-- ILINDEN UPRISING -- - Part 04

Again due to the large Ottoman presence in the region, Hristo Chernopeev’s Cheta was spotted by spies in the village Vitosha in Kochani Region, and on September 16, 1903 came under Ottoman

pursuit. After spotting the Ottomans, Tsernopeev and his insurgents fled for the security of the mountains and took up defensive positions. Unfortunately in their haste to flee the insurgents left a vast part of their arms and ammunition in the village which the Ottomans had unintentionally destroyed.

Unaware of the presence of the ammunition, which included bombs and dynamite, the Ottoman soldiers set fire to the houses in the village and as the bombs began to explode they became startled fearing an attack. The Ottomans withdrew immediately and called for reinforcements. After about 6,000 new soldiers arrived the next day, the Ottomans went in pursuit of Tsernopeev’s Cheta in the mountains. A fierce battle ensued and lasted the entire day. Unable to hold back the numerically superior Ottoman force, the insurgents in the dark of night decided to flee towards the Bulgarian border. Unfortunately due to the heavy build up of Ottoman forces at the frontier the Cheta was spotted and intercepted by Ottoman soldiers. To save itself, the Cheta split into several smaller units and each took separate paths to safety. This unfortunately still did not save them all as some of the units were ambushed and destroyed. The ones remaining, with the exception of one, fled to Bulgaria. One fled to Sultantepe and fell into an ambush. A vicious battle broke out lasting two days. The Macedonians fought fiercely and by September 18, 1903 when the battle was over 75 insurgents and 380 Ottoman soldiers lost their lives.

One of the most vicious battled fought in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District was that of September 24th, 1903 where Nikola Dechev’s Cheta from Veles, Grigor Manasiev’s Cheta from Kratovo and Toma Pazarliev’s Cheta from Voden, totaling 113 insurgents, were pitted against a force of 7,000 Ottoman Soldiers. The Macedonian Chetas found themselves surrounded near Lukovo and Emiritsa in Kratovo Region when the battle broke out. Unable to puncture the siege, the Macedonians fought gallantly the entire day. Then during the dark of night they slipped through the encirclement and fled to Bulgaria. While most escaped with their lives intact, 31 insurgents, including vojvodas Dechev and Manasiev, lost theirs.

Outside of battling the Ottomans, the Macedonians in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District also fought against Bulgarian sponsored Supremacist bands operating in Skopje Region, especially near the Macedonian-Serbian border. This was particularly more pronounced after the fall of the Krushevo Republic.

Unfortunately the failed Uprising in this region, as carefully as it was planned not to provoke Ottoman retaliation against the civilian population, did exactly that and the Macedonian people suffered immensely from Ottoman retaliation and revenge killings.

As large as the Macedonian population in the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District was the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was unable to motivate it on mass to take up arms against the Ottomans. But as we have seen it was not because the population was unwilling to fight but rather because it was afraid of Ottoman retaliation; a fate it did not escape.

The Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District covered an area stretching from the Struma River in the east to the Vardar River in the west. It bordered the Skopje Uprising Revolutionary District in the north and the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District in the south. In other words, it covered the Strumitsa, Radovish, Maleshevo and parts of Gorna Dzhumaja Regions.

The Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District had two important roads and a rail line passing through its territory which made it strategically very important to both the Ottomans and the Macedonians. One road, connecting Strumitsa with Solun and Sofia, followed the flow of the Struma River. The other road and railway, connecting Solun and Skopje, followed the flow of the Vardar River. The Vardar and Struma valleys in turn were interconnected via the Kluch Gorge and via the Strumitsa to Petrich roadway.

At that time the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District was supported by a population of 104,000 people of whom 71% were Macedonians. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 357)

At the Solun Congress when it was decided to begin the National Uprising early, the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District, represented by Ivan Ingilizov from Strumitsa and Georgi Vamaliev from Radovish, despite its unprepared state, voted for an early uprising. The District did not have enough weapons to arm all its insurgents but that did not worry its leadership because it expected that Bulgaria would soon furnish it with what it needed.

Towards the end of January 1903 the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District was visited by Boris Sarafov and his Cheta of 40 insurgents. At that time there were two local Chetas operating in the District with a combined strength of 25 insurgents, which joined Sarafov’s Cheta in its mission to inspect the readiness of Strumitsa District. Sent by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Sarafov’s job here was to consolidate the various bands and their leaders who were at the time operating independently and to begin agitating the population and prepare it for the National Uprising.

Towards the end of March more help arrived when Hristo Tsernopeev and Hristo Maznejkov arrived with their Chetas to assist with the Uprising in Strumica and Radovis Regions. Nikola Detsev’s Cheta from Veles and Timo Angelov’s Cheta from Tikves also crossed the border into the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District and together with the other Chetas participated in various missions.

On April 6, 1903 the combined Chetas descended from Mount Goten and openly attacked the Ottoman, making this an offensive operation. When the battle was over Tsernopeev and Maznejkov went to Strumitsa and Radovish Regions to continue their missions.

After the Solun assassinations 200 angry and frustrated residents from the village Voislavtsi, in Radovis Region, armed with a variety of firearms, swords, knives and pitchforks took to the streets and demanded that Tsernopeev immediately commence the Uprising. Fortunately Tsernopeev was able to calm the angry villagers but not for long. All through May, 1903 frustration drove people to take to their protests to the streets; resulting in fights.

Unfortunately the usual cure for this type of violence was more violence and Ottoman retaliation. In mid July 1903 while traveling through Radovis, Hilmi Pasha himself ordered extreme measures be taken against these outbreaks. This, as usual, resulted in punishing the innocent civilian population more than it punished the troublemakers.

Without the delivery of the expected arms and ammunition from Bulgaria, the Strumitsa Uprising Revolutionary District leadership found itself inadequately prepared and unable to sustain any operations, not even partisan style diversionary ones.

----- The Solun Uprising

Prior to the preparations for the National Uprising, the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District (now occupied by Greece) consisted of two districts: the second or eastern district known as “Belasitsa” and the third or western district known as “Kozhuf”. These were later consolidated to form the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District.

At the start of the 20th century, the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District supported a population of 418,270 people of whom 195,637 were Macedonians, 103,957 were Ottomans, 30,786 were Jews and the remaining were Vlachs and others. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 359)

Solun, the capital of Solun Vilayet, was not only a cultural, administrative and military center; it was also a cosmopolitan city with enormous economic power. Much of the high ranking Ottoman authorities were located and lived there. The staff of the 3rd Army Corps, the 17th Infantry Division, the 3rd Cavalry Division and the 3rd artillery Division as well as the staff from several regiments, for example, were all located in Solun. In addition to supporting high ranking officials, Solun Region also supported a number of regular Ottoman army divisions.

As one of the most important cities in the Ottoman Empire, Solun, at the time, was literally the transportation junction between the Balkans and the outside world. It was the crossroad between Europe and Asia, capable of supporting not only a huge civilian population

but also large armies on the move to and from Asia Minor and the Balkans.

Being a cosmopolitan city and supporting many foreigners on political, religious and business missions, Solun was a calm and relatively peaceful city. But that was not the case after the Solun assassinations in April 1903. To restore order and regain the confidence of these foreign investors and businessmen, Ottoman authorities had to crack down on the troublemakers with massive arrests. These actions unfortunately not only robbed the Uprising of its leadership but also created conditions of fear which significantly decreased the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization’s ability to function in this District. Without grass roots participation, all the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District could muster was the formation of small bands.

Understanding that very little could be done with small bands, the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District leadership decided to organize its activities around partisan style hit and run activities. Plans were then put in place to conduct combat missions in and around Mount Kozhuf.

Appointed to lead the Kozhuf branch of the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District Headquarters were vojvodas Sava Mihajlov, Argir Manasiev and Apostol Petkov. Considering the lack of leaders available to lead the insurgency in other branches of the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District, it was decided to combine some of the Chetas.

In Belitsa, the Eastern part of the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District, the most prepared region to do combat during the National Uprising was Kukush. Here it was decided to allow the larger Cheta, lead by Krsto Asenov, formed before the Solun assassinations to function as a whole.

Preparations for the National Uprising continued to be made even after the Solun assassinations regardless of the strict measures imposed by the Ottomans. While secrecy and vigilance restricted their movements, organizers did manage to build a large base of operations in the seclusion of the reeds near Lake Ahmatovo.

Among other things they built a warehouse for storing food, weapons and ammunition, barracks for the insurgents, and other buildings to be used for cooking food and nursing the wounded. The insurgents from Kukush also owned a red flag made of silk which they carried during their missions.

Around mid-May 1903, for its own safety, the Kukus Cheta retreated into Krusha Mountain to wait until the National Uprising date was announced. Unfortunately no sooner had the Cheta arrived and settled than it was discovered and placed under siege by a column of Ottoman soldiers. While patrolling an area near the village Megurek, south-west of Lake Butkovo, the Cheta was attacked and a battle broke out. Throughout that day the battle spread outside the villages Gorni and Dolni Todorak, lasting the entire day. The insurgents fought gallantly but were unable to break the siege as the Ottomans continued to pursue them through the night. As the insurgents pushed the battle into the woodlands of the village Nemantsi, Kukus Region, they finally broke free and fled leaving behind many dead including Milan Delchev, Gotse Delchev’s brother.

It took a while for the insurgents to regroup but by the start of June 1903 they all arrived in the secluded region of Lake Ahmatovo where they met up with Trajko Jotov and Gotse Nistorov’s Chetas. Combined, the three Chetas numbered over 200 insurgents.

Even in the seclusion of the reeds the insurgents were not safe as the Ottomans continued to look for them and kept the lake surrounded with artillery fire. For almost a month the Ottomans pounded the area with artillery and when they couldn’t uproot the insurgents they tried to burn the reeds but without success.

While the Ottomans were pounding the insurgents, the local Kukush Uprising leadership was making plans of its own to attack and gain control of the city of Kukush. The plan was to combine the three Chetas and assign Krsto Asenov as the top leader while separately each Cheta would have its own vojvoda, Trajko Jotov, Gotse Nistorov, or Gone Beginin.

Before the attack on Kukush, scheduled for July 28, 1903, the Chetas met at the village Postolar to discuss strategies. The attack commenced on schedule and, surprised by the sudden assault, the Ottomans were easily defeated giving the insurgents a decisive victory. Unfortunately before he could be stopped, the Kukush Kaimakam requested support from the Ottoman garrisons stationed in Kukush, Gevgelija and Dojran. Running out of time the Macedonians strengthened their defenses as much as time would permit but not soon enough to be able to hold onto the city. By morning the Ottomans had surrounded the city and at dawn began their attack. A vicious battle ensued and lasted until late night when the insurgents, in small groups, broke through the siege and escaped to Ardzansko Blato. Given the circumstances, the insurgents managed to inflict great casualties on the enemy while themselves suffering minimal losses.

When the National Uprising began in the Bitola Uprising Revolutionary District on August 2nd, 1903 the Kukush Cheta lead by Krsto Asenov, the Enidzhe Vardar Cheta lead by Apostol Petkov and the Gevgelija Cheta lead by Ivan Karasulijata attacked and liberated the village Komisor. With the Kukush Cheta’s flag flying high, vojvoda Krsto Asenov celebrated the liberation by marrying Ana Malesevska, a teacher and daughter of the famous revolutionary Nikola Malesevski. Unfortunately Krsto Asenov’s happiness was cut short as he was killed in action soon after his marriage. After his death the Kukush Cheta remained intact and, together with the Gevgelija and Enidzhe Vardar Chetas, continued to contribute to the National Uprising and to the liberation of Macedonia.

Soon after preparations began for the National Uprising in the western half, or Kozhuf part of the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District, the District leadership, lead by Apostol Petkov, subdivided the District into four regions; Grubevtsi, Kriva, Tumba and the City of Gumendzhe. A base of operations, with a number of warehouses, was established on Mount Pajak near Lake Enidzhe Vardar for carrying out Uprising preparations and revolutionary activities. Unfortunately, even though Vojvoda Apostol Petkov was able to recruit a large number of insurgents he was unable to arm them because of lack of weapons and ammunition. With the exception of delivering 10 rifles of 'Gra-Gra' type and several revolvers even the

Macedonian Revolutionary Organization’s Central Committee could not help.

To make things worse the Bulgarian sponsored Supremacists became involved in the region and began to agitate the population in the villages around the Pajak and Kozhuf mountains to rise en masse during the Uprising. Vojvoda Apostol Petkov, however, opposed their plan arguing that under the circumstances it would be best not to involve the general population and instead allow the village and local Chetas to carry out partisan style combat activities. Accordingly, Apostol Petkov issued specific orders to the Tumba and neighbouring villages to coordinate their activities with those of the Gevgelija Cheta lead by Sava Mihajlov and Argir Manasiev. Some of those activities included the demolition of the Vardar Bridge and the destruction of the railway north of Gumendzhe. The village Cheta from Grubevtsi meanwhile was ordered to cut the telegraph lines between Enidzevardarsko and the village Kufalovo. At the same time the Gumendzhe leadership was instructed to make preparations for an attack on the installation in Gumendzhe.

Because of a large Ottoman army presence in the area the Uprising in the Enidzhe Vardar Region did not begin until August 6th, 1903.

The Uprising began with a planned attack on the village Kriva where Apostol Petkov was hoping to destroy the garrison of 30 Ottoman soldiers and liberate the village. Unfortunately his plan was discovered and instead of the insurgents attacking the Ottomans, the Ottomans attacked the insurgents and drove them back. While this was going on Sava Mihajlov, with assistance from the Bojmitsa villagers, dynamited and destroyed the railway. A few days later Petkov’s Cheta attacked and besieged the Gumendze garrison. Although the insurgents did not capture the city they did manage to block the Ottoman army and hold it besieged in its installation for some time. When Ottoman reinforcements arrived Petkov’s Cheta, along with the other Chetas, retreated to Mount Pajak and by mid October 1903 fought several independent battles in various parts of this region.

One of the most severe battles fought in this part of the district was in Gandats, one of the highest peaks of Mount Pajak. There Apostol

Petkov and Ivan Karasulija’s insurgents took their frustration and anger out on the Ottoman army and Bashi-Bazouks for the crimes they had committed against the innocent and unarmed Macedonian civilian population.

On September 12th, 1903 via a letter to the Ottoman garrisons in Gevgelija and Gumendzhe, the insurgents challenged the Ottoman army to “Come up to Gandats and fight the insurgents instead of attacking the unprotected population in the villages...”

Frustrated by their peoples’ plight, vojvodas Apostol Petkov and Ivan Karasulija looked for a way to teach the Ottomans a lesson for taking revenge on the innocent Macedonian population. They strongly believed that if they could draw the Ottomans into the mountains, away from the civilian population, they could strike a blow that the Ottomans would never forget.

The challenge was accepted and on September 14th, 1903 the Ottoman army climbed Mount Pajak from two sides and took position around Gandats peak. The Ottoman plan was to surround the Chetas and deliver a devastating blow. Petkov and Karasulija however were well aware of Ottoman army tactics and the Macedonians with great skill out-maneuvered the Ottomans and forced them into an ambush. The insurgents fought until they ran out of ammunition killing 183 Ottomans. Taking advantage of the dark of night the insurgents then slipped away leaving the Ottomans in peace to bury their dead.

In Gevgelija Region in the meantime, Vojvodas Sava Mihajlov and Argir Manasiev were busy recruiting insurgents for their own Chetas and making preparations for the National Uprising. Just before the Uprising began they had managed to recruit about 50 insurgents. They chose the village Konsko as their base of operations and as their Uprising center for this region. When the time came the Gevgelija Region leadership decided to split up its Cheta into smaller groups and initiated the Uprising by taking diversionary actions against the railway north and south of Gevgelija.

On August 15th, 1903 Sava Mihajlov’s Cheta, assisted by the villagers from Bojmitsa, attacked and destroyed the local railway

and a local bridge. While explosives were placed on the railway by small groups, the larger Chetas secured their positions. In the meantime, Argir Manasiev’s Cheta carried out a couple of diversionary actions, one near the village Balintsi and the second near the village Smokvitsa where a vicious battle broke out and the insurgents fought against an Ottoman army unit.

In Tikvesh Region meanwhile, vojvoda Petar Jurukov took charge of the Uprising preparations which began early in February 1903 immediately after the Solun Congress. Unfortunately due to the close proximity of Tikvesh Region to Solun and the strict measures imposed after the assassinations, acquiring weapons became very difficult. Even under these circumstances Petar Jurukov still managed to acquire about 300 rifles of the ‘Gra-Gra’ type and some Martini rifles.

By end of July, 1903 Jurukov’s Cheta had grown to 80 insurgents, which was then subdivided into three groups each capable of carrying out individual diversionary actions. Jurukov’s presence in the region unfortunately attracted the attention of Ottoman authorities who retaliated by imposing further repression on the Macedonian population. These strict measures forced Jurukov to re-think his strategy and as a result he demobilized the groups of insurgents, dismissing half of them. With the other half he formed two Chetas, one lead by himself and the other by vojvoda Lazar Misev.

As Ottoman weapon search activities increased in Tikvesh Region, to avoid conflict and further endangering the civilian population, the two Chetas left Tikvesh Region and transferred to Prilep Region, but only for a short time before returning to Tikvesh.

While patrolling the vicinity near the village Sheshkevo, on August 16, the Tikvesh insurgents came under Ottoman fire and a vicious battle broke out. When it was over 15 insurgents and 17 Ottoman soldiers lay dead. A few days later another battle broke out, this one near the village Kopristits, leaving 2 insurgents and 7 Ottoman soldiers dead.

Even though the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District had been restricted by the Ottomans in so many ways, its leadership still managed to accomplish a great deal. For starters it mobilized its forces and kept them active. It got the attention of the Ottomans by forcing Suleyman Pasha to send his powerful army after them and to commit large forces to guard the railways. By doing this the Solun Uprising Revolutionary District leadership proved that even a small number of insurgents involved in partisan style activities could literally pin down a large army, as Gotse Delchev had earlier predicted.

----- The Seres Uprising

The Seres Uprising Revolutionary District (now occupied by Greece), with the City of Seres as its center, covered the territory extending from Mesta River to the east, the Bulgarian border to the north, the Struma River to the west and the Aegean Sea to the south.

Immediately before the 1903 Ilinden National Uprising, the Seres Uprising Revolutionary District supported a population of 429,382 people of whom 245, 582 were Macedonians and the rest were Muslims, Ottomans, Vlachs and others. (Vanche Stojchev. “Military History of Macedonia”. Military academy. Skopje, 2004. Page 362)

The Seres Uprising Revolutionary District, being geographically positioned between a number of mountains, rivers and gorges, was not only of strategic importance to both the Ottomans and the Macedonians but because of its poorly developed road networks it made it ideal for organizing a revolutionary movement. Unfortunately because of the 1878 Kreshna Uprising this District gained special significance in the Ottoman defense strategy and was well guarded. Besides being militarily well guarded, this District was also placed under constant Ottoman watch for revolutionary activities.

In terms of defense in the first half of 1903, just before the August 2nd, 1903 Macedonian National Ilinden Uprising, stationed in the Seres vicinity alone were parts of the 9th Infantry Division and the entire 18th Brigade. The 33rd Infantry Brigade was stationed in Goma Dzumaja and forward battalions were stationed in Melnik,

Drama, Demir Hisar, Nevrokop and other cities. There were also smaller units ranging from 30 to 40 and from 100 to 150 Ottomans soldiers deployed in the various villages in Seres District. All in all there were over 5,000 Ottoman soldiers stationed in this District alone. How this massive Ottoman military presence was deployed largely depended on the geographic position of the cities and villages and on the perceived threat from the revolutionaries.

To keep itself clandestine as much as possible, Seres Uprising Revolutionary District took the name “the fourth Uprising District -Pirin”. But in spite of its large Macedonian population and all efforts by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization to bring this Revolutionary District in line with the others, there was not much success. This was also reflected by the fact that only one delegate attended the Solun Congress.

Lazar Dimitrov, representing the Seres Uprising Revolutionary District, was well aware of the situation in his District when he voted against an early uprising. But given that many of the delegates voted for an early Uprising, Dimitrov accepted the decision and complied with the wishes of the majority.

Towards the end of January 1903, Gotse Delchev paid the District a visit and met with Jane Sandanski, Pejo Javorov, Taskata Serski and others in the village Kara Koj, Nevrokop Region, to assess the situation. Unfortunately before his work was done Delchev was killed and his death brought further deterioration to the District’s ability to organize the people and to participate in the National Uprising.

Gotse Delchev’s death was viewed as suspicious and there was contention between the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO) and the Bulgarian sponsored Vrhovist leadership. The two factions were accusing one another of betrayal and of having Delchev murdered.

The presence of a large number of Bulgarian sponsored Vrhovists did not help the situation. Discord between the MRO and the Bulgarian sponsored Vrhovists always existed but nowhere more than in the Seres District where there was a gaping divide between

the ideologies of the two groups. In fact at one point just before the Uprising, there was so much tension that there was serious danger of an armed conflict breaking out between the two groups.

Because this district was already suspected of being involved in revolutionary activities and due to earlier revolutionary incidents in Gorna Dzumaja and Solun (assassinations), the people in Seres were placed under extreme scrutiny. So to avoid placing the civilian population in peril, Yane Sandanski, the only revolutionary leader in the District with authority to make decisions and influence the population, decided to follow Gotse Delchev’s idea and not participate in the National Uprising, at least not en masse. Unfortunately since that decision had already been made during the Solun Congress, to avoid making the situation even more difficult for the civilian population, Sandanski gave in to Vrhovist pressures and joined forces with the Bulgarian sponsored bands.

All in all there were 850 Vrhovists; 134 were under the command of Colonel Anastas Jankov, 300 were under the command of Jordan Stojanov and Petar Drvingov. All were under the command of General Ivan Tsonchev.

Because of the problems experienced, the District remained inactive, that is, until August 15th, 1903 when Vrhovist Lieutenant Jordan Stojanov’s Cheta clashed with an Ottoman unit on the slopes of Belasitsa Mountain.

On August 19, 1903 another battle broke out on Etipitsa Hill in Bansko Region near Lake Eltepen. Here Lieutenant Jordan Stojanov’s Cheta combined with Boris Strezov’s Cheta to form the Belitsa detachment and fought the Ottomans under Lieutenant Petar Drvingov’s command.

On August 22, 1903 Yane Sandanski held the long overdue Seres District Congress in Belemeto, Pirin Mountain. Here it was decided that the Seres Revolutionary District would continue to participate in the Uprising but in a limited way and through the use of diversionary partisan style actions. The first target chosen to be attacked was the Dedeagatch to Solun rail line.

During this Congress, which lasted three days, it was decided to start the Uprising in Seres District much later than in the other districts. The date chosen was the Krstovden Holy Day, September 14, 1903, 43 days after the Ilinden Uprising in Bitola District. The reason for the delay was because the Seres District was not ready to enter the Uprising with all that Ottoman military build up in its District. The thinking was that if Seres remained peaceful, the Ottomans would surely redeploy the Seres District massive force elsewhere where it was needed. Counting on the Ottomans to disperse their troops to other Districts that had already commenced the Uprising, the people of Seres would rise up and have a better chance of liberating themselves. At least that was the plan.

On August 28, 1903, in order to make use of all available forces, Yane Sandanski summoned Lieutenant Jordan Stojanov to bring the Vrhovist Chetas to the village Pirin, Melnik Region, where he intended to incorporate the Vrhovists with Mihail Tsakov’s and his own Cheta. Many were not happy with Sandanski’s decision but accepted the idea and cooperated as long as the aim was to liberate Seres and Macedonia.

On August 31, 1903 more Chetas arrived, both Vrhovist and MRO, and met in the region between Nevrokop and Melnik. Included among the Vrhovist leadership were General Ivan Tsonchev and Colonel Anastas Jankov as well as a couple of Russian journalists named Petar Orlovetz and Romoald Przhevalski.

The concentration of armed insurgents unfortunately attracted the attention of the Ottomans who dispatched two military battalions to engage them. A vicious battle broke out near the village Pirin as the combined Chetas took joint action for the first time and defeated the Ottoman attack.

Afterwards Sandanski met with Tsonchev and explained to the Vrhovist that he could not have frontal confrontations with the Ottomans at this time and ordered him to take his Chetas to a region near Lake Braznitsa and wait until the official announcement of the Uprising in Seres Region was made. General Tsonchev accepted Sandanski’s recommendation and withdrew his Chetas.

After the Vrhovist withdrawal, Sandanski went to Breznitsa and met with Tsonchev and the other Vrhovist representatives in hopes of reaching a consensus on how to deploy the troops during the Uprising. While Tsonchev wanted an all out war simultaneously deploying every available resource, Sandanski wanted to divide up the Chetas by region and conduct long term partisan style diversionary actions. Unfortunately no consensus could be reached other than to begin the Uprising on Krstovden, September 14, 1903. A vote was taken and, by majority, Tsonchev’s plan was accepted and a General Headquarters was established. Tsonchev and Dimitar Stefanov, as well as others from both sides, were appointed to lead the Uprising. Unhappy with the outcome, Sandanski and his insurgents returned to Seres and Drama to begin preparations for the Uprising and to conduct partisan style diversionary actions.

Vrhovists General Tsonchev, Colonel Jankov, Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Nikolov, Lieutenants Drvingov and Sarakinov, along with their Vrhovist Chetas, waited until September 15th, 1903 before initiating frontal attacks against the Ottomans. They restricted their campaigns close to the Bulgarian border, mainly in the Gorna Dzumaja and Razlog Regions, and when confronted by sizable Ottoman forces the Vrhovists retreated inside the Bulgarian border leaving the villagers open to Ottoman reprisal.

As planned, Sandanski divided up his insurgents into smaller Chetas and placing one under Vojvoda Mircho Kiprev’s command. Unfortunately on September 15, 1903, while patrolling the Drama region, this Cheta fell into an Ottoman ambush. While most insurgents escaped with their lives, Vojvoda Kiprev was killed. Command of the Cheta fell to Vojvoda Ivan Anastasov-Grcheto.

On September 16, 1903 the same Cheta ran into another column of Ottoman soldiers, this time near the village Kalapot. Another battle broke out but, unprepared to fight a frontal attack against a numerically superior enemy, the insurgents retreated into the woods leaving behind four of their own dead.

By mid September 1903 most Revolutionary Districts had fallen to the enemy and the Ottomans had no problem responding to the late

Uprising in Seres with a formidable counter attack, thus putting an end to the short lived Uprising in that District.

Having failed to drive the Ottomans out of Seres, the Vrhovists continued their campaign in the District but focused their actions more on spreading Bulgarian propaganda and less on attacking the Ottoman army.

From a military perspective, the short lived Uprising in the Seres Revolutionary District was unsuccessful mainly due to the District’s inability to become organized under the constant watchful eye of the Ottomans but also due to the conditions of the Uprising’s late start. By mid September 1903, free from campaigning in other districts, the Ottomans had more than enough resources to respond to the Seres Uprising, something the insurgents did not count on.

From a moral and political perspective, the Uprising was a success because, in spite of all odds, the Seres Revolutionary District, mainly due to Sandanki’s good leadership, was able to muster enough will to begin the Uprising thus entering the annals of history as a District that struggled to not only free itself but to free all of Macedonia.

1903 - Misirkov - book “On Macedonian Matters”

1903 - Krste Petkov - Misirkov publishes the book “On Macedonian Matters” (“Za makedonskite raboti”) in which he projected the principles for standardization of the Macedonian literary language.

1907 - The Nozh Uprising

By the middle of 1907 the Macedonian people found themselves in a state of anarchy with war looming on the horizon. No one knew or could confirm with any certainty how many illegal armed bands were operating in Macedonia. Neither the Ottoman army nor the International Peacekeepers wanted anything to do with them. These Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Romanian bands were paid to terrorize and victimize the Macedonian civilian population with a single aim, to eliminate the Macedonian peoples’ desire to create a free and independent Macedonia and to make it easier for whoever

possessed Macedonian lands to assimilate the Macedonian people once Macedonia was partitioned. These bands were dispatched and paid for by the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian governments to serve their interests.

By this time the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO) had recovered somewhat from the failed Ilinden Uprising but did not possess the strength or resources to respond to all the troubles that the Macedonian people were facing. However the few Macedonian Chetas that remained active fought day and night to protect the people, sometimes two or three battles per day. If they fought the Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians in the morning then they fought the Ottoman army in the evening.

The civilian population did not know what to make of all the chaos and violence and lived under constant fear and threat of war. The situation worsened when the Ottomans began to reinforce their military installations in the Bitola Vilayet with ten additional battalions. Not knowing what this military buildup was for the MRO decided to react, particularly after the Ottomans joined the Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians and Bashibazuks in committing violent crimes against the Macedonian population.

Given the dire situation, particularly in the Bitola Vilayet in April 1907, many of the Macedonian insurgents and Vojvodas who survived the Ilinden onslaught were recalled and asked to reassemble at Babuna Mountain in Bitola.

The first to return were Vojvodas Petar Atsev and Tane Nikolov along with 50 experienced and well-armed insurgents. Vojvodas Mihail Chakov, Hristo Tsvetkov and Mircho Najdenov, along with their Chetas, arrived followed later by Ivan Naumov- Alabakov from Veles with his Cheta. In total there were 230 insurgents who had returned and 300 more from the local village militia. After arriving, the force of 530 insurgents relocated to the Nikodin vicinity where they were joined by more local Chetas and some from Kostur Region and southern Bulgaria.

On June 6, 1907 the Council of Vojvodas held a meeting in Popadiski Chukari where they discussed strategies on how to take

adequate measures to protect the population. Anticipating dramatic events, the Council ordered the local organizations to immediately prepare food for 500 persons for three days. Fortunately the dramatic events anticipated did not materialize.

In the middle of June, 1907 two Serbian armed bands appeared in the village Nikodin and began to hassle the civilian population. On June 22, 1907 the Macedonian Chetas led by Mihail Chakov, Tane Nikolov, Petar Atsev, Mircho Najdenov and Hristo Tsvetkov surrounded Nikodin and began their assault on the Serbian bands. Unfortunately before the bandits could be captured most escaped the encirclement by disguising themselves as women wearing traditional clothes, or shepherds and herdsmen.

When the Ottoman authorities found out that Macedonian insurgents had returned and were in the vicinity of Nikodin, they quickly dispatched their army and garrisoned all the villages including the small ones.

On July 10, 1907 the Chetas, led by Nikolov, Atsev, Najdenov, Tsvetkov and Gorgi Mariovski from Mariovo numbering more than 150 insurgents reinforced with 300 insurgents from the village militia, regrouped in the vicinity between Popadija -Nikodin and Rakle and went on their way to intercept another Serbian armed band which had entered Nikodin.

On July 11, 1907 the Council of Vojvodas decided to encircle the Serbian band and this time destroy it for good. But yet again the Serbians breached the encirclement and escaped. Eager to save their own skins and get revenge on the Macedonian Chetas, Serbian agents reported the Macedonian buildup to the Ottoman authorities who in turn sent a large local army unit as well as other units from Bitola, Prilep, Voden, Lerin, Tikves and Veles to immediately depart for Babuna Mountain. Upon learning of this, the Prilep Revolutionary Committee advised the Vojvodas to quickly leave Nikodin and retreat to Mariovo.

Unfortunately all the Chetas could not retreat as they were expecting other Chetas to arrive and needed to warn them of the Ottoman advance. Ivan Alabakov’s Cheta decided to stay behind while Tane

Nikolov and Petar Atsev, who had major roles in the Council of Vojvodas, watched the Serbian movement and while waiting for the arrival of the Ottoman army divided their forces into two groups. The first group led by Nikolov, Atsev and Mariovski, together with the local militia, occupied the Popadiski Chukari hills. The second group led by Chakov, Tsvetkov and Najdenov occupied the Nozh hill near the village Rakle. The second group was then subdivided into two smaller groups of eight insurgents each, commanded by Sekula Oraovdolski and Velko Popadiski. One group was sent to secure Jasenova Glava peak between the villages Nikodin and Vladilovtsi.

On July 13, 1907 messengers from Prilep, Topolitsa, Trojatsi and Veles reported that a column of 3,000 Ottoman soldiers led by Enver Bey, future leader of the Young Turk revolution, was headed towards Nikodin. The same day, the Vojvodas Chakov, Tsetkov and Najdenov were urged to consult with Nikolov, Atsev and Mariovski, now located near Popadiski Chukar, to decide what to do. Petko Kojchev, secretary of the Veles Cheta, in the meantime, was given the role of acting Vojvoda at Nozh to replace Ivan Alabakov who had left with his 50 insurgents the night before.

Soon after the Vojvodas met they were informed that the Ottoman column was now moving towards Nozh. Messengers were immediately dispatched with orders to inform the Chetas to retreat from Nozh and head towards Popadiska Vodenitsa.

After receiving the order all but 54 insurgents left Nozh. Among the remaining 54 was the entire Kostur Region Cheta numbering 30 insurgents and some volunteers who had recently joined. Command of the Kostur Region Cheta was entrusted to 19 year old assistant Vojvoda Atanas Popov from Sesteovo, Kostur Region and 19 year old Tredafil Dumbalokov from Suho, Solun Region. Dumbakov was a volunteer who had just left the Military Academy in Sofia to join the fight and be close to the Macedonian people.

When Popov and Dumbalokov received orders from the Council of Vojvodas to retreat they immediately rejected the orders and refused to leave claiming that they were sent there by the people of Kostur Region to fight. They were again informed that a column of 3,000

Ottoman soldiers was about to embark on their position, but the two young men and their insurgents again refused to leave insisting that this was their destiny. They came here to fight and not retreat. This was their final decision and they were here to fulfill their obligation to the people of Kostur even if they had to fight to the death.

Popov’s and Dumbalokov’s decision to fight, although astonishing, was welcome news to the village militia and to the Papradiste insurgents led by Najdo Arsov and Petko Kojchev but a disappointment to the Council because it would prove to be a senseless loss of such good fighters and patriots.

But as the first Ottoman soldiers began to arrive and encircle Nozh there was a change of heart in the Vojvodas, insurgents and village militia as they tried to unsuccessfully breach the Ottoman encirclement. It was impossible to help the brave souls since by then all roads to Nozh were occupied by the Ottoman army and another large army group was approaching.

Tane Nikolov and Mirche Najdenov with their Chetas took position on the highest hill, while Mihail Chakov and Tsvetko Popadiski with their Chetas climbed to another hill surprising and pushing back the Ottoman advance.

Tane Nikolov's insurgents fought the Ottomans approaching from Veles while Ivan Alabakov attacked the Ottomans headed to Nozh in order to open a gap for the Kostur Region Cheta to escape. Understanding the seriousness of the situation, the village militia too tried to punch a gap in the Ottoman encirclement but again without success. The Ottoman army was much too numerous to overwhelm and well informed of the situation at their disposal.

Still refusing to budge, knowing that they would all die, the Kostur Region Cheta and its new volunteer recruits remained steadfast and determined to give their lives for the liberty of Macedonia. During the night of July 13 and 14, 1907 the brave insurgents took an oath that they would not surrender and took their position with only one thought in mind, “victory or death”.

By dawn on July 14, 1907 the 3,000 strong Ottoman column had completely encircled Nozh and a vicious battle ensued. After firing the first volley the Ottomans sent a message asking the Macedonians to surrender. The Macedonians in turn rejected their offer with a counter offer saying that they preferred to fight.

The Ottoman commander was not amused so he began to tighten the noose escalating the battle from all directions.

The unequal battle continued, leaving many dead and wounded but without any surrenders and no attempts to escape, until noon when the last bullet was fired. Then as was previously agreed to, the 45 insurgents who were still alive huddled together, destroyed their guns, watches and other valuables so the enemy could not possess them, gathered all their ammunition and explosives, pointed their revolvers at each other and began to sing a Macedonian patriotic song. They then blew themselves up with their own ammunition.