Part 26 - The Skopje and Strumitsa Uprisings

Part 26 - The Skopje and Strumitsa Uprisings

Just before the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District began its preparation for the Ilinden Uprising, its leadership decided to rename the District to “Ovche Pole” in hopes of keeping it clandestine. Unfortunately those involved in continued to call it “the District of Skopje”. Ovche Pole, or the District of Skopje, was supported by a population of 308,719 people of whom 196,417 or 64% were Macedonians. Of the remaining, 82,084 or 26% were Ottomans, 15,543 or 5% were Albanians and 14,000 or so were Vlachs and others. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 353) The most significant strategic part of the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District was the central location through which the transportation and communication corridors passed, connecting Skopje to Kjustandil, Kumanovo, Prishtina and Solun. This strategic location was very important to the Ottomans so it was well guarded. Because of the constant movement of Ottoman troops and supplies this region was always very busy and difficult for the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization to function in unnoticed. Besides being well guarded and well traveled by the Ottomans, this region was also sandwiched between the largely Albanian populated villages to the north, swarming with Bashi-Bazouks, and the Ottoman civilian populations to the south. The constant pressure from all sides created many obstacles for the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and made preparations for the National Uprising very difficult. As if that was not enough, there was also pressure from Serbia. As Serbia was preparing to assert its influence in Macedonia, many of its agents were operating inside Macedonia, feverishly promoting Serbian propaganda. This interfered with the natural development of the Macedonian national consciousness, a vital component in creating awareness and recruiting insurgents. There were also constant clashes between the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and the Bulgarian sponsored Supremacist forces competing for control of this District, which did not always go un-noticed by the Ottomans. In fact because of these clashes there was an incident in 1897, later termed “the Vinitsa affair”, which caused much damage not only to the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District but to the entire revolutionary movement as well. After the Solun assassinations in April 1903, the Ottomans began to suspect that the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was busy promoting revolutionary ideas and preparing the population for an Uprising. With that in mind, Ottoman authorities began to reinforce their military instillations, particularly those in vital areas such as Skopje and the surrounding region. Outside of reinforcing their regular military

instillations, the Ottomans in Skopje District also mobilized the Albanian and Muslim population forming numerous Bashi-Bazouk units. By the end of June 1903, Ottoman military strength in the Skopje Vilayet was up to 87 infantry battalions, each consisting of 800 regular soldiers, 20 cavalry squadrons, 19 field artillery batteries, 36 mountain weapons, 3 pioneer Chetas and several technical stations. The Ottomans had over 80,000 soldiers stationed in the Skopje Vilayet alone. Of these, 23 infantry battalions, 5 cavalry squadrons, 10 field artillery batteries and 2 pioneer Chetas were stationed in Skopje Sanjak, on the territory of the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District. After the Solun assassinations, Ottoman army installations were reorganized and forces were relocated to the east of Skopje mainly to Kumanovo, Kratovo, Kriva Palanka and Kochani and were placed in a state of combat readiness. Many of these units were also charged with guarding various places of strategic importance such as villages, roads, bridges, etc. Being under constant watch by the Ottomans and having to compete with Bulgarian sponsored Supremacist intrusions, the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District leadership decided it would be best if its forces existed in small units. This way it could carry out partisan style diversionary missions without engaging the enemy and at the same time keep the civilian population safe from retribution and retaliatory attacks from the enemy. On July 17, 1903 the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District held a Congress in Kratovo. The Congress was unfortunately only attended by the Skopje Cheta, lead by vojvoda Nikola Pushkarov, and by the Kratovo Cheta, lead by vojvoda Dime Stojanov Berbercheto. In spite of the small turnout however, it was decided, among other things, to pursue and capture the Rumelia Vilyet main inspector, who at any time was expected to be there. They also planned to attack Kratovo and capture Husein Hilmi Pasha. Husein Hilmi Pasha, they were informed, would be residing in Kratovo while visiting the Eastern Cazas of the Skopje Sanjak. As was the case with other Revolutionary Districts, on July 30th, 1903 General Headquarters informed the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District of the date of the National Uprising and requested of its leadership to make plans and prepare for attacks. It also requested it to carry out diversionary attacks on the roads and bridges and keep the Ottoman forces engaged as much as possible. Diversionary attacks were ordered to begin immediately after the Bitola Uprising Revolutionary District began its Uprising on August 2nd, 1903. Unfortunately the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District remained passive during this period because the District’s plans to capture Husein Hilmi Pasha were discovered and Husein Hilmi Pasha reinforced his military and police units making it impossible for the insurgents to operate. All the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District could muster that day was to assemble the City of Skopje Cheta, lead by the teacher vojvoda Andrej Kozhuharov, which numbered no more than 170 insurgents. Unfortunately that Cheta too could not operate and had to quickly withdraw so as not to endanger the Macedonian civilian population because in addition to reinforcing his military and police units, Husein Hilmi Pasha also armed the Muslim population with 5,000 modern rifles and had the city surrounded preventing the Macedonian population from gathering during the day or from leaving or entering the city during the night. Skopje was surrounded, barricaded and locked tight by regular and by irregular Ottoman military forces making all insurgent efforts to start the Uprising futile. But regardless of what was happening in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District the Ilinden Uprising in Bitola began as planned. At this point vojvoda Nikola Pushkarov moved his Cheta out of Kratovo to the St. Jovan Monastery near the mouth of the Pchinja River where 100 kilos of dynamite and 200 bombs were stored.

After recovering the ammunition Pushkarov dispatched his deputy Milan Angelov with a number of insurgents and 30 kilos of dynamite to deliver it to the Cheta inside Skopje so that diversionary actions could be initiated inside the city. Unfortunately, when Angelov and his insurgents arrived in Skopje, the Skopje Cheta, lead by Kozhuharov, had already left and there was no one there to receive the dynamite. Unable to deliver the material, the planned diversionary actions never materialized. Sometime after the General Uprising began, Macedonians working outside of Macedonia began to arrive and joined the fighting. One such group, consisting of seven insurgents lead by vojvoda Andelko Aleksich, arrived in Skopje from Serbia and at the beginning of August joined Pushkarov’s Cheta. Reinforced by Aleksich and his insurgents, Puskarov decided it was time to carry out those overdue expected diversions. The first target of attack was the railway. At this time the railway was of crucial importance to the delivery of Ottoman troops to the various battle zones. Any attacks on the railway would hinder Ruzdi Pasha's ability to deliver Ottoman soldiers where they were needed. As it happened, Ottoman forces at the time were being moved from Uroshevats through Skopje and Veles destined for the Gradsko railway station. From there the troops were expected to go on foot via Prilep to Bitola in order to suppress the Bitola Uprising. During the night of August 13th, 1903 Puskarov and his insurgents arrived at the St. Jovan Monastery near the village Vetersko. There Pushkarov divided his Cheta into three squads each consisting of 12 insurgents. With himself in command, he reinforced the first squad with the village Cheta from Kozhle and tasked it with taking control of a local bridge. The second squad, lead by Dimitar Bojanov was dispatched northward to take control of another bridge. The third squad, lead by Todor Nikolov, was dispatched across the river to take control of a tunnel. Each squad was instructed to wait until 11pm before attacking its target. At precisely 11 pm Pushkarov and his insurgents opened fire on the 50 soldier security force guarding the bridge. A fierce battle ensued. Surprised by the vicious attack 10 Ottoman soldiers were left dead and the rest fled. Fearing more Ottoman soldiers would soon return, the insurgents mined the bridge with explosives but in their haste managed to use the wrong fuses and their effort to blow it up was unsuccessful. The second squad lead by Bojanov attacked the northern bridge at the scheduled time but without success. The security force on this bridge was better prepared and the insurgents were unable to dislodge it. Given the number of soldiers guarding the tunnel, the third squad decided it was not safe to attack and withdrew. Disappointed that he did not blow up the targeted bridges and tunnel, Pushkarov decided to take more drastic measures and blow up a military train. His insurgents waited near the village Novachani until a train arrived before setting off the charges. This time the explosives did go off but only caused minimal damage. With only two soldiers wounded, the military train continued along its journey unabated. This action however did have some subsequent effects because for the next two days the Ottomans stopped using this railway to transport soldiers. Also this part of the railway was only used during daylight hours. The next day, August 14, 1903, after bombing the train Pushkarov’s insurgents retreated to the St. Jovan Monastery only to be discovered by the Ottomans. No sooner had they arrived than they were surrounded and attacked. The insurgents fought back fiercely all day but could not break the siege. Finally they broke through the siege during the night and escaped to the village Divlje. There they met up with the Kumanovo Cheta lead by vojvoda Bobi Stojchev and together the Cheti fled for the seclusion of the Sveti Nikole Monastery in Gurishte. This hideout too unfortunately was discovered by the Ottomans and on August 16, 1903 the Chetas were surrounded by a large Ottoman force aided by Bashi-Bazouks from the local villages.

Numbering about 50, the insurgents resisted with all their might and around 9 pm the same night they broke through the siege and escaped to Kumanovo. On August 30, 1903 another Ottoman force was dispatched to seek and destroy the Chetas but by then the Chetas were well on their way to Vranje in Serbia, out of Ottoman reach. Other Chetas belonging to the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District remained active and were joined by new Chetas, such as the one from Kochani, until the Ottoman counter offensive began. On August 27, 1903 Georgi (Goshe) Tanev’s Cheta from Dolno Trogertsi, Shtip Region, consisting of 12 insurgents, was surrounded by

200 soldiers from the regular Ottoman army and destroyed. After a long and vicious battle 10 of the 12 insurgents were killed. On August 15, 1903 another Cheta attempted to blow up the iron bridge near the village Nerezi but without success. Its plans were discovered before they could be put into action. Another Cheta attempted to cut the telegraph lines near the village Gorno Lisiche but it too was unsuccessful due to its premature discovery by the Ottomans. On August 17, 1903 two of Ruzdi Pasha’s Ottoman battalions from Uroshevats arrived in Skopje, increasing the Skopje battalions to seven. At this point the Ottomans were amassing a huge force, up to 15 battalions, in order to subdue the Uprising in the various regions in Eastern Macedonia. By mobilizing its forces the Ottoman plan was to create up to 55 battalions and let them loose on the Macedonians. On August 26, 1903 the Skopje Vilyet alone had amassed 41 battalions and by mid September that number had increased to 63 battalions, five squadrons, two artillery regiments and two pioneer Chetas. Because of fears of a Bulgarian invasion, most of these forces were dispatched to guard the frontiers at the Macedonian-Bulgarian border. This massive show of force literally ended the first or diversionary phase of the Uprising in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District but the National Uprising was not over. The second phase began with the arrival of two new Chetas from Bulgaria. Both numbering about 100 each, were lead by vojvodas Vladislav Kovachev and Atanas Dimitrov-Babata. Unfortunately on their way to Skopje the Chetas were intercepted by Ottoman forces. Pinned down by 300 Ottoman soldiers at Plavitsa Mountain, just south of Kratovo, the insurgents fought a vicious battle killing 25 Ottoman soldiers and losing 2 of their own. Due to the severity of the battle, the Chetas returned to Bulgaria. The following day several new Chetas arrived in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District with over 270 insurgents lead by vojvodas Hristo Tsernopeev, Captain Georgi Trenev, Pesho Samardzhiev and others. Among the several Chetas were Dushko Zheve’s technical specialist’s Cheta and Milan Stoilov’s field medics. Again due to the large Ottoman presence in the region, Hristo Chernopeev’s Cheta was spotted by spies in the village Vitosha in Kochani Region, and on September 16, 1903 came under Ottoman pursuit. After spotting the Ottomans, Tsernopeev and his insurgents fled for the security of the mountains and took up defensive positions. Unfortunately in their haste to flee the insurgents left a vast part of their arms and ammunition in the village which the Ottomans had unintentionally destroyed. Unaware of the presence of the ammunition, which included bombs and dynamite, the Ottoman soldiers set fire to the houses in the village and as the bombs began to explode they became startled fearing an attack. The Ottomans withdrew immediately and called for reinforcements. After about 6,000 new soldiers arrived the next day, the Ottomans went in pursuit of Tsernopeev’s Cheta in the mountains. A fierce battle ensued and lasted the entire day. Unable to hold back the numerically superior Ottoman force, the insurgents in the dark of night decided to flee towards the Bulgarian border. Unfortunately due to the heavy build up of Ottoman forces at the frontier the Cheta was spotted and intercepted by Ottoman soldiers. To save itself, the Cheta split into several smaller units and each took separate paths to safety. This unfortunately still did not save them all as some of the units were ambushed and destroyed. The ones remaining, with the exception of one, fled to Bulgaria. One fled to Sultantepe and fell into an ambush. A vicious battle broke out lasting two days. The Macedonians fought fiercely and by September 18, 1903 when the battle was over 75 insurgents and 380 Ottoman soldiers lost their lives. One of the most vicious battled fought in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District was that of September 24th, 1903 where Nikola Dechev’s Cheta from Veles, Grigor Manasiev’s Cheta from Kratovo and Toma Pazarliev’s Cheta from Voden, totaling 113 insurgents, were pitted against a force of 7,000 Ottoman Soldiers.

The Macedonian Chetas found themselves surrounded near Lukovo and Emiritsa in Kratovo Region when the battle broke out. Unable to puncture the siege, the Macedonians fought gallantly the entire day. Then during the dark of night they slipped through the encirclement and fled to Bulgaria. While most escaped with their lives intact, 31 insurgents, including vojvodas Dechev and Manasiev, lost theirs. Outside of battling the Ottomans, the Macedonians in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District also fought against Bulgarian sponsored Supremacist bands operating in Skopje Region, especially near the Macedonian-Serbian border. This was particularly more pronounced after the fall of the Krushevo Republic. Unfortunately the failed Uprising in this region, as carefully as it was planned not to provoke Ottoman retaliation against the civilian population, did exactly that and the Macedonian people suffered immensely from Ottoman retaliation and revenge killings. As large as the Macedonian population in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District was the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was unable to motivate it on mass to take up arms against the Ottomans. But as we have seen it was not because the population was unwilling to fight but rather because it was afraid of Ottoman retaliation; a fate it did not escape. The Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District covered an area stretching from the Struma River in the east to the Vardar River in the west. It bordered the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District in the north and the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District in the south. In other words,

it covered the Strumitsa, Radovish, Maleshevo and parts of Gorna Dzhumaja Regions. The Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District had two important roads and a rail line passing through its territory which made it strategically very important to both the Ottomans and the Macedonians. One road, connecting Strumitsa with Solun and Sofia, followed the flow of the Struma River. The other road and railway, connecting Solun and Skopje, followed the flow of the Vardar River. The Vardar and Struma valleys in turn were interconnected via the Kluch Gorge and via the Strumitsa to Petrich roadway. At that time the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District was supported by a population of 104,000 people of whom 71% were Macedonians. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 357) At the Solun Congress when it was decided to begin the National Uprising early, the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District, represented by Ivan Ingilizov from Strumitsa and Georgi Vamaliev from Radovish, despite its unprepared state, voted for an early uprising. The District did not have enough weapons to arm all its insurgents but that did not worry its leadership because it expected that Bulgaria would soon furnish it with what it needed. Towards the end of January 1903 the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District was visited by Boris Sarafov and his Cheta of 40 insurgents. At that time there were two local Chetas operating in the District with a combined strength of 25 insurgents, which joined Sarafov’s Cheta in its mission to inspect the readiness of Strumitsa District. Sent by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Sarafov’s job here was to consolidate the various bands and their leaders who were at the time operating independently and to begin agitating the population and prepare it for the National Uprising. Towards the end of March more help arrived when Hristo Tsernopeev and Hristo Maznejkov arrived with their Chetas to assist with the Uprising in Strumica and Radovis Regions. Nikola Detsev’s Cheta from Veles and Timo Angelov’s Cheta from Tikves also crossed the border into the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District and together with the other Chetas participated in various missions. On April 6, 1903 the combined Chetas descended from Mount Goten and openly attacked the Ottoman, making this an offensive operation. When the battle was over Tsernopeev and Maznejkov went to Strumitsa and Radovish Regions to continue their missions. After the Solun assassinations 200 angry and frustrated residents from the village Voislavtsi, in Radovis Region, armed with a variety of firearms, swords, knives and pitchforks took to the streets and demanded that Tsernopeev immediately commence the Uprising. Fortunately Tsernopeev was able to calm the angry villagers but not for long. All through May, 1903 frustration drove people to take to their protests to the streets; resulting in fights. Unfortunately the usual cure for this type of violence was more violence and Ottoman retaliation. In mid July 1903 while traveling through Radovis, Hilmi Pasha himself ordered extreme measures be taken against these outbreaks. This, as usual, resulted in punishing the innocent civilian population more than it punished the troublemakers. Without the delivery of the expected arms and ammunition from Bulgaria, the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District leadership found itself inadequately prepared and unable to sustain any operations, not even partisan style diversionary ones.