TITO INTENSELY PRESSURED BY BRITISH

TITO INTENSELY PRESSURED BY BRITISH

During the Inform Bureau time the British forced Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia to stop supporting DAG

Tito secretly promised his friend Sir Fitzroy MacLean, Chief of the British Mission in Yugoslavia during World War II, that he would stop supporting the democratic powers (DAG) during the Greek Civil War. This promise was kept secret and no one was allowed to speak about it because it could have damaged Tito’s reputation. This secret was later revealed when the British documents referring to the Macedonian and Yugoslav-Greek relations were published by the Republic of Macedonia’s Federal Archives.

This is what Charles Pick, British Ambassador in Belgrade, wrote in a telegram to the Foreign office, “In the beginning of May 1949, MacLean visited Belgrade and had a discussion with Tito after which Tito stopped helping the insurgents in Greece. At the same time he said that he would not refuse asylum to political refugees that were already in Yugoslavia. Tito also promised that in future he would not allow insurgents that entered Yugoslavia to return to Greece and fight, nor would they be given any other kind of help. At the same time Tito requested that his promise be kept a secret at any price because if it was exposed it would cause a great number of problems...”

Pick continued, “MacLean assured me that Tito’s promise sounded genuine and honest. For him it was most important that the insurgents not regroup and enter Yugoslavia. We can assume that Tito, most likely, told his old friend MacLean the truth and it is very much desirable that we keep that to ourselves. Because of that, we request that this good news be treated as highly confidential and personal…”

In the period when Tito kept saying “no” to Stalin, Yugoslavia was blocked from all sides. Yugoslavia’s economic difficulties could only be overcome with help from the West. But in order to help

Yugoslavia, the USA and Great Britain placed some conditions. One of those conditions was that Yugoslavia close the border with Greece.

This is what Sir Geoffrey Arnold Wallinger, Foreign Office Chief in the United States Embassy in London wrote, “The solution to the problem connected with Greece, I suppose, depends on Tito alone. If he wants to see the ‘situation’ in Greece calm down, there are several steps that he should take in that direction - here are same examples: He can turn off the radio station that Markos is using, which is situated on Yugoslav territory. He can return the child refugees that are now in Yugoslavia to Greece by negotiating through diplomatic channels. He can stop the Greek insurrection recruits from being trained on Yugoslav territory. He can reopen communications between Skopje and Thessalonica (Solun). He can close the Greek - Yugoslav border which he has opened to insurgents. Tito can prove his honesty and assurances by taking any one of these actions!”

Soon after that Tito began to fulfill the promises he made to the British. On July 10, 1949 Tito gave his famous speech in Pula during which he attacked the Greek government for allowing the “monarcho-fascists” to create constant incidents at the Yugoslav-Greek border. During the same speech Tito also criticized the Democratic Army of Greece for allowing itself to get involved in events that most likely would have fatal consequences for the Greek liberation movement…

At the same time Tito emphasized that Yugoslavia would have to close the border completely in order to protect the lives of the working people in that region. This is what Tito added, “We certainly shouldn’t show any kind of regret or any kind of weakness, but strength because we defend our own country and we have to protect the peaceful build up of socialism in our country and we will defend that from everyone….”

According to Liljana Panovska and Todor Cepreganov who analyzed the documents from the National Archive of Great Britain, “The British were prepared to support Tito economically in return for Tito withdrawing some of his support to the Greek insurgents. In

other words, like one diplomatic representative from the Foreign Office suggested, ‘...if (Tito) still wants to receive our economic support, it will be in his interest to give us some support in return...The easiest thing that he can do for us, without losing his reputation inside his country, is to withdraw unnoticeably his support for the Greek insurgents…’

According to Panovska and Cepreganov, Yugoslavia used every possible means to convince its western allies to change their policies towards Greek-Yugoslav relations, so that “... Tito could not only be able to do what he promised MacLean, but also fulfill the promises he made to the American Ambassador through Kardeli...” stressing that “...everything is different now. ...we don’t have friends there (among the insurgents)”. With that statement Tito assured the British that there were no doubts that “the Macedonian Question for the time being was frozen…”

After the Democratic Army of Greece was defeated, Great Britain started a diplomatic offensive to normalize relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. According to Panovska and Cepreganov, “Many politicians from all interested sides were involved in the process. Many issues and problems were placed on the table and long uncomfortable discussions began to take place. Among them was the Macedonian Question with regards to the Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia as well as the refugee children. And as usual, no Macedonians were present at the table where discussions were taking place and decisions made concerning them. So, in the end, it was “take it or leave it” for the Macedonians. Also, as usual, the Macedonians were silent observers and were forced to accept what was decided for them by the so-called higher authorities. In other words, the federal interests of Yugoslavia were more important and had higher priority over the fate of the Macedonians in Greece. The Macedonians in Greece were ‘sacrificed’ to normalize relations between Yugoslavia and Greece…”

There are several British documents which show that Tito “sold out” the Macedonians in Greece in order to normalize relations with Greece. Here is what was written in one of them, “The Yugoslav Government, said Tito, doesn’t have pretensions toward Greece and has no interest in getting involved in the internal affairs of Greece.

Tito doesn’t think that the issue of the Macedonian minority in Greece will be in the way of Greece and Yugoslavia rebuilding good relations between them; nor does he think that the issue with the Greek children will represent an obstacle. The Yugoslav Government is ready to do everything in its power to solve the issue with the children; which is more complicated than it looks…”

The British, through their diplomatic channels, constantly pressured Tito and Edward Kardeli, his Minister of Foreign Affairs. They even insisted that no pro-Macedonian oriented persons be present at their discussions. And as noted in one of the documents there was a scandal caused by Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo and Vladimir Dedier, two Yugoslav politicians. This was on August 19, 1959 when Charles Pick, then Ambassador of Great Britain, informed the Foreign Office that there was a meeting between Ernest Davies, Federal Vice-Secretary of Parliament and Edward Kardeli, but their discussions ended unsuccessfully because Tempo and Dedier showed up. The negotiations were interrupted because those two arrived and stayed for dinner. And when they said something in favour of the Macedonians in Greece, the British Ambassador stopped talking and became agitated and distrustful of Kardeli.

In another telegram, which he sent the next day, Charles Pick give his opinion on Tempo and Dedier emphasizing that he was unpleasantly surprised with Tempo and Dedier showing up. This is what Pick wrote, “I don’t doubt that Kardeli has the right to choose the people present for these discussions but his present choice, honestly, was undesirable. Tempo is a Macedonian fanatic and it is believed that Dedier, right or not, is strongly anti-British oriented…” In his defense after the scandal, Kardeli said that he did not want Tempo and Dedier to participate in the discussions, and that he had only invited them to dinner. At the same time, he suggested that the discussions continue in Bled, in a more intimate atmosphere.