world, discredit the real IMRO. By the year 1900 IMRO's enemies were growing in number and intensifying in ferocity. IMRO's woes were just beginning when they discovered that the Vrhovists had dispatched six assassins to murder Delchev and Sandanski (a legendary Cheta chief affectionately known as the "Tsar of Pirin"). The Vrhovist Cheti were raining terror on Macedonian villages provoking the Ottomans to act. Although never proven, it was alleged that the Vrhovist leaders were working with the Ottomans in successfully arresting members of Organization, destroying munitions depots, and torturing, raping and murdering people. Even the Ottomans themselves participated in sabotage tactics. Several Greek spies were killed at one time and IMRO was blamed. As a result of this many organizers were rounded up and arrested.

In reality, however, it was Ottoman Begs who committed the crimes as was later discovered. The same Begs were seen attacking Ottoman tax collectors. Failing to assassinate Delchev and Sandanski, the six assassins, in frustration, turned to attacking people, burning down villages, stealing money and claimed it to be the work of IMRO. Several important leaders, including the famous "Marko Lerinski" (the "Tsar of Lerin"), Cheta leader of the Lerin and Kostur Regions, was killed in these attacks. On January 31st, 1903 the Ottomans declared IMRO illegal and sought ways to destroy it. This bad news for IMRO gave the Vrhovists the necessary momentum they needed to become a wedge between those in IMRO, who wanted an immediate uprising and those who believed that an uprising at this point in time was suicidal. Gotse Delchev was against this "willing sacrifice" and was hoping to find a better solution, but time was running out. A second Solun Congress, dominated by the Vrhovists, was staged in February of 1903. Delchev and most of IMRO's loyal supporters did not attend. A resolution was reached, but not ratified by the regional committees, that an uprising would take place on Ilinden, on the 2nd of August 1903. To weaken the Ottomans, the Vrhovists, through anarchists, ordered a number of bombings and terrorist acts. The Solun to Constantinople railway was bombed on March 18th, as was the Solun Ottoman bank a month later. This did not weaken the Ottomans as expected but instead brought more Ottoman troops into Macedonia and further escalated the violence against innocent civilians. If that was not enough, the sudden rise in violence against Ottoman institutions was not well received by European investors and businessmen, who saw Ottoman Macedonia as a safe place to invest. The few lonely voices in London, calling for Macedonian support, were quickly drowned out by the many voices of discontent calling for the demise of the terrorists. Tragically the Ottomans killed Gotse Delchev in Banitsa on May 4th, 1903, a day after the IMRO Smilevo Congress had started. Termed the Bitola Congress, the purpose of the Smilevo Congress was to review the resolutions from the Vrhovist dominated Solun Congress, held earlier the same year. Damjan Gruev (a native of Smilevo) chaired the Congress and tried hard to present the situation realistically by arguing for and against an early uprising. When the matter was put to a vote, however, the majority declared themselves in favour of an uprising. With these words, "better an end with horrors than horrors without end", Gruev also voted in support of the Ilinden rebellion. From here on there was no turning back. A general

staff was elected with Gruev as one of three heads (the other two were Boris Sarafov and Atanas Lozanchev) and preparations for the uprising began. In due time plans were made, a military strategy prepared, weapons, medical supplies and food-stuffs were requisitioned and stock piled. Cheti were organized and training drills were performed. On July 26th, 1903, by a dispatch to the Great Powers via the British vice-consul in Bitola, the General Staff formally announced the uprising. Then on July 28th, 1903 IMRO dispatched mounted couriers to all the sub-districts with the message "let the uprising begin". On the same day the General Staff informed the Ottoman Director of Railways to warn travelers to choose a different mode of transportation in order to avoid being hurt.

The Ilinden 1903 Macedonian Uprising and the Aftermath

Following Damjan Gruev's orders from Smilevo, the village Cheti combined forces to form the following: the Smilevo and Gjavato Region Cheta (650), the Krushovo Region Cheta (400), the Kichevo Region Cheta (350), the Bitola Region Cheta (250), the Ohrid Region Cheta (880), the Resna Region Cheta (450), the Demir-Hisar Region Cheta (420), the Prespa Region Cheta (300), the Kostur Region Cheta (700) and the Lerin Region Cheta (450). The Cheti, under the command of capable leaders such as Damjan Gruev, Vasil Chakalarov, Petar Pop Arsov, Pitu Guli and others, faired well and enjoyed considerable success in the few weeks before the Ottoman militia began to amass. The local villagers also joined the movement giving moral support to the fighters. Even men from others regions that had not yet risen left their homes and came to fight. All in all the Macedonian people possessed the will to fight but lacked the rifles and ammunition with which to do it. When the rebellion began, as a precaution, most villages were evacuated. People who left the villages took up residence in secluded places up in the mountains. They took with them whatever they could carry and set up camp. Temporary shelters were constructed from tree branches and were covered with vegetation. They fenced their livestock, out of sight, in wooded areas. They even built underground ovens to cook food and bake bread in safety. Some villages that didn’t join the rebellion felt it was unnecessary to evacuate because they posed no threat to the Ottomans. Residents of one such village, Neokazi near Lerin, stayed home thinking they would be safe. When the Ottoman militia passed by they razed the village and turned on the civilian population. Not being satisfied with just burning the village, the Ottomans summoned about 60 Macedonian men and placed them under arrest. On their way to Lerin the Ottomans, instead of taking the men to jail, tortured and massacred them in cold blood. Eyewitnesses reported observing the Ottomans lining the men up in rows and firing at them to see how many one bullet could kill. They had new rifles and wanted to test them. Three days later it was Armensko's turn. After losing a skirmish to Chakalarov, Haireddin Bimbishi's (the butcher of Smrdesh) troops, defeated, angry and embittered were heading for Lerin when they came across a welcoming committee at Armensko. The priest and other

members of the village went out to greet and welcome the Ottomans. The Ottomans were not pleased and murdered the welcoming committee on the spot. Bambishi's men then turned on the defenseless village and pillaged, burned and satisfied their brutal lust undisturbed. Sixty-eight villagers were massacred and ten women and eight girls were violated. "Several women who managed to crawl out of their burning houses were afterwards caught as they lay dying, and violated repeatedly until they expired." (Page 160, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future, taken from Page 319 of the "Blue Book") The Ottoman soldiers had orders to burn down all empty villages, a sure sign that they belonged to the families of insurgents, and to spare the rest. As it turned out those who didn't join the rebellion and didn't want trouble not only lost their homes but some even lost their lives. It was a choice between having your village burned or having it burned and being massacred as well. It was a hard lesson learned but it didn't help the sick and bedridden who were burned alive where they lay. As battles raged on throughout western Macedonia, the Cheti put down most of the local Ottoman garrisons. They destroyed bridges, railway lines and communications centers, captured most chifliks and briefly liberated some regions such as Kichevo, Demir-Hisar, Kostur, Lerin, Klisoura and Neveska. The cities of Kostur and Lerin themselves were not liberated. The most successful and highly celebrated of all battles was the storming of the town of Krushevo. Nikola Karev led the Cheti in the attack and defeated the local Ottoman garrison with ease. The Macedonians quickly took over the most strategic points like the Post Office, Town Hall and local Police Station and declared Krushevo liberated. True to their democratic commitments, the leaders of the liberating force constituted the Krushevo assembly which appointed a committee of sixty members, twenty from each of the community's Macedonian, Vlach and Albanian populations. The committee in turn elected an executive body of six delegates, two from each community, which operated as a provisional government. The government in turn established a financial, judiciary and police force. "At Krushevo, under the rays of temporary liberty, fraternity and equality, national hatreds were dispelled and peace and concord reigned. For ten whole days Krushevo lived as a little independent state, and although in miniature, clothed with flesh and blood that idea which spurred Macedonians to fight, against tyranny up to the Ilinden rising." (Page 193, Vasil Bogov, Macedonian Revelation, Historical Documents Rock and Shatter Modern Political Ideology)

The "Krushevo Republic", unfortunately, only lasted ten days but it was a glorious Republic that will forever remind the Macedonian people of their eternal struggle for independence and thirst for freedom. The liberation of Krushevo imprinted on the new Macedonian generations the legacy of a timeless and irreversible march towards self-determination. IMRO came a long way from a group of academics deliberating what to do in the face of repression to delivering, in true revolutionary fashion, a democratic Republic with all the socialist trimmings. Here again we see the Macedonian desire for multiculturalism and for a new multiethnic society waiting to resurface. The Republic was constituted on a multiracial basis in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the Macedonian people. Next to Krushevo, Kostur faired second best in the tactical mobilization of the Cheti, under the command of Lazar Pop Trajkov and Vasil Chakalarov. These brigades staged successful raids, liberating Klisura and Neveska, then returned southward and, with the support of over three thousand villagers, attacked Kostur but without success. In the meantime other Cheti attacked and liberated Ohrid, which remained free for almost three months. The Ohrid attack was the most successful in terms of advance planning and administering the establishment of medical aid, underground workshops, secret bakeries and securing foodstuffs. Ohrid later became the center for establishing refugee camps for many displaced persons. Uprisings outside of western Macedonia were limited to swift guerilla actions consisting mostly of attacks against Ottoman institutions, bombings of railway lines and the occasional skirmish with the Ottoman militia. Many Cheti were successful in capturing important Ottoman officials. They hoped to construct dialogue for prospective negotiations but, in actuality, met with little success. Vrhovist involvement, as expected, was minimal during the uprising and brought to light, once again, the true nature of Vrhovism (Macedonia for the Bulgarians). As the Cheti fought gallantly putting down garrison after garrison in the larger towns, many of the smaller villages were left unprotected and open to Bashi-bazouk and Ottoman militia attacks. Keeping in mind the Neokrazi and Armensko incidents, many of the Cheta chiefs felt compelled to return home to repel such attacks. Due to this and the fact that the numerically superior Ottoman militia overpowered the Cheti, in the short term, a large-scale operation against the Ottomans never

materialized. Unfortunately, as time passed so did the opportunity for a decisive strike, as an even larger Ottoman force was amassing. The initial success of the rebellion was a surprise to the Ottomans especially since Ottoman forces were numerically superior to those of the rebels. The Cheti, however, demonstrated their abilities in battle and more than matched the numbers with will. The Ottomans, unfortunately, were determined to put down the rebellion and amassed additional forces, deploying a total of 167,000 infantry, 3,700 cavalry and 440 pieces of artillery (all cannons). Krushevo alone was surrounded by 20,000 Ottoman troops with 18 cannons against an encircled force of no more than 1,200 rebel fighters. The battle to retake Krushevo began on August 12th with the Macedonians crying out "Sloboda ili Smrt" (liberty or death) against the onslaught of Ottoman cannon fire. Pitu Guli and his men fought gallantly. They provided stiff opposition to the Ottoman advance but were no match for General Baktiar Pasha. Baktiar was a skilled war veteran who overwhelmed the Cheti by attacking the entire region simultaneously. The region was surrounded by soldiers, encircled by cannon fire and every Macedonian stronghold within was attacked simultaneously, cutting off all reinforcements and outside support. Once Krushevo fell, one by one other IMRO strongholds began to yield, winding down the ten-week-old rebellion. In Krushevo, Baktiar Pasha allowed his troops to kill, pillage and rape for three days. The town was permanently devastated with 117 civilians murdered, 150 women raped and 159 houses burned. In the Ilinden aftermath, according to Radin, in total 4,694 civilians were murdered, 3,122 women raped, 12,440 houses burned, 201 villages razed, 75,835 people left homeless and about 30,000 people left the country for good, becoming permanent refugees. (Page 105, IMRO and the Macedonian Question) Besides the atrocities committed against the civilian population in Macedonia, the most significant impact of the uprising was the loss of so many great IMRO leaders. To preserve whatever they could from a failing rebellion, IMRO turned its attention to diplomacy. In September 1903 Pere Toshev, of IMRO, took a trip to Constantinople to elicit some guarantees from official representatives of the Great Powers. Toshev's only request was that Macedonia be given a Christian governor. Unfortunately, his request was rejected in favour of the status quo. Later, however, when statistics of Ottoman atrocities started pouring in, the Great Power attitude softened a little. In October the Great Powers reconsidered Toshev's request, but

instead of appointing a Christian governor each nation agreed to send a small "peace-keeping" force. This did not help the Macedonian position at all. In fact it hindered IMRO from self-defense initiatives even against Bashi-bazouk attacks. Ottoman atrocities committed against the Macedonian villages, in the eyes of the world, created bad publicity for the Ottomans and for their allies, the Western Powers. As a result, Ottoman popularity started to decline and so did Ottoman favour with the Great Powers. Being financially strapped and having its hands tied, the Ottomans turned to their neighbours for assistance. By declaring Macedonia a "multi-interest zone" and inviting armed propaganda from Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, to counter IMRO insurgence, the Ottomans were hoping to turn the tide of the rebellion in their favour. Again Great Power inaction put Macedonia and the Macedonian people in peril. At the end of August, after the fall of Krushevo, Nasir Pasha was appointed to take over command from Omar Rushdi Pasha. Rushdi was blamed for the flare up of the rebellion and Nasir was chosen to put an end to it. Nasir Pasha was a favourite of the Sultan, who spoke German and was considered civilized by many who had high hopes for a quick end to the rebellion. Unfortunately, Nasir's plans involved the burning of ALL revolting villages and quickly cornering and rounding up all those doing the revolting. He certainly had the "right men" with the "right courage" to execute such a barbaric plan. Unfortunately, Nasir Pasha's plan did not involve pursuing the Cheti. "...The regiments which should have been pursuing the insurgents found it more agreeable and interesting to pillage the defenseless villagers and make war on the women and children." (Page 155, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future) Nasir Pasha's strategy forced IMRO and the Cheti to rethink their plans and change tactics. Henceforth, organized Cheti attacks on the Ottomans subsided and the Cheti regrouped to take up defensive positions. Concerned for their families and villages, some of the Cheti broke up and returned to defend their own homes. After that fighting became disorderly and on November 2nd, 1903 the insurrection was declared at an end. According to Brailsford, the Cheti fought about 150 battles in total with 746 casualties, which amounted to about 15 % of the total fighting force. In most of these encounters the Cheti were outnumbered by at least 10 Ottomans to 1 Macedonian. (Page 155, Macedonia its Races and their Future) Before it was all over, the Ottomans were attacking everywhere, even in secluded areas that once were beyond militia reach. To save

themselves, many civilians resorted to camping among the fighters and even following them in wild battles. Their only safety was to be with the Cheti. "…Sometimes the battle raged about the lair where the women and children lay, the men fighting with all their manhood to defend some shallow trench, knowing that behind them cowered wife and child expecting massacre if their courage failed or their bullets missed the mark." (Page 162, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future) "The young women fared the worst, for, when the troops (Ottomans) could catch them, they were often carried off to the Ottoman camps and there kept for some days until the last brute who desired them had had his will." (Page 163, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future) Many of the young girls who survived returned to their village. Instead of finding a home they found abandoned ruins and again fell prey to prowling soldiers or marauding Bashi-bazouks. The Ilinden rebellion had no happy ending for Macedonia. The Macedonian people lost their bid for freedom and paid the ultimate price. Henry Brailsford in his book, Macedonia its Races and their Future, describes the Ilinden aftermath in some detail by providing specific accounts of some of the worst horrors perpetrated. Brailsford was an aid worker inside Macedonia during the conflict and was witness to some of the accounts in his book. The book is worth reading, as long as you keep in mind that when he talks about Bulgarians and Greeks he means Macedonians who belonged to the Exarchate or Patriarchate Church. The Macedonian rebellion did not succeed because there were too many factors working against it. The Macedonian people showed will and determination and rose to the task in spite of all odds. Compared to the Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian rebellions, the Macedonians were the most determined, well organized and most desperate, but they were not ready. The Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians had only one enemy, the Ottomans, but received a lot of help from friends in high places (the Great Powers). In contrast, no one beyond the Macedonians wanted the Macedonians to succeed. The Greeks and especially the Bulgarians went out of their way to create obstacles. The Great Powers, believing that they had nothing to gain, also abstained from helping Macedonia. The Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian struggles for independence prepared the Ottomans and made them more determined to deal with the Macedonians. "The Turks had made war upon the women and children, and the men dared not prolong the unequal conflict with starvation." (Page 163, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future)

When the conflict was over, the people who returned to their villages were devastated to find their homes destroyed. Added to all their ills, winter was fast approaching and no food or shelter was to be found. "The villages were mere heaps of charred wood and blackened stone, buried beneath a red dust which the rain converted to mud. A few walls still stood upright, the only hope for the winter." (Page 164, Brailsford, Macedonia its Races and their Future) To make matters worse, a curfew was placed on travel and those away from home found themselves stranded. Those in need of work were no longer allowed to leave their vilayets. This was the first time in Macedonian history that Macedonians ever considered permanent emigration. Many early Macedonian emigrants to Canada, the USA and Australia were refugees from the Ilinden aftermath. The failed uprising, loss of so many great IMRO leaders, the Ottoman backlash and now the foreign influence was too much for IMRO. The close links with the villages and the ideological differences between isolated IMRO branches widened. Although IMRO continued to live, it lacked direction and was on the verge of an ideological collapse. In time, however, it managed to muster two more congresses. With the advent of Krste Misirkov’s book, a new tide of opinion was spreading throughout Macedonia. Misirkov warned against falling under the influence of the chauvinistic elements and recommended taking a more nationalistic approach in order to weed out Vrhovist and conservative elements. At the Prilep Congress held in May 1904, IMRO was re-vitalized and its independence reasserted (this time with a socialist character). The most significant developments to emerge from this Congress were IMRO's ability to shed itself of its conservative elements and to adopt a resolution to decentralize the organization and give more power to the sub-districts. This Congress literally split IMRO into two ideologically polarized halves. While leftist IMRO adopted a defensive strategy, the right wing conservative Vrhovists pursued a policy of renewed confrontation. The two factions continued to masquerade under the same banner and were headed for a showdown. The showdown materialized in November of 1905, at the Rila Monastery near the Macedonian-Bulgarian border and took the form of a General Congress. There was a single item of paramount importance on the agenda, to determine the direction of the Organization. Twenty-two elected delegates, in total, attended the Rila Congress and by secret vote the left came out victorious. Defeated at the Rila Congress, the Right wing Vrhovists took up permanent residence in Sofia and continued to wage a terrorist war on the

IMRO leadership. Both Nikola Karev, in 1905, and Dame Gruev, in 1906, were indirectly eliminated by terrorist acts of the Vrhovists. Bulgarian interference in Macedonia not only damaged the revolutionary movement but also put fear in the civilian population, ripening conditions for Balkan intervention. Greece and later Serbia were quick to take advantage of a weak IMRO and a frightened population. With the assistance of the Ottoman military they were able to step up armed propaganda campaigns inside Macedonia. The aim was to kill two birds with one stone. By being the eyes and ears of the Ottomans, the Greek clergy spied on the Macedonians and disclosed information to Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman military in turn, stepped up activities to eradicate the remnants of the Cheti and their leaders. At the same time, in the midst of terror, the same Greek spies were offering Macedonians Hellenism as a way to salvation. "No one can deny that the Greeks owed much to the Ottomans. Indeed the victory of the Ottomans in 1903 was the salvation of Hellenism in Macedonia. From the outset the Greek clergy and notables devised means of passing information to the Turks. The Ottoman authorities on their side welcomed this support." (Pages 118-119, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913) The ultimate disgrace for Karavangelis came after the massacre of the village Zagoricheni. Refusing to bend to Hellenism, Zagoricheni, on direct orders from Karavangelis, was massacred to the last person the Greeks could lay their hands on, including the unborn children inside the wombs of pregnant women. Witnesses reported finding bodies of pregnant women with their abdomens cut open. The survivors who escaped the atrocity refused to bury the dead bodies of their neighbours. For days the dead were guarded until the European consuls in Bitola came to witness the atrocities for themselves. Here is what Brailsford had to say. "The chef d'oevre of this Hellenic campaign was achieved at Zagoricheni, a large Bulgarian village (author's note: Macedonian village, there were no Bulgarian villages inside Macedonia) near Klissoura, which, like Mokreni, took a leading part in the uprising of 1903, and like Mokreni was burned by the Ottomans. A Greek band, which is said to have numbered over two hundred men under three Greek officers in uniform, surprised it by night (April 6-7, 1905) by using bugle calls which led the villagers to suppose that Ottoman regulars were manoeuvering in the neighbourhood. They burned ten houses, and twenty-eight of the temporary homes erected amid the ruins of the last conflagration. They wounded seven persons and killed no less than sixty, among them seven women, twenty-two persons over

sixty years of age, and five children under fifteen. There was a good deal of evidence to show that the local Ottoman authorities were privy to this massacre, and some circumstances seemed to include the Archbishop of Castoria (Kostur). It is quite clear that no conflict or provocation preceded what was simply a deliberate massacre, and the only reason for choosing Zagoricheni was that it was an eager and patriotic Bulgarian center, and that it disobeyed the summons of the Greek Archbishop to return to the Patriarch fold." (Pages 216-217, Macedonia its Races and their Future) After the massacre when it was discovered that Karavangelis was implicated, to escape punishment, the cowardly Archbishop of Kostur fled to Sveta Gora (Holy Mountain) where he spent two years in hiding before fleeing to Austria. Today, there is a statue of Karavangelis in Kostur to commemorate his great contributions to Hellenism. Macedonians were well acquainted with the murderous activities of the Bulgarian Vrhovists whose new waves of terrorist bands began to penetrate the eastern borders of Macedonia in March of 1904. Fortunately, Yane Sandanski's forces were still in control of the Pirin district and more often than not, successfully repealed Bulgarian advances. In the west bands of young Turks, who deserted the army during the Ilinden rebellion, joined Albanian gangs, looting and killing indiscriminately. From the north Serbian bands began to penetrate Macedonian territory. By mid 1905, there were eleven bands numbering almost 100 men pillaging, murdering, razing entire villages and wreaking their own special brand of terror. The most violent campaign was waged by the Greek terrorists who penetrated the south-central regions of Macedonia. By 1905 the Greeks imported a contingent of Cretans, a thousand-strong, reinforced by Ottoman deserters who roamed unhindered razing and slaughtering entire villages. By 1906 eight bands numbering over 400 men were operating in the Solun district alone and another twelve bands (600 men) around Bitola. Along with the intrusions of armed bands in Macedonia there reappeared the foreign schools and propaganda institutions directed by the Greek and Bulgarian churches. The terrorist bands instilled fear in the Macedonian population and the churches were quick to take on the role of protector, setting the stage for the partitioning of Macedonia. Unfortunately for them, something else was brewing within the Ottoman Empire, liberalism, headed by a small group of European educated, young Turks. The Western Powers had little faith in the Ottomans and their old Ottoman conservative Islamic values but preferred the status quo

maintained in Macedonia. There were two factors at play that hindered the Powers from taking action. The first was the lucrative Ottoman import-export markets upon which the Ottoman consumer was dependent for a variety of goods, and a moneymaking venture for the Western Capitalists which they did not want to lose. The second was the power struggle between the Great Powers themselves over Balkan domination. The Powers were locked in a diplomatic embrace where none could freely maneuver without upsetting the others. Each of the Great Powers knew that a sudden or massive shift in any one’s policies would result in an engagement that would involve all of them. No one wanted a “world war” on his hands. Britain, at one point, contemplated creating an autonomous Macedonia but knew that Russia and Austria would be against it. “It was fortunate for Greece at this juncture that Lansdowne’s plans foundered in a sea of European politics and that both Russia and Austria opposed Macedonian autonomy.” (Page 152, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913).

The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 and Macedonia’s Partition

The “Balkan League of Nations” consisting of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia and Montenegro was spawned in June 1912 and shortly after the Ottomans were given a signed ultimatum bearing the League’s signature, which in short read, “deliver the promised reforms in Macedonia or prepare to be invaded”. There was much intrigue, agreements, counter-agreements and secret deals between the League of Nations (Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia) but from the outset each was determined to exploit any situation that developed, purely for its own gain. “The League of Nations in fact was simply a device for synchronizing a military effort upon the part of the four powers (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) who had come to realize that the simplest way to settle the Ottoman question, before it was too late and while circumstances were favourable, was to attack the Ottoman Empire simultaneously and present the European powers with a fait accompli.” (Page 440, Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913) All that remained now was to provoke the Ottomans into committing an offence against the Christian population and the invasion would become a reality. When the Ottomans investigated disturbances conducted by Vrhovist bands, both Patriarchist and Exarchist authorities corroborated their stories and pinned these acts on the Macedonians. As expected the Ottomans responded swiftly and dealt with the situation in the usual manner. Unfortunately for the Ottomans their actions were welcome news to the League’s spies who dispatched them to the European press. The Ottomans, in the eyes of the world, committed atrocities against the Christians in Macedonia and something had to be done. It was now up to the Great Powers to decide the course of action. Along with documents of Ottoman atrocities, the foreign press also received well-camouflaged League propaganda. The League had commenced extensive propaganda campaigns against the Ottomans, detailing every Ottoman act for European consumption. A war was imminent but, according to the League’s propaganda, it was a necessary war to “liberate” the enslaved Christians from Ottoman oppression. The League, through extensive media campaigns, called on all Christians in Macedonia to join the League and oust the oppressive Ottoman. Here is what Yane Sandanski had to say; “We ought to work on the awakening of the consciousness of the Macedonian masses that they are an independent

nation...because those who seek to ‘liberate them’... will actually be coming to enslave them...” (Page 134, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question) As mentioned earlier, the Western Powers had not exhausted the full potential of the Ottoman markets and were unwilling to let the Ottoman regime in Macedonia collapse. At the same time Britain, France, Italy and Russia were greatly concerned about the aggressive attitudes of Germany outside of the Balkans. More importantly, they were concerned that the Ottoman regime was leaning towards an Ottoman-German alliance. When Russia proposed the idea of a “Balkan League of Nations” it was welcome news for Britain, France and Italy. The League was viewed as an anti-German front, a way of ejecting the Ottoman regime from Europe and at the same time, safeguarding (British, French and Italian) interests and expansionary ambitions. The not so obvious Russian motive for sponsoring the League was to guarantee its own influence in the Balkans perhaps through Serbia or Bulgaria or both. On October 18th, 1912 Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire with the League following suit. The battles that ensued were fought almost entirely on Macedonian soil, once again causing the Macedonians to suffer from someone else’s war. Russia, the architect of the Balkan League, was against a war in 1912 and so were France and Britain. A war at this point might throw off the delicate diplomatic balance and escalate into a “world war”. Russia feared that the half-millennium old Ottoman Empire might not be as easy a target as the League had estimated. Britain and France feared a backlash from Germany and Austria now that the Ottomans were warming up to them as prospective allies. To stop the League’s aggressive actions, both Britain and France threatened them with economic sanctions but that was not enough to suppress the appetites of the three hungry Balkan wolves. The League’s plan was to surround the Ottoman army in Macedonia and force it out to Constantinople. To everyone’s surprise, however, the League won a crushing and unexpected victory in just six weeks. Five Ottoman divisions were surrounded and defeated in two battles, in Bitola and Kumanovo. With the exception of Sandanski and a force of 400 Macedonians who fought back and liberated Melnik and Nevrokop, the League received no opposition from the Macedonians. In fact, the enthusiasm created by the “liberators” not only helped the League fight harder but also encouraged thousands of Macedonians to enlist in the League’s armies. “A Macedonian Militia force of 14,000 fought under the

Bulgarian command in the East. The ‘Volunteer regiment’, directed by IMRO veterans, consisted of a thousand Macedonians, Ottomans and Albanians. In the Serbian and Greek armies, Macedonian detachments such as the ‘National Guard’ and the ‘Holy Band’, were given the task of encircling the Ottomans to fight their retreat.” (Page 143, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question) Even Chakalarov, the protector of the Lerin and Kostur regions, joined the fight to help the League get rid of the Ottomans. The League’s victories and intense propaganda were so convincing that the entire Macedonian nation welcomed the “liberators” with open arms. The moment the three wolves evicted the Ottoman army from Macedonia, they quickly worked out a partitioning strategy along the following lines: Serbia was to receive the northwestern portion of Macedonia, which included Skopje, Bitola, south to west of Lerin, east to Gevgelija and west to the Albanian Mountains. Bulgaria was to receive all of Thrace, west to Gevgelija, south to the Aegean Sea and east from Solun. Greece was to receive north to Lerin, west to the Albanian Mountains, all of Epirus and east to Solun. “To ensure their hegemony and quell any dissent, the occupying forces set up the apparatus of government and, by legislative decrees, extended their own constitutions to these new bodies, from which Macedonians were absent. Indeed, in many provincial centres, such as Gevgelija, a double or triple condominium was established, much to the detriment of the Macedonian citizens.” (Page 143, Radin, IMRO and the Macedonian Question) In view of the Macedonian contribution to the League’s success in evicting the Ottomans, in December 12th, 1912 Sandanski called for Macedonian autonomy. The League’s occupying armies, however, refused to budge and initiated a violent assimilation program. The Macedonian fighters, who fought side by side with the League’s armies, found themselves policed by a joint League command ensuring that no resistance or independent action would arise. The League also pursued Sandanski and his men. Sandanski resisted and stayed active in the Pirin Region until his assassination in 1915 by Bulgarian agents. The changing conditions inside Macedonia forced the IMRO leadership to seek refuge in foreign cities away from home. Some of the more prominent leaders moved to St. Petersburg and joined the Macedonian community living there. This small group of Macedonians