Part 18 – The Ilinden 1903 Uprising

Part 18 – The Ilinden 1903 Uprising

As was decided at the Solun Congress of January 1903, bells would toll to welcome the Uprising and the people in all villages and cities in all of Macedonia would rise up and with all their might demonstrate to the world their displeasure to Ottoman rule. Even though many knew they were not properly prepared for a fight, they saw the Uprising as a welcome alternative to the status quo of being tormented and oppressed. After the Solun assassinations in April 1903 Ottoman authorities took extraordinary measures to prevent the occurrence of an uprising which is why they reinforced their military capabilities with 80,000 soldiers. Besides mobilizing the Muslim population and creating a number of Bashibazuk units, Ottoman authorities also reinforced their forces with 87 infantry battalions numbering approximately 800 soldiers each, 20 cavalry squadrons, 19 artillery batteries, 36 mountain type weapons, 3 pioneer chetas and a number of technical stations. Once the decision to begin the Uprising was made, the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO) set plans in motion and converted the six Revolutionary Districts into six Uprising Districts and moved their headquarters to safe places deep in the mountains. Each Uprising District was numbered and was given a pseudonym: 1 -Pelister, 2 - Kozhuf, 3 -Belasitsa, 4 - Pirin, 5 - Ograzhden and 6 - Ovche Pole, to keep the locations a secret. Although differing in opinions on how to conduct the Uprising, its goal none the less was to liberate Macedonia from Ottoman rule. The districts that were prepared to participate in the Uprising were the Revolutionary District of Bitola, the Revolutionary District of Skopje, the Revolutionary District of Strumitsa, the Revolutionary District of Solun and the Revolutionary District of Seres. The Revolutionary District of Bitola, being geographically located near roads and communication lines of significance, was chosen to lead the Rebellion which is why the general Headquarters for the Uprising, both political and military, was located in the village Smilevo, near the vicinity of the city of Bitola. Among the personnel who administered the mountain headquarters in Bitola District were Parashkev Tsvetkov, Ivan Delev, Gjorgji Pavlov and Gjorgji Sugarev. The Bitola District itself was sub-divided into three Regions, the Mariovo, Smilevo and Pelister Region. According to military historian Dr. Vanche Stojchev, the population of the Bitola area, just before the 1903 Ilinden Uprising, consisted of 35,983 people of whom 20,713 were Macedonians, 11,150 were Vlachs, 2,740 were Albanians (of whom 250 persons were Christians) and 1,380 were Ottomans. Among the participants in the Uprising were almost the entire Macedonian and Vlach populations and some Albanian Christians. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 310) The Skopje District, also known as number 6 – Ovche Pole District, was subdivided into seven Regions with a total population of 308,719 people of whom 196,417 or 64% were Macedonians. The rest were 82,084 or 26% Ottomans, 15,543 or 5% Albanians and others. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 353) Unfortunately as it turned out, the Skopje District was one of the least prepared Districts to enter the Uprising and was hampered by many factors including the heavily traveled and guarded main roads that lead from Skopje to Kjustandil, Kumanovo, Prishtina, Nish and Solun. The constant movements of Ottoman troops, the numerous Bashibazuks, the involvement of Vrhovist forces attacking the Macedonians and the spreading of Serbian propaganda in the region were all obstacles working against the Macedonian Uprising in that District. Of the total number of Ottoman forces stationed in Macedonia, given the massive Macedonian population living in the Skopje sanjak, 23 battalions, 5 squadrons, 10 batteries and 2 pioneer chetas were positioned on the territory of the Skopje sanjak.

This naturally convinced the MRO leadership to re-think their approach on how to deploy their forces and a decision was made to only carry out terrorist type attacks and avoid direct confrontation with the Ottoman army. The Skopje District held a Congress in Kratovo on July 17, 1903 which was attended by the Skopje Cheta lead by vojvoda Nikola Pushkarov and by the Kratovo Cheta lead by vojvoda Dime Stojanov Barbercheto. But because of the limited attendance little was accomplished except for Pushkarov and Stojanov’s decisions to engage the enemy by planning to capture Husein Hilmi Pasha, chief inspector of the Rumelia vilayets, at the time visiting the eastern kazas of the Skopje sanjak. The Strumitsa District covered the Region stretching along the Strumitsa River in the East, to the Vardar River in the West bordering the Skopje District to the North and the Solun District to the South. Included in the Strumitsa District were Strumitsa, Radovish, Maleshevo and parts of Gorna Dzhumaja Regions. Strumitsa was a key strategic point because of its proximity to the road following the Struma River which connected Solun with Sofia and the road and railway line following the flow of the Vardar River connecting Solun and Skopje. These two valleys were connected via the Kluch Gorge and the Strumitsa to Petrich roadway. Prior to the Ilinden Uprising the population of Strumitsa District numbered about 104,000 of which 74,000 was Macedonian. Even though Ivan Ingilizov from Strumitsa and Giorgi Vamaliev from Radovish, representing the Strumitsa District at the Solun Congress, both voted for an early uprising they did not have enough weapons to engage the enemy and were heavily relying on Bulgaria to supply them. Unfortunately the promised weapons from Bulgaria never materialized and as Ottoman authorities began to crack down, Strumitsa District did not have a Congress and no preparations for the Uprising were ever made. The Solun District was divided into two Regions pseudo-named number 2 – Kozhuv and number 3 – Balisitsa. Again according to military historian Dr. Vanche Stojchev the population living in the Solun District prior to the Uprising numbered 418,270 people of which 195,637 were Macedonians, 103,957 were Ottomans and 30,786 were Jews, Vlachs and others. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 258) The Solun District was one of the most important Districts in Macedonia because it was an important economic, political and military center. And because Solun was the center of the vilayet, it was home to much of the Ottoman administration and military. Solun was home to the 3rd Army Corps, the 17th Infantry Division, the 3rd Cavalry Division, the 3rd Artillery Division and to various other regiments and staff. But because of Solun’s proximity to Asia Minor and because of its transportation potential, it could easily import more military forces on short notice if necessary. The tense situation created by the April 1903 Solun assassinations and the subsequent arrest of thousands significantly reduced the number of revolutionaries and their potential to carry out a massive Uprising in the Solun District. Being left with little to work with the Solun District, particularly the Kozhuf Region, was reduced to campaign by terrorist tactics. Among the leaders from this district who participated in the Uprising were vojvoda Sava Mihaijlov, vojvoda Argir Manasiev and vojvoda Apostol Petkov. But in spite of the shortcomings the Solun District did well during the Uprising keeping the Ottoman forces constantly engaged, forcing them to divide up their powerful army thus giving the other districts a break. The Seres District covered the territory to the River Mesta in the East, the Bulgarian border in the North, the River Struma in the West and the Aegean Sea in the South. The city of Seres was its center. Prior to the Uprising the population living in this district consisted of 429,382 people of whom 245,582 were Macedonians and the rest were Muslims, Ottomans, Vlachs and others.

(Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 362) Seres Region is another part of Macedonia that is of geographical and strategic significance particularly because of its numerous mountains, rivers and gorges. The Ottomans thought so too which is why they stationed parts of their 9th Infantry Division and their 18th Brigade in the city of Seres, their 33rd Infantry Brigade in Gorna Dzhumaja, and a number

of battalions in the cities Melnik, Drama, Demir Hisar, Nevrokop and others. They also had smaller units, ranging from 30 to 40 soldiers and from 100 to 150 soldiers, stationed outside of the major cities deployed in villages and strategic locations. Then just before the Uprising Seres was reinforced bringing the number of Ottoman soldiers to 5,000. The Seres District, also known by its pseudonym number 4 – Pirin, represented by Lazar Dimitrov at the Solun Congress voted against an early Uprising but accepted the decision of the majority and began its preparations for a fight. Unfortunately after Gotse Delchev’s death the District of Seres postponed its Congress because of the infighting between Vrhovists and Delchev’s supporters and the Congress never materialized until August 22nd, 1903. Having discussed the Uprising situation and the Solun Congress decision at length with Gotse Delchev, Yane Sandanski, chairman of the Seres Congress, decided to continue the Uprising terrorist style just like Delchev had recommended. Also during the Seres Congress which lasted three days it was decided to begin the Uprising on September 14th, 1903 on Krstovden. After all the preparations and after all that was said and done it was up to each individual to do his or her part in aid of the Uprising. But as was well known to most, the Macedonian people were not adequately prepared for such an Uprising. Even those who were willing to fight and give their lives for the liberation of their country unnecessarily sacrificed themselves. Fighting unequal battles against the Ottomans and consistently risking their lives for country and liberty were heroic acts indeed but this is not what the MRO had envisioned for the Macedonian people. The MRO, particularly Gotse Delchev, wanted a slow and widespread campaign of hit and run tactics to divide and wear down the enemy with minimum loss to the rebels. By continuously disrupting communications, travel and business in general, it was believed would wear down the Ottoman administration forcing it to make concessions. But lack of training and pent-up frustration drove the rebels to throw themselves at their tormentors with all their might resulting in many unnecessary deaths. The Macedonian Chetas were numerically small in comparison to the Ottoman army, sometimes outnumbered by more than ten to one but the ferocity of the Macedonian fighters more than matched the numbers. In terms of how to conduct campaigns, the Macedonian rebels had strict rules to adhere to. These were designed for their safety and for the preservation of their lives. When marching to a campaign, fighters were organized in columns, one by one or two by two marching at a distance of three to four steps apart. Each column was accompanied by intelligence and combat security units. Two or three fighters were assigned reconnaissance duty, usually frontal, flank and rear. Columns moved four to six kilometers per hour and hid from sight during rest periods. Unsecured zones were usually checked by couriers or reconnaissance patrols and information on enemy movements was relayed to the column. During movements strict discipline was exercised making sure no one was talking or smoking and orders were given by whispering. Fighters also used camouflage especially when approaching guarded places or places where they could be seen by the public. In villages and towns insurgents were strategically positioned in houses from where they could make observations and relay information back to those outdoors. When the Uprising first began the insurgents applied mostly offensive tactics by sudden and massive attacks, which in the short term proved to be very effective. But as the enemy forces built up the insurgents switched to more hit and run and eventually to defensive tactics. Offensive actions in populated areas had to be organized very carefully and with utmost secrecy, being very cautious not to harm the civilian population. Uprising forces were divided into detachments, Chetas and cores.

Reserve forces were organized whenever possible but often village Chetas were used for that purpose. Immediately before a campaign the insurgents made sure the place of attack was isolated, particularly of civilians, and the attack began when the insurgents came 100 to 200 steps away from the position being attacked. The signal for commencing the attack was usually a bomb explosion. The weakest point of defense was usually the first point of attack. The Ilinden Uprising began with military campaigns and offensive actions and after the desired effect was achieved the insurgents switched to defensive actions mainly to protect the liberated areas and the population in them until such time when the Great Powers or the Bulgarian army intervened, which as we know never happened. Defensive actions were organized at various strategic points in populated areas such as villages and towns. The Macedonians did not have the necessary numbers to defend entire regions so they concentrated their defenses around hills, passages, roads and other convenient places from where the enemy could be observed and its advance obstructed. Defensive positions were also organized in camps and populated areas with a main defensive position in the nearby hills and a backup position in the first buildings on approach to the settlement. Guards were posted to watch enemy activities and report to their leaders. If the enemy was to approach the defended settlement, the backup guards would initiate a battle in order to delay enemy penetration until the leadership could organize a proper defense depending on the size and strength of the enemy. Unfortunately insurgents, whose families lay behind the flimsy first line of defense, could not stand to wait for reinforcements and would throw themselves at the enemy and fight to the death. The best example of such self-sacrifice was that of vojvodas Pitu Guli and Gjorgij Stojanov who not only turned down the Ottoman offer for surrender but disobeyed General Headquarters orders to retreat. On many occasions defensive strategies were turned into suicidal attacks when reinforcements could not arrive on time or when there was potential for the enemy to penetrate the defenses and attack the civilian population. The Ilinden Uprising received a massive response from the Macedonian people and from other ethnicities living in Macedonia and in the neighbouring countries. But the real driving force behind the Uprising was the rural and village population which not only sacrificed many lives but suffered the most. The Ilinden Uprising was yet another step in the eternal struggle for freedom for the Macedonian people. According to information published in 1904, 26,500 insurgents from all over Macedonia participated in the Ilinden Uprising and fought 239 battles against an Ottoman army of 350,000. Losses to the Ottomans totaled 6,000 dead and 5,000 wounded. On the Macedonian side 1,000 insurgents were killed in direct confrontations with the Ottoman army, more than 200 villages were burned down, 4,700 women, children and old people killed, 3,000 women and young girls raped, 70,000 people left homeless and 30,000 people fled the country as war refugees. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 368) In terms of achieving its aims, the MRO fell short of delivering a military victory but its aims were not to defeat the Ottoman army but to last out and fight a long term terrorist-type war until the Great Powers or the Bulgarian army intervened as had been promised. But as we know the 1903 Uprising was very much more than an active military movement. It was also a passive demonstration in which the whole Macedonian population participated. As mentioned earlier the casualties from the battles were relatively small but it was the non-combatants who bore the full weight of the Ottoman wrath. The misery, loss and hardship endured with courage and unfaltering resolution were a sacrifice to the ideal of liberty rarely paralleled by any of Macedonia’s neighbours.

Every town and village that joined the Uprising did so with the knowledge that it might be burned to the ground, pillaged and its population decimated to the last person. That every Macedonian voluntarily faced these dangers is proof of each Macedonian’s desperation in which life had lost its value and peace its meaning. In many of the districts which joined the Uprising the people had little doubt about what was in store for them and many abandoned their villages the first day of the insurrection. Men joined their bands accompanied by a few women, who went to bake and as nurses to care for the wounded. The older men, women and children sought refuge in the mountains and took with them as much food as they could carry. In most of the insurgent defended zones the non-combatant population came together under the direction of the MRO and formed great camps in inaccessible places. Temporary shelters were constructed from the branches of trees, ovens dug in the earth and all the normal functions of village life were reproduced as much as circumstances would permit. Life of the refugee population, which soon numbered close to 60,000, grouped in some dozen camps among the mountains passed through three distinct phases. During the hot weather of the first two or three weeks of August they lived in relative comfort rejoicing in their brief freedom, welcoming as heroes the bands which came and went, hailing their successes. Then came the second phase of perhaps two weeks during which people in the camps still enjoyed relative security, had food to eat and did not suffer grievously from cold even on the mountainsides. But down below them their villages were burning. They no longer heard tales of glorious victories, but rumours of massacre and torture and the sounds of gunfire haunted them. Then came the third phase when the Ottomans tightened their grip around the mountains and hunted the refugees from forest to mountain and from peak to peak. “Their only safety was to follow the now concentrated bands, and sometimes the battle raged about the lair where the women and children lay, the men fighting with all their manhood to defend some shallow trench, knowing that behind them cowered wife and child expecting massacre if their courage failed or their bullets missed the mark. Fleeing incessantly, they soon left behind them their stores of food and their herds of beasts. They were now shelterless under colder skies. There were villages which lived for days together on roots and salad grasses. The younger children died in great numbers, and men and women graduated for the epidemics which were to decimate those whom the Turks had spared. Often the big camps broke up into scattered groups of starving and terrified fugitives, who returned at last to make their submission among the ashes of their homes. It sometimes happened that these fell in with prowling soldiers or marauding Bashi Bazuks. Fifteen villagers, for example, from Bouno (near Resna), trudging, with their priest at their head, towards the town, were massacred without distinction of age or sex. The younger women fared the worst, for, when the troops could catch them, they were often carried off to the Turkish camps and there kept for some days until the last brute who desired them had had his will. Many were shot while they sheltered behind the insurgents during the latter skirmishes of September and October, and sometimes the same bullet wounded a mother and her baby. It was the impossibility of feeding and protecting the refugees which compelled the leaders to proclaim the insurrection at an end with the close of October; for the weather was still relatively mild (indeed, to us who came direct from England it seemed warm), though to be sure the mountains were already snow-clad, even on their lower-heights. The Turks had made war upon the women and children, and the men dared not prolong the unequal conflict with starvation. By the first week of November the population of the revolted districts had once more settled down, part of it on the sites of the ruined villages, part of it among friendly neighbours who had saved their roofs.

Long before November the towns were crowded with helpless masses of starving women, who begged their bread from door to door, clamoured about the portals of the Bishops' palaces, and slept in the abandoned and ruined houses which abound in every Macedonian town. It was at this stage that we first saw the condition of the returning villagers with our own eyes. Those who had found a roof beneath which to shelter in some friendly village were in an enviable case. They had lost everything indeed — crops, home, cattle, and household gear. They lived on the charity of neighbours, who as often as not had themselves been robbed. They owned nothing but the tattered summer garments in which they had fled three months before. They had neither blankets nor winter cloaks. At least there was still a thatch between them and the rain. But the majority were camped among their ruins, busied during the last warm days of the autumn in clearing away the rubble from some corner of their homes and erecting some sort of ‘lean-to’ of wood and straw against a crumbling wall. Nothing but a photograph could convey an idea of the devastation. The villages were mere heaps of charred wood and blackened stone, buried beneath a red dust, which the rain converted into mud. A few walls still stood upright, the only hope for the winter. Where the churches had not been burned they were riddled with bullets, blackened with bivouac fires, pillaged, dishonoured, and defiled with the ordure of a camp. The wells were sometimes buried under the debris of fallen houses, and in one case at least poisoned with the carcass of beasts. The mills, like the houses, had been burned, their dams broken down, the machinery destroyed, and even their stones in some cases shivered into fragments. Of the horses and oxen which the peasants owned, even after the authorities had professed to recover the loot, not one in four remained. Of the sheep and other small beasts and the poultry I doubt if one in ten was left. Even the ploughs were burned or stolen. It was rarely, too, that a family recovered the clothing and utensils which it buried before its flight — the Bashi Bazuks had the knack of finding spoil. Of the harvest most villages saved sufficient for four or six weeks, while a few in the upland places where the ripe crops had been left ungarnered had enough for three months at most. But more harrowing than the material ruin was the moral desolation. Women would stand on a frosty day, their breasts bare, their feet naked upon the icy ground, oblivious of cold and hunger, sobbing out some tale of how they had seen the dear head of son or husband beaten in before their eyes by soldier or Bashi Bazuk. Not less to be pitied were the young men who had laid down their arms and returned to find neither wife nor home. I think of one whose case seemed to me a full world of commonplace miseries. He was a mason who worked in Constantinople to keep a family in a village near Resna. He was driven out of the capital, with all his countrymen, early in the spring, and returned home with an empty money-belt. Three months of idleness followed, and, when the lot fell upon him, he went out with the village band. His wife was struck by a soldier, and died in premature child-birth. The father cared for the baby as best he could, but he could find no work, and he came to us begging that we would provide milk to save the life of the ailing child. The quick horror of painful deaths seemed less moving than this succession of everyday troubles, each due to some political catastrophe or some national hate. Nor was the misery at an end when the insurrection ceased. Hundreds of men were in gaol or in exile in some distant Armenian town, and, as the months went by, the ill-spelt missives, without date or signature, began to arrive, which told how one village leader after another had died of typhus on the way to Diarbekir. There were other troubles too, more secret and more horrible, which would come to our ears through some kindly doctor who used his skill, where the Turks would allow it, among the village folk.

Two young girls, for example, in a single village, who had passed some days and nights of shame in a Turkish camp, at last gave way to madness as they realized that they must become mothers. And all the while amid the degradation and the suffering, the sickness, and the fear of famine, there weighed upon this defeated people the sense that all its sacrifice had been in vain. The Turks had triumphed; Europe was still heedless and unconcerned; Macedonia was still enslaved; and we, who were doling out our blankets and our flour among them, were only keeping them alive to endure fresh oppressions and further shame. The first surprise was that this population rose at all, and rose en masse. The second surprise, to my thinking more startling than the first, was that all the sufferings of the autumn produced no reaction whatever against the Committee or its leaders. The peasantry remained loyal to the organization which plunged it in all this misery. Among the ashes of comfortable villages, or in the wards of the hospitals where the Relief Society had gathered the wounded women and children, there were moments when one felt tempted to curse the whole idea of insurrection, to think that no provocation could justify a population in facing such risks, to doubt whether any gain in freedom could warrant the mere physical pain involved in winning it. But these were an outsider's reflections. They seldom entered the heads of the Macedonians themselves. One heard no recriminations, no blame of the Committee, no regrets for an apparently wasted effort.” (“Macedonia: its Races and their Future”, H. N. Brailsford, London, 1906, pages 163 to 167)