5. REAL MOTIVES FOR CHANGING THE POLICY FOR A UNITED AND INDEPENDENT MACEDONIA - Part 01

5. REAL MOTIVES FOR CHANGING THE POLICY FOR A UNITED AND INDEPENDENT MACEDONIA

The motives that led the CPG to change its attitude towards the Macedonian National Question were of external and internal character. The factors, which mutually both conditioned and influenced each other, led the CPG to reject the policy for a united and independent Macedonia and to adopt the policy of minority equality within the Greek state.

А) EXTERNAL FACTORS

The external factor played no small role in the direction of this CPG policy in relation to the Macedonian National Question. The new “Versailles Europe” with its unresolved national and territorial issues, as well as with the great revolutionary wave it encompassed between 1917 and 1923, upset the European bourgeoisie. This class saw salvation in the removal of the liberal principle that lay in the foundations of the European states and its replacement with a totalitarian system. The introduction of a strong arm regime in Hungary with Admiral Horti’s dictatorship, the appearance of fascism in Italy in 1922 when Mussolini introduced a totalitarian regime, with the coup in Spain in 1923 when Rivera introduced a dictatorship, with problems in Estonia, Austria, Pilsudski’s tough government in Poland and Gomez da Costa’s strong tactics in Portugal… All these factors eventually culminated in the introduction of a fascist dictatorship in Germany. Germany immediately began to implement active revisionist policies with respect to Denmark, Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and to express open wishes for the unification of “German Austria” with Germany. For this reason fascist Germany instigated the “national movements” of the Germans in Czechoslovakia (Sudetes), in Poland (Gdansk), and in Romania (Erdei), and actively supported them to organize the fascist movement in Austria, thus seriously questioning the Versailles Peace Agreement. The external revisionist policies, as well as the anti-Communist ideology that underlined the fascist regime, could not help but affect the policy of the Comintern. The emergence, strengthening and successes of fascism seriously influenced the Comintern’s global strategy and tactics. The uninterrupted fascist ideological and territorial expansion policies of fascism could only be stopped by an adequate Comintern political platform. The Soviet Union, whose national and ideological interests were already seriously threatened by fascist expansionism, was also interested in this respect. So, according to the Comintern’s political assessment, developing a People’s Front policy was the only political solution. During the period when fascism was most prevalent in Europe, G. Dimtrov, at the Comintern Seventh Congress in 1935, said: “The most important task is the creation of a broad-based popular anti-fascist front based only on a proletarian front. The success of the entire proletariat struggle is closely linked to the formation of proletariat fighting unions with the peasants and with the base mass of the petty bourgeoisie, which represent the majority of the population in the industrialized countries.” (Georgi Dimitrov, Fight in a Single Front against Fascism and War, Sofia, 1975, p. 62.)

The Comintern’s decisions during its Fifth Congress in 1924, to resolve the unsettled national issues in the Balkans by breaking the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Greece, etc., weakened the “successor states” (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Greece) even more, and they became unsettled economically and politically. Due to this they also became weakened by the increasing fascist pressure applied by Germany, Italy and their allies Hungary and Bulgaria. The Communist parties in the Balkans had no choice but to implement appropriate policies, at all costs, so that they could turn the tide and contribute to the strengthening of these states to defend themselves against these revisionist countries.

With an active policy for a united and independent Macedonia, the Macedonian National Question placed doubt on the integrity of the Balkan states which occupied Macedonian territories and, in addition, contradicted the new Comintern strategy and tactics. Therefore, in line with its global political strategy, the Comintern decided to change its own policy on the Macedonian National Question, adopted at the Comintern Fifth Congress in 1924. Instead of breaking the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania, etc., the Comintern strove to consolidate these states vis-à-vis the revisionist states and the solution to unresolve national issues would be sought only through respect for minority rights within the already existing Balkan states. The new Comintern policy and tactics fully satisfied the CPG’s most intriguing wishes, unlike the policy for a united and independent Macedonia, which the CPG had to accept with great anxiety.

B) INTERNAL FACTORS

The internal motives that led the CPG to change its policy towards the Macedonian National Question were of primary importance and played an extremely important role in replacing and rejecting the policy of a united and independent Macedonia. What then were the internal factors that led the CPG to change its policy to such an essential and sensitive issue as the Macedonian National Question?

Attracting the Greek people en masse

The policy of a united and independent Macedonia, implemented by the CPG after 1924, did not attract the Greek population in Old Greece such as the Peloponnesus, Euboea, Thessaly, Epirus, the islands, etc., nor did it attract the colonist population living in Greek occupied Macedonia. This so-called Greek and non-Greek colonist population was not at all interested in how this Macedonian National Question was established and especially not in how it was going to be solved. The only two basic factors that determined the colonist attitude were: national origin (with the corresponding national consciousness), on the one hand, and economic status (economic interest), on the other.

After the great Greek state rigmarole, sudden ethnographic changes took place in Greek occupied Macedonia. Immediately after 1913, the Greek state began to carry out an active colonization policy with a colonizing population that came from Old Greece and abroad. The Greek state did this with intentions to change the traditional Macedonian ethnographic character and impose a different ethnographic character in Greek occupied Macedonia, which had nothing to do with Macedonian habits and Macedonian historical traditions. Through the so-called Greek state internalization, the Greek state eventually succeeded in installing a population of non-Macedonian origin and language in Greek occupied Macedonia. (Statistika apotelezmata tis apografis..., Athina, 1935, p. 12, the internal Greek colonization lasted from 1913 to 1923.) These colonists originating from Thessaly (11,346), Sterea Elada and Euboea (9,752), Peloponnesus (7,727), Epirus (6,757) and the Aegean islands (1,726) were settled mainly in Eastern and Central Greek occupied Macedonia. Of them, 26,324 colonists were settled in Solun Region, 7,610 in Kavala Region, 4,830 in Drama Region, 4,178 in Seres Region, 3,877 in Kozhani Region, 1,777 in Lerin Region, 1,554 in Pela Region, 1,255 in Sveta Gora, and 1,611 in the Halkidiki Peninsula. The colonists from Old Greece nurtured and expressed strong Greek national feelings. When they were settled in Greek occupied Macedonia, the Greek state gave them land, houses, cattle, etc. That is why the policy of a united and independent Macedonia was not attractive to them and had to be changed to reflect Greek national sentiments and economic interests in line with the colonists. In other words, a policy for a united and independent Macedonia was not only unacceptable and alien to these people but economically counter-productive. The policy for a united and independent Macedonia was also unacceptable to the so-called indigenous Greek population (236,755) which supposedly lived in Greek occupied Macedonia as a minority before 1913. This population, as well as the colonist population, cherished and expressed strong anti-Macedonian feelings over long periods of time, especially during the periods when the Macedonian people struggled and fought to free themselves and create their own free and independent Macedonian state. This is why the CPG had changed this policy.

As a result of the Lausanne Peace Treaty and the population exchanges between Greece and Bulgaria, 565,143 so-called Greeks and non-Greek Christians were settled in Greek occupied Macedonia. (Ibid.) About 200,000 of these so-called Greeks by language lived in Europe, America, Africa, but especially in the western parts of Turkey before they arrived in Greece and colonized Greek occupied Macedonia. Before the Greco-Turkish war started, the predominant Christian population living in Turkey felt strongly that it belonged with the Christian population living in Greece and was in favour of the idea of creating a “Greater Greece” that would encompass Asia Minor up to the Mendere River, to the city Edrenik in the north and, in the deep west, to the cities Izmir, Atdin and Manisa, Eastern Erakia with Edrene, the Gallipoli Peninsula, Western Thrace, Greek occupied Macedonia, Southern Albania with Argirokastro Region, the islands and Cyprus. Much of this population has developed an active movement in aid of creating a Greater Greece. After this population was expelled from Turkey, it was settled mainly in Greek occupied Macedonia, where it received 500,000 hectares of Macedonian land, 93,549 Macedonian houses, various building materials and other material assistance, worth millions of drachmas, from the Greek government. (Societe des Nations, L’establissement…, p. 85.) If, on the one hand, the CPG’s policy for a united and independent Macedonia collided with the national sentiments and economic interests of the Greek colonists from Asia Minor, this policy, on the other hand, was in deep

contradiction with the economic interests of the non-Greek (Turkophone, Caucasian, Armenian, etc.) speaking Christian population that was settled in Greek occupied Macedonia. These non-Greek speaking Christian colonists, in their absolute majority, were illiterate and only understood the policy for a united and independent Macedonia on the basis of their property obtained from various Greek governments. In their profound awareness, the policy of a united and independent Macedonia, to them, meant that the Macedonian population that was evicted from its homeland by force would be allowed to return and reclaim its lost property. Therefore, the entire colonist population, as well as the so-called indigenous Greek population living in Greek occupied Macedonia, was prone to support the bourgeois parties, mainly the liberal ones, because they were prepared to guarantee the integrity of Greece, and to foster strong antipathy towards the CPG’s policy in relation to the Macedonian National Question. Therefore, the accusations of the “minority” group leveled against the “majority” were in fact correct. The “majority”, while preparing the policy for a united and independent Macedonia, had not taken into account the interests of the colonists and how they felt about this policy. This is why the colonist population was moving away from the CPG and looking to the Greek bourgeoisie for leverage. (G. D. Kaculi, I istoria tu KKE, tomos II…, p. 38.)

The CPG’s policy for a united and independent Macedonia was in fact also in contradiction to the national and economic interests of the Greek population in Old Greece (the Greek peninsula south of Mount Olympus). Traditionally educated in the spirit that “Macedonia is Greek” and the “Macedonian people” are Greek, the so-called Greek people in Greece proper viewed the CPG’s policy for a united and independent Macedonia as incomprehensible, unacceptable and treasonous.

In the presence of the loud Greek voices of discontent, as well as needing to look after the economic interests of the population of Old Greece, the CPG was under constant pressure to replace its policy for a united and independent Macedonia. This pressure and Greek sentiment, as well as colonists joining its ranks, in time, turned the tide in the Party. The colonists who joined the CPG were immediately promoted to run the main functions in the party

apparatus, and whenever the Macedonian National Question came up, Greek national feelings and Greek national interests were always present at the highest levels. With the formation of the new CPG Central Committee in 1931, headed by Nikos Zahariadis, a colonist from Asia Minor, the Party made sure Greek and colonist interests were always placed at the top of the Party agenda. Immediately after 1931, the new CPG Central Committee rejected the policy of a united and independent Macedonia and realistically began to implement the policy of minority equality within the Greek state. By doing so the CPG reassured the entire Greek and non-Greek colonist population that the Party was looking after its interests and that Greek occupied Macedonia was always going to remain inseparable from the Greek state. When the CPG rejected the policy for a united and independent Macedonia and accepted the minority rights policy during its Sixth Congress in 1935, it formally satisfied the national feelings of the entire so-called Greek indigenous and colonist populations. The CPG also assured this population that the new policy on the Macedonian National Question was a permanent CPG commitment. This guarantee was further strengthened during the CPG’s Sixth Party Congress when a new CPG Politburo was elected. Of the 7 members elected, 4 were colonists. The 4 colonists were: Secretary General Nikos Zahariadis, D. Partzalidis, G. Porfirogenis and S. Sklavenas. From then on, these people made sure that the Greek national line was always placed ahead of the Macedonian National Question, which was treated as a secondary issue and always behind Greek national interests. The Greek national orientation, in relation to the Macedonian National Question, was further strengthened when Mitsos Partzalidis and Markos Vafiadis, also colonists from Asia Minor, later joined the CPG Central Committee. The aim of the new CPG policy, regarding the Macedonian National Question, was to attract the so-called Greek and non-Greek colonist population to its side and thus be able to escape from the costly “political isolation” in which the Party found itself in the period when it implemented the policy for a united and independent Macedonia. (Information obtained from a speech delivered by Nikos Zahariadis during the CPG Central Committee seventh extended meeting held between February 18 to 24, 1957. p. 204.)

“Disarming” the Greek bourgeoisie

When the CPG initially adopted the policy for a united and independent Macedonia, at its Third Party Congress in 1924, it triggered a strong reaction from the Greek bourgeoisie, known for its “exclusive” state nationalism. By adopting the united and independent Macedonia policy, the CPG provoked the bourgeoisie and entered an “unnecessary conflict”. In other words, the CPG gave the Greek bourgeoisie a “dangerous weapon” with which to attack it. (S. Maksimos, op. cit., “Rizospastis”, 6. II 1927.)

Realizing that the Greek population, traditionally brought up in the spirit of believing in the “Megali Idea” (Greater Greece), was definitely opposed to any territorial secession made regarding the Greek state, the Greek bourgeoisie immediately exploited the situation and began to work on the Greek people’s sentiments. Many political points were scored at the CPG’s expense, which in time significantly isolated the Party. In their attacks the Greek bourgeoisie portrayed the CPG as nationally colourless, as a party to which the Greek national interests were incomprehensible and alien, and so on. But in reality none of this was actually true because the CPG always defended Greek national interests. The demonstrations carried out by some 500 people in Solun, in favour of an autonomous Macedonia, were used by the Greek bourgeoisie as examples of non-national criminal acts and this gave them yet another opportunity to condemn the “treacherous CPG policy”. (Ministere des Affaires, Etrangeres, Archive diplomatique, Gréce 1918-1929, p. 5.)

When in 1925 the ambitious but incapable General Theodoros Pangalos established a dictatorship in Greece, he not only immediately began a repressions campaign against the CPG, but did not even care to understand any of the CPG’s Greek national interests. To the Greek nationalists the CPG’s policies were “incomprehensible and alien”. Wanting to definitively discredit the CPG in the eyes of the Greek people, Pangalos organized a number of well-known autonomist processes against the Communists. In Solun alone 12 Communists were tried on the basis of Article 123 of the Law on State Security. They were tried for high treason and the

desire to secede territories from the Greek state. (I. Stavridis, Ta paraskinia tu KKE, Athina, 1953, p. 301). The following Communists were tried in Solun for attempting to secede territories from the Greek state: Tasos Kainoglou, Georgios Kurtidis, Tomos Dikalis, G. Papanikolaou, G. Marangos, A. Papadopoulos, Soporna (a Jew from Solun), Nikos Zahariadis and Markopoulos, editor of the newspaper “Voice of the Worker”. At the same time the CPG leadership in Athens was also tried. Included among those tried was CPG Secretary General P. Pulipoulos, leader of the Party, and S. Maximos, member of the CPG Central Committee. They were all accused of high treason and a desire to break up “Greek territories” from the Greek state. In order to avoid the death penalty, the Comintern, through Batulescu, its Romanian representative, advised the accused Communists to reject the slogan for a united and independent Macedonia before the court. Batulescu personally advised P. Puliopoulos to lower his tone during his plea and not to insist on the right of Macedonia’s autonomy. P. Puliopoulos, however, rejected Batulescu’s advice and spoke before the court for over 4 hours protesting and defending the rights of the national minorities and their right to decide their fate for themselves. Defense attorney Hristos Lagos, rejected the high treason charges and called for their dismissal because the policy for a united and independent Macedonia was only a theory which would be only be realized under one condition – the bolshevization of the entire Balkans. Even ordinary communists were tried. Some did not even know what the Macedonian National Question was. They only knew that it was generally of national ideological importance, at the moment. This also caused great damage to the CPG and gave the Greek bourgeoisie the opportunity to use the “national card” to maximize on its own gains. Most of what these convicted Communists, who spoke before the court, said was nothing more than “classical nonsense”. (I. Kordatos, op. cit., “Rizospastis”, 18 II 1927.) This is what one of those convicted Communists said: “We are calling for Macedonia’s autonomy because we are Communists and because we are Communists we will demand that the Peloponnesus too become autonomous because we do not have a homeland.” (Ibid.) With this, the CPG lost a lot of points in the eyes of the masses, and it became significantly isolated.

The great repressive policy against the communists was also carried out by Eleftheros Venizelos in 1928 and all throughout the great economic crisis, as was carried out in 1925 by Theodoros Pangalos, with a desire to put an end to all the CPG’s activities and, with the Macedonian National Question in hand, to justify its repressive policies waged against the communists and against the Greek workers’ movement. Liberal leader Venizelos demanded that all communist activities in the country be prohibited. He insisted that there was no place in Greece where a communist circle did not exist and demanded that even the CPG itself be banned because this Party, with its policy, has put in question Greece’s territorial integrity. (Ministere dеs Affaires..., Gréce...dos 61, p. 166.) M. Zaviatinos, Minister of the Interior in Venizelos’s government, asked the MPs in the Greek Parliament to pass a law banning all communist activities in Greece at all costs, because “one great danger undermines our social foundations, and that is Greece’s territorial integrity”. (Ibid., p. 129.) Zaviatinos insisted that this be done so that “we can all sleep at little better...” (Ibid.) Zaviatinos insisted and demanded that all of Venizelos’s MPs in the Greek Parliament do everything they can, at all costs, to ban the activities of a party that supports a policy that runs contrary to Greek national interests… (Ibid., p. 166.)

Unfortunately, despite all the opposition, the Greek Parliament passed Law no. 4,229 of 1929 prohibiting all communist activities in the country. This anti-Communist law was opposed during the voting by civic politicians who were known for their liberal political views. Unfortunately the situation on the ground was so bad that even those who were seen reading the newspaper “Rizospastis” or the magazine “Neolea” were accused of being communists and of spreading communist propaganda and sent to prison. The newspaper “Rizospastis” and the magazine “Neolea”, at the time, were outlawed and circulating illegally among the left-leaning population. About 2,500 court actions were brought against party and union officials under this Law. Over 1,000 CPG members and supporters were imprisoned, 50 workers were killed and another 500 were wounded in clashes with the police. Unfortunately, even with all these new political measures, the situation in Greece still did not calm down. Political instability continued and culminated with the introduction of the 1936 dictatorship in Greece.

This was another reason why the CPG, during its Third Extraordinary Congress in 1924, rejected the policy for a unified and independent Macedonia and adopted the minority policy for full equality for the minorities living within the Greek state. By doing this, the CPG in effect took away the “dangerous weapon” from bourgeoisie hands and their main reason for attacking it and accusing it, among other things, of being non-national, colourless and non-patriotic. By removing the old policy, the CPG also found greater understanding in the Greek masses, in whom the idea of a Greater Greece was still fresh in their minds and, uninterruptedly, influenced their so-called “Greek consciousness”.

Getting around the internal political crises and controversy over the Macedonian National Question

Immediately after it was created in 1918, the CPG began to experience factional struggles and internal clashes. Its internal political confrontations, as well as the various attitudes taken towards the Macedonian National Question, uninterruptedly followed the CPG through time until its “crisis turned into its own shadow” and the Macedonian National Question became the “apple of discord” that continued to interrupt its “inner Party peace”. (I. Kordatos, op. cit. “Rizospastis”, 19. II 1927.)

The CPG’s internal clashes over the Macedonian National Question inside the Party’s ranks began immediately after the issue was first identified. The various sides, be they in the “minority” or in the “majority”, were influenced by the current political situation on the ground that was acceptable to them. Their understanding of the importance of “class” as opposed to “Greek national interests” varied and was very much influenced by the Macedonian National Question. Eventually, in 1924, the “minority”, i.e. those who believed that Greek national interests were more important than class interests, very much contributed to getting closer to the official Greek state terminology and to the right political concept when it came to Greek occupied Macedonia. Instead of using the term Macedonia, Kordatos, for example, always used the term Northern Greece or Greek Macedonia. This terminology in time was accepted and used more frequently by the “majority” after 1935 and especially in the period from 1941 to 1945. Clearly, contrary to the historical reality, this was purposely done to negate the Macedonian nation and to deny its existence. Being a supporter of the idea of conducting Marxist science in line with the Greek historical reality, Kordatos, for example, never visited or made contact with the Macedonians like Puliopoulos did. Puliopoulos personally and directly, and not through decisions made by the Comintern, made contact with Macedonians who told him exactly how they felt, thought, lived, grieved and died - only as Macedonians.

Because of the Macedonian National Question, even the “archaeomarxists” (old Marxists) were influenced to take a new position, contrary to the position taken by the “majority”. The archeomarxists demanded exclusive respect for the rights of minorities within the Greek state.

But in time even Puliopoulos’s views seriously evolved over the Macedonian National question. The new “minority’s” views, while Puliopoulos was in charge, evolved over the old “minority’s” views when Kordatos was in charge, and so did the views of the archeomarxists and those of the “majority”. The emergence of the new “minority” was a natural reflection of the internal clashes between Trotsky on one side and Stalin on the other, that arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in the USSR. The struggles between the opposition left headed by Trotsky and the other groups headed by J. Stalin were carefully watched by the CPG. Those struggles, naturally, were also reflected in events all over the international communist movement as well as within the CPG. Some of this was reflected in Puliopoulos’s intervention in 1927 during an internal CPG pre-party meeting discussion in which Puliopoulos advised to: 1. Reject Trotsky’s wild ideas and those of his notorious supporters; 2. The Party needed critical experience and should, at all costs, raise the cultural level of its members; 3. The Party was losing itself among its mass affiliation of uneducated and inexperienced members; 4. All defamatory elements needed to be removed from the ranks of the Party; 5. It was necessary to develop the theoretical work of the Party and to abandon the bureaucratic ways of working. All Puliopoulos wanted to do was “liquidate” all negative obstacles and “create a serious Party” that had greater internal freedom and “educated” members. The so-called liquidation

movement led by Puliopoulos appeared at a Party meeting held in Athens on November 6-8, 1926.

The ideological struggle between the new “minority”, headed by Puliopoulos, and the new “majority”, headed by H. Teu, G. Siantos, N. Kutvis (N. Zahariadis), A. Haitas and H. Eutychiadis, was further aggravated by the emergence of the so-called “centrists”, headed by S. Maximos, K. Sklavos and T. Hainoglou. The “majority” essentially accepted the Stalinist views which were passed on to the CPG through the Comintern. During the CPG Third Regular Congress, held in 1927, the “majority” condemned the views of the new “minority” calling them “Trotsky-ists”, with “liquidation-ist” tendencies. They also removed Puliopoulos from the CPG ranks. As a result, the so-called “liquidators” continue to fight the “majority” through the newly formed “Neo Xekinima” (New Movement). The provisional Politburo, elected by the “majority and by the “centrists” during the Third CPG Regular Congress, did not resolve the internal Party unrest. Also, political misunderstandings between the “majority” and the “centrists”, led by Maximos, forced the “centrists” to show greater sympathy towards the “minority” headed by Puliopoulos. On November 1, 1927, “centrist” representatives (Maximos, Sklavos and Hainoglou) and “minority” representatives (Puliopoulos, Giatopoulos, Nikolino, Hazistavrou and Papanikolaou) created the “United Opposition” and through the magazine “Spartacus”, continued to fight against the so-called “majority”, which, with help from the Comintern, took over the Party leadership. The Organization “Greek Communists – Internationalists” (OKDE), later renamed to AOKDE, after its formation, began to accept all members removed from the CPG. This organization later became the Communist Party of Greece -internationalists, a section of the Fourth International. OKDE was formed in 1934 by the supporters of “Spartacus” and by the permanent members of LAKKE (Leninist opposition of the Communist Party of Greece). This organization’s creation further complicated the Left political spectrum in Greece in the period between the two World Wars. The political orientation of the new “minority” changed its attitude towards “class-national” issues within the framework of the left ideology and this seriously affected Puliopoulos’s position regarding the Macedonian National Question.

The new “minority”, headed by P. Pulipoulos, like the other political groups that were later formed under the influence of the “Spartacus” magazine ideological platform, remained within the Left ideological framework and did not drift to the Right like the “minority” did when it was headed by Ianis Kordatos and Tomas Apostolidis. The left ideological and political orientation of these groups increasingly accentuated internationalism and suppressed the kind of Greek nationalism that had invaded the left ideological framework. They also took a more pristine attitude towards the Macedonian National Question. Puliopoulos himself, on the other hand, came much closer to the Macedonian people and, as a result, understood their national feelings and national and historical aspirations. While serving a prison sentence in the Akronavplion camp, Puliopoulos met many Macedonians and was strongly impressed by their national and class consciousness as well as by the fact that they continued to speak their Macedonian language despite the unprecedented terror the Greek authorities had unleashed on them. Puliopoulos also concluded that the Macedonian language was a separate Slavic language, and not a dialect of the Bulgarian or the Serbian languages, as claimed by supporters of the “minority” group in 1924, headed by Kordatos. In addition to having a good knowledge of French, English, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian, Bulgarian, Latin, Old Greek and Esperanto, Puliopoulos also taught himself to speak some Macedonian, even to write in Macedonian, which he learned while serving with Macedonians at the Akronavplion camp. Thanks to his excellent knowledge of the major European languages, Puliopoulos was able to get acquainted with the works of Marx, Engels, Kant, Schopenhauer, Schmidt, Ricardo, Plato…, thus creating a solid philosophical and political culture that raised him to one of the most interesting figures in the Greek workers’ and revolutionary movement. In parallel with speaking and writing in Macedonian, Puliopoulos paid special attention to the Macedonian Question and in 1940, while still in the Akronavplion camp, wrote an article entitled “On the Macedonian Question”, in which he recognized the Macedonian people’s right to self-determination and the unification of their fragmented homeland. Among other things Puliopoulos also wrote the following:

“1. He who does not recognize the existence of the Macedonian National Question in Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian (occupied)

Macedonia, in the past and today, is undoubtedly a lackey of the bourgeoisie,

2. He who does not recognize the Macedonian historical liberation movements is either illiterate, and should learn the history of those movements and about their national heroes, or is a lackey of one of the three oppressive bourgeois,

3. These (Macedonian) liberation movements have so far been suppressed in blood and betrayal and had devastating consequences for the interests of the Macedonia people (especially those in Bulgaria),

4. These (Macedonian) movements can find new developments in new and more favourable historical conditions: social, economic, political… (In the internal crisis of the Balkan counties, in war, in the exploitation of the Macedonian labour force by the oppressive bourgeoisie, in the problems with agricultural property, and so on),

5. Whoever does not recognize these possibilities is blind or deliberately blind, if he is not a lackey of the nationalist persecutors of a very tortured Macedonian nation,

6. Communists will not involve themselves in ‘creating’ national movements where they don’t exist. That would be a waste of time. They will, however, support such movements if they already exist and are active,

7. Communists do not close their eyes on ‘defeated’ national liberation movements or allow the denationalization aspirations of the nationalist bourgeoisie to exist… and they certainly do not become supporters of such ‘committed acts’. We will not give up on the nationally oppressed nations and the desires that exist in their hearts and thoughts (as they do in every Macedonian worker). The communists will adopt the libertarian desires of the Macedonian people and from now on the Macedonians can loudly declare that they have the right to self-determination and to state secession, if that is their will. The communists are prepared to support every national request, whether economic or political, and thus are preparing for a future revolutionary alliance with a Macedonian

social revolutionary movement against a common enemy - the Balkan bourgeoisie.” Three years after he wrote the article entitled “On the Macedonian Question”, using Macedonian grammar, Puliopoulos became seriously ill with tuberculosis and was shot dead by the Italian fascists along with 106 other communists.

But regardless of the different attitudes taken by the various “minorities” and “majorities”, in relation to the Macedonian National Question, it is a fact that the CPG had significantly been weakened by this. The Party’s polemics on the Macedonian National Question strongly contributed to “The party suffering major blows and losing its comrades, some of whom turned into social democrats, because of the National Question, or used this opportunity as a motive to abandon the struggle...” (Information taken from a letter written by Trohidromikos, published in “Rizospatis” on 9. II 1927.)

The opposition, including the “Archeomarxists” (Old Marxists), was always against the policy of a united and independent Macedonia in regards to the Macedonian National Question. The “minority” led by Kordatos, and in the period from 1926 to 1931 led by Puliopoulos, demanded that the CPG adopt a policy that would support Greek national interests and would not question the Greek national integrity.

Under strong pressure from the “archaeomarxists”, the “minority”, as well as its own membership, the “majority”, i.e. the CPG, decided to radically alter its policy in regards to the Macedonian National Question. With that it also changed the “majority’s” attitude towards “national” and “class” issues. If the CPG, in relation to the Macedonian National Question, favoured the Comintern policy with regards to “class issues” before 1931, after 1931 the CPG raised its favour towards “national issues” and rejected its policy for a united and independent Macedonia. This, of course, contributed to the appearance of two tendencies within the Party. Some thought that the Macedonian National Question was in profound contradiction with Greek national interests and that this question should not be treated as a tactical question. Others, especially those headed by Zahariadis, felt that if the political needs demanded it, the

Macedonian National Question could be turned into a tactical question to aid the needs of the “class struggle”.

By adopting a policy for full equality of minorities within the Greek state, the “majority” positioned itself in a new political orientation which not only influenced its overall political culture, but at the same time protected itself from political attacks. The CPG’s new orientation, in regards to the Macedonian National Question, also gave rise to new interpretations in its objectivity, logic and terminology. The Balkan Wars, for example, instead of being called “imperialist wars of the Greek bourgeoisie” were called “Liberation Wars”. Eleftheros Venizelos, a symbol of Greek nationalism and chauvinism, would find a suitable place in progressive Greek historical science. The CPG, for example, would rename the “Macedonian National Question” to the “so-called Macedonian Question”. This naturally also began to influence the political logic of the Party itself. Based on the large colonist settlements in Greek occupied Macedonia, the occupied Macedonian territories began to be seen as an inseparable part of the Greek state. The CPG not only acknowledged this but at the same time also denied the rights of the Macedonian majority living in Kostur, Lerin and Voden Regions and robbed the Macedonian people of the right to decide their own destiny.

The CPG’s new political orientation after 1935, in relation to the Macedonian National Question, also influenced the ethnographic terminology when it came to the Macedonian people. Instead of calling them Macedonians, like they called themselves and like the CPG used to call them during the period when it recognized them as a unique and separate nation, the CPG began to call them “Slavo-Macedonians”. The CPG did not use the term “Slavo-Macedonians” to distinguish the Macedonians from the foreign Christian colonists who were settled in Greek occupied Macedonia, but for other and deep political reasons. According to the CPG, in addition to “Slavo-Macedonians” living in Greek occupied Macedonia, there were also “Greek-Macedonians”, “Vlach-Macedonians”, and so on. With this the CPG aimed at turning Macedonia into a geographical region with no Macedonian national character. The CPG took careful measures not to use the name “Macedonians”, especially during the People’s Liberation Struggle. When Macedonian partisan units from

the Republic of Macedonia were passing through Greek occupied Macedonia, the CPG referred to them as “Serbian partisan units”.

And even today, in the presence of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the CPG still uses double terminology for the Macedonians. It uses the name Macedonians for the Macedonian people living in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and Slavo-Macedonians for the Macedonian people living in Greek occupied Macedonia, as if they were not members of the same nation. This, however, did not happen with the Communist Party of Britain, the Communist Party of Spain and the Communist Party of France, in regards to the territorial divisions in Ireland and Euskania (Basque). These parties did not change the ethnographic terminology of the divided Irish and Basques people. Those parties simply called all divided people Irish or Basque, the way these people called themselves. The CPG, however, did this to calm down its membership and to remove the controversial Macedonian issue from its agenda, which always created storms and indignation inside the party. It was “the only way to avoid mistakes, controversies and talks about Greek Macedonia, which is now inhabited by 90% Greeks and therefore constitutes an inseparable part of the Greek state.” (N. Zahariadis, op. cit, p. 173.) By adapting the new orientation, in relation to the Macedonian National Question, the CPG managed to calm down internal opposition. In other words, by removing the “apple of discord” from its agenda, the CPG became stronger and began to deal with other serious political issues and gain legitimacy in the consciousness of the Greek people.

The CPG’s real attitude towards the Macedonian National Question

The policy of a united and independent Macedonia was never a realistic reflection of the CPG’s intimate wishes. The presence of Greek national interests within the left component of the CPG, very much contributed to the divergence between the official Party policy and the membership’s real wishes, when it came to the Macedonian National Question.

On the one hand the Comintern forced the CPG to adopt a policy on the Macedonian National Question and, on the other, Greek national interests expressed through Greek national feelings, including those expressed inside the Party, pressured the CPG to adopt a non-Macedonian attitude towards the Macedonian National Question. The standpoint that existed inside the Party was expressed externally through the position taken by Petsopoulos, Stavridis, Maximos, and others, during their various consultations with the Balkan Communist Federation or with the Comintern.

This internal standpoint continued to exert strong pressure on both the Comintern and the CPG leadership for the Party to formally accept and harmonize its official Macedonian National Question policy to reflect the true wishes of its membership.

With its 1931 adoption of the minority equality policy within the Greek state, the Party formally legitimized and aligned its position with its official policy. This was also the first independent move the CPG made and independent attitude it took in relation to the Comintern and the Macedonian National Question.

The contradiction that existed between the CPG’s “formal” and “desired” approach towards the Macedonian National Question in the period from 1923 to 1931, greatly contributed to the Party’s inactivity and to the Macedonian national progressive movement’s stagnation. But even though the “majority”, at the time, was convinced that the CPG’s policy for a united and independent Macedonia was fair, it never did realistically advocate for its implementation on the ground. Therefore, remarks made by the “minority” that the “majority”, in practice, had done little to nothing for the linguistic and educational rights of minorities were correct. (“Rizospastis”, 5. II 1927.) This is what T. Apostolidis said in a 1927 article published in “Rizspastis”, about the “majority’s” activities in relation to the Macedonian National Question: “It should be noted that most of the proclamations drafted about the national question remained untouched in files even three months after they were drafted. None of them were circulated in the cells in Macedonia.” (Ibid., 13. II 1927.) So, according to the “minority”, the “majority” supported the Macedonian National Question in words only. (X. Vatis, op. cit., “Rizospastis”, 26. III 1927.) This was also confirmed by the 1926 CPG Central Committee Bulletin no. 2 which, among other things, reported the following: “We did not take

any action to create a minority movement in Macedonia and Thrace nor did we take any actions to solve the minority problems...” (“Rizospastis”, 18. II 1927.)