DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN 1946

DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN 1946

Development of partisan forces and General Markos’s shrewd tactics for keeping the force small

At the beginning of 1946 the CPG and EAM, given the political climate in the country, decided it would be premature to develop the population and amass its forces for an armed resistance, and as such, thousands of experienced ELAS soldiers and officers, as well as CPG members and sympathizers were sent home where they were fiercely persecuted by the new Greek government of Athens.

17 According to a number of analysts after several years of persistently building the Yugoslav unity a crisis developed in the Yugoslav “identity” around 1980. The SFRY national identity began to weaken and was rejected by most of the people living in the SFRY. Macedonia had already gone through similar phases when Bulgaria and Greece refused to recognize the existence of the Macedonian nation. By now it should be obvious that creating a new national identity is not so easily achievable even after many years of trying. What is really surprising about all this is that while the CPG and EAM dismissed/demobilized their experienced fighters, the CPM/CPY created NOF in order to mass mobilize the Macedonian population and prepare the Macedonian people for war. Obviously, this shows that strategy and tactics were being carefully planned by strangers (CPY/CPM) for the Macedonian people’s future.

What is also surprising is that after the CPG dismissed its ELAS fighting force, thus preventing the leftist forces throughout Greece from participating on mass. It later forcibly mobilized those same ELAS fighters in DAG. And, it is no wonder that from the 25,000 partisans forcibly mobilized in DAG’s 50% were Macedonian fighters. The rest were Greeks. That means that out of the Greek population numbering eight million there were no more than 18-20 thousand Greek fighters in DAG. And that out of the Macedonian population numbering three hundred thousand there were about 15-20 thousand Macedonian fighters in DAG, throughout the Greek Civil War period (1946 - 1949).

According to General Zafiropoulos’s research, the partisan forces during 1946 developed according to the following dynamics:

- Until April 1946 950 - May 1,300 - June 2,700 - July 3,500 - August 3,600 - September 4,490 - October 5,930 - November 7,450 - December 9,285

Which means the ratio of government forces to partisan forces was 10:1 and the military armaments were unmatched.

But let us look at the facts:

Markos Vafiadis said to me (Kisavos): “…When I arrived in Belgrade I immediately met comrade Ioannidis in an office where I also met two CPY leaders; Tempo (Vukmanovich) and Rankovich.

They asked me what they needed to do to help us (DAG). I told them that we needed armaments for 18,000 fighters. As soon as Ioannidis heard that (that I was looking for armaments for 18,000), he stood up and said: ‘Markos, are you thinking straight? What are you going to do with all that armament?’ He then said ‘You only need enough to arm 4-5 thousand, not one more…!” (Page 94. Kisavos).

Markos continued:

When I (Kisavos) asked Markos “why did you change the number when you returned from Belgrade back to Greece?” Doctor Sakelariou was there with me. Markos said: “Ioannidis changed my number in Belgrade, Comrade Georgi.”

It is most certain that the number was changed by the Yugoslavs and by Ioannidis and since then Markos gained special sympathy from the Yugoslavs and personally from Tito, which is noticeable to this day. In other words, the CPY and the CPG wanted a small left armed force in Greece. Was this how were they going to win against the Greek government or was this done to get the Macedonians and the communists into trouble?

In his book Kisavos has confirmed that, after returning from Belgrade to his headquarters in Greece, Markos decided to send large numbers of DAG volunteers back to their homes. For example: about 1,500 - 2,000 volunteers were returned home and after their return the enemy mercilessly destroyed them like “dogs”. Kisavos also cites other examples, such the one where Kostas Aridas, Political Committee Secretary of Trikala, returning a large group of volunteers back to their homes. These volunteers had firmly made up their minds that they wanted to fight in the surrounding area of Thessaly. They were prepared to go into the mountains and fight. When they returned home they were all were arrested and shot. (Page 88.)

According to Kisavos, another, more tragic and even shameful event took place:

“When the CPG authorities tried to send home a group of about 250 armed young volunteers from the Kalambaka-Kastrakiou District, the volunteers resisted and on their own initiative, organized themselves into 2-3 companies and decided to fight alone against the enemy government forces during the largest military operations the government army had undertaken.

They were led by Spiros Tsaras from the village Kastraki, Kalambaka. During the fiersest fighting they proved to be excellent fighters without any casualties. But, instead of congratulating them for their bravery, the leadership in Markos’s headquarters scolded them for disobedience and, for a long time, viewed Spiro Tsaras with suspicion.

So, if Markos Vafiadis’s political strategy and tactics were not to arm the resistance movement on mass with experienced ELAS fighters, then where should we look for the logic for this political move? Let us not forget that when Markos was dismissing volunteers while NOF was recruiting Macedonians villagers on mass:

(Moscow - Belgrade - CPG)

(The following facts reveal key moments in NOF’s history - from the military archives: USSR, Yugoslavia and the CPG)

March 20, 1946 - Zahariadis left Athens and went to Prague. He used this trip as an opportunity to discuss his armed struggle in Greece with the communist party leaders and to seek assistance from them. But, as it turned out, he received silence or advice that it was a bad idea to start a war at this point in time and that such a move would be foolish. The most notable leaders, including Torez of France and Toliati of Italy, told him that it was ‘dangerous to resort to arms’ at this point in time. Georgi Dimitrov asserted that ‘the international situation does not allow an outbreak of a new armed conflict, especially one that would directly interfere in the affairs of the Western allies in the Balkans’.

All those leaders knew very well that Zahariadis had returned to Athens in May 1945, after being imprisoned in the Dachau Camp in

Germany for nine years, which had left a strong impression on him and gave him a new attitude towards the world. He returned to Greece on a British plane and, immediately after returning, took up his former duties as CPG Secretary General and began to work.

Zahariadis laid out his Party’s aspiration for the newspaper “Rizospastis” by saying that the CPG “never attempted to seize power against the wishes of the people and he had never had to pursue a course of action against the Trotskyites, anarchists and idiots”.

At the same time the communist party leaders knew that “Aris Viluhiotis” was the “symbol of Greek guerrilla” whom Zahariadis publicly reprimanded by referring to him as an “adventurer” who, with his “reckless behaviour”, prompted the Right to attack the Left. Subsequently, following this, he was expelled from the Party and shortly afterwards was killed by the Right.

But during his meetings in Prague, Zahariadis did receive much information about Marshal Josip Broz Tito who, ‘after his successful guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia, had aims at expanding the revolution all over the Balkans’.

Disappointed by the reception he received in Prague, Zahariadis, on his way back, decided to pay Tito a visit in Belgrade.

Zahariadis was well-received by Tito who communicated with him in Russian and, after toasting him, Tito asked Zahariadis: “What do you think about the future of the Balkans?” To which Zahariadis replied: “Marshall, that’s why I come to you, being urged by many leaders who have much respect for you and for your success with the guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia.” Zahariadis then went into a detailed explanation in regard to the political situation in Greece, emphasizing that the people were ready to fight and take power away from the Anglo-American imperialists.

Unable to hide his excitement, Tito, feeling comfortable being surrounded by his subordinates, Rankovich, Kardelli, Dzhilas, Tempo, Kolishevski and others, said: ‘Life does not go back, it moves forward. Revolutions bring progress in society and develop

productive forces. On behalf of the Communist Party and the people, I promise you extensive assistance and whatever is needed to organize an Army. You know that after World War II, we immediately thought of starting a revolution but even today in Aegean Macedonia the same revolutionary power exists in the citizens of Greece, the Macedonians. They are led by our experienced centres and have a long revolutionary tradition. We are willing to put under your command those forces and the forces available in the Bulkesh Camp.’

Tito then turned to Kolishevski and said: “Lazo, take notes and do everything to bring those forces together under the motto ‘brotherhood and unity’ and put them under the authority of the CPG who it can use in its revolution.”

Here are the notes dictated for Kolishevski by Tito:

a/ NOF and AFZH are to break away from you (CPM) and be attached to the CPG. Do not get involved and do not give mixed orders on how to fight. Do not tell them to fight for a united Macedonia. And of course change their program goals and lead them to accept the CPG program goals;

b/ NOF is to form a central authority that will answer and report to a CPG Regional Committee;

c/ Put the armed Macedonian units in Aegean Macedonia under the command of military officers who are under the command of the CPG.

See how the English and Americans are doing it in Greece.

“But all this Comrade Nikos,” said Tito, “will have to be approved by the old man, Generalissimo Stalin before we can act on such a revolution.’ But Tito already knew that Stalin was in the mood to cause trouble for the capitalists and was sure he would accept Zahariadis’s proposal.

Zahariadis excitedly then said: “I am ready to take this to the Generalissimo and get his approval”.

“I am ready to convey all this to the Generalissimo and ask for his support.”

“Here’s to the future of the revolution!’ said Tito, continuing, “Be determined, not afraid, don’t be afraid of casualties and overcome all difficulties, so you will succeed in your intentions. That’s what a revolution calls for! Grab everything firmly in your hands and, with great certainty, you can count on us!”

* * *

Towards the end of March 1946, after his stay in Yugoslavia, Zahariadis left for Moscow where he had talks with the Soviet leaders. During one of his meetings, Stalin, Molotov and Andrei Zhdanov approved Zahariadis’s proposals, which he made on behalf of the CPG. After that Zahariadis had a secret meeting with Stalin during which Stalin instructed him to “gradually begin the armed action from the villages towards the cities in order to prevent a premature military intervention by the British and to give him time to work on a means of finding a compromise”.

Stalin, while filling his pipe with tobacco, looked at Zahariadis directly in the eyes and asked:

“Do you see Marshal Tito as the future leader of a Balkan Federation?”

Confused, Zahariadis wanted to avoid the question but replied anyway:

“The Marshall is a great strategist and an internationalist,” he said. “And I have received a promise from him that he will give me 20,000 armed and ready fighters who were hunted by the Monarcho-Fascist armies.”

Stalin then said: “According to my information, Marshal Tito, in only a year, has organized the Macedonians for a heroic struggle in Aegean Macedonia, in Greece and has established successful Macedonian organizations. Examples of these are NOF-National

Liberation Front, and AFZH – Macedonian Women’s Anti-Fascist Front which are directly led by the CPM / CPY. All these fighters were pursued by Markos after World War II. All those fighters who constituted the ‘Aegean Brigade’ are now in Greece and are struggling for a united Macedonia. What are you going to do with all these Macedonian military and political formations? The old sense of a united Macedonia will persist in them until ‘the socialist revolution in Greece’ prevails and after that they will be fine. Socialism is the same everywhere...” concluded Stalin.

Zahariadis then took out a sheet of paper that read: “Agreement between the CPG and representatives of the Macedonian state.” According to this agreement “the Slavo-Macedonians from Greek Macedonia, on the one hand, have pledged to support the CPG during the elections in its bid to gain power. With this power lies the only hope for a favourable resolution of the Macedonian Question. On the other hand, they pledged to help the CPG in cases where incidents between the left and right may arise during the elections.”

Stalin then said: “Macedonians are heroic fighters known to be strong people.”

But Zahariadis confirmed that, “They can easily be manipulated and are victims of history.” Zahariadis also informed Stalin that all military formations and political organizations known as “brotherhood and unity” belonging to Marshal Tito will now be placed under CPG control.

“Marshal Tito has international insight in the struggle against Anglo-American imperialism,” said Zahariadis, to which Stalin replied,

“So, you have agreements regarding the revolution! That’s good. Then proceed as you think it necessary. Now go and prepare a draft resolution of your decision for the CPG Central Committee.”

With that Stalin wanted to appear as a moderate, good, unobtrusive and generous leader giving the impression that he was an admirer of the revolutionary thoughts of other leaders in the camp of socialism.

After the meeting Zahariadis said: “The CPG has ceased to seek a peaceful solution to the Greek issue and now will devote itself to seize power by force of arms!”

Stalin was well aware of Tito and Zahariadis’s agreement: “Tito’s main concern was to protect the new federation.” From this new development Tito’s position became clear to Stalin. Tito knew that Yugoslavia was 50% influenced by the West and strongly endeavored to keep the Yugoslav federation intact, as was emphasized many times by the Yugoslav Security Service and by the Yugoslav Army General Staff: “...it is best to keep the war out of Yugoslav borders and to wholeheartedly assist, than to have it inside Yugoslavia.” This was acceptable even to Stalin because it preserved the socialist camp created after World War II.

But neither Stalin nor Tito were prepared or willing to take action to bring victory to the Greek communists or to reunite Macedonia.

Stalin in fact could not foresee providing “strong military action” to Greece in the near future and made no particular promises of support but he did recommend to Zahariadis that when it comes to forming a People’s Liberation Army it is best to respect Tito’s advice.

The next day Zahariadis went to Belgrade to work out organizational details with Tito regarding assistance and cooperation. He also asked Tito to define all problems, characteristics and prospects associated with the Democratic Army and measures to be taken to prepare for a future war. Zahariadis was received in Moscow as a bold revolutionary leader. Stalin sat in the great hall on a hand-knitted chair, puffing on his pipe with a smile on his face while the other leaders, including Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mikoian, Kaganovich, Suslov, Baria and Bulganin, members of the Communist Party of the USSR Politburo, drank “Pertsovka” vodka.

The waiters busied themselves offering the guests all kinds of snacks. Stalin, at one point, looked at Zahariadis and, with a smile on his face, wished him success in his upcoming revolution. Zahariadis then calmly and obediently stood up in front of the Generalissimo and, in broken Russian, uttered the following words:

“Glubokovazhaemi tovarish Iosif Visarionobich, bolisoe spasibo. Zhelaiu Vam krepkoe zborovie i ushte mnogie leta da ne vodite vo sotsialismot kon pobeda na komunizamot. (Deeply respected Comrade Јosif Visarionovich, many thanks.

I wish You good health and may You, for many summers, lead us in socialism towards the victory of communism.) Your advice will be our roadmap that will lead us in our struggle against Anglo-American imperialism, until the working class in the world achieves its final victory.”

* * *

On April 8, 1946 Zahariadis returned to Belgrade and was received by Tito. When he stood before the Marshal, awe stricken, Tito told him: “If we are already revolutionaries and internationalists, our duty is to help ‘revolutions’ and I don’t see any reason why we should be against the revolution in Greece, which you have taken measures to realize. For that I can only congratulate you, Comrade Nikos. Gather everyone who can hold a rifle. That is normal in every revolution and the people want that.” Tito then lit a cigar and continued walking through the spacious room and when he returned to his table he asked Zahariadis: “What is the mood of the youth?” Zahariadis replied: “Great!”

This is what was said in the book “Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question” by Steve E. Palmer and Robert R. King, Archon Books, 1971, p. 117:

“In the beginning of May 1943, Tempo established contact with the Greek Communists, in an attempt to establish domination of the CPY in Greek occupied Macedonia, which smoldered from the repressive measures applied by the Metexas dictatorship before the war. The situation was ignited by the Italian occupiers who organized special Macedonian gendarmes (Kostur rebels) to fight against the Greeks. The Kostur rebels received carte blanche and their influence was dangerous for CPY plans in Macedonia in a Yugoslav framework. Tempo suggested that it would be good to allow Tito’s agents (Macedonians in ELAS and the CPG) to organize and lead the Macedonians in Greece. The Greeks refused.

Tempo however took his case to the Supreme Command of the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) which then allowed the Greek Macedonians to organize the Slavic National Liberation Fronts (SNOF). ELAS Command immediately agreed to combine military actions with the Yugoslav partisans but, of course, was not thrilled with the formation of separate Greek Slav units because it seemed like a move to enable Yugoslav efforts to create a Greater Macedonia. It was possible that Greece could lose Aegean Macedonia and that was the main black point of the Greek communists. Agreement to such a proposal, no matter how it was camouflaged in plans for some kind of Balkan Communist Federation, was going to strongly jeopardize their mass support.”

THUS THE TRIANGLE BETWEEN: STALIN, TITO AND ZAHARIADIS WAS CLOSED. FROM A POLITICAL GAME TO A MILITARY DISASTER.

BUT, WHY CAN’T WE MACEDONIANS FROM 1945 UNTIL TODAY GET OUT OF THAT MOST TERRIBLE COMMUNIST TRIANGLE?

They led their own world politics, interfered in other people’s affairs, constantly planned revolutions and strikes, but we became the only victims of genocide - world WANDERERS.

Now: Political and military aid from Yugoslavia to the CPG, not to NOF and AFZH.

During his stay in Belgrade Zahariadis, was awe-struck by the meeting he had with Marshal Tito, particularly by Tito’s determination to set up a central task force to help the Democratic Army of Greece. The task force, headed by Aleksandar Rankovich, consisted of General Iovo Kapichich, Deputy Federal Minister of Domestic Affairs, Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan Ucha Krstich, Lieutenant Colonel Mile Vrbitsa, Giuza Radovich, Marshal Milutinovich, Major Drago Miovich, Major Obradovich Trninich, Captain Giuro Giurits, Lieutenant Iovan Popovich, Lieutenant Rade Kosmanovich, Krste Pengovski, Shime Benchich and soldiers Lazar Seferovich and Boshko Jovanovich. There was also a special team comprised of medical staff. Included in this team were Lieutenant

Colonel Velimir - Bratsa Maistorovich and Dr. Iovan Bielich. Their task was to organize a hospital to treat the wounded and a means of transporting wounded from the battlefields to the hospital. The task to acquire and supply weapons for the Democratic Army fighters fell to Major Vladimir Dekich, Major Sveta Stefanovich, Lieutenant Iovan Popovich and Lieutenant Petar Luchich. An impressive number of weapons and materials were acquired including cannons, machine guns, rifles, Panzers - Fausta, pistols, hand grenades, radio stations, overcoats, horses and lots of food worth upwards of five million dinars.

Zahariadis paid a visit to the Greek camp in Bulkes, Vojvodina where he observed the military training of the 5,000 fighters already inducted.

In his speech Zahariadis ordered all political refugees to use “an iron fist” against the Anglo-American imperialist and Monarcho-Fascist regime in Athens. He told them: “You are obligated to carry out the CPG solution. Arm yourselves with the weapons provided for you by Marshal Tito and return to Greece to fight against the Monarcho-Fascists because their regime aims to destroy the democratic forces and to install a fascist regime in Greece.” See: Dragan Kljakich, “Sovetizatsia Balkanske zone” – Confessions of Lazar Kolishevski, Belgrade, 1992, publisher “Radnichka Press”.

When Zahariadis returned to Greece on April 9, 1946 he went to Solun where he gave a speech to his followers in which he warned the Greek government that the people would not stand for the abuse they were getting and that they would be forced to defend themselves by resorting to arms. The attack on the village Lithohori in Katerini Region during the night of March 30/31, 1946, on the eve of the elections, was just one example of what the future might bring.

In order to win over the Macedonians, on April 14, 1946, in Solun, Zahariadis said: “The government has directed its terror against the Slavo-Macedonians... Why are the Monarcho-Fascists carrying out such terror acts against the Slavo-Macedonians? Their first aim is to break their beliefs (the thoughts of NOF and AFZH), the Democratic

People’s beliefs and second, they want to sow discord between the Greeks and the Slavo-Macedonians…”

* * *

In early June 1946, Zahariadis, without consulting anyone, appointed Markos Vafiadis to the Politburo, made him a member of the CPG Central Committee and put the former ELAS Captain in charge of the future Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). He then ordered Markos to leave for the mountains and take over leadership of the “partisan groups that were already active”.

British Ambassador Norton: “According to the envisaged plan, on August 25, 1946, Ioannidis and Rossos crossed over to Belgrade where, on September 1, 1946, they met with Markos Vafiadis who was there to consult with them on specific military and political issues. After going to Belgrade, Vafiadis returned to the Aegean part of Macedonia where, on October 28, 1946, he formed the Headquarters for the guerrilla forces. At the same time he appointed regional commanders who began to organize their fighters into armed units. In December 1946 these combined units were officially consolidated into the “Democratic Army of Greece” (DAG). Vafiadis was appointed Chief of the Democratic Army and was given the pseudonym General Markos.”

Evdokia Foteva – Vera calls NOF’s RECOGNITION BY the CPG the Second Phase of NOF’s development.

However, it’s not like that. Among our Macedonians living in Greece (who were NOF and AFZH leaders), almost all “coincidences” hide a clearly visible reason behind them. The key word is “hide”.

What is the truth? Did the Macedonians agree with the CPG RECOGNITION? With NOF and AFZH!? Or with those who until yesterday manipulated us and we became their servants?

Historical facts show that: “Based on the decision made between Tito (CPY) and Zahariadis (CPG) on October 14, 1946, Karaivanov of the CPY and Ioannidis of the CPG later made the following

declaration: “The Macedonian organizations NOF (AFZH NOMS) and its leadership are to be fully subordinated to the CPG and the small armed Macedonian military units are to be incorporated into DAG under the leadership of General Markos”.

In other words, all this was “arranged” at State Level between Yugoslavia and Greece, which means that it was done with strict adherence to all “State Level” Treaties including the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest; the Treaty by which Macedonia was partitioned.