CHAPTER TWO - Restoration of the monarchy - Part 01

CHAPTER TWO - Restoration of the monarchy

1. Parliamentary elections and plebiscites

After the counter-revolutionary forces in Greece, aided by the British occupation forces, attacked the democratic forces and delivered a strong blow, they began to prepare forged electoral lists to ensure that their side wins. Having the support of Sofoulis’s Liberals the counter-revolutionaries felt ready to hold elections on March 31, 1946. Themistoklis Sofoulis formed his cabinet in late 1945.

During that time democratic forces, democratic parties and organizations struggled to revise the electoral lists, to end the terror and to involve international monitoring and control by appealing to the great powers, which included the US, the USSR, Britain and France, but without much success. Ignoring the bitter protests coming from the democratic forces, ignoring public opinion, the counter-revolutionary forces in Greece, with help from imperialist circles abroad, held elections and forcibly formed a Parliament with members who would fight for and further strengthen the counter-revolutionary cause. Thousands of democratic citizens were not allowed to vote because their names were not on the electoral lists. Greece was ruled by lawlessness and violence perpetrated by armed authorities and right-wing organizations. Terror increased and tens of thousands of people were imprisoned or persecuted during the course of the elections.

And indeed, the Greek political right achieved its aims. Because of the ensuing problems the EAM coalition, which included the CPG, Tsideros’s party, Kafandaris’s party, Kartalis’s group, the Leftist Liberal group and Zvolos’s ELD party, decided to abstain from the elections. The left coalition’s abstinence unfortunately allowed for easier manipulation and falsification of the electoral lists. There was no need to prove that over 55% of the electorate abstained from voting but that did not prevent the counterfeiters from redrawing the result since there was no one monitoring them. There was a control commission sent by the UN but all that commission did was aid the counterfeiters. The elections Control Committee was not composed of the four Great Powers as requested by the democratic side, it was

composed of members from Britain, the USA and France only. The Soviet Union did not agree to participate because it did not want to be accused of “interfering in Greek internal affairs”. But even if the Commission was honest about what it was doing, how could several teams of people, scattered across the country, ensure the election would be free from interference? They could not, which further proves that the percentage of people who voted was falsified. But that did not stop the “most responsible” and “most authoritative” committee of representatives from the US, Britain and France from confirming the election results and from legalizing the illegitimate regime that took power.

The Parliament elected was composed of the following:

Populists – 131, Liberals - 84, Papandreou’s Social Democrats – 30, Gonatas’s National-Liberals - 22, Zervas’s National Party – 21, Markezinis’s Party – 18, Kanelopoulo’s National-Unionist Party – 12, The National Force – 10, Independent Parliamentary Group – 5, Independents – 15, Pan-Hellenic National Party - 1, Reformist Party – 1, Patriotic Union – 1, Worker’s Party – 1, Union of Agricultural Formations – 1 and Independent Liberals - 1.

Outside of the Liberals with 84 MP’s, among whom were camouflaged monarchists, the rest were openly monarchists. And that was how the Populist Party was able to form a government and organize a plebiscite and restore the king in 1946.

A Plebiscite was held on September 1, 1946. It was conducted under extreme conditions of anarchy and terror. First, now that the counter-revolutionaries were “legally” in power and their authority was given to them by the people in the March 31, 1946 elections, they threw themselves with even greater vigour against the democratic forces. They liquidated all provincial EAM and CPG organizations and shut down all democratic newspapers. Second, after the parliamentary elections, as terror increased to unprecedented levels, the civil war began to enter a new phase. Open armed resistance began to take shape in the country. The plebiscite to return the king back to Greece actually took place while Greece was in the midst of a civil war.

The democratic organizations and the political left in general did not abstain from the plebiscite. But who could now doubt the success of the monarchy? If falsification could succeed in parliamentary elections, then why not in a plebiscite? Indeed, on September 1, 1946 the eyes of the world were focused on Greece’s second massive fraud, this time in the restoration of the monarchy.

The most gruesome moments in this period were:

- Counter-revolutionary forces systematically intensifying terror against the democratic movement;

- The civil parties and Sofoulis’s Liberals, which traditionally supported the liberal bourgeoisie, went over to the monarchists. They participated in the elections and held the plebiscite to restore the monarchy, which confirms their non-solidarity with the EAM’s left coalition, Kafindarisa and other groups.

- The political left shows hesitation towards possible avenues for development in Greece. Because of the terror more resistance fighters flee to the mountains.

- The “Greek question” is put before the United Nations and becomes a subject of international discussions.

2. Positions of the Political Left

Themistoklis Sofoulis’s cabinet coming to power in November 1945, as seen immediately after its takeover, was groundlessly evaluated by the CPG Central Committee Politburo as a victory for the democratic forces. The CPG foolishly placed trust that this would hopefully lead to peace in the country, free elections and so on. For the first few months after he was given power, Sofoulis navigated around in a typical Liberal fashion sowing even greater uncertainty and illusions. Unfortunately at the same time, terror caused by the authorities not only did not stop but became even more systematic and widespread. Despite that Sofoulis continued to manoeuver towards having the elections. He openly stood against the democratic camp when he announced that, despite objections and the ongoing terror, “elections will be held”. Only then, as can be

seen from the Party’s press releases, the Politburo showed some opposition. The following article was written on November 24, 1945: “About the Allied observers. Allied observers arrived in our city and will monitor the elections that Sofoulis wants to hold on March 31, 1946”. (“Niki” March 16, 1946, EAM organ for Lerin.) Later on another article said: “No one to elections. Every democratic citizen from every town and village should abstain from voting so that their abstinence will become a grave for this electoral coup”. (“Niki”, March 28, 1946.) It should be noted that this newspaper was illegal at that time. On February 16, 1946, when it was still legal, the same newspaper published an article entitled: “Under what conditions will we participate in the elections?” and then the article listed the conditions.

On February 12, 1946, during the CPG Central Committee 2nd Plenum, Zahariadis, among other things, said:

“...Without a doubt today we need to emphasize once again that the Varkiza Agreement was entirely proper for responding to national, democratic and the people’s interests.”

It is clear that such an attitude was an attitude for “peaceful developments”. But the real situation was somewhat different, as evidenced by a report compiled by a partisan group on Mounts Paiak and Kaimakchalan which said:

January: The people at Paiak are fighting for fair and free elections; they are fighting against British and American plans, who, by all means, are preparing for an electoral coup. It is important to take defensive action by all means and fight against these monarchic plans. An entire month has gone by without any organizational work and with no action, waiting for a situation to develop.

February: The situation in the region remains the same and the same problems remain unresolved. We are making some organizational preparations in case of a possible coup. A People’s Self Defense Committee was created in Voden Region in the last ten days, which will take part in the movement to organize a self-defense strategy. Unfortunately it is difficult for the Committee to move around under

the present conditions, especially because of the uncertainty of where our own leadership stands on this issue.

March: The situation at Paiak is deteriorating. The Monarch-Fascists are leading towards an electoral coup. People are struggling under the most difficult conditions of terror. The Self Defense Committee has come to an understanding with the local leaderships and has created tasks in an attempt to create a comprehensive mass popular self-defense strategy. It began with studying the problem of obtaining and transferring arms. We are also analyzing the problem of a possible coup. We have met with the villages and are working to raise the spirit of self-defense. We are also delivering some weapons.

April: With the results of the election coup, the mad Monarcho-Fascists are exerting immense cruelty against the democratic organizations and against the democratic nation...”

From the above reports, it seems to me that the impending situation was clear and so was the top leadership’s hesitation during the “development of the situation”. It was by no accident that nothing was done and no armed action was undertaken before the elections. In fact the top leadership waited for the “coup” to take place while it was studying it. The “mass popular defense strategy” was put into action only after the “election coup” took place. By definition a coup is anti-parliamentary and taking control by forcefully seizing power. But it was not the Greek bourgeoisie who were experienced in playing these games that took power forcefully. This was an enacted “parliamentary coup” won by manipulating the elections.

As we have seen from the partisan group reports originating in Paiak and Kajmakchalan, preparations for armed resistance were being made since the beginning of 1946, namely since persecutions against the resistance fighters began and since many democratic organizations were shut down and made illegal all over Greece. Unfortunately no armed action on the resistance side was enacted until the end of the elections.

The democratic resistance abstained from voting in the March 31, 1946 elections but took part in an armed action. An armed guerrilla

group carried out an armed attack against the opposition at Lihtohori, a town near Mount Olympus, and thus marked the official start of the Greek Civil War; members of the political left who were in a state of exile and terror, struck back.

There were frequent armed clashes in the coming months, in all regions of Greece with guerrilla groups constantly growing. On October 28, 1946 the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) established its General Headquarters. But even during this situation it was difficult to determine what the CPG leadership was thinking. Which form of struggle would it consider important: political or armed? Even though the CPG was not in parliament, because it voided the election results, it always thought that its time would come if “free” elections were truly held. Because of that, it did not object to having a plebiscite and in fact agreed for the political left to participate in it, even though the actual plebiscite was held under conditions of war.

In fact the CPG’s hesitation continued until October 1947. From this we can conclude that the CPG was waging a political struggle as a means to force the political right to agree to its compromises and to end its terror campaign against the democratic movement. When it failed to achieve results, the CPG resorted to indirect armed resistance, trusting a cadre who was persecuted by the CPG to do its bidding so as not to tip its own hand. The CPG’ attitude towards the armed struggle was made obvious by the following information given by Markos Vafiadis: “In October 1946 when I went to the mountains, I found one group of 65 soldiers acting in Gramos under the leadership of Mr. Gianoulis. I found another group of 350 fighters in Vicho. Besides those there were another 1,200 fighters in all of Greece... There was no CPG directive given for the establishment of the General Headquarters, established on October 28, 1946”. (Statements made by General Marcos at the CPG Central Committee 7th Plenum in 1957, published in the journal “Neos Kozmos”, April-May 1957, p. 53.)

The course the CPG was going to take was still unclear until October 1947 when, during the CPG Central Committee 3rd Plenum, the CPG called for an armed uprising expressed by the following paragraph:

“The American intervention in Greece has closed the door to both sides for an agreement and therefore has raised the question for starting an armed struggle.” Furthermore it puts in place the goal for “liberating the entire country, ensuring its independence and its democratic development”, and the immediate task of “creating more free territory and establishing a democratic government. To this end the Democratic Army is to conduct mobilization and numerical growth; raise the fighting spirit; design a master plan for attacking and implement tactics of constant offensives; to expand and increase impact; to protect our forces...”

3. Events from September 1946 to September 1947

Greece restored the monarchy with a forged plebiscite held in September 1946. George II came to the throne with a bad reputation in Greek political life, but greatly influenced the counter-revolutionary circles in Greece. With the Konstandin Tsaldaris government in power, George II had only one thing in mind: suppress the resistance movement by force. Such a solution could not be achieved without violent means including war. Therefore, his tactics steered towards a calculated blow to the democratic movement on the battlefield. And in December 1946, when he turned to the UN, he began his work in accordance with that plan, namely that the “armed rebellion was supported from the outside” and a war against the democratic forces in his country was justified.

The CPG position, on the other hand, was that the armed struggle should be strengthened but without intending to take power by force by overthrowing the government, but as a means of putting pressure on the government to withdraw quietly with a parliamentary solution. This CPG leadership attitude was valid only until October 1947, which was a result of the evaluation that “the balance of power in the country allowed this and that international conditions had matured enough for a peaceful solution to the Greek question”. Unfortunately, by then international conditions had turned against a “peaceful solution” because at that time the world was being internationally polarized and the spirit of the World War II coalition was being increasingly distorted.

A targeted aim of the Tsaldaris government, after the king returned to Greece, was to accelerate the growing terror against the democratic forces, which in turn intensified the growth of armed resistance in the country, where chaos reigned and economic and labour strikes became a regular phenomenon. In the fall of 1946, agreement was reached to combine and unite the Greek Left armed guerrilla forces with those of the (Greek occupied) Macedonian People’s Liberation Front (NOF) forces which had acted in conformity with the CPG. This agreement had a positive effect on amassing the armed struggle in the country. The small guerrilla groups were combined to form large and regular partisan units capable of standing up to the royal forces.

Being unable to resist the attacks on their own, the Greek reactionaries in December 1946 raised the issue at the UN. A UN Security Council Inquiry Commission was put together and dispatched to Greece in January 1947. During the time the Commission was preparing to visit Greece and during its visit, to some extent, the terror was eased and a weak image of democratic life began to show in the cities. The democratic newspapers, once again, began to publish their dailies and EAM organizations were able to acquire office space. But the moment the Inquiry Commission left Greece and with the takeover of the Ministry of Security by Napoleon Zervas, in March 1947, the mass terror was back again. Zervas filled all important positions in the Ministry with his friends and supporters. All those people who testified before the Inquiry Commission were arrested and thrown into prison. Zervas even issued orders to hunt down the central CPG leadership. The democratic newspapers were again shut down. The larger towns and cities were faced with frequent provocations disabling CPG and EAM functions.

The Tsaldaris Government used every means possible to destroy the guerrilla movement, refusing to agree to any kind of compromise or to maintain the struggle at a political level. To that end the government’s activities can be summarized as follows:

a) In order to restrict the development of the partisan movement, the government conducted mass terror campaigns against all democratic appearances. It conducted mass arrests, internments, killings and

issued death sentences in order to stem the democratic and worker-peasant movements in the towns and villages.

b) All responsible positions in the state apparatus were filled with people who had distinguished themselves with their anti-people’s works during the Metaxas fascist dictatorship, during the Italian and German occupation and afterwards.

c) The government used every means possible to increase and strengthen its armed forces with its own trusted people – both the army and the gendarmes. After that it began to arm the general “loyal” population and turn it into armed units.

The army was cleansed of all officers who appeared to have even the slightest democratic ideas and replaced with proven monarchists. It strengthened ESA – the military police, which stifled even the smallest democratic appearance. It mobilized new forces but this mobilization was done by personal invitation rather than by the usual general induction by year. It paid careful attention to the equipment and armament for the military. Officers and NCOs were paid well and veterans and their families were awarded assistance.

But despite all the measures taken, the monarchists, at that time, still had not developed a reliable military machine because the soldiers were not sure what they were fighting for. Also, given that they were fighting a civil war, they were expected to fight against their own people. Also, all those militant democratic elements, perceived as being a threat, were either in prison or in the mountains. That is why there was a conservative and hesitant spirit in the army. It took strong government propaganda to influence the soldiers to fight because a democratic victory was not possible… The propaganda emphasized the Anglo-American presence in Greece. Also, to avoid erosion the CPG was banned from influencing the ranks of the royal army.

In the hands of the Athens government, the police and the gendarmes were the most trusted armed forces in the country. They were privileged and well paid. They were responsible for persecuting the people and carrying out terrorist acts in the provinces. They were responsible for carrying out mass arrests in the

cities and villages, destroying democratic institutions, shutting down democratic newspapers, offices and clubs. They were also responsible for the fiercest fighting against the partisans. Included in the police and gendarme formations were many of the quisling elements and collaborators who aided the occupiers during the war. They were the people who participated in the “tagma asvalias” (battalion formations) in Greece and who fought in favour of the occupiers. With collaborator Napoleon Zervas taking charge of the Ministry of Public Security in March 1947, the police and gendarme forces were expanded and the terror and violence were increased to unprecedented heights, especially after the elections and the plebiscite.

In the course of 1947 the government began to force the civilian population to arms. This was nothing new and had been done before through “auxiliary organizations” under the pretext that “the population is arming to defend itself against the partisans”. Now that role was openly taken over by the state authorities, the military and the police. The armed civilians now became an integral part of the auxiliary armed forces in the counter-revolution. The units created were called “Monades Asfalias Ipetrou” MAI (Provincial Security Units) and played an important role as an auxiliary military and political tool for the Greek reactionaries during and after the Greek Civil War. To this day they still play an important role in Greece in the suppression of democratic rights.

The Monarcho-Fascist propaganda machine, using radio and the press, did not need a reason to attack the democratic movement and the democratic army, all it had to do was vilify them by calling them “weapons of the Slavs” who wanted to “destroy Greece”. Their propaganda also concentrated on strengthening the belief in the masses that Britain and the United States did not want the Democratic Army of Greece to win. It was very important to the US and the UK that DAG be destroyed because they did not want to lose a very important strategic position, which otherwise would fall to the influence of the USSR. This propaganda had significant impact on the masses because it was supported by actual events. Britain persistently fought in the UN to maintain the right to station troops on Greek territory and by being there they aided and intervened on behalf of the political right. The US government, on

the other hand, on top of its diplomatic and political support in international relations and in the UN, in March 1947 announced that it would give Greece material assistance, which followed immediately afterwards.

But in spite of all the effort the Tsaldaris government made to suppress the democratic movement, including increasing the government’s armed forces to the extent that the government would be able to defeat the partisan resistance, it was unable to do so. The partisan movement continued to grow and strike back with increased ferocity until the Royalist General Headquarters found it difficult to operate in wide open space and came up with a plan to withdraw into a secure space. In April 1947 the royalist government issued a secret order to all its units to withdraw from open spaces and concentrate in major administrative and communication centres. Here the forces found better security and at the same time isolated these urban centres from democratic partisan movement access. The royal army’s retreat into city centres was followed by a forceful civilian evacuation of many villages which gave the royalists greater economic control. These measures were accompanied by efforts made to organize a defense strategy around urban centres and communication facilities. The cities in the regions where partisan movements existed were surrounded by barbed wire (left over from the occupation), minefields, bunkers, machine gun and cannon nests, etc.

The tactics to withdraw the government forces from the most rebellious regions and place them in urban centres and the forceful evacuation of villagers from their homes (some villagers left on their own) created panic and economic chaos in the affected regions. The population in some affected cities doubled and tripled. Hundreds and thousands of refugees were forced to live in collective centres with meager assistance provided mainly by UNRA. The Athens government used the opportunity here to arm a segment of these refugees and use them to keep the rest down and to defend internal facilities.

Day by day the civil war in the country intensified and so did the never ending economic chaos and terror. Even though it was supported by six party leaders belonging to the extreme political

right, the Tsaldaris government fell in August 1947. In the next ten days that followed Tsaldaris tried to assemble a new “broad coalition” government to include the Liberals, but failed. Then on August 29, 1947, the Populists put together an exclusively one-party government but that too did not hold. On September 7, 1947 Themistoklis Sofoulis, as head of the Liberal Party, stepped up and created a new government.

The democratic forces, during this period, led a two-pronged fight against the Athens regime: one, politically and two, by militarily means through an armed partisan struggle. The political parties from the political left carried out the political struggle while simultaneously the armed struggle was carried out by the growing partisan units which later became the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). In the meantime, EAM fought against the terror in the country, trying to preserve and extend democratic rights, the right to life, the right to work and the right for its own parties and organizations to exist and function. Agitation was the most effective weapon used in the field, mostly through the press. The Athens regime, by then, had effectively disabled most democratic organizations and arrested many of the activists working in the field and among the masses. EAM’s main position was to stay calm and continue to work with the government on compromises for a peaceful means of development and building of the country, for cleansing the state apparatus and the army of fascist elements and for conducting free democratic elections (this was the CPG’s attitude at that time).

The EAM’s position regarding the armed resistance was that “this was a result of the immediate terror in the country”. Parallel to that was the CPG’s Directive: “Whoever is afraid and in danger of being arrested is welcome to join the partisan ranks.”

When the UN Inquiry Commission was in Greece, the CPG arranged a number of visits by individuals and groups with various memoranda and complaints. The opinion that prevailed in the Party at that time was that, in international terms, conditions were mature for a peaceful solution to the Greek question.

When Napoleon Zervas took control of the Ministry of Public Safety in March 1947, he not only escalated the ferocity of terror against the democratic population but brutally attacked EAM and CPG political organizations rendering them completely mute. This pressure from the political right created an even greater objective need for the partisan units to constantly grow; new fighters joined the partisan ranks, particularly those from the ranks of the democratic organizations who were threatened with arrests by state bodies.

The resistance movement gained particular momentum after April 1947, after the Greek government General Headquarters issued the order, mentioned earlier, for the government forces to withdraw from the terrain and organize their defenses in urban centres. But even though DAG in that period was growing at a faster rate, and from time to time repelled government attacks against the “free” zones, it was still an army with a revolutionary character and unable to engage the enemy in a general offensive.

In the spring of 1947, the government army was forced to withdraw from the rebellious terrain and move to urban and communications centres in Macedonia, Thessaly and Epirus. It is important to mention here that Greece, at that time, had not yet recovered from the destruction to its infrastructure which was destroyed during the war, especially its rail links. The rail link from Solun to Lerin and from Solun to Istanbul, for example, did not work. The urban centres had no defense facilities and the morale in the government army had fallen, while the morale of the DAG fighters was growing.

It was most unfortunate that DAG did not capitalize on these “favourable” conditions to attract more fighters to increase its decisive forces for the revolution. I have no idea what the CPG leadership was thinking, while it was free to walk the Athens boulevards. I have no idea what the DAG leadership thought, sitting quietly up in the mountains. But the fact remains that conditions were most favorable for initiating an offensive and expanding the “free” territories to include all of northwest Greece - western Macedonia, Epirus and part of Thessaly.

The reasons why the political left did not take advantage of the situation expressed earlier can be explained if we consider the following points:

- The armed uprising at the time was viewed not as a means to deliver a decisive victory over the enemy, but as a means to compel the enemy to compromise.

- Even though more focus was being shifted to the armed struggle, the EAM and CPG leaderships, in their numbers, still existed legally. Because of this the revolutionary forces were divided and its leadership was not in a good position to make strong demands in favour of the needs of the revolution.

- Because of the division in the revolutionary forces, the direction in which the struggle was going to take place could not be expressed in terms of which the masses and the armed insurgents could be made aware.

- To a considerable extent, the spirit and tactics of ELAS pervaded the ranks of DAG in saving its strength.

And thus the summer of 1947 came and went without delivering the decisive blows that could have been delivered by the revolutionary forces against the state machinery. In fact the signs of a positional struggle were there. The blockade of the free regions by the Athens government, for example, and the Democratic army responding with a counter-blockade, was a tactic which damaged the revolution; an error recognized a few months later. That was all the opponent needed, just those few months to organize his defenses and safeguard a few of his critical positions. Also, this was the most ideal time for DAG to expand its forces, improve its tactics in order to gain decisive superiority over the enemy and attack and defeat the enemy’s strong points. But that did not happen. In the summer of 1847 DAG, as it was then, had enough forces to deliver a crippling blow against its enemy but it didn’t do that either.

This, and the fact that the Athens regime had help from the international community, is why Greece did not destabilize during the ten days in August 1947 when it was facing a crisis without a

government. But had the revolutionary forces taken the offensive during that time, during the most severe crisis in the civil war, the Monarcho-Fascist regime could not have survived.

In August 1947, during the time that the government was facing a crisis in Greece, DAG General Headquarters issued a communiqué with which it declared that Greece was an “independent republic”. Further in the communiqué it reported that DAG General Headquarters was in charge of the supreme legislative and executive powers up to the formation of a democratic government.

4. International intervention

International intervention in Greece had actually started in the course of World War II when Britain, under the pretext of using the resistance movement in the country, was helping the collaborator Zervas to stifle the growth of the armed resistance movement led by EAM. But this was a hidden intervention until British intentions became clear in December 1944 when it was irrefutably asserted that the Greek political right had found itself in danger of completely losing its positions in Greece, with a high probability of being removed from power.

The December events were rekindled with the arrival of Churchill in Athens, accompanied by British Foreign Minister Eden, Commander of the Middle East forces Alexander and by Minister for the Middle East McMillan. Under the protection of British tanks the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on December 26 and 27, 1944, held a conference attended by representatives of the various political parties, the president of the Greek government that was resigning, George Papandreou, the regent candidate Archbishop of Athens Damaskinos and Nikolaos Plastiras (candidate for President of the Greek government). Attending from the CPG and EAM side were EAM Secretary and member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo Dimitrios Partsalidis. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the two allied Great Powers: US ambassador to Athens McCabe and representative of the Soviet Union Colonel Popov.

Churchill’s visit to Greece by itself was a sign of British intention. The British government was led into an extremely awkward situation, both in Greece and internationally which, at the time, existed in the atmosphere of the coalition. On the other hand, this speaks loudly of the fact that the political right in Greece was bottoming out and in danger; with a chance of losing if the struggle developed nationally. There was no consensus reached at this meeting and the fighting continued and ended with the signing of the Varkiza Agreement.

After this international scene with regards to the Greek question, things went down the road with a unilateral civil war waged against the democratic movement with moral and material assistance from the British forces which remained in Greece after World War II.

The “Greek question” itself, however, never did become a subject of international discussion during 1945.

With intentions of helping the EAM coalition, which had been persecuted in the country since the beginning of 1946, a Soviet delegation at the UN, on January 21, 1946, raised the Greek question in the Security Council with a request to adopt a resolution to “withdraw the British occupation forces from Greece”. This resolution, however, was met with bitter resistance from the British as well as from the American, French and other Western Power delegations which, after lengthy discussions at the Security Council, ended on February 6, 1946 with a vague resolution that read as follows: “The Security Council took into consideration statements made and opinions expressed by the Soviet, British and Greek delegations regarding the presence of British troops in Greece. The statements were entered into the Council’s documents and thus the issue was considered closed.”

Shortly after this, while the Greek situation was still active internationally, parliamentary elections were called in Greece to be held on March 31, 1946. EAM and some small bourgeois-democratic parties informed their supporters to abstain from voting. The elections took place anyway and, even though the results were falsified, the counter-revolutionary government was elected and legalized. The Greek bourgeoisie was in need of international factor

validation to show that “the elections were free”. On this the Greek political right received assistance from election monitors from three major powers: the US, Britain and France. In other words, it received international intervention from the Anglo-Americans because they saw this as a necessary measure to preserve their imperialist positions in Greece. After the March 31 elections a supposedly “legitimate” government was chosen which, with the September 1946 plebiscite, restored King George II to the Greek throne and continued the unilateral civil war against the democratic movement in Greece. The extended persecution by the right against the democratic movement caused a gradual increase in the democratic resistance movement, which turned the unilateral civil war into a real civil war. Feeling the pressure, the Greek government turned to the UN for help. On December 3, 1946 a Greek delegation was sent to the UN to inform the Security Council that the struggle being led in Greece was led with help from the outside, claiming that “the rebels in Greece are being helped by Greece’s northern neighbours who are it violation of international law and are endangering the peace and security in the Balkans”.

This Greek government appeal was quickly discussed in the Security Council and, with support from the Anglo-Americans, on December 19, 1946 a decision was reached to form an Inquiry Commission which was to go to Greece and examine the situation on the ground. The Inquiry Commission consisted of 11 Security Council representatives which included delegates representing the interested parties of the four named Balkan countries - Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria on the one hand and Greece on the other. The Inquiry Commission began its work on January 29, 1947 as soon as it arrived in Athens. The Commission remained in Athens from January 19 to February 15, 1946, after which time it moved to Solun with individual teams visiting one side and then the other side of Greece’s northern border. On March 24, 1946 the Commission left for Sofia and Belgrade with one team heading for Skopje, where it held meetings until April 2, 1947, conducting interviews of witnesses. The Commission also received CPG and EAM delegations, one team even made contact with General Markos Vafiadis, Army Commander of DAG General Headquarters. The Inquiry Commission then retreated to Geneva where it remained from April 17 to May 23, 1947 preparing the report of its findings.

Unfortunately the report was not impartial and therefore was not unanimously supported. But with 8 out of 11 votes, the following conclusion was reached:

“Based on evidence found, the Commission concluded that Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, did help the rebel war in Greece.”

This is exactly what the Greek regime in Athens needed in order to mobilize the UN to help the Greek government. In other words, to justify American aid and the presence of British forces in Greece on one hand, and to suppress outside assistance offered to the democratic movement on the other, all in the nаме of preventing the Partisan movement from “threatening the peace in the Balkans” and from “violating international law”. The Inquiry Commission report hardly made any mention of the terror that the democratic forces were facing or their opinions as to what they were fighting for and why more than 70,000 people were in prison, people who not only did not collaborate with the occupier but were fighters in the resistance movement, hundreds killed, tortured, etc. And in that sense the democratic forces took moral victory.

Based on the conclusion the Inquiry Commission delivered and even before it had completed its first survey, a new Inquiry Commission called the “Balkan Commission” was put together. This Commission, however, was not recognized by the Balkan countries -Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania; the countries that were accused of “helping the rebel war”. Even though the Commission did not visit their territories, it collected “evidence” that “Greece’s northern neighbours threatened its independence”. This Commission was the moral factor of the Greek bourgeoisie which helped them survive the major crisis in 1947.

But moral support was not quite enough to quell the partisan movement. Material assistance was also needed. However the weight of growing Greek demands on Britain was too much to bear so the United States took Britain’s place. In March 1947, US President Harry Truman openly said that he was determined to “help Greece secure its independence”. Truman announced this to the US Congress and his statement became known as the “Truman

Doctrine”, which basically was a plan to rescue the Greek bourgeoisie. Based on this the US government began to openly intervene in the Greek Civil War. In 1947 alone the US sent 300 million dollars of military aid and this practice continued throughout the entire duration of the civil war and beyond. On top of material assistance in military equipment, the US also sent military experts to train the Greek army. In the fall of 1947 a joint military staff was formed and placed under the command of US General Van Fleet and all major operational units were staffed with US officers. This intervention was deemed of “legal” character because it was there to help the “legally elected government” and the “lawful regime in Greece” against “subversive elements”. US aid came at a time when the Greek bourgeoisie had fallen into a difficult situation. Before the US had awarded this aid, part of the Greek bourgeoisie was unsure of Prime Minister Konstantine Tsaldaris’s Populist Party and the success of its dynamic policies. Themistoklis Sofoulis, head of the Liberals with his MP’s in opposition, had criticized the government and the partisan movement of being two extremes and advocated “for agreements”, “peace”, etc. But the arrival of US aid in September 1947 had such an effect on the entire liberal bourgeoisie that it entered into coalition with the government and led the war against the Democratic Army with even greater dexterity.

Based on the two reports which the Balkan Commission prepared regarding “Greece’s neighbours helping the rebel war”, the Greek government requested that this “Greek issue” remain on the Security Council agenda, which it did for the entire summer of 1947. But because the Soviet Union placed a veto on it whenever the issue was brought up, the US, on August 20, 1947, sent a request to the UN Secretary General to move the “Greek issue” to the UN General Assembly agenda. When the General Assembly convened on December 17, 1947 in New York, the item was present on the agenda under the theme “Endangerment of the national independence and territorial integrity of Greece”.

The initiation of the “Greek issue” by the US delegation in August 1947 had great significance for the Greek government and was also encouragement for the counter-revolutionary forces in the country. The major crisis that the Greek government faced in August 1947, thanks to the international factor, primarily the US, reached consent

and the leadership was assigned a mandate to put together a government headed by Themistoklis Sofoulis. For the Americans, and for the international factor, it was like it was for the domestic factor, he was last but a pretty good trump card.