“ORDER

“ORDER

Democratic Army of Greece General Headquarters Headquarters Bureau I

Protocol number 722

In connection to number 132/25. VIII. 1947 and A.P. 307/25. IX. 1947 order;

1. We call to arms, to serve in the ranks of the Democratic Army, all men and women in the following categories:

a) All citizens who have served in the ranks of ELAS as fighters and officers who were discharged after the Varkiza Agreement.

b) All citizens who served in the National Militia as officers and militiamen who were discharged after the Varkiza Agreement.

c) All those who served in the partisan supply corps and were discharged after the Varkiza Agreement.

2) Excluded from the above mobilization are those who became disabled during the People’s Liberation Struggle 1941-45 (ELAS) whose degree of disability had made them incapable of military service.

3) The above-mobilized, wherever they are, must find a way to report to the nearest Democratic Army units.

Those from the mobilized groups who do not report to the Democratic Army, as requested by this order, will be regarded as unreported.

4) The Headquarters in the various areas are to issue appropriate orders to their units to take timely measures to inform all invited.

General Headquarters, 30. IX. 1947. General Markos.”

The following order was issued under order number 721:

“Bearing in mind the Greek people’s desire to fight with all their might for freedom, democracy and an independent Greece, DAG General Headquarters calls on all democratic citizens located in towns and villages held by the enemy, to help the Democratic Army in every way possible.

All those in the ranks of the Democratic Army will be taken into account as being democratic citizens. In the towns and villages they will be gathered together in groups of three or more and they will be asked to take the Democratic Army fighter oath and will work vigorously for the successful execution of DAG’s objectives.

General Headquarters, 30.IX.1947. General Markos.”

The tasks that the CPG Central Committee issued during its 3rd Plenum did not materialize and neither did the mobilization results expected to be derived from the publications issued by DAG General Headquarters. The enemy had strong control over the cities and villages and held them under its authority. In addition to having military and police presence, the government also had armed civilians, the so-called MAI, who strongly supported the counter-revolutionaries. Apart from these important reasons why the mobilization failed to deliver expected results, there is also the fact that, up to this point the CPG line in relation to the armed struggle in Greece was too ambiguous. But even so, the mobilization did deliver some results which numerically strengthened the Democratic Army to a point where it was not only able to repel Monarcho-Fascist advances in the Peloponnesus, Thessaly, Eastern and Western Macedonia, but was also able to go on the offensive. In the coming winter months and in the spring of 1948, DAG took the offensive all over Greece. Large partisan detachments began to appear near Athens with frequent attacks in the south - in the Peloponnesus and Thessaly as well as in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus. During the above-mentioned period DAG also carried out attacks against some cities including Solun, Nigrita, Negush, Sobotsko, Xanthi in Thrace and Konitsa in Epirus.

If the Democratic Army of Greece was capable of taking the initiative to implement the above-mentioned actions in the winter of 1947 and in the spring 1948, it lost that initiative in the summer of 1948 and ever since then it began to slide backwards.

Based on the assessment that “the American intervention in Greece closed the door for an Agreement on both sides of the camp.” and on the task for “freeing” a larger chunk of territory, a plan was adopted for “freeing” Western Macedonia and Epirus and for moving the front line to Thessaly. This was the minimum target set for 1948, which would have allowed for a democratic government to be established with international recognition. Unfortunately the Democratic Army failed to fulfill that task and, in December 1947, when the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece was formed, there was no large free territory and no large city to serve as its capital.

The Provisional Democratic Government of Greece was formed on December 23, 1947. The news of its formation created attention worldwide and confusion in Athens, London and Washington because its formation created a new phase of developments, with international importance, in the democratic struggle in Greece. Unfortunately its importance was denied by a course of events. While the DAG fighters and the democratic masses in Greece expected this government to be recognized as the legitimate government of Greece because it was legitimately supported and aided by a democratic mass movement, the enemy worked hard through its propaganda campaign to discredit it, until it eventually did.

In the meantime the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece adopted several internal legislative acts and created several social programs in aid of the political life in Greece. Among other things, it introduced a law for the formation of democratic people’s councils, a law to carry out agrarian reforms, some legal acts to govern schools and to recognize the national minorities as equals. And in response to Sofoulis’s government, it adopted a law on amnesty.

But all these laws were not enough to compensate for the fact that the Provisional Democratic Government was not recognized by external institutions as the legitimate government of “free” Greece.

Events in 1948 did not go, not in the political field and not in the battle field, as predicted by the democratic movement in the country.

First, the mobilization did not bring expected results. The enemy undertook a massive offensive in February-March 1948 and victoriously attacked a column of newly mobilized and not fully armed partisan fighters from Thessaly and Rumelia. This success gave the enemy a morale boost while delivering a military and political blow to DAG.

Second, the Democratic Army, even though it undertook offensive actions with a number of attacks on several towns across Greece, failed to realize any territorial success on schedule, or to destroy the

main enemy forces. In contrast to that, when the enemy failed to win in Gramos in the summer of 1948, it invaded Rumelia and caused undue damage to the civilian population in the “free” territories; torturing, persecuting and sending hundreds of innocent people to prison.

Third, the Cominform Resolution against the CPY and against Yugoslavia was enacted in June 1948, which had direct negative impact on the democratic movement in Greece and encouraged the enemy, which skillfully knew how to use it, in its propaganda.

Fourth, as a result of the Cominform leadership attitude towards the CPY and towards Yugoslavia, weaknesses and errors in the democratic movement during 1948 created divergence in the DAG leadership. Zahariadis’s quarrels with his opponents caused a crisis in the Democratic Army and in the democratic movement in general.