KOSTUR REGION

KOSTUR REGION

1. Prespa District A. - German area B. - Africa area

2. Korestata District A. - D’mbeni area B. – Drenoveni area C. – Tiolishta area

3. Poleto District A. – Zhupanshta area B. - Rupishta area C. – Kastenaria area D. – Kalevishta area

16 villages 7 villages

9 villages 14 villages 14 villages

12 villages 10 villages 18 villages 5 villages

LERIN REGION

1. Lerin District A. - Buf area B. - Kotor area C. – Banitsa area D. - Ovchareni area E. - Turie area

2. Sovich-Kailari District A. - Ekshi-Su area B. - Aitos area C. - Mokreni area

13 villages 15 villages 6 villages 9 villages 6 villages

5 villages 8 villages 16 villages

VODEN REGION

1. Meglen District A. Krontselevo area B. – S’botsko area

13 villages 11 villages

2. Ostrovo District

A. – Ostrovo area B. – Mesimer area C. – Tsrno Marinovo area

7 villages 11 villages 8 villages

The report emphasizes that meetings were regularly held in the month of January. Most villages accepted the NOF line and fought under NOF leadership. The report also states exactly how many people belonged to each of these organizations, and the numbers are staggering giving the impression that the Macedonian population was completely under the influence of these organizations. There are other details.

Organizational Management - Secretary, s. b.

(Moscow – Belgrade - CPG)

Development of NOF and AFZH forces - (The following facts are key moments in NOF’s history)

On April 2, 1946, on his way home from Moscow, CPG General Secretary Zahariadis stopped off in Belgrade where he met with Marshal Tito and discussed his decision to launch an armed struggle against the political right in Greece. Zahariadis received Tito’s full support, that is, a promise to supply him with moral and material help. The following was also agreed during this meeting:

1. The Macedonian national liberation movement in the Aegean part of Macedonia, led by NOF, which since April 1945 was under the leadership of the CPM/CPY would be passed on to the CPG leadership.

2. Part of the CPG Central Committee Politburo composition, headed by Ianis Ioannidis, would be transferred to Belgrade to lead the armed struggle from abroad, taking care to supply the partisans with weapons, clothing, food and other materials.

3. The CPG would be allowed to freely recruit fighters from the ranks of the Macedonian and Greek political immigrants in Yugoslavia. It would be allowed to organize hospitals for the sick

and wounded DAG fighters. Yugoslavia would assume the role of organizing and coordinating aid for DAG from other countries.

* * *

Based on the Tito – Zahariadis April 2, 1946 Agreement, part of the CPG Central Committee Politburo composition, headed by Ioannidis Ioannis and the necessary apparatus, was illegally transferred from Athens to Belgrade on August 24, 1946. General Markos Vafiadis, who in June 1946 Zahariadis appointed organizer and head of the partisan groups, illegally left Greece and moved to Belgrade, where the CPG Central Committee Politburo gave him specific directives. In September 1946, Markos moved to Aegean Macedonia, where on October 28 1946, he established the Main DAG partisan unit Headquarters. Then, on November 10, 1946, Zahariadis received orders from Stalin to not create a massive armed movement during the winter of 1946-1947 because the international situation supposedly did not allow it and that the CPG should look into finding a political solution to the struggle, etc.

Again, based on the Tito – Zahariadis April 2, 1946 Agreement, the CPY and CPG, represented by Karaivanov and Ioannidis, on November 21, 1946, reached the following agreement: “The leaderships of NOF, AFZH and NOMS were to be placed under CPG command and the Macedonian armed units were to be added to the DAG composition under Markos Vafiadis’s leadership. This was all organized by the CPY and CPG, Tito and Zahariadis, without Macedonian consent.

The goal of the foreigners (CPY and CPG) here was to make heroes out of some of their henchmen through whom an entire nation would be implicated and reduced to villains. On top of that the same foreigners created conditions where Macedonians were made to hate each other. This definitely was done to members of NOF, even by Zahariadis himself, telling one member of NOF false tales of what another member of NOF 29 had supposedly said creating friction between them.

29 At a session of the Ilinden Presidency established on Zahariadis’s initiative, held on June 4, 1956, Colonel Pando Vaina, head of the organization, in his report on the persecution of Macedonians by CPG officials said: “...When DAG was active in combat Some time after the Tito – Zahariadis April 2, 1946 Agreement was made, the NOF main board membership, headed by Paskal Mitrevski, was received by Lazar Kolishevski, CPM Central Committee Secretary, who said to them: “You are now to go down there (to Greek occupied Macedonia). The CPG will now be the leader of your struggle. The CPG line is the correct line. Have confidence in it. Fight with all the forces available against chauvinism, separatism and local tendencies...”

This entangled understanding of comforting illusions shows that there was a sunset (darkness) in the Macedonian leadership.

Now we authorized General Markos to shape our destiny

Order no. EP 13, dated February 27, 1946, issued by General Markos, read: “From today forward all partisan units are to be included in DAG.”

So, from this date forward NOF was neither a political nor a military factor. After the so-called “Brotherhood and Unity” agreement was reached with the CPG, all its importance was taken away. After this a delicate balance emerged between NOF and the CPG, as NOF slowly became the CPG’s vanguard. Encouraged by the top CPM leadership NOF became a victim of foreign political games and fell into the hands of CPG’s unscrupulous absolutist rule.

The Macedonian leaders should have well remembered the CPG’s hatred and fatalist attitude towards the former ELAS fighters, which was later repeated against the NOF leaders and fighters.

But sadly none of this was entered in the annals of our history.

1. If NOF was truly a Macedonian political entity it should have defined what kind of concessions it could make for the CPG, while

and subsequent to its defeat, Zahariadis pursued a policy of defaming and persecuting a good portion of the Slavo-Macedonian cadres and other people. For no reason at all he was quick to label them “agents of the enemy”. In 1948 and 1949 and even later, many Slavo-Macedonians were arrested, and some liquidated based on false allegations... (Am, F-21/1600.)

not inflicting lasting and inviolable harm on the Macedonian people. But the opposite happened. The CPM/CPY, not the Macedonian people, created NOF and therefore the CPM/CPY, handed it over to the CPG. Since NOF was not created by the Macedonian people its true political goals were never defined. In other words only the CPM/CPY knew NOF’s true aims!

And now our hopes were placed back on the CPG’s table, we were placed in DAG uniforms and our children were sent all over the world. In other words we worked hard to “ethnically cleanse” ourselves.