Introduction - Part 07

Chossudovsky also said that there was deep friendship between General Richard Griffiths and KLA commander Agim Cheku.

Griffiths, who at the time was director of the MPRI program in Macedonia, according to Chossudovsky, was “the bridge between the two armies”, which gathered intelligence from the Macedonian army and passed it on to Agim Cheku and his MPRI colleagues who then advised the KLA in Kosovo. He also informed MPRI headquarters in Virginia, which was in close contact with the Pentagon.”

Chossudovsky also acknowledged that in 2001, MPRI’s venture in Macedonia was coordinated with another operation sponsored by the CIA. The head of the OSCE Mission in Skopje was none other than Robert Frowick. Chossudovsky wrote: “Following Washington’s instructions, Frowick managed to engage the NLA directly into the political scene…”

2. Frowick’s role in Macedonia, according to Chossudovsky, was identical to CIA agent William Walker in Kosovo. Walker was head of the OSCE mission in Prishtina. It is well-known that Walker staged an absolutely fictional motive (the armed conflict between the KLA and the Serbian military was presented as a massacre against the civilian population) to justify the bombing of Yugoslavia.

Chossudovsky concluded that “It is public knowledge now in Macedonia that both the Macedonian government and the Macedonian army collaborated with the enemy, called the United States”. Whether they knew that the United States was the enemy or not, that is a different question…?

3. Chossudovsky also confirmed that Frowick was obliged to establish a connection between the Albanian political parties in Macedonia and NLA terrorists because the PDP and DPA were not up to date with current events. This is a key confirmation that the 2001 war in Macedonia was an American project.

In an article published on August 29, 2001 Chossudovsky wrote: “The Framework Agreement had no connection with any ‘peace’! It was a document that required the surrender of a sovereign state to the enemy...” About J. Pardew, who represented himself to the foreign media as a “foreign facilitator”, Chossudovsky concluded: “His military intelligence mandate was to assist, through pressure, intimidation and political manipulation, in the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.”

Chossudovsky also wrote a lot of other articles from which we have taken the following quotes:

“It is now fully documented that Washington was behind the terrorist attacks in Macedonia. While State Secretary Colin Powell reaffirmed U.S. determination to combat terrorism, U.S. military advisors were working together with the NLA terrorists.”

“Among the terrorists retreating from Arachinovo, there were 17 MPRI instructors.”

“When the terrorists were defeated in Arachinovo and raised a white flag, OSCE and NATO were in a panic and immediately ordered a stop to the Macedonian military action.”

“OSCE and KFOR entered Arachinovo and ‘saved’ 500 terrorists and, along with their weapons, took them to the village Radusha, where they renewed their attacks killing civilians and carrying out ethnic cleansing in several Macedonian villages...”

“Macedonian security forces claimed that 70% of the equipment the terrorists used in Arachinovo was U.S. made, including the sophisticated third generation night vision cameras…”

“NATO transported the terrorists from one place to another and re-armed them instead of taking their weapons.”

“In the middle of March 2001, the Pentagon approved the use of a few drones to monitor the Macedonian-Kosovo border. There are indications that the information gathered was sent to the MPRI instructors who were with the terrorists.”

“In Tetovo Region, in villages inhabited by Macedonians, ethnic cleansing was done in the presence of American military personnel who then advised the terrorist commanders.”

“This terrible military intelligence enterprise was made possible because the Macedonian President and some of his associates were American puppets.”

“The British special forces, who trained the KLA terrorists in 1999, also arranged the handover or surrender of NLA weapons.”

“Among the NLA fighters there were Albanian volunteers from the United States who have joined the NLA with agreement from the U.S. government.”

“The International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch are working secretly for NATO and “are an integral part of the military-intelligence enterprise” in Macedonia. “Their job is to influence public opinion in Macedonia and to turn the people against the Macedonian government but not against the U.S., NATO, or the IMF.”

If only ten percent of what Chossudovsky has written is true then there is already enough evidence to grasp the reality of the situation. It is well-known to us that everything he has done is absolutely true.

All of Chossudovsky’s articles can be found online under the heading: “Chossudovsky on Macedonia”.

VII – Why did the U.S.A. recognize Macedonia by its proper name in 2004?

1. Many among us, including numerous politicians, do not know what actually happened in November 2004. If you recall, a referendum was being prepared to prevent new administrative divisions from taking place. The aim of these divisions was to albanize Struga and Kichevo and to introduce bilingualism in Skopje. If there was bilingualism in the capital then it was only a matter of time before a large part of the country became bilingual. And this is exactly what happened because the referendum was prevented from taking place. Now the Albanian language has infiltrated into state agencies, public institutions, clinics, other agencies, etc., and is working its way into the larger firms, service industries, etc.

1.2. In order to achieve the required quota of 20 percent of Albanians in the Skopje community, Skopje region was restructured unnaturally to include rural municipalities and villages that had a predominantly Albanian population. The same was done with Struga and Kichevo... Instead of “tightening up” Skopje to enable it to become rapidly urbanized as a true metropolis of our independent state, we turned it into a provincial city in the worst possible way.

2. Macedonians traditionally don’t like referendums and may have not participated in the prevention of the administrative divisions, especially since the ruling SDSM called for a boycott. The Americans, however, were concerned and did not want to take the chance that the referendum would succeed because it would have prevented their plans to albanize parts of the country. So, clearly intending to undermine the referendum, on its eve, the United States announced that it had recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name! There followed a great eruption of euphoria, all organized by the Macedonian government, which did not want a referendum. It meant – don’t worry, America is with us! It seemed to everybody, with no exceptions, that this was a serious push for the country in the name dispute. Initially, no one knew why the U.S. had recognized Macedonia’s name and very few

were even aware that the recognition was only for bilateral communications. But over time everything became clear.

2. 1. The unexpected American recognition of Macedonia’s historical and constitutional name was received with much fervour and was seen as a significant step forward in relations between the two countries. Unfortunately, our first impressions turned out to be completely wrong. We soon discovered that the recognition did nothing and carried no special meaning. It even turned out to be detrimental to Macedonia’s long-term interests. For the Americans it was a temporary sacrifice of a chess piece for achieving their final victory. It was a calculated American move designed, in the long-term, to aid the implementation of U.S. policy in Macedonia; a policy which ignores the fundamental interests of the Macedonian people. A policy that would irreversibly albanize Struga and Kichevo and inappropriately introduce broad use of the Albanian language in Macedonia, while the Macedonian people essentially got nothing in return.

3. Even though it was strictly for bilateral communications, Macedonia’s constitutional name was recognized with much glamour by the U.S. However, the same had long been a practice with almost all Western countries. The UK (from 1999), Germany, Italy, Sweden, Austria and even France had all already been using our name for bilateral needs. They all did it quietly, without any fuss, probably because of the great injustice they had committed against the Macedonian people and maybe to avoid objections from Greece.

4. Athens reacted furiously, which in turn increased the pleasure in Skopje. It was reported that it was a violent shock for most Greeks. Today, however, we can see that it was only a good acting job! It was unbelievable that Washington would take such a step without first informing Athens!? But, as it turned out America’s recognition of Macedonia caused no damage to Greece, outside of some short lasting propaganda. There were absolutely no serious consequences of this outcome that proved to be unfavourable for Athens. On the contrary, it led to a total turnaround in U.S. policy in their favour, at the expense of Macedonia. It was precisely after Bucharest that the U.S. started to openly require Macedonia to change its name, something that had never happened before.

5. The referendum failed but the planned, permanent and irreversible albanization of those territories succeeded. The Americans realized their vision. The new administrative division was one of modern Macedonia’s biggest strategic mistakes. And the American acceptance of the Constitutional name brought no benefits for the country! Just the opposite! After that Washington hardened its treatment of Macedonia which, three years or so later, became apparent in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Here the U.S. did a complete turnaround in its reference to Macedonia and went fully in favour of Greece. Macedonia’s entry into NATO and the EU was blocked and the country was blackmailed to change its name before becoming a member, meaning to change the identity of its people, as well. Such a change in NATO policy could only have be driven by – the U.S. No other country could have done this, least of all Greece. The only power that had such authority was, without a doubt, the U.S.A. The arguments mentioned in this text will prove it. One of these arguments is the fact that Washington is the only entity that permanently and most frequently asks for Macedonia to change its name!

6. After the Bucharest episode, the United States not only started, for the first time, to openly advocate for Macedonia to change its name but also introduced violent pressure to do it. Reeker, U.S. Ambassador to Skopje, made these demanded even through the media! In his interview with “Dnevnik” (“There are no talks about the identity”, June 8, 2009) he openly said: “This country needs to find a name in order to start moving further towards full integration!” In other words if we don’t find a name, according to Reeker, there will be no “integration”! If this is blackmail or not is up to the readers to decide.

If Reeker’s colleague in Athens had acted in Macedonia’s interests, like Reeker did in Skopje, he would have been expelled immediately and relations with the U.S., if not broken, would have certainly been - frozen. But here in Macedonia it is not like that and that is the reason why people like Reeker can do whatever they want.

7. Another important facet in U.S. policy towards Macedonia is the fact that the Americans insist that we “need to agree” with Greece, emphasizing that if we do, the U.S. will respect our agreement. This message is very clear – if Macedonia changes its name and Greece accepts this, the U.S. will be the first to use it! So the partial acceptance of our Constitutional name by Washington, done so glamorously in 2004, will no longer be valid! This episode will go down in history as the most tragic event in our existence. At the same time, the albanized parts of Macedonia, realized thanks to our acceptance of this, will remain forever! This should be a good reminder for us of what real American politics are and how naïve we are. The partial American acceptance of Macedonia’s name is a textbook case of chess: short term sacrifice for the final victory.

8. At an informal meeting with a top U.S. diplomat from the Embassy in Skopje (in 2010), after it had been assessed by him that the U.S. had accepted Macedonia’s name only for the referendum to fail and that, as a result, parts of Macedonia were albanized, he gave an unexpectedly direct and honest answer. He said “Yes, we achieved our goal.” And then he asked: “What can we now do and what offers can we make to you to accept a new name?!”

American pragmatism indeed has no limits. They pretend to be our friends by using our name in bilateral relations but at the same time they try their best to get Macedonia to change its name. They do not hide that they will be the first to use the new name if we capitulate!

Did Prlichev think of the Americans when he wrote, “They have faces of saints and hearts of wolves?”

VIII – The Interim Accord, the NATO summit in Bucharest and The Hague verdict

A. The Interim Accord

The Interim Accord, signed by Macedonia and Greece on September 13, 1995 was not an obligation derived from the Security Council Resolution with which Macedonia was admitted to the UN. There is no legal connection between the Interim Agreement and the Security Council Resolution, only a functional one. Unfortunately, with the Interim Accord Macedonia’s position in the dispute has been considerably devalued. The language used in the Interim Accord is much worse for Macedonia compared to its use in the UN document.

Since we know that the Interim Accord was an American initiative then we should not be surprised by the formulation of the text, in which hidden are initiatives which are contrary to our long-term interests.

1.1. The Interim Accord was drafted with the active participation of former mediator Cyrus Vance and is naturally a logical segment of Washington’s mosaic of a long-term policy towards Macedonia; a policy which we will try to evaluate in this book. The Agreement was signed under the direct involvement of American diplomat Holbrook, commonly referred to as the “bulldozer”. So the question is - “why was Holbrook involved if this was not a United States initiative, i.e. if the U.S. was not behind the whole name issue”? Holbrook, definitely, did not become involved because the UN Secretary-General asked him!?!

The way the Interim Accord was handled is clear proof that Washington managed both the name problem and its mediation. Let us not dismiss that Athens too was involved in the preparation of the Accord.

2. The Interim Accord was well thought out and designed to achieve a number of specific goals.

First, the Interim Accord came into being because there was a need to establish normal communication between Macedonia and Greece. Most probably, it was a result of the “tolerance” demonstrated by Macedonia.

Second, the Interim Accord was to be the vehicle by which issues of interest to both parties were to be resolved, even though the accord was designed to favour Greece. But we can’t say it was all bad. Despite the damage it inflicted, there were certain benefits that emerged from it. One being Greek recognition of Macedonia…

Third, with the Interim Accord, Macedonia, for the first time, was forced to officially accept that there was a problem with her name. The document was signed with our country being nameless… i.e. being referred to as “the second party”. It is true that Greece was also referred to as “the first party” but that had nothing to do with Greece’s name because no one was disputing it.

Fourth, another purpose of the Interim Accord was to open new avenues for the achievements of levels not possible through the UN. These, of course, were not put in to benefit Macedonia. By signing the accord, at least indirectly, Macedonia in fact legalized the illegal procedures that challenged our country’s name in the UN.

Fifth, the ratification of the Interim Accord in our Parliament was not only unnecessary but a huge mistake with strategic consequences. There was nothing in the Accord that required parliamentary approval and Greece, rightly so, did not seek such approval. The Interim Accord was entered into force one month after it was signed and no additional procedures were necessary. With its ratification, unfortunately, Macedonia gave the Accord undue importance and the problem with the name received state-wide dimensions. Officially, at the highest level, we approved a document that worsened our position in the dispute.

Sixth, Article 5 of the Interim Accord stated: “The Parties have agreed to continue negotiations under the auspices...” That part was meaningless because something that does not exist could not possibly continue… There were not, nor could there have been, negotiations between the two sides. Such a formulation was directly degrading our country’s position. It was accepted that the name of the state was subject to negotiation when there was not, nor could there have been such an obligation in the UN Security Council Resolution. No one has the right to impose conditions on us where we had to negotiate our own name. Not as a sovereign state!

A few years later, in an interview, President Gligorov informed the public that the term “negotiations” was adopted because of strong pressure and blackmail from Greece. The Greeks threatened there would be no agreement without “negotiations”! This certainly does not excuse us from making such a mistake, but it makes us more aware of the “games” that were being played at that time. We were far from the level of expertise needed to make for such important decision… At the same time we should have known which side Holbrook and the other Americans were supporting when they were preparing the Interim Accord.

Seventh, the Interim Accord used the term “differences”, while the UN Security Council Resolution spoke of a single “difference” over our country’s name. Normally “differences” (plural!) mean more than one thing and not singularly just the name.

Eighth, with Article 21, Macedonia abandoned the opportunity to go to court and seek legal justice! It robbed us of the opportunity to submit an application to The Hague and legally fight against the illegal procedure by which our country had been admitted to the UN… in flagrant violation of the UN Charter (Constitution)! That is why we must take the problem back to the UN General Assembly, as well as seek advice from the International Court in The Hague, a year after we withdraw from the Interim Accord! That’s the term of notice.

Ninth, with Article 23, Macedonia accepted to sign a “final agreement” with Greece, placing our side in an extremely unfavourable position. Maybe that was the main American aim in drafting the Interim Accord; to prepare a foundation to bring the issue back to bilateral waters where Macedonia’s manoeuverability would be minimized. The Americans know perfectly well that Macedonia and Greece would never agree to anything that takes into consideration, at least, our minimal requests. With this move they tied Macedonia’s hands behind its back with practically no chance for a positive outcome. But, as was mentioned earlier, if Macedonia is to sign a lasting agreement with Greece, it must uncover all outstanding issues between the two countries, not just the name. If we don’t do that we would be making yet another strategic, unpardonable political error. This means that any final agreement with Greece must include and regulate the position of the Macedonian minority living in Greece and the needs of the Macedonian people exiled by Greece, including their properties...

Is such a thing possible? You decide!

Tenth, the name was internationalized from the outset and it should and must be treated as such to the end. Macedonia was crippled by the UN Security Council and not by Athens. Therefore we need to go back to where the error was made in the first place and seek a resolution there. A dignified exit for Macedonia must be found in the UNSC. Taking any other route will hurt our interests even more.

Eleventh, given that a solution must be sought from the UN Security Council, our diplomacy must start working overtime with Russia, then China and why not with the UK, as permanent members of the Council to have more understanding for our most legal aspirations. France is closely linked with Greece and we can hardly achieve anything there, however, Paris too must be constantly and directly informed about our position and the moves that we are going to make. Without any doubt, the U.S. is the key to this problem and currently its manager. Therefore, the first thing we need to do is make our policies clear to the U.S., then, over time, ask for their support. They are the only ones who can reverse what has been done so far. At the moment this may seem unrealistic… Twelfth, the vocabulary used in the Interim Accord has truly revealed America’s aims in narrowing Macedonia’s manoeuverability. It is a step by step approach and a gradual process of deconstructing everything that is Macedonian, continuously implemented since the early 1990’s.

3. A different thesis could be developed for the timing and motives for drafting the Interim Accord.

3.1. The first assumption is that such an agreement was not needed while the Greek border blockade was exhausting Macedonia’s economy leading to collapse. There were clear indicators that the U.S. also, not only Samaras from Greece, expected Macedonia would not survive. Why else would the blockades of Macedonia’s border from the south (by Greece) and from the north (because of sanctions against Serbia) be tolerated for so long by the main international factors, by the U.S. in first the place, when daily havoc on Macedonia was unprecedented? Why else would the U.S. delay its recognition of Macedonia for years without any public reason? In 1995, four years after the Yugoslav dissolution, Macedonia continued to endure in spite of all hindrances imposed on it. This gave a strong signal that Macedonia was not going to collapse so the U.S. undertook new measures to ensure its destruction. Was the Interim Accord the first step in that direction? You decide!

3.2. The second assumption was that, without a “bilateral agreement”, relations between the two countries would be constantly strained and there would not even be minimal dialogue or cooperation. The border would remain blocked and Greece would not recognize Macedonia and thus the dispute would escalate... And if this were to happen, the entire region might become a security risk, which would require urgent attention. That, in itself, would jeopardize U.S. aims for closing the “Macedonian question”, which could not be done quickly. In such a situation and due to the wars in the neighbourhood having just finished, there was no real room for Macedonia’s immediate partition, or for it to be renamed by force. Thus, the likely conclusion was that the Macedonians had proved themselves to be tougher than anticipated and thus the U.S. would have to use different means and stages to achieve its aims.

The steps that follow will confirm this. It is within this framework that we see: a) the 1999 declaration of friendship and cooperation between Bulgaria and Macedonia (when with American involvement and with our consent the Macedonian language was ignored), b) the 2001 War (when attempts were made to fragment our state by force and after those attempts failed, the state was reconfigured by fraudulent means), c) The United States recognizing Macedonia in 2004 by its constitutional name (in order to successfully albanize parts of the country), d) Macedonia’s membership in NATO in Bucharest being blockaded (when Macedonia was officially blackmailed to change its name if it wanted membership in NATO)...

4. Drafting of the Interim Accord was an American initiative. The final text was, more or less, three times more in favour of Greece than it was for Macedonia. On top of that there were many negative implications for Macedonia imbedded in it. Articles 5, 6, 7, 21 and 23 were entirely advantageous for Greece while only Articles 1 and 11 were favourable for Macedonia. Every other Article was, more or less, in support of both sides, although there were more pro-Greek tangible benefits imbedded in it. Key benefits for Macedonia were: a) Greek recognition of Macedonia (Article 1), and b) Greece’s obligation not to block Macedonia’s integration into international organizations (Article 11). Unfortunately Athens ignores that obligation and continues to block Macedonia’s integration into NATO and the EU. It is important to also mention that the Interim Accord put an end to the two-year long illegal blockade of the border. In fact, ending the blockade was America’s strongest argument in squeezing Macedonia to sign the Accord. It is clear that the blockade was introduced and lasted as long as it did in order to force Macedonia to sign the Accord. Macedonia suffered enormous damages daily as a result of the blockade which, no doubt, was kept for so long in order to weaken Macedonia to the maximum.

4.1. Nevertheless, it should also be emphasized that, thanks to the Interim Accord, today we have the extremely favourable judgment by the court in The Hague, as our strongest argument in the dispute.

5. Our biggest advantage has been the fact that after the Accord was signed we somehow were left alone and in peace for several years, which worked well for Macedonia. We have received a number of recognitions under our country’s constitutional and historical name and our country’s international position has continued to strengthen. Nearly two-thirds of the world’s countries have recognized us as Macedonia. According to the number of people, probably four-fifths of the people in our world have accepted our country’s Constitutional name. Greece and its partners in the meantime are losing ground.

5.1. As time passed Macedonia became more stable and prosperous. But, it seems, some international factors did not like that. Which ones, judge for yourself. This positive process lasted until 2001.

5.2. Looking from today’s position (2013) we can say with certainty that the 2001 war, in addition to accelerating the “Greater Albania” project, also aimed to stop Macedonia’s stabilization. Since the plans of the main international factors were not completely realized it was normal to expect new measures. It seems that Washington rang the alarm. So, with the armed aggression from Kosovo, a war was started in Macedonia at the beginning of 2001, which completely changed how Macedonia was treated. It was to end in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest. The goal was to give Macedonia a punch in the nose and let it know that American interests cannot just be ignored.

5.3. The U.S. not only stopped Macedonia’s progress but pushed it back in time. Without being directly at fault, Macedonia sustained massive damage in all aspects of life, in politics, in the economy, in ethnic relations… The American strategic planners obviously concluded that Macedonia’s membership in NATO could only strengthen its position, making it almost impossible to force it to change its name and rename its people. If Macedonia

was inside NATO then the Americans could not treat it the way they do now…

5.4. It’s clear now that Greece’s obligation not to prevent Macedonia’s membership into NATO become an American problem for the realization of their plans for the country and the region as well. The only way out of this was for Greece to ignore (that part of) the Interim Accord! And that is exactly what it did!

6. The fact that Washington and not Athens made these arrangements was confirmed by Nimetz in an interview given for Voice of America (“Dnevnik”, March 3, 2008, “The Accord is over, now we need a new Agreement”). In the interview Nimetz said: “Compromises were made at that time but the Interim Accord has ended. We are now talking about a new deal and people need to look at what can be done now...” In other words, only a month before the Bucharest Summit, Nimetz announced that the Interim Accord was no longer valid and therefore Greece no longer had obligations not to block Macedonia’s entry! So the stage was set to block Macedonia’s accession into NATO.

6.1. For the first time Nimetz publicly, in this interview, put the “name issue” in historical context. He said: “The ‘Macedonian question’ may be present for hundreds of years…!” There is a strong impression that he may have done this inadvertently or why not on purpose, and uncovered both the essence of the problem and his ultimate goal. In other words Nimetz connected Macedonia’s name with the “Macedonian question” and told us that he was actually working with aims to close it! The key to the problem was not the name but the Macedonian people themselves.

6.2. There is no better proof than this to show that this whole mess we are in is about “the Macedonian people” and not about the name “Macedonia”. Otherwise, why mention the “Macedonian Question” which is much older than the “name dispute”? When it was on the agenda, there was no Macedonian state! The functional relationship made between the “Macedonian Question” and the “name of our state” was strictly done in order to deny the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. 6.3. From whom, if not from Washington, was Nimetz obliged to send us the message mentioned earlier? This statement too is confirmation that Nimetz works for the State Department and not for the UN. Why else would he come out with news that the Interim Accord was no longer valid? The Interim Accord is a bilateral agreement between Macedonia and Greece and has nothing to do with the UN. Why would the UN, much less mediator Nimetz, have an interest in ending its importance? Nimetz, according to his mandate, has no connection with the Interim Accord, which means that he is not authorized to make such judgments.

(In fact, the “abolishment” of the Interim Accord, no doubt would strain relations between Macedonia and Greece because there are no conditions for a new agreement. Thus, the search for a solution would become more difficult. It would also be to Nimetz’s detriment because his function on behalf of the UN would become more difficult).

6.4. We should be grateful to Nimetz because he has been a valuable source of information, although slightly encrypted, regarding the essence and background of U.S. handling of Macedonia. Events that follow will uncover more of this. Nimetz made the statement for someone’s needs, but for whose needs? Clearly there is no other candidate outside of the U.S. According to the mosaic of American long-term policies, the U.S. has special interests in keeping Macedonia from joining NATO… unless it changes its name.

6.5. The U.S. kept silent on the issue of renaming our state and our people until Nimetz made this statement on public radio. In 2008 in Bucharest the U.S was the main instigator who pushed Macedonia to change its name. While making such a request, the Americans openly declaring that they would immediately start using the new agreed upon name!

B. The NATO Summit in Bucharest

7. Macedonia should have been admitted into NATO under its current “reference” during the Bucharest Summit held from April 2 to 4, 2008. It was normal to expect admission because one, all NATO members had confirmed that Macedonia had met all the necessary criteria for admission, including Greece, and two, the Interim Accord “guaranteed” that the attempt could not be blocked.

7.1. Instead of admitting Macedonia, NATO completely changed its own policy toward the country. With the highest conviction we may state that the new treatment of Macedonia was introduced under the dictates of the U.S. The main aim was to block the membership of Macedonia in order to press it to accept changes to the name of the country and the national identity of its people. Nimetz practically announced it in advance in his radio interview. He did it in the name of Washington, not in his personal name. Applying the blackmail combined with the ultimatum – first the name and then membership, NATO and the EU left their doors for Macedonia – shut!

7.2. At the Bucharest Summit, there was a deliberate violation of Greece’s obligation not to hinder Macedonia’s accession into NATO. This was done not by Greece alone. Greece was supported by all its allies in ignoring the Interim Accord, a UN international agreement. This act alone should have disgraced NATO, its leaders and all member states without exception. Macedonia sustained collateral damage and paid for the consequences resulting from hidden interests, manipulation, double standards, unprincipled acts and inconsistencies... not to mention bullying and violations of international law. Law and justice were grossly violated at the Summit. If this is democracy, then what isn’t?

Even though Greece may have profited from this the most, as we will see later in the text, the change of policies in Bucharest was not to her merit.

8. Like all other members of the Alliance seeking support, Greece can count on the solidarity of other members, can use procedural opportunities, or use its veto power. But it is unrealistic to believe that a small and insignificant country like Greece can make major decisions and impose its will on important matters… Greece does not have the authority to dictate new policies for NATO. New policies cannot be formulated on the basis of the assumption of solidarity among the member states but only on the ground of concrete interests of the leading members. The role of solidarity, one of the basic rules of the Alliance, is very limited in that sense. It can hinder implementation of some policies, can make exemptions but definitely cannot create new ones, as in the case with Macedonia.

9. If in Bucharest, for example, Greece was really the main obstacle to Macedonia’s admission to NATO, at least, there would not have been a change of policy in the Alliance; i.e. to impose a permanent blockade plus the blackmail for Macedonia to change its name. There would be no conditions where ultimatums are formulated, i.e. “change the name first, then membership…” Greece’s doing alone could have resulted in Macedonia’s rejection but without imposing new, massive and unbridgeable consequences for it. That is the maximum that Greece could have done. There was no veto in Bucharest. In order to avoid a direct Greek blockade, all members lined up behind this “new” policy.

Nevertheless, Greece violated the Interim Accord by being part of the consensus. Without it, it was not possible to reject Macedonia’s entry into NATO. Athens, however, indirectly hindered that...

10. As mentioned earlier, there is no other country in the NATO alliance, outside of the U.S. that has the authority to dictate new policies. If Washington, for example, had the slightest doubt that this new policy was inadequate and bad for Macedonia... it would have had no chance of being implemented. Also, if the U.S. had had a different attitude towards Macedonia, than the one described above, then it would have intervened on Macedonia’s behalf and the result would have been quite different. If Washington had thought that Macedonia should have joined NATO under its reference, i.e. if the U.S. respected the Interim Accord, the new policy would not have been invented and Macedonia would have been admitted into NATO. In fact, generally speaking, the Americans take responsibility for at least 30% of all alliance decisions. In this particular case, however, the Americans undoubtedly took a more dominant role… nearly one hundred percent. No doubt the U.S. also had support from France, Germany... and so on; a kind of support that should not be underestimated.

11. After the Bucharest Summit, the dealings with the name issue were moved from New York to Brussels. But its overall manager remained - Washington. With its new policy towards Macedonia, NATO has exceeded its authority and illegally interfered in the mediation exclusively covered by the UN. NATO established new norms, much beyond the ones described by the UN Security Council, which were silently accepted by Macedonia. In the UN documents, for example, there was no explicit requirement for Macedonia to change its name. So, who gave NATO the right to demand that Macedonia change its name, imposing blackmail?

11.1. Nimetz also got a new role in Bucharest. Since then he has been working for Brussels but as before - directed by Washington. It was especially apparent before the end of 2012 and during the beginning of 2013, when talks of a date for negotiating Macedonia’s membership into the EU were being discussed. After a long break Nimetz was “reactivated” for the needs of the European Union. Nimetz had never worked for the UN and his most recent involvement, yet again, proves that Nimetz always worked for U.S. interests…

11.2. The transfer of the mediation from New York to Brussels, no doubt, was made for pragmatic reasons. While Nimetz from the UN side had no tools to pressure Macedonia, NATO and the EU not only had the right tools but also used them immediately. They started using force by blocking and blackmailing Macedonia to change its name, usurping its universal right to use whatever name it wanted. Nobody has the right to force a sovereign state to change its name in order to be admitted into an institution. This is public humiliation of the candidate.

12. Indications are very strong that the NATO Summit in Bucharest meant the beginning of the final stage of closing the “Macedonian Question”. In fact, from what Nimetz had told “Voice of America”, that a new final agreement with Greece would be necessary, is – unachievable! It is no surprise that after Bucharest a violent offensive was started, using all means including brutal force for Macedonia to capitulate.

13. There is one more point which deserves our attention because it fits perfectly with America’s long-term attitude towards Macedonia. At a press conference, just at the end of the Bucharest Summit on April 8, 2008, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, during a provocation from a Greek journalist (“Macedonians are a fact for the United States”, “Dnevnik”, April 9, 2008), said: “I do not think that the Macedonian language is called as such. The Macedonian language exists. Macedonians exist. As you know, the Macedonian language has been studied by the State Department!” He also said: “There is certainly a historic Macedonian province, which is something different from the state... It is clear that the Government of Macedonia has no pretensions. We recognize the difference between the historic territory of Macedonia, which is certainly larger than the state...”

13.1. The Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis reacted immediately from Athens: “Such statements do not help to resolve the disputed issues between Athens and Skopje.” She then said: “Athens will not be drawn into such discussions…”

13.2. Unfortunately Macedonia remained deaf to Washington’s precious official position and did not take advantage of the comments made. Since then, not a single statement has been made by Washington in support of the Macedonian people, or the Macedonian language... All that followed from the U.S. side were promises that the name and not the identity of the people were under discussion…! More and more lies.

The Americans repeatedly say that they support Macedonia’s NATO membership but do not mention that it can only be done under one clear condition… “first change your name…” And our politicians not only remain silent about such ordinary bluffs but publicly thank the Americans for their support!? Journalists do the same and no one asks the American officials: “Under what conditions are you supporting us?”

13.3. The roots of Daniel Fried’s assessments were left uncovered by our aide. Fried was a diplomat since 1977 who served in senior positions with the State Department until May 15, 2009, just a few months after President Barak Obama’s inauguration. We can only guess at the reasons for his excellent statements concerning Macedonia and hope that his leaving the diplomatic service was not as a consequence – of them?!

C. Why President Bush’s support was not enough?

14. Not to leave any dilemma about the reality of our previous explanations we need to clarify President Bush’s involvement in Bucharest. At the Summit, Bush had personal ambitions to stabilize the southern flank of NATO by adding Albania, Macedonia and Croatia to it. His statement that the three countries would become members, meaning Macedonia as well, was overridden after less than 24 hours! Nothing like that had ever happened to another American president! Obviously, the administration did not share Bush’s personal interests any longer, as his mandate was finishing and Macedonia was left in the lurch. We can only guess that the recycled plans for Macedonia, prepared in the meantime, proved that its membership in NATO, even with the UN reference, would make it impossible to proceed with pressure for changing its name. Such an outcome was definitely not acceptable to Washington.

While Bush went into history, the American bureaucracy is still there. In any case, Bush deserves our respect and we have to look for ways of rewarding him in return.

15. According to unconfirmed reports from Turkish sources, the night before the summit Bush met with Turkish President Gul who he asked not to set any conditions for the admission of Albania and Croatia, without Macedonia. It was speculated that Turkey could support Macedonia’s condition that all three join NATO, or none. Bush did not want to risk the summit to experience a total failure without admitting any new member. Ankara, despite its undeniable commitment to Macedonia’s membership, apparently was not ready to confront the U.S., the sole superpower. And who would?

16. The fact that Turkey did not voice its support for Macedonia in Bucharest, also confirms that the U.S. stood behind Macedonia’s rejection, not just Greece. If Athens was the bearer of this blockade and the architect of the new policy, Ankara would have certainly and vehemently opposed it and would done everything in its power to help Macedonia join NATO. But because the United States was behind the rejection, Turkey had some normal concerns…. The bite would have been too much for Turkey.

16.1. According to information received from reliable sources, Macedonia officially did not request that Turkey play the three card hand; all three candidates together or none. If that was true then there was a serious error made by the Macedonian side. It has to be done. If Ankara was prepared to take such a step it would have been up to them. Whether it was going to succeed or not, would have been another matter. Our initiative, in any case, would have obliged Turkey to act in our favour, to the maximum.