АПОСКЕП БАБЧОР БОБИШТА БРЕШТИНА БОМБОКИ ВИШЕНИ ГАБРЕШ ВМБЕЛ

АПОСКЕП БАБЧОР БОБИШТА БРЕШТИНА БОМБОКИ ВИШЕНИ ГАБРЕШ ВМБЕЛ

Greek Civil War

8, 64, -, 23, 39, 43, 31, -,

Ilinden

5 -17 - 7 7 -24

ГАЛИШТА -, -ГОРЕНЦИ 21, -ДОБРОЛИШТА 28, -ДРЕНОВЕНИ 29, 15 ДМБЕНИ 52, 46 ЖЕРВЕНИ 2, -ЖУПАНИШТА 60, 8 ЗДРЕЛЦИ 14, -ЗАГОРИЧЕНИ 53, 22 ИЗГЛИБЕ 20, -ЈАНОВЕНИ 26, -КЛИСУРА 234, -КОНОМЛАДИ 52, 10 КОСИНЕЦ 27, 45 КОСТУР 8, -КУМАНИЧЕВО 25, 6 КРЧИШТА 17, -КОСТУРАЖЕ 23, -ЛОБАНИЦА -, 15 МАЊАК 6, 2 МОКРЕНИ 65, 71 НЕСТРАМ 91, 71 НОВОСЕЛЕН 9, -ОЛИШТА 15, -ОМОТСКО 9, -ПЕСЈАК 15, -ПИЉКАТИ 19, -ПОЗДИВИШТА 46, -РЕВАНИ 3, -РУЉА -, -СЕТОМА 17, -СМРДЕШ 36, 96 СЛИМНИЦА 24, -СТАТИЦА 43, -СТАРИЧАНИ 35, 5 СТЕНСКО 26, -ТИОЛИШТЕ 36, 4 ХРУПИШТЕ 35, -ЧЕРЕШНИЦА 15, 11 ЧЕРНОВУШТА 11, 2

ЧЕТИРОК -, -ЧУКА 17, -ЦАКОНИ 6, -ШЕСТЕОВО 29, 8 СНИЧАНИ -, -СВ. НЕДЕЛА -, -ЗЕРЕЦ -, -

The first and somewhat honest recognition of this human disaster, not only in Kostur Region but in all the Macedonian villages, was offered by the magazine “Sholastis” published on January 18, 1989. Among other things the article said: “The Slavo-Macedonian villages were loaded with a disproportionately large burden during the struggle… especially in the ranks of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG).” This is about the only recognition we have received because Greek historiography (communists) has not officially said anything about us Macedonians after the Greek Civil War.

But it is important that we mention the fact that the war was located in exactly these villages, in Macedonian villages, as confirmed by these sources which make mention of the so-called “free zones” or better known as the villages that were under DAG control. In addition to the Kostur Region villages, mentioned in the table above, there were also villages in other regions of Greek occupied Macedonia that suffered just as much; maybe with fewer casualties, but just as equally with devastation and loss of population due to migration and expulsion. This includes all the villages in Mala Prespa as well as the villages Zhelevo, Oshchima, Trnaa, Rula, Besfina, Psoderi, Trsie, Turie, Lagen, Neret, Gorno Kotori, Dolno Kotori, Negovan and many others in Lerin Region.

The only villages that were under the control of the Greek government army in Kostur Region were Rupishta, Kostur itself, Nestram and a few other smaller villages.

But, despite our official historiography, most of what happened in Kostur Region has not been forgotten thanks mainly to the effort of the Kustur Region people who have written about their experiences in biographies, in village monographs, etc.

And in all those monographs there is a chapter with a list of the fallen who died in the various wars, including those who died during the genocidal Greek Civil War. At least one person from these villages has made the effort to catalogue these names because they belonged to his or her friends, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, parents, etc. In addition to that some wrote about their personal experiences, which provides us with first-hand testimony of what happened. Most of what is written in these monographs is simple observation of events as they transpired in certain places at a certain time. But when they are viewed together they form a bigger picture, a visible pattern that not only verifies what truly happened but pieces together our true history and not the manipulated history that has been written for us.

But still the question, remaining deep in the consciousness of each one of us, is: “How is it possible, as indicated by these monographs and by Gkasis’s chart, that so many people have been killed from the same family and from the same village?” We have no memory in recent history of something like this ever happening; not even during the Ilinden Uprising!

To find piece of mind some have said: “… This happened because those who lack compassion for humanity enjoy the destruction that wars bring…” But if we get to the core of the problem and have a good look at the political processes, which for us Macedonians were conducted by foreigners for foreign political aims, we may get some answers.

FIRST: We first need to know why the CPG called for an armed resistance exactly one year after the Varkiza agreement was signed.

From a political standpoint, most Greek historians agree that the Greek Civil War was a huge historical mistake because it took place after World War II ended and after the Great Powers had already agreed on the division of spheres of influence and after it was decided that the state borders in the Balkans were to remain status quo and that the Greek-Yugoslav border had already become a militarized frontier between the two opposing camps.

If this were truly a “Greek Civil War”, as it was made known to the world, then Greeks would have been fighting against Greeks all over Greece. Unfortunately the facts as we know then speak differently! As far as the world knew, Macedonians did not exist and no Macedonians fought in that war. There was no mention of Macedonians in the history of DAG even though about 50% of the DAG fighters were Macedonians and the Macedonian people, almost exclusively, supported the war effort.

If the CPG intended to keep its promises, then why did it lie to the world about the Macedonians? Was this an unintentional error or was it purposely done for “other reasons”? Could this “other reason” explain why so many Macedonian people from the same village died?

1. The problem that historians have with DAG’s history is grounded in the so-called historical decision made during the 2nd CPG Central Committee Plenum and that was to begin the armed uprising on March 31, 1946, exactly one year after the Varkiza Agreement was signed on February 12, 1945, when the left, i.e. EAM and the CPG, handed over power to the right, which is viewed as a historic mistake.

Given our massive involvement in this war we need to ask: Were the Macedonians considered a factor when this Varkiza Agreement was signed? And the answer is NO! As a matter of fact, the entire time we Macedonians fought in the ranks of anti-fascist EAM and ELAS, we were never partners with the Greeks. SNOF, at the time, was not seen as a relevant factor or political entity. All negotiations between the Right and the Left were conducted exclusively by Greeks; EAM and ELAS on the left side and the Greek government and the English military mission on the right.

2. Historians of course also have a problem with the decision made during the 3rd CPG Central Committee Plenum held in Belgrade in September 1947 during which, according to Gusias, only six members of the CPG Central Committee and several military personnel attended, among whom there were no Macedonians.

The Plenum decided to oblige DAG General Headquarters to start mobilizing recruits right across the country so that by March 1948 there would be 60,000 armed fighters in DAG. At the same Plenum it was decided to switch fighting tactics from self-defense to going on the offensive and take power by force. To achieve this goal plan “S” was put into effect, also known as operation “Lake”. This plenum also coined the slogan: “All to arms and everything for victory!” At this Plenum it was decided to create a free territory on the Kozheni plateau, which was surrounded by the mountain Massifs of Pindus, Pieria, Karakamen, Kajmakchalan and Vicho. The plan was to liberate the towns Lerin, Voden, Negush, Sobotsko, Konitsa and others as a first stage to liberating all of Greece.

From what was said above, there is clear confirmation that all these decisions were made without Macedonian presence or consent and that the Greek Civil War was intended to be fought in Greek occupied Macedonia. All this was decided at the Belgrade Plenum in September 1947 with no Macedonian representation!

SECOND: Macedonia nihilism, errors, citizenship and rivers of blood.

1. Half a century has passed and we Macedonians still don’t know what the national strategy for the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia was behind the formation of NOF in Skopje on April 23, 1945. Why was NOF was created outside and independent of the CPG and any other political party in Greece? Why was NOF and its program goals guided by the CPM/CPY for more than a year and why was it directed to struggle to attain national rights and the right to self-determination for the Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia by an armed struggle? Why did the leadership of NOF, a few days after its formation on April 28, 1945, decide to establish Macedonian partisan units? (See: Kiriazovski 1995/202)

And more importantly, how was NOF going to achieve all that; i.e. national rights and the right to self-determination for the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia? Was it not clear to NOF that part of the population in Greek occupied Macedonia would not support a Macedonian national liberation movement? It would appear that NOF was not ready, unable, or simply failed to

face many of the complex problems that were to occur internally and externally. NOF was unable to evaluate its strengths, interests and strategic plans and we have yet to hear from NOF, the CPM or the CPY as to why that was? This leaves us, the participants in this war, to ask:

a) How was NOF going to convince 600 thousand settlers and colonists, who did not see themselves as Macedonians and who numbered the same or more than the Macedonians, to support the Macedonian position; i.e. exercise self-determination in Greek occupied Macedonia when the colonists and settlers saw themselves as Greeks and wanted to stay in Greece?

b) Was NOF not aware that almost the entire Left, EAM and the CPG, was headed by settlers and colonists including Zahariadis, Partsalidis, Ioanidis, Markos and many others? Did NOF expect to gain their support for Macedonian self-determination?

c) And why would the settlers and colonists support the Macedonians now when these same people led the anti-Fascist struggle in which all members of NOF served and fought in the ranks of EAM and ELAS, when no Macedonian was given any consideration? And not only that, many Macedonians were jailed and exiled when they made mention of national rights for the Macedonians. Many Macedonians were slandered, anathematized and labeled autonomists, secessionists, bandits and Slavophones! Did NOF forget all that?

But let us return to the greatest manipulation of all. Let us return to April 2, 1946, to the time when Tito and Zahariadis met in Belgrade, without the presence of a single Macedonian, and decided that:

1.1 The Macedonian National Liberation Movement in Greek occupied Macedonia led by NOF, which since April 1945 was under the direction of the CPY/CPM, was to be transferred to the CPG leadership and the participation of the Macedonians was to be a condition for the victory of such a revolution.

1.2 The CPG was free to recruit fighters from the Macedonian and Greek political emigrants in Yugoslavia.

2. We Macedonians were shuffled from one communist hand to another, between Tito and Zahariadis.

For those who find this hard to believe, then ask yourselves this question: “Did Kolishevski and the CPM Central Committee not know about Tito and Zahariadis’s agreement to involve the entire Macedonian population in the armed struggle through the mass recruitment activities carried out by NOF, AFZH and NOMS? Were they not aware of the Greek reactions to such a struggle? Did they not know how the Greek government was going to respond to such a move and what ‘a Macedonian uprising’ might motivate it to do against the Macedonian people?” All one had to do was read the newspapers which spared no words to describe the Greek sentiment. It was made abundantly clear that neither the Great Powers nor Greece was in support of such action, especially the dismemberment of Greece! So tell me, where was this struggle going? And if it was not the responsibility of Kolishevski to guide the struggle, then why advise the Macedonian people to get involved in it in the first place? (See: “Directives and recommendations made by Lazar Kolishevsk” in Kiriazovski’s book, 1995/29.)

On September 27, 1947 the General Headquarters of Markos’s Partisan units, before the Democratic government was declared, which makes this act illegal, issued orders to mobilize fighters aged 17 to 35 years. But after this mobilization, because it was carried out only in the Macedonian villages, only 15,000 to 17,000 fighters were mobilized. Just for comparison: in the spring of 1946 when the Greek Civil War began, the Greek government possessed the following numbers: 27,000 policemen from whom 14,000 were from Northern Greece (i.e. Greek occupied Macedonia); paramilitaries about 5,000; national military units 17,000 (40 battalions); 75,000 regular soldiers (7 armies and two free brigades) (See: “DAG-strategic issues and management tactics,” G. Maltezos Dzhumerkiotis, p.60.)

According to Dzhumerkiotis: “It is well-known that in 1947 DAG had not resolved either the issue of military supplies or the issue of arming its fighters with ordinary battle machine guns and other battle assets, as well as ammunition. It also remains to be explained

why, on the one hand, Zahariadis gave Markos orders to increase the number of fighters in DAG to 60,000 while Ioannidis gave Markos orders to acquire arms for only 4,500 fighters. It is also well-known that Markos, in 1947, ended up sending home thousands of fighters who wanted to voluntarily enter the ranks of DAG.” (p. 354) The question is: “Why did General Marcos conduct an illegal mobilization only in Macedonia, mobilizing young and old and wreaking havoc on the Macedonians?”

On November 23, 1948 DAG headquarters ordered, only for Vicho Region (Aegean Macedonia), to mobilize all men and women ages 17 to 35. This applied to all men including those who were left behind to construct fortifications and those who were left behind due to illness. Practically the entire Macedonian population in the Kostur and Lerin Regions was recruited during this mobilization.

It would be no exaggeration to say that of the 25, 000 fighters mobilized into the ranks of DAG 50% were Macedonians, most of whom were forcibly mobilized. Looking at this in proportion, it means that half of the fighters came from the Greek population of 6 million and the other half came from the Macedonian population of no more than 300 thousand people. So in terms of percentages the Greek population contributed 0.21% of its total population while the Macedonian population contributed 4.17 %, that ratio being 20 to 1. In the long term, throughout the entire Greek Civil War, the total Greek contribution amounted to 18-20 thousand fighters while the Macedonian contribution amounted to 15-20 thousand fighters. This also partly answers the question why so many Macedonian people died from the same village.

Following is a list of battles that took place during the Greek Civil War. These were frightful battles where the opponents had forces as high as ten times larger and were much better equipped.

1. Battle at North Pindos, (June 26 to July 22, 1947); 2. Battle for the city Konitsa (December 24, 1947 to January 4, 1948); 3. Battle in Kailari, (October 18, 1948); 4. Battle in Bukovic (November 10 to 14, 1948);

5. Battle for the reception of the heroic unarmed phalanx from Rumeli to Mount Pieria, (March 16, 1948); 6. Battles in Agrafa: Villages Karoplesi, Smokovo, Kerasovo and Mount Niala (April 8 to 22, 1947); 7. Battle at Ilia, Furka, Taburi-Greco, (July 31, 1948); 8. Battle at Golio-Kamenik, (June 21, 1948); 9. Battle at Klevti (June 28 to August 1, 1948); 10. Battle at Taliaro-Likokremasma and Eastern Smolika, (July 31, 1948); 11. Battle at Alevitsa, (June 14, 1948); 12. Battles to conquer the cities Edessa, Sobotsko and Negush, (December 22, 1948 to January 14, 1949); 13. Battle for the conquest of Lerin, (February 12, 1949); 14. Battles in Kajmakchalan, (June 4, 1949); 15. Major battles for the re-taking of Gramos (April 1 & 2, 1949); 16. Battles at the heights of Bulgara, Kotelsko-Gramos, (April 4, 1949); 17. Battles at Patoma-Gramos, (June 2, 1949); 18. Battles for Vicho. The fiercest battles were fought at Lisets and at Iamata, (August 10 to 14, 1949); 19. Dramatic battle fought at Kulata - Prespa between the two lakes, (August 14, 1949); 20. Battles at Black-Gramos, (August 24 1949); 21. The last battles of Gramos, (August 24 to 29, 1949); 22. Battles at Kiafa (elevation 2322) in Gramos, (August 30, 1949, just less than 10 hours before DAG’s defeat).

On this day, history will witness a terrible event; the heroic death of Petso Romev, commander of the 426 battalion within brigade 118. He was born in the village Gornichevo, Lerin Region, in 1919.

Hundreds of fighters, members of the CPG and much of the democratic force that took part in this disastrous war, have wondered why the CPG continued the fighting in August 1939 after its defeat on the Vicho and Gramos frontlines?

We never did get an explanation why the CPG was fighting battle after battle when its leadership was well aware that it was losing the war? Why not negotiate surrender while they still could? What was the CPG trying to do? Why was it pushing the DAG fighters to hell?

Was there confidence high up in the DAG and CPG leadership that the DAG forces were capable of holding onto Gramos because they were led by General Gusias? Or was there conviction in the slogans raised by Vassilis Bardziotas, the second man in DAG, that: “Gramos was not Vicho, Gramos will become the tomb of the Monarcho-Fascists! Long live the CPG and DAG!”

After the devastating losses in Vicho and Gramos, the slogans continued to exist on the walls… “We are soldiers of Greece… at every moment Greece is calling on us to liberate it from the Monarcho-Fascists…”

This war for us Macedonians was the most tragic event in our modern history, which is correlated with the pattern developed by Bishop Karavangelis, because all of us Macedonians from Greek occupied Macedonia, especially those from Kostur Region, have been left without roots and have been implanted with a sense of alienation. That war was a new test for us Macedonians, which had two dimensions now factually confirmed. That war was led simply to change the demographic in Greek occupied Macedonia in favour of the settlers and colonists on one side and to give the Greek government the opportunity to expel more Macedonians on the other.

The Greek government used this opportunity well by exploiting:

1. The establishment of NOF on April 23, 1945, and,

2. The March 31, 1946 CPG Central Committee 2nd Plenum Decision to start the Greek Civil War which was a skilful strategic move to tighten the noose and bring hell to Greek occupied Macedonia in order to exhaust its population, particularly in Kostur Region.

So the question here is: “Would the Macedonian population have been exhausted had these two events not materialized?” If this had not happened, today we would have a compact Macedonian population, consisting of several hundred thousand and we would have lived in a compact Macedonian territory.

Given the above stated facts we can now attempt to answer the question: “How is it possible that so many people died from one village?”

Let’s say that we allowed this to happen because we placed our trust in those whom we believed to be telling us the truth… And the victims in Gkasis’s list are our brothers, fathers, mothers, sisters, villagers, relatives, comrades and countrymen; which gives rise to the question:

“What evil have we exiles committed, all these fifty years, to not have the right to return to our homes and light a candle on the graves of our relatives!?”

But this was not the only punishment handed out to the people of Kostur. The people of Kostur made many sacrifices, which the communists recognized, including the lives lost in the defense of Kostur Region by the legendary freedom fighting bands. These people were made sacrifices by ELAS and various other Greek military groups who had it in for the Macedonians.

8. Book: “БУГАРСКАТА ПРОПАГАНДА ВО ЈУГОЗАПАДНА МАКЕДОНИЈА (1941-1944)”, by Tashko Mamurovski.

The book “Bulgarian propaganda in southwestern Macedonia (1941-1944)”, by Tashko Mamurovski, is an edition of the Institute of National History, Skopje, 1989. In this book Mamurovski talks about the implications that exist in the Macedonian consciousness where now we Macedonians do to ourselves exactly what Bishop Karavangelis and others modeled for us, i.e. the desire to make Bulgarians or ideological soldiers out of us… but not Macedonians.

After reading this book, based mainly on what people remembered particularly about the Macedonian people’s trials in Kostur, a question comes to mind: “Do we need someone to assure us about the truth, to explain to us that these divisions and self-evaluations were the wishes of the Macedonian people? That these were done by the Macedonian people for some kind of self interest? No, these are stories that can still be found, concocted by some of our more misguided and negligent contemporaries, made up in order to

preserve their own sinecures. But no such stories and insights carry any weight today before our modern Macedonian intelligentsia.

In the third chapter of this book Mamurovski wrote: “Activities carried out by Bulgarian agents in Kostur, in other words the activities carried out by Bulgarian emissaries on March 5, 1943 in order to form armed detachments in Kostur, resulted in the formation of the first unit numbering 80 counter-bandits and headed by Zivko Shekerov.” (p. 43)

Mamurovski has entangled himself in something that he has no basic knowledge in and wants to simulate an ideological superstructure which includes forms of social consciousness. This absurd dogma is not only a sin against these people, but also a national evil. We have hundreds of cited examples by Dr. Hristo Ivanovski, a man of high virtue, a scientist, a professor and a man who has been awarded high recognition, which show differently. His father, Vasil Ianakievski - Mussolini, was fingered as being a Bulgarian agent who, according to the Yugoslav model of writing “the history of the Aegean Macedonians”, was a rebel and a counter-revolutionary. As a result his reputation was tarnished for life. So the question is: “Is this how we are we building our Macedonian history? And how much longer are we going to mistreat the Macedonian people this way?

It makes one wonder why an academic such as Mamurovski would want to stigmatize, defame and cast aspersions on his own people? Mamurovski and others like him have also failed to mention that many of these so-called “Bulgarian agents” happened to be the sons and grandsons of the Ilinden fighters who fought to liberate the Macedonian people from Ottoman slavery to create a Macedonian state! More than 4,700 Macedonian freedom fighters, during World War II, raised arms to defend the honour of the Macedonian people and it was by no accident that the Greeks wanted them liquidated.

These were the villages, for example, which were armed and placed under the protection of our Macedonian freedom fighters: Tikveni, Izglibe, Maniak, Kosinets, Lobanitsa, V’mbel, Breznitsa, Gorentsi Starichani, Dobrolishta, Chetirok, Gorno and Dolno Drenoveni, Pozdivishta, Chernovishta, Konomladi, Gorna and Dolna Statitsa,

Aposkep, Setoma, Tiolishta, Blatse Chereshnitsa, Prokopana, Olishta, Zagorichani, Mokreni, Bobishta, Kumanichevo, Gorentsi, Bomboki, Lichishta, Kondorabi, Galishte, Zdreltsa, Zheegozhe, Starichani, Rupishta etc., and their central headquarters were located in Kostur, Rupishta and Koreshtata. Each was a political entity of the Macedonian subjects in each of those Kostur Region villages. This is why the Greek government in exile wanted them liquidated before it took power in Greece. The Greeks did not want to have the job of dealing with a Macedonian political entity.

By writing this book, Mamurovski has denounced the Macedonian freedom fighters and, before the Macedonian public, has accused them of being traitors. He used information given to him by people who wanted to slander the entire Macedonian nation. For a critical analysis and review of this author’s confusing work see Dr. Kiriazovski’s report in “Glasnik” year 39, no. 1-2, page 157, 1997. Only people who lack logic and scientific understanding, and who don’t care about the damage their work will cause, write like this. It is our history we are talking about here and the least we could do is apply some common sense and thoroughly study the subject we are writing about.

In short, by what I am saying here, I want to send a message to INI and Mamurovski that if they want to stay in a strong Macedonian position, let them reply to Bulgarian author Georgi Daskalov (Book 10). Please express your views whether there really were or were not Bulgarians in Kostur Region fighting in the Greek Civil War and whether the Macedonians in Kostur Region were fighting for a Bulgarian national consciousness!