THE POLITICAL REFUGEES AFTER THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

THE POLITICAL REFUGEES AFTER THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

On August 29-30, 1949, after the Greek Civil War ended, DAG General Headquarters transferred all military personnel to Albania where they were disarmed and sent to the Bureli and Elbasan military camps. Some fled to Bulgaria where, after crossing the Berkovitsa border, they were disarmed.

The CPG Central Committee held its 6th Plenum in Bureli where, in addition to evaluating its military achievements, it decided what to do with its DAG fighters, where to send them and in what numbers:

Country

Czechoslovakia Poland Romania Bulgaria Hungary East Germany USSR (Tashkent)

Number of people

13,500 9,000 5,600 8,800 4,000 2,200. 16,500

to arrive later

6,000 from Bulkesh 3,000 1,000

2,000 1,500 young children 5,500

It should be noted that 56 to 60% of these numbers, as verified by Greek sources, were Macedonians.

There were no reliable sources for the exact number of refugees in Yugoslavia, but according to some sources there were about 60,000 people, exclusively Macedonians.

FACTS FROM GREEK OFFICIAL HISTORY ON THE GREEK CIVIL WAR (1944-1949)

FACTS AND ARGUMENTS ON THE GREAT FRAUD AND GENOCIDE COMMITTED AGAINST THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE IN GREECE

Historical Studies of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia during the Greek Civil War 1944-1949

The CPG 5th Plenary

Decisions made during the CPG Central committee’s 5th plenum in January became apparent after February 8th. They clarified, interpreted, and confirmed in detail General Markos’s isolation and removal from duty as well as the removal of Hrisa Vasiliou who agreed with Markos’s views, and the removal of Ioanidis from the PDK.

1. “DAG is firmly and safely in control of the entire region of Mount Pind. We took the top of Mount Gramos once again. The national (Greek government) army soldiers showed fatigue and despair.

2. The enemy’s military forces (national army, police, National Guard, Maids, MEA and so on) number over 300 thousand. They forced over 700 thousand people out of their homes with aims at isolating DAG.

3. General Headquarters and the Divisions will provide all necessary military supplies to all the units in this region at all times. Any delays in this will cause problems, similar to the ones we had in 1948. (The kind that made us lose Vicho.)

4. As their task, Thessaly and Rumeli are obliged to launch combat operations and begin offensive attacks with aims at pinning down the enemy and preventing him from expanding his capabilities in 1949.

5. The 6th and 7th Division (Eastern Macedonia and Thrace) are tasked with gradually increasing pressure and launching strikes against the enemy and against Solun.

Other observations made and problems uncovered during the 5th Plenum are showing that the leadership (the CPG leadership) is currently far from its targets.

6. DAG is showing to be stronger than in 1948. It has widened the national liberation movement all the way down to the Peloponnese.

The Peloponnese should be torn apart by our military campaigns and all ordinary villagers should join DAG’s ranks.

All of the above suggestions and conclusions may represent little in terms of tangible items but are good news for the left-leaning public. As for the Macedonians, the 5th Plenum said the following about them:

In northern Greece, the Macedonian (Slavo-Macedonian) people are giving their all for the struggle and are fighting for the ultimate goal with heroism that provokes a heroic self-sacrifice that is a feat of great admiration. There should be no doubt that after DAG comes out victorious in the people’s struggle, the Macedonian people, who spill their blood today, will find their full national freedom as they wish. The Macedonian Communists are always at the forefront and responsible in the struggle. At the same time, the Macedonian communists should also pay attention to the Macedonian communists who carry out agitation for foreign intelligence services. The CPG is loyal to the EAM which is in close cooperation with all the people’s organizations and first and foremost with AKE and NOF.

APPENDIX A

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

The Macedonian Syndrome-The Chronic Crisis in Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/07: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500030001-8

During the past four years Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have exchanged a torrent of invective over a seemingly obscure historical issue—the ethnic and linguistic ancestry of the peoples of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Yugoslavs claim that all the clamor, when stripped of its academic pretensions, reveals a strident irredentism on the part of the Bulgarians.

For Sofia, the Macedonian question is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is exploited for domestic Bulgarian consumption, affording the regime the only safe outlet for Bulgarian nationalism without fear of intervention by Moscow. Not even the Yugoslavs believe that Sofia, at the present time, intends to retake Yugoslav Macedonia by force. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Bulgarian leadership will be alert to any opportunity to loosen Belgrade’s hold over Macedonia in the post-Tito era, and it has already prepared the way with strong claims of inherent rights in Macedonia.

Yugoslavia looks on Bulgaria’s refusal to recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality as a potential threat to Yugoslav territorial integrity. The Yugoslavs have also recently become uneasy over what they consider the Kremlin’s tacit approval of Sofia’s claim that Macedonia is inhabited by Bulgarians. In Belgrade, for example, it has been noted that Bulgarian pressures in Macedonia have at times peaked when tensions have been unusually high between Belgrade and Moscow, as when Yugoslavia voiced its opposition to the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The intensity of the Yugoslav reaction to the argument over Macedonia must be viewed against a backdrop of serious internal economic problems and the pending major govern mental reorganization. There has been no attempt to hide the seriousness or magnitude of the problems that confront Yugoslavia, and Tito’s age adds a note of urgency to the situation. In many respects, therefore, the Macedonian problem and Bulgaria’s vague threat to regain the region are an intrinsic part of the succession problem. The Yugoslavs, most of whom wish to hold their federation together after Tito, are keeping an eye on the potential for political instability and disintegration that could come with Tito’s passing, which Bulgaria might try to exploit.

To the Yugoslav leadership the dispute is not without its positive aspects. By over dramatizing the immediate threat, Belgrade apparently hopes to minimize internal dissension and rally support for the new federal system, as well as to keep world attention focused on Yugoslavia and on the “implied” Soviet threat.

Actually, the ebbs and flows of the Macedonian problem have not always reflected the status of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Party and government boss Todor Zhivkov provoked the present crisis in late 1967 at a time when Belgrade and Moscow were on fairly good terms. Historically, the Macedonian question has always had something of a life of its own, reflecting traditional Balkan hostilities and Bulgarian and Yugoslav internal requirements, as well as the prevailing winds in the Eastern European political arena.

Through 1967 and early 1968, Bulgaria took the initiative in the dispute, promoting its claims to Macedonia. But in mid-1968, because of festering problems in the Kremlin’s relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviets became active in the confrontation. Then, in late 1969, when both Moscow and Sofia desired a temporary abatement in the intensity of the dispute, the beleaguered Yugoslavs verbally threw down the gauntlet to their two antagonists and have been on the propaganda attack ever since. Thus the future direction of the Macedonian conflict depends now on the preferences of Belgrade.

Background

Bulgaria’s campaign questions the Yugoslavs’ right to sovereignty over Macedonia, one of the Yugoslav federation’s six republics. Sofia claims that all Macedonians are really ethnic Bulgarians cut off from the motherland. This position pre dates the Communist era in Bulgaria. In 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano gave the modern Bulgarian state control of the lands of Macedonia for the first time. A few months later this territory was expropriated by the great powers and given to Serbia (now part of Yugoslavia). Most Bulgarian governments since then have continued to lay claim to this province, although since 1878, Sofia has held the land for a total of only four years.

Belgrade’s commitment to a separate Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav state dates from the postwar establishment of the Communist regime. Tito’s personal involvement in Macedonia goes back at least to January 1943. At that time he appealed to the Macedonians in Yugoslavia to fight for their independence and to seek national identity through self-determination, i.e., through the establishment of a Macedonian Republic in union with the Yugoslav peoples. Following World War II, Tito put his words into action and a separate Macedonian Republic was created in 1944 as an integral part of the Yugoslav federation. This republic did not include Pirin (Bulgarian Macedonia).

The Communists’ seizure of power in both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia seemed to mark the end of the Macedonian issue as a point of contention between the two countries. Bulgarian party leaders condemned the actions of past Bulgarian governments in Macedonia and proclaimed the province an integral part of Yugoslavia. Belgrade and Sofia—stressing reconciliation—agreed in 1947 that, in the long run, a reunion of the Macedonian peoples might be possible.

The charismatic Yugoslav leader, however, had plans for a “greater” Macedonia. He pres3ed the concept of a larger Yugoslav-Bulgarian confederation headquartered in Belgrade. Sofia was receptive to the idea of forming a federation of “Southslavs” in the Balkans—the Dimitrov Plan— but balked at the suggestion that Pirin Macedonia

be initially joined to its Yugoslav counterpart as a separate republic. For a time, Macedonians from Yugoslavia were even allowed to open schools and bookshops in Pirin, and the Yugoslav Macedonian-language newspaper was freely sold in Bulgaria.

Even after Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, when Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations also took a turn for the worse, there was no resurrection of past claims to Macedonia. This, however, may have been due to the fact that in the period between the executions of the Bulgarian national Communists in the 1950s and the emergence of the Zhivkov clique in the early 1960s, any expression of nationalism was looked upon with great suspicion in Bulgaria and the USSR.

There was some minor fencing over Macedonia between Belgrade and Sofia in the late 1950s, when the Bulgarians again began to remonstrate over the loss of this province after San Stefano. This vocalizing was usually limited to academic circles in both countries. Scholarly articles on Macedonia were exchanged by social scientists, who debated the true cultural and historical heritage of the people. In the course of the Tito-Zhivkov talks in 1963 and 1965, as well as in Zhivkov’s discussions with Yugoslav Macedonian chief Crvenkovski in 1967, it was agreed that “these differences” should not be used as an excuse for polemics; rather, “experts should discuss them and establish the historical truth about them.”

The Macedonian issue was revived in a campaign, not very well thought out, that Zhivkov launched in early 1965. The idea was to develop an ethos of patriotism arid national spirit in the youth of the then emotionally stagnant country. The dispute over Macedonia became a key means of building national pride, which had been stifled by the Bulgarian Communist Party’s subservience to the Soviet Union. Studies were launched “analyzing” the past relationship of the Macedonian people to Bulgaria. The party re-evaluated its past stand on the Macedonian issue and concluded that it had taken an incorrect and “non-Leninist position” by dropping Bulgarian claims to Macedonia. The party then reasoned that “in doing so, Bulgaria had accepted foreign rule for an area that had a predominantly Bulgarian population.” The head of the Bulgarian Writers’ Union went so far in the autumn of 1966 as to deny the existence of a separate Macedonian language, concluding that it

really was a variant of Bulgarian (a statement with which many Western linguists would agree). During the same year, a leading ethnographer publicly took exception to an article in a Soviet journal treating the Macedonians as a separate nation or people.

San Stefano Revived: By 1967 many Bulgarian academicians and politicos were engaged in turning out books and articles supporting the contention that Macedonia, belonged ethnically, historically, and spiritually to the Bulgarian nation. Long-dead irredentist authors and their works were “rediscovered” and republished.

In January 1967, Sofia celebrated the birthday of Gotse Delchev, a departed Macedonian patriot declared for the occasion to be a “Bulgarian patriot.” In December, an article in the party newspaper by an eminent historian—commenting on the upcoming anniversary of the treaty of San Stefano—concluded that the pact was based on “generally recognized ethnographic frontiers of the Bulgarian people at that time.” In Zhivkov’s Theses on Youth, also published in December 1967, a whole chapter was devoted to the need for an expansion of patriotic education. Bulgarians, he said, do not make “sufficient use of our glorious historic past in order to educate the youth in a patriotic spirit.” The Yugoslavs consider that the present Macedonian crisis dates from the winter of 1967, and accrued from these Bulgarian actions.

The dispute was raised to the level of official bilateral relations on 29 January 1968, when the Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade was advised by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry of the “harm” Sofia’s pursuit of the Macedonian issue could have on relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, or, the 90th anniversary of San Stefano, in February 1968, the Bulgars held a massive ceremony in Sofia, during which the participants lamented Bulgaria’s loss of Macedonia.

After the San Stefano celebrations, neither side showed an inclination to lot the issue drop; instead, outside events heated the quarrel to serious dimensions. The occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 increased Belgrade’s suspicion of Soviet-Bulgarian ‘collaboration on Macedonia. As Yugoslav support for the Dubcek regime continued throughout the spring and summer of 1968, the

Kremlin became increasingly unhappy with Belgrade. At the same time, the Bulgarian communications media mounted a loud assault on the policies and programs of the League of Yugoslav Communists, and the threat of Bulgarian irredentism became real to Belgrade. In mid-1968, the Bulgarian military newspaper, echoing the Brezhnev Doctrine, announced that it was the “duty of the Warsaw Pact to help every country where socialism” was “in danger,” implying that what was true for Czechoslovakia could also be true for Yugoslavia. In August, after the Czechoslovak invasion, a Bulgarian deputy minister of defense (who had fought alongside Tito as a partisan) pointedly reiterated the threat, stating that Bulgaria was ready to go “anywhere else” to rescue socialism.

Tito’s open criticism of the events of August 1968 apparently prompted Zhivkov—undoubtedly with Soviet endorsement—to adopt an even stronger propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Yugoslavia. The polemics were primarily based on the Macedonian issue but they also contained hostile references to Yugoslav political and economic practices, emphasizing the social and economic problems of ‘the country. It was naively hoped that the Bulgarian campaign would put enough pressure on Belgrade to distract the Yugoslavs from events in Prague and moderate their response to the invasion.

In November 1968, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, under party direction, issued a pamphlet claiming that Macedonia had never existed ethnically, nationally, or linguistically as a nation apart from Bulgaria. The publication stated that all Macedonians, even those in Yugoslavia, actually were Bulgarians. It denounced Belgrade for forcing the integration of the Macedonian people with the Yugoslavs, who were accused of wishing also to lay claim to the “Macedonians” living in Bulgaria. It said that Bulgaria would continue to seek a “constructive solution” to the Macedonian problem that would let Macedonia “freely determine and express its nationality and its national feelings,” implying, of course, that these “national feelings” were Bulgarian. This tract was widely distributed in Bulgaria, was broadcast to Yugoslavia, and was circulated in Eastern Europe. Belgrade later reported that several people were arrested in Yugoslav Macedonia for distributing this “irredentist pamphlet.”

The following month, in a further sign of their antipathy, Bulgarian leaders boycotted Yugoslav national day celebrations in Sofia, and rumors began circulating in Moscow that Pact maneuvers would soon be held in Bulgaria near the Yugoslav border. These stories inspired increased tensions in Yugoslavia.

Polemics became vitriolic…. A contemporary dimension was added to the dispute by Bulgaria’s claims that it had liberated Macedonia in 1944—a claim Belgrade categorically denied but viewed as an implied threat.

In September 1969, it appeared that some progress might be made in the Macedonian dispute. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko first visited Yugoslavia, and the President of the Yugoslav National Assembly’s Chamber of Nationalities, Mika Spiljak, then went to Sofia. Whether there was any connection between the two journeys is not known, but with things in Czechoslovakia then quiet, the Soviets apparently desired an aura of tranquility in East Europe. If so, little was accomplished, and the Spiljak mission proved a failure. The Yugoslavs, as they had in the past, demanded an end to the Bulgarians’ campaign, but Zhivkov declared that he would discuss outstanding problems only with Tito. Spiljak, originally hopeful of compromise after the Gromyko trip, left Sofia “disgusted with the platitudes and generalities” into which the meeting had degenerated.

Despite the fiasco, the Bulgarians showed a willingness to discuss the problem. A meeting between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian foreign ministers at the UN, however, led to a disastrous visit by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev to Belgrade in December 1969. This incredibly undiplomatic trip revealed that neither side was ready to moderate its stand. The talks nearly ended before they started when Bashev let it be known that Bulgaria was willing to renounce all territorial claims on Yugoslavia if Belgrade would admit that the Macedonians were ethnically Bulgarians. The proposal, which was of course rejected, only confirmed Belgrade’s suspicion of Bulgaria’s sinister designs on Yugoslav Macedonia.

Bulgarian Twists and Turns: In general, the old-line Bulgarian apparatchiks, who had severed rather close ties to the Yugoslav

party in 1948, are still nervous about their independent neighbor and the residual common interests that might still prove attractive to some nationalistic Bulgarian party members. Sofia has never been comfortable about having Yugoslavia, an unorthodox yet successful Communist country, on its border, especially because of the sharp contrast it affords with Bulgaria’s economic and political stagnation.

The Macedonian issue thus seems to have been contrived by the leadership partly to keep Yugoslavia and things Yugoslav at arm’s length, and at the same time to rekindle a spirit of Bulgarian nationalism that could be useful to the regime. The nationalism campaign of 1966 fizzled out in two years, but the Macedonian issue has always had a character of its own, and has from time to time been exploited by Moscow. Certainly, Bulgaria’s Macedonian policy was developed haphazardly and ha moved ahead in an erratic fashion. Some of this can be ascribed to fluctuations in Soviet policy, but some of it must also be related to Sofia’s political vicissitudes and ineptitudes in the pursuit of traditional Bulgarian foreign policy goals.

The vehement diplomatic and public responses from Yugoslavia over the Macedonian dispute—particularly after the Czechoslovak crisis— caused Sofia to hesitate and re-evaluate the direction and force of its Macedonian policy. This was partly because by early 1969 the Soviets were interested in reducing tensions in Eastern Europe. In March an editorial in the Bulgarian party newspaper disclaimed any territorial desires in Yugoslavia. This was followed by a public statement by First Deputy Premier Zhivko Zhivkov that his country “did not have any interest in land expansion.

In April 1969, in a talk with Austrian journalists, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev said Macedonia remained a “historical legacy” but concluded that it was not a “topical political matter.” He accused unnamed “imperialist” circles for “fostering nationalist passions” in the Balkans.

For Belgrade, nevertheless, such platitudes were not reassuring, and Yugoslav propaganda continued to hammer away at the issue. In response, Bulgaria ended its moratorium on polemics in June 1969, though without making Macedonia the direct issue. Sofia’s antipathy

toward Tito’s regime again surfaced, but it was directed at “revisionism” in Yugoslavia rather than at Macedonia. On 28 June, for example, the Bulgarian army paper stressed the “anti-Soviet” nature of Tito’s programs and policies. A week later Zhivkov delivered an anti-Yugoslav speech in a similar vein. In July Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations took a further turn for the worse when Sofia restricted the traditional free movement of people from Yugoslav and Bulgarian border villages across the frontier.

Yugoslav Reaction: On 12 February 1969, Belgrade sent its second diplomatic note of protest within one year peppering Bulgaria for “fomenting an atmosphere of disquiet and tension in the Balkans.” That same day acting Yugoslav Foreign Minister Miso Povicevic gave a speech in the Federal Assembly in which he said Bulgarian policy could not be “understood any different than as the feeding of territorial pretensions toward integral parts of Yugoslavia.” The Legue of Yugoslav Communists’ newspaper expressed the fear that the Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited sovereignty” would be used as a justification for an invasion. In March 1969 over 2,000 people demonstrated in the Macedonian town of Ohrid, protesting against the Bulgarian “anti-Yugoslav campaign.” By May, the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister spoke of a “Balkan confrontation,” accusing the Bulgars of territorial aspirations, interfering in Yugoslav internal affairs, subversive propaganda, and planning to hold military maneuvers in border areas. The minister also reiterated the charge that a “third country” was influencing Bulgarian policy toward his country.

In the years since the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavs have become convinced that Moscow has a role in the Macedonian controversy. This was graphically illustrated in an article of 25 November 1970 entitled “Ghosts of the Past,” which appeared in both Belgrade’s Borba and the Macedonian republic daily Nova Makedonija. The article accused Bulgaria of reviving bourgeois territorial claims to Macedonia (and parts of Serbia) as they existed under the treaty of San Stefano. Tsarist “Russia” is the real culprit, according to the two journals, because it “created the fiction of San Stefano Bulgaria.”

For a brief period in the spring of 1970, the Bulgarian media gave Yugoslavia more positive treatment, and Soviet diplomats told Westerners that Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations were entering “a new phase.” Indeed, something new did seem to be in the offing, and in late June the Bulgarian press talked of all-Balkan cooperation and of improving relations with its neighbors, including Yugoslavia.

For the Yugoslavs, however, there could be no improvement until Sofia officially changed its stance on Macedonia. While Sofia talked of detente, the Macedonian government announced it had uncovered “increased foreign activity” of a hostile nature in the republic. Contrary to Sofia’s expectations, the Yugoslavs interpreted Bulgarian statements on Balkan cooperation as a maneuver to embarrass them and to give the appearance that Belgrade was dragging its feet.

Nonetheless, in early July, Belgrade provocatively tested Bulgaria’s “new” good will. Three normally routine documents—a 1971-75 economic protocol, a radio-TV protocol, and a border traffic agreement—were presented in the Macedonian language for Sofia’s signature. The red-faced Bulgarians refused to sign, whereupon the Yugoslav press jumped on the issue, labeling the refusal, “a revival of greater Bulgarian (claims) to sovereign Macedonian territory.” In early August, the widely read Yugoslav weekly, NIN, accused Bulgaria of spreading Stalinist propaganda in Yugoslavia, as well as offering highly paid jobs to Bulgarians living in Serbia in an attempt to lure them across the border. The situation went from bad to worse; in September the Macedonian party central committee called home all Yugoslav-Macedonian students studying in Sofia because of hostile Bulgarian propaganda activity among them.

Three times during 1970 Bulgarian Premier Zhivkov requested a face-to-face meeting with President Tito to discuss major points of difference, but when representatives of the two countries finally met on 9 and 10 November in Sofia to lay the groundwork for such a meeting, the results were disastrous. As they had for the past year, the Bulgarians came to the meeting determined to achieve a facade of agreement by discussing non-controversial subjects. But the Yugoslavs declared Macedonia the only major issue and stipulated that it be the core of any negotiations. Party Secretary Velchev, the

chief of the Bulgarian delegation, then pulled a paper from his briefcase that had been prepared for such an eventuality. The Bulgarians were willing to concede that “a Macedonian state” had emerged after the second World War, but they rigidly insisted that the Macedonian people of this state were ethnically and culturally Bulgarian and that its territory was not conclusively defined. Velchev then declared that, although the present Bulgarian government now was ready to settle the Macedonian problem, he was not certain that the next generation of Bulgarians would be as willing. The chief of the Yugoslav delegation replied that this Bulgarian position negated a policy established by Bulgarian hero Georgi Dimitrov and the COMINTERN. Velchev’s admission that this was so ended the discussions, and Yugoslav press polemics sharply increased. Furthermore, Yugoslav Macedonia—with government encouragement—began expressing their support for the “national aspirations” of their brothers in Bulgaria.

In spite of this dismal turn of events, there are indications that the two countries may yet come to terms.

Yugoslav press attacks on Bulgaria have subsided somewhat, although party meetings throughout the country continue their well-orchestrated denunciation of Bulgarian policy. Furthermore, Yugoslav party luminaries have, in the past month, spoken in a conciliatory manner about improving relations with their eastern neighbor.

On 23 December, when President Tito interrupted his vacation on Brioni to receive the Bulgarian ambassador, but the Yugoslavs now say nothing productive came from these talks.

Since October the Bulgars have virtually ignored any invective coming from Yugoslavia and have continued to play for a meeting with Tito to codify some agreement to disagree. Recent public statements of the Sofia leaders have been peppered with calls for a Balkan rapprochement. In a probably related development, the most vociferous of the Bulgarian newspapers on the Macedonian problem, Narodna Arrniya, published by the Defense Ministry, was ordered discontinued as a daily and converted to a weekly in late December. The paper, however, has continued to appear on a daily

basis, with no explanation of the sudden reversal in publication schedules. This could indicate some disagreement within the Sofia leadership over the present trends in Bulgarian policy on the Macedonian question.

Prospects for 1971 - Todor Zhivkov’s present self-abasement shows an uncommon willingness to improve the atmosphere. The Bulgarians have made so many concessions that about the only card they have left to play is to agree to a settlement or quietly to let the issue die—if the Yugoslavs will allow It. This suggests that perhaps the Yugoslavs are partly correct in assuming that the Soviets now have taken a hand in the matter, if only to try to cool the situation. It is difficult, however, to foresee formal repudiation by Bulgaria of its past Macedonian stand. Rather, a settlement could provide for a tempering of the more provocative elements of Sofia’s position and a change in the tone and emphasis of Bulgarian propaganda to stress points of agreement between Belgrade and Sofia.

Belgrade now insists that prior to any rapprochement, Sofia must specifically recognize the existence of an ethnic Macedonian nation within Yugoslavia, demonstrate a willingness to allow free expression of Macedonian national identity in Bulgarian Pirin, and publicly repudiate its position since 1967. If Zhivkov is serious about improving relations with Tito, he will have to accept the first of these terms. If Tito wishes to reciprocate, he probably will have to drop the last two demands.

Of course, such an arrangement would constitute no more than a return to the tacit arrangement that existed prior to 1967, and it would be quite embarrassing to Zhivkov at that. If such an agreement does take shape, it may be due more to a Soviet desire to avoid involvement in a Balkan territorial squabble than to a lessening of Sofia’s nationalistic passions.