CHAPTER SEVEN - RELATIONS BETWEEN NOF AND THE CPG

CHAPTER SEVEN - RELATIONS BETWEEN NOF AND THE CPG

1. Disagreements between the NOF and CPG leaderships

Disagreements between the NOF and CPG leaderships were largely based on which form of struggle to take; armed or political parliamentary. This, unfortunately, created a series of consequences in the situation in Greece. Worst of all was NOF’s hesitation on whether to step up with the armed struggle or not. Other hesitations included NOF’s position on issues; it almost always waited to see which direction the CPG leadership was going to take before it made its own decisions. This is how it was when the right time came to strengthen the armed units. This is how it was on the question of certain Macedonians entering the ranks of the Monarcho-Fascist army as service personnel. This is how it was on the issue of the parliamentary elections in March 1946 and on the plebiscite in September of the same year.

NOF’s position regarding the question of certain Macedonians entering the ranks of the Monarcho-Fascist army, which was in agreement with the general view of the situation in Greece, was not to go, while the CPG’s position was to go. NOF’s position, on the other hand, was not fully consistent because avoiding the call to serve was illegal and those avoiding it would be persecuted under the current law. So it was obey the law or join the partisan groups in the mountains. Unfortunately, as was stated earlier, the partisan groups were not allowed to recruit. And even if they did, they did not have weapons to arm the new recruits. Worse than that, as stated earlier, in August 1945 the armed partisans were ordered to avoid armed rifts with enemy formations. It was no coincidence that the Monarcho-Fascists were recruiting and mobilizing men of certain ages at exactly this period of time. So, Macedonians who were not allowed to join the partisans had to make a choice; leave the country, report to the Monarcho-Fascists, or risk being court-martialed for avoiding the draft. This, unfortunately, did not bode well for NOF.

The following, among other things, was written in a letter addressed to the NOF leadership on July 9, 1945: “We received a letter today

from behind the scenes which says a proclamation has arrived in the village Bouf, requiring all men from the draft ages 1941-1945 to contact the recruiting commission on July 18th…

The people behind the scenes want to know what to do. Please expedite your reply so that we can quickly inform our youth about this mobilization.”

The NOF leadership was asked another question via a letter dated on December 7, 1945, written by the Voden regional leadership. Among other things, the regional leadership asked: “Will we continue to boycott the nationalist army mobilization?” It would not be in vain in this regard to emphasize a very important matter in regards to the leadership of the Organization. Due to its own reluctance to tackle certain questions, or waiting to harmonize with the CPG, NOF lacked leadership and organizational clarity precisely at the time when clarity was required. A flagrant example of this was NOF’s position after the parliamentary elections in Greece. Actually one cannot talk about NOF’s position because it did not exist. “NOF’s position was precisely aligned with that of the CPG.”

As discussed earlier, the parliamentary elections were actually held under civil war conditions amid political chaos and lawlessness while the Macedonian people and the democratic minded citizens of Greece were persecuted and terrorized. The situation that developed after the elections was a result of whether to initiate an armed struggle or not. And because NOF’s position was always for an armed struggle, then there was nothing for NOF to think about after the elections. But for certain reasons NOF’s stated position had to be in line with that of the CPG and, for as long as the CPG kept silent on the issue, particularly before the elections, NOF also kept silent.

As was also stated earlier, when it was decided to abstain from voting, NOF performed that task successfully. It would be of interest, however, to highlight some of the other tasks set out during the campaign. During its February 1, 1946 Session among the “Political Tasks” set out to be done by the Voden District Board, as per paragraph 9, was the task: “To produce electoral booklets… even though it was unknown at the time if the democratic people were going to vote or not, which was dependent on the set

conditions. Nonetheless, the issue of finding suitable people needed to be studied, particularly trusted Macedonians with authority to be candidates.”

Under item 5, entitled “Solutions”, was written: “We need to identify candidates for members of parliament in the first half of the month…”

This means that preparations were being made for possible participation in the elections. In a self-directed letter to the organizations dated March 1, 1946, the NOF regional leadership posed the question: “Regarding the election our position will be as follows: We will only participate in free elections. A necessary precondition for this is for the Sofoulis government to resign, which is accountable to the people and to the country. Then a form of coalition needs to be established, representative of the government, with broad democratic participation and not just EAM participating in the Sofoulis government. We do not support the idea of Sofoulis being in the government. Sofoulis’s government must be completely removed and replaced with a broad democratic formation. Similarly, a necessary precondition for free elections is the withdrawal of the English from Greece, who are an organ of English imperialist policies and supporters of the Greek plutocracy.

Therefore, it is necessary first for the British troops to withdraw from Greece and second for the Sofoulis coalition government to be removed…”

Here is what another paragraph in the same letter said: “The Black Front is preparing for a Monarcho-Fascist coup. We need to determine our position regarding this. If EAM and the other democratic parties call for armed resistance and to be armed en masse, we will also participate en masse in the democratic resistance. If NOF by itself cannot support a wide front of resistance then we will organize for limited armed opposition as part of the people’s self-defense initiatives. If we and the people are attacked by subversive actions with weapons from the Black Front we will rely on EAM for support, especially in case of an armed Monarcho-Fascist coup. That is why we too should be ready to go on the side of the democratic forces.”

I have included the above two quotes one after the other to show the reader the kind of problems the Organization was facing at that time. It is clear from the above statements that a battle was fought around the political issue of the elections, to which the democratic forces took a negative attitude in hopes that the elections would break down and new elections would take place under conditions set by EAM. This assumption, however, proved to be completely unrealistic because the political right in Greece and its masters abroad were well aware where such a step would lead. Also, the kind of “classic coup” NOF and the other democratic organizations were expecting to take place, for which “they were preparing”, never materialized.

It should be noted at this point that, even though there was talk of a coup, the democratic organizations made no effort to strengthen their armed forces as was mentioned in the second quote. NOF took this position because the CPG led it to go in that direction. At that time there was close contact between NOF and the CPG leaderships on the ground. After the elections they agreed to perform joint actions.

The situation after the elections unfortunately deteriorated sharply. The political right continued to strengthen its position and perpetrate unheard of terror against the democratic citizens; particularly against those who abstained from voting. The CPG, at this point, decided to deploy the partisan groups. Here is what Lazar Pop Lazarov, Secretary of NOF Lerin District, wrote to the NOF top leadership on April 12, 1946: “I came into contact with the Lerin CPG Regional District leadership, which informed me that the CPG Central Committee Politburo had decided to deploy four partisan groups in the Lerin Region terrain. This is in response to the Monarcho-Fascist attacks and in preparation for any development of a wider rebellion movement in Greece. NOF in Lerin Region had become massive and solid and had survived the crisis. It proved itself in the battle of abstinence. That is why they requested its help in the new form of struggle. I want to expose the new developments here and ask if we need to change tactics to solve the technical difficulties. We too will deploy partisan units, after we arm them and after we clarify our tactics.”

The following was written under item 5 concerning the tasks set out at the April 15, 1946 NOF Voden Regional Board meeting: “To strengthen the partisan movement with people and materials by any means possible…” (I gave more examples about the Voden Organization when it was active and persistent as was repeated by its leadership consisting of Vangel Aianovski and Mirka Ginova.)

Meaning, after the elections the CPG and NOF decided to strengthen the armed struggle. But still this does not mean that the CPG leadership opted for an armed insurrection. We saw how things were developing in the first part of this book. This attitude had impacted NOF’s position, which at that time was negotiating an agreement with the CPG. This attitude was also reflected in the decision to participate in the September 1946 plebiscite. But the plebiscite showed that the Greek political right used the parliamentary elections and the plebiscite to perpetrate fraud, not only against the democratic people but also against the entire world. The agreement between NOF and the CPG was worked out after the plebiscite, which became the basis for a strong impetus towards the uprising in Greece.

2. Agreement between NOF and the CPG

The interests of the struggle demanded full agreement on all issues as well as harmonization of all views and actions between the CPG and NOF. This became imperative with time, with the tightening of the crisis and with the wider fueling of the civil war. But in order to come to an agreement many obstacles had to be overcome. It was not sufficient just to agree on the assessment of the situation and to have a unified position on the question of what kind of struggle was to take place in the country. The change of attitude on the part of the CPG to begin an armed struggle, which up to now was a dividing issue between the CPG and NOF, did not resolve all the problems between the two organizations. There were other issues that needed to be solved such as relations between the two organizations, NOF’s status, the development of partisan units, etc. All these things were difficult to settle, as we shall see, mostly because of past bad experiences. NOF and the Macedonian people did not trust the CPG and the Greeks in general. On the other hand, the two year discord

between the organizations was full of unprincipled campaigns and personal insults. In 1945 the CPG leadership had developed a broad anti-NOF campaign which was very difficult to forget.

In order to erase and forget the hostilities between them, NOF and the CPG had to focus their attention on their common enemy. Only in this way they could come to an agreement. Both sides had to make every effort in good faith in order to come to common terms. The CPG, as the leading organization, had to take every measure necessary to assure NOF and the Macedonian people that it was sincere in its intentions, without any doubts. Unfortunately that was not the case. The CPG leadership did not approach this issue in the communist way. When it came to the conclusion that it was impossible to carry out a struggle without NOF; without the Macedonian people’s participation in a common struggle against a common enemy - the Greek counter-revolution and foreign interventionists, the CPG decided to recognize all its previous unprincipled relations with NOF. It not only recognized its mistakes but went even further to declare that it had given up on such bad policies and was looking forward to fruitful results from this agreement.

When the CPG leadership realized that NOF had to exist in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia, it agreed to talk to its leadership in a consistent and sincere way. This was not because it was about some ideological and foreign class organization or about a temporary CPG partner; this was because it was about a people’s national organization run by socialist principles with a specific purpose. The CPG leadership had to take the upper road on this question because it had made a mess in the past which had fundamentally shaken the Macedonian people’s confidence in the CPG leadership as well as in the CPG itself. Exactly because of this the Macedonian people from Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia massively and solidly stood behind it and boldly defended its principles. This is why the CPG had to take a revolutionary account of these facts with honesty and without hidden intentions.

For a successful struggle against a common enemy, for successfully organizing the Macedonian masses on a broad scale and for attracting the Macedonian people’s support towards the CPG, NOF

needed to be supported not only formally but also to be independent. This meant that it had to be strengthened ideologically and organizationally and its leadership had to be supported. Unfortunately the CPG leadership did none of those things. It needed an agreement with NOF in order to enter the armed struggle, which at the time was increasingly gaining pace. This, in the CPG’s estimation, became a priority and a necessity which could not be avoided and demanded that NOF be unconditionally placed under CPG leadership.

Talks between members of the CPG and NOF for achieving joint political action were ongoing even during the parliamentary elections in March 1946. After that there were talks about initiating some military actions on the ground. But those talks were taking place on the ground and were mainly about tactical tasks. The agreement in principle between the main NOF leadership and the CPG Secretary for unifying the forces was not reached until the summer in 1946. Pursuant to this agreement in principle, members of the top NOF leadership pledged to implement solutions.

In the second half of September 1946 Markos Vafiadis, then party official, later commander of the Democratic Army and Chairman of the Provisional Democratic Government, informed the NOF leadership of the conditions under which the unification was to take place.

Listed here are the conditions:

1. Dismantle existing Macedonian partisan groups and order the fighters to join ELAS units. In the CPG’s opinion, the existence of Macedonian partisan groups weakened the Party’s control over them (only two months before that the CPG was in agreement that Macedonian units, with their own leaders, should exist in Greek occupied Macedonia, and wherever Greek units existed, they were to form a higher joint headquarters).

2. On the issue of the leadership compositions and command of the military units, the CPG reserves the right to appoint “good commanders” who can be trusted by the CPG. They could be Greeks, while the groups they lead can be entirely composed of

Macedonians, if that’s what the Party finds it to be suitable. This is the CPG’s position.

3. The CPG’s position regarding the Macedonian NOF leadership joining the CPG leadership in the Macedonian provinces which, to acertain extent have been influenced by the NOF leadership, is as follows: “…in the Macedonian regions, between the leading party organs we must not also have Macedonian leaders. It is important to appoint those who are more capable and who have more confidence in the Party.”

Based on the kind of attitude the CPG expressed towards the Macedonians, one can easily imagine how the NOF leadership, the Macedonian fighters in the ranks of DAG and the Macedonian people in general felt. The Greeks, once again, proved themselves to be who they always were and subordinated NOF, the Macedonian fighters and the Macedonian people altering their destiny and filling it with uncertainty.

No one could agree with the imposed conditions, not the NOF leadership and certainly not the partisan fighters, but that agreement was implemented anyway.

The NOF leaders who were tasked with implementing the original agreement (that of July 1946) may have had different ideas when they went to the terrain but were met with cold pressure from the CPG representatives.

A meeting was held on August 25, 1946 between CPG District Committee representatives and NOF leaders from Mount Vicho. The NOF leaders attempted to implement the original agreement but they were refused by the CPG. The CPG representatives would not agree to create a joint headquarters and demanded that the Macedonian units be disbanded. They also demanded that partisan command personnel be appointed by the CPG and that NOF cease to have any influence in the military. This was the attitude of the CPG representatives.

The CPG attitude was no different in Kaimakchalan and Paiak. Here is what the main NOF leadership said about the situation in a report dated September 27, 1946:

“1. The CPG representative for Paiak (Enidzhevardar and Gumenitsa Regions) was our friend Stathis. As a condition for cooperation and joint military activities, Stathis initiated the dismantling of Macedonian partisan groups and their incorporation into the Greek units. We would like to note that there were 115 Macedonian partisans and 100 Greeks under Stathis’s command. This move, however, was not well received by Pavle Rakovski who then threatened to end all relations and since then does not want any co-operation. All in all, under orders from Pavle Rakovski, our organizations continue to operate because in these places there are no other organizations other than those of NOF, which function properly.

That same friend (Stathis) accused the NOF fighters of being traitors to the CPG and organs of Ohrana (a Bulgarian nationalist organization) and the Intelligence Service. He openly preaches with a clear objective to sow confusion and fanaticism among the Greek masses...

2. Our friend Panos is an instructor at the Regional Committee for Voden, Gianitsa, Gumenitsa and Negosh Regions. A few days ago this friend arrived in Kaimakchalan where about 200 Macedonian partisans and 30 Greeks were stationed and tried to break up the Macedonian partisan groups threatening to arrest Dzhodzho. At the same time Panos openly attacked the NOF leaders accusing them of being influenced by the CPY and that this would not bode well for them.

3. Our friend Tasos is an instructor at the Regional Committee for Western Macedonia, which includes Kostur, Lerin, Grevena and Kozhani Regions. During various meetings and conversations that he had with his friends, he said that he saw no reason for a separate antifascist Slavo-Macedonian organization, i.e. NOF, to exist. He was of the opinion that NOF should be broken up, ‘and it will be broken up for sure’, and that the Slavo-Macedonians should join the Greek anti-fascist organizations...

4. Our friend Fotis Papadimitriou is a CPG District Committee secretary. During a meeting Fotis had with Pavle Duvalevski, NOF District Board member of Kostur Region, Fotis, in confidence, urged Pavle to leave NOF and join the EAM and CPG. He told him that if he did leave NOF he would be appointed member of the Kostur District Committee. ‘By this means NOF will be dismantled and the organization will break up” said Fotis to Pavle. While Fotis publicly agitated that Macedonians should organize under NOF, privately and conspiratorially he advocated that Macedonians should not organize under NOF.”

I quoted a larger part of this report because it directly related to how the Macedonian people’s drama ended. For the CPG, NOF was never an ally in the struggle. From the way it was treated, NOF was simply an unpaid mercenary. This may sound strange but that’s the way it was!

As we have shown, the CPG leadership wasted no time in completely decapitating the Macedonian movement, something they had wanted to do from the beginning. They did not want the Macedonian partisan groups left in NOF’s hands. An organization without a military force was an organization without authority that could easily be pushed around.

Right from the beginning to the withdrawal of the Democratic Army and to the end of the armed struggle in Greece, the CPG leadership worked systematically to undermine NOF and deprive it of any independence. In fact the CPG made sure NOF was robbed of its soul. At the same time the Macedonian partisans in the ranks of DAG were oppressed and discriminated against. Those who were members of NOF who did not act in conformity with the CPG were specifically targeted and scorned. But, despite these serious flaws and weaknesses in the agreement and in the determined course of the armed struggle, we had a wide swing in the uprising. In the spring of 1947 we freed targeted areas in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia. We spent 1947 in a revolutionary upsurge. This was particularly evident in Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia.

3. NOF’s First Congress

Despite the serious shortcomings in the democratic movement and NOF’s bad relationship with the CPG, the struggle in Greece managed to survive and continued to grow. In the spring of 1947, under pressure of strong blows from the partisan army, the Athens regime found itself forced to evacuate all the mountainous regions and concentrate its defenses in urban and traffic centres. In the spring of 1947, for example, it evacuated Prespa Region which was connected with the free territory in the mountain ranges Vicho and Gramos. The mountains Kaimakchalan, Zhena and Paiak were also free and so was the Karakamen (Vermion) massif. Similarly, free regions were also created in Eastern Macedonia. The armed rebellion had also successfully spread all throughout Greece, the Central and Southern Peloponnesus and the Greek islands.

Macedonian participation in the struggle was full blown. This of course was due to the favourable political condition created on January 13, 1948 by NOF during its first congress, at which time it adopted its Program and Statute.

The day the Congress was held there were a total of 10,147 Macedonian partisans in the Democratic Army, of whom 9,477 were men and 670 were women.

The Organization was supported by professional staff working behind the scenes, consisting of 25 men and 12 women organizers. There were also district organizers consisting of 61 men and 23 women, as well as 16 regional organizers working in the various sectors. The organization published its own newspapers called “Nepokoren”, organ of the main board of NOF, “Pobeda”, organ of Voden District, “Zora”, organ of Lerin District and “Edinstvo”, organ of Kostur District. Economically the Organization was in good shape (according to the data submitted to the 1st NOF Congress).

I - What is NOF?

The NOF Congress was a historical event in the Macedonian people’s struggle for freedom because it adopted two historical documents: the Program and Statutes of the organization.

Explained under the heading “PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NOF) OF MACEDONIANS IN GREEK (OCCUPIED) MACEDONIA”, were the conceptual basis and conditions under which the organization was founded and the foundation and objectives of the armed struggle. Here is part of the program:

“The National Liberation Front (NOF) has emerged as a nation-wide anti-fascist movement of the Macedonian people, within the terms of the open Anglo-American imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of our country and within the barbaric attacks by the Monarcho-Fascists against the democratic forces in our country and especially against the Macedonian people. The national liberation struggle that the Macedonian people have led in recent years, together with the people’s anti-fascist forces of the Greek people, is a struggle against the national oppressive policies administered by the ruling capitalist oligarchy against the Macedonian people. This struggle is a continuation of the struggle waged jointly by the Greek and Macedonian people against the fascist occupation.

II - NOF’s main objectives

1. Independence and democracy

In December 1955 English imperialism crushed our national independence and democracy by armed intervention and by unleashing the Monarcho-Fascist regime to bring upon us and the people of Greece, violence, terror and destruction. These barbaric foreign and megalo-Greek measures are especially devastating for the Macedonian peoples who are being threatened with physical extermination by the Monarcho-Fascist reactionaries. The main objective of the National Liberation Front (NOF), as leader of the Macedonian people, fighting in alliance with the Greek people, is to fight for independence and democracy in our country.

This is a fight to rescue our people, a fight for our national and physical existence. This is a fight for free national and cultural development, for freedom and for rights for our people in a Democratic Greece.

Freeing Greece and solving the Greek people’s democratic question, a purpose for which the Greek people are fighting in the ranks of the People’s Democratic Front (EAM), are also NOF’s priorities, politics and aspirations for our people. Peace, normalization and free democratic development in our country - things that EAM is struggling for are also NOF’s basic requirements.

2. National equality

NOF’s second major objective is to fight for ethnic equality and for the recognition of national rights for the Macedonian people.

Achieving ethnic equality will guarantee the Macedonian people and the other minorities living in our country, the possibility of preserving and developing their culture, language, customs and folk traditions. These democratic rights are sought and protected every time our people bravely fight alongside the Greek people...”