The Great Decline – Chapter 14

The Great Decline – Chapter 14

Mount Kleftis fell into enemy hands on August 2. News of its fall was received in silence at the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) Headquarters. General Markos stood in front of the large topographical map hanging on the wall. His thick neck muscles tightened and his veins swelled up. His left cheek began to twitch uncontrollably. He turned towards the staff behind him and asked for a cigarette. He lit the cigarette, turned towards the map and stared at the jagged red line. He then looked at the red circle marked Kleftis. He clenched his fist and loosened it again. His fingers were trembling. He walked over to the table and picked up a black pencil. He slowly, as if not wanting to do this, walked back to the big map and scratched an “X” inside the red circle marked Kleftis. He sighed deeply, as if wanting to rid the discomfort he was feeling inside. For forty five days Kleftis was the only thing on his mind, the only thing he cared about on which he had placed all his hope. All this time his entire attention was focused on this hill. There was a special telephone line connecting his trench directly to Tamboulidis’s trench. Tamboulidis was commander of the 105th Brigade, the man in charge of defending Kleftis. Kleftis was the only name that came up in all their conversations, assessments and exchanges of ideas. They had both been preoccupied with Kleftis for the last forty-five days. The battle for Kleftis was the precursor for all the battles for possessing Gramos. Now, standing in front of this huge military topographic map, Markos was reminded of the unpleasant words Zahariadis had spoken only a few days before:

During an inspection of the front lines, “Markos,” he said, “you are obsessed with Kleftis. I believe every hill in the Pind Mountain Range is like Kleftis.”

Markos had nothing to say. He just looked at Zahariadis sideways and said to himself: “There is only one Kleftis!” Then he remembered that Kleftis has been taken before but then was re-taken by DAG’s 105th Brigade. Markos remembered what he had said then: “I am filled with enthusiasm now that you have re-taken Kleftis. Now you need to hang on to it at all costs. Holding Kleftis in your hands is the key to holding on to the entire southern front. Defend it heroically; defend it with your lives. I will tell you again, Kleftis must be held to the end. Kleftis is the backbone of Gramos; Kleftis is the fist of Gramos.”

The taking of Kleftis by the government forces was a great relief to the government General Headquarters and to Athens. Churches rang bells to commemorate the victory. The next day all the newspapers were filled with big headlines announcing the great victory. The fall of Kleftis not only raised the morale of the First Corps, whose units fought bloody battles for forty-five days and nights, but gave encouragement to the entire Greek government army. Kleftis, in the hands of the government army, now opened the doors to the southern front. The key, firmly held by DAG up to now, was taken and was about to unlock the door to the north.

Markos turned toward the staff behind him and quietly, barely audibly, almost disappointed, said: “For all practical purposes, the southern front is gone. It no longer exists. The door to the north for our opponent is now practically open. The next line of defense will be the Golio – Kamenik – Tamburi defense line. My orders, with emphasis, now are: “To focus all attention on Tamburi… If Tamburi falls we are indeed done for,” He knew very well what would happen if Tamburi fell. He then said, “It will also be tragic if Kamenik (elevation 1957) were to fall into enemy hands. “Comrades,” Markos addressed the staff, “we have dire days ahead of us...”

Then, suddenly, Zahariadis’s voice was heard speaking. “It is not so bad,” he interrupted. “Don’t be so hard on yourselves. You wait and see. We are yet to give our enemy a bleeding lip and some busted teeth. Look,” he said and moved closer to the topographic map, “see how big our fortress is? Comrades, the struggle has not even begun. To the west,” he pointed at the map with his hand, “is the line Gorno-Kamenik and to the north is the line Gramos – Skirtsa – Kiafa – Tsrni Kamen – Gorna and Dolna Arena. These are tall hills, over two thousand metres above sea level. To the east we have the line Pirgos – Gorisha – Gupata – Bel Kamen and on the other side of the River Bistritsa we have Buf – Aleksova Chesma – Petre Peleni – Amuda – Alevitsa and a little to the inside, we have Charno and Krastavets. This, Comrades, is the unbreakable Gramos fortress.” Zahariadis paused for a moment, turned to Markos and said:

“Markos, don’t beat your head against the wall over this...” but in his voice there were tones of ridicule and threat.

Another person to detect the tone of sarcasm in Zahariadis’s voice was General Kikitsas, a close friend of Markos since their youth, since their school days in the military academy in the distant thirties, who significantly helped Markos establish DAG Headquarters. Even before speaking to Markos, Kikitsas found Zahariadis’s reliance on the tall mountains as resistance against the enemy, funny and reckless. He did not intend to participate in this discussion. Kikitsas thought that this, first informal exchange of view between the top leadership on the fall of a strategically very important place, was very odd. But whatever else Kikitsas thought, based on his facial expression, it was a dire thought… perhaps the beginning of the end? Indeed that’s exactly what he thought… defeat was imminent... He leaned on his wooden staff, which he never separated from himself (even when he slept, in a trench, in a bunker, he always placed his staff under his pillow, under his head), and turned to listen to Zahariadis’s report.

“The battle for Gramos, Comrades,” Zahariadis continued, “has not only strategic, but also political international significance. If we manage to hold onto Gramos, even one small part of it, then that will definitely strengthen our position internationally. Gramos, Comrades, has become a symbol of our struggle. And its meaning is not just whether we win the battle on the battlefield or not. The fact that we held on to it for forty five days shows resilience, dignity and unprecedented courage. It shows that our fighting spirit and will are unbreakable. We have proven this to ourselves, to our opponent who is attempting to subdue us and to the entire world. We are holding on bravely. And you Markos, in front of all these people… you are saying that because we have lost the front, the road has been opened? How can you lose your head, as you said yourself, in these dire days, yes, dire, how can you lose your head? Yes, Markos how can you lose your head?”

Zahariadis, it seemed, was waiting for the right time, for this critical day, to say what he was always thinking, what he had harboured in his mind for a long time. With his sarcastic tone of voice, with a barely visible smile at the edge of his lips, with his narrow glaring

eyes, with the pronounced movements of his hands, with the frequent changes of tone in his voice, Zahariadis left a strong impression on everyone in his presence. Barzotas and Gusias, his closest associates and cronies, looked on with agreement. Markos, standing tall and straight with all his height, kept taking long drags from his lit cigarette and stared at the map. First he looked at the entire map. Then he spent a long time looking at Konitsa, where last year, just before the new year, he had received his first military defeat, which was a failure for the entire movement.

All the small partisan successes achieved in 1946 and during almost all of 1947, except for the bloody battle for the town of Grevena, were consumed by the eight-day battle for Konitsa. All hopes and reliance on the Democratic Army of Greece and its ability to become a regular army and attack cities and fight on open fronts were destroyed on the battlefield in front of the enemy trenches and bunkers near Konitsa. At the very moment, while looking at the map, Markos, was reminded of this and of what he had said at the conference after this tragic battle:

“Today we are changing paths and, in a transitional sense, we are switching from fighting guerrilla campaigns to fighting on fronts like a regular army. The first thing we need to do is train and prepare our cadres... Every day we must strive to change our consciousness and knowledge, that is to say we need to master our knowledge of military techniques and arms... We have learned how to fight like partisans and we understand partisan tactics well and that, thus far, has given us great success...”

Markos also remembered what else he had said: “Comrades, while government troops are embracing partisan style battle tactics we want to give them up...”

They failed to convince the political leadership that Markos was right. Partisan tactics were tailored for the mountains and delivered results. The command composition consisted of battle hardened fighters who had fought during the Italian and German occupation, non-commissioned officers with a bit of officer education and the rest had only primary or secondary education but they led warfare against colonels and generals. Their first introduction to frontal

warfare now was not about courage and heroism but about knowledge and strength of arms.

Markos also said the following during the conference: “The crossing over into a regular army must come naturally, without any hurry, by learning the various methods of fighting and not by changing the schedule...” At one point he added: “Partisan cadres who cross over into classic warfare will ultimately collide with strategists and military specialists and this, I hope, does not prove to be a disaster to our movement...”

Markos was a practical man. The only military education he had was what he had learned in school, which amounted to what a non-commissioned officer would have received in the thirties when he completed his education. He was a lieutenant during the Italian war and rose to captain or “Kapetanios” during the resistance. This was what the detachment commanders in ELAS were called in those days. They were all “Kapetanios” in small and large detachments which eventually grew into brigades, divisions and corps. And when Markos commanded the Macedonian divisions in Macedonia, even then he was “kapetanios”. The legendary Sarafis and Velouhiotis, main commander of ELAS who even before the war carried the rank of general, were also called “kapetanios”.

Zahariadis had a dislike and no tolerance for all these “kapetanios” who actually carried the burden of the war and the resistance on their shoulders. Zahariadis was in the camp at Dachau during the entire war. In the meantime the new Greek government, aided by the British, hunted down, jailed and killed participants of the resistance movement. Zahariadis returned to Greece on an English airplane in May 1945 during a time when white terror had gripped all of Greece. His arrival was announced on May 29, 1945 by the morning edition of the newspaper “Rizospastis”, with the headline “Zahariadis is back!” which sold out as soon as it came out. The news also brought long awaited hope for the people. The streets, squares, bars, taverns, etc. were buzzing with news of Zahariadis’s return to Greece. The news spread across Greece like a wild fire, raising the hopes of those jailed in camps and in prisons that the time for their release was nearing. The tortured and tormented

masses expressed their feelings with tears of joy, hugging and excitedly yelling: “Zahariadis has returned! Zahariadis is back!”

Zahariadis’s return to Greece gave new hope to the resistance fighters and opened new paths for the Party and for the struggle. During the occupation Zahariadis’s comrades, communists and resistance fighters, all sang about him, their great leader:

“To boudroumi den ton liga I skeptsi tou fevgi gorga Stous sindrofous pou polemoun…”

For them, Zahariadis’s return meant opening a new page. They had waited for a long time for someone to lead them back to hope. They had waited disappointed, living in uncertainty… Those in jail, those abducted from their homes in the dark of night and those facing a judge or the noose, also waited. They all believed that his return would wash away all these things; everything would be restored as it should be and the people would live happy and free.

“Zahariadis is back!” echoed the streets, squares, towns and villages. And they all yelled with one voice in his honour: “Zahariadis arhigos! Zahariadis arhigos!”

Markos had an article in his possession from the newspaper “Mahi” which he kept in his personal archives. It was given to him when he was up in the mountains living in a deeply dug trench in the forest of Mount Olympus. It was June 1946. Every time he remembered the days when he could only come out of his shelter during the night, he was reminded of what the newspaper said:

“Western Macedonia at the moment is a flash point in our country. There is wild terror everywhere... The gendarmerie and mobile military units are working closely with former gang members and occupier associates. The military mobile units are sowing fear among the residents. Their appearance today in the villages in Western Macedonia has caused much fear and terror... All men are fleeing to hide. God help those that fall into the hands of the gendarmerie...”

In those days news reports were more sympathetic to the villagers who had to post guards during the night in order to defend themselves from the terror gangs that roamed the various villages. The Macedonians suffered the most, not only because many of them had joined the resistance but simply because they were Macedonians. In those days Macedonians had no choice but to organize themselves into groups for their own defense. The first shots were fired by the partisans in March 1946 but it is unclear where exactly they were fired. To save themselves, those persecuted began to join partisan detachments. Then just as the partisan headquarters was established, the Party issued the following directive: “Do not come out, do not become active. Avoid the armed resistance even in cases of extreme danger…”

The directive was signed by Zahariadis himself. And it was not because the left had no means or did not know how to fight. There were all kinds of weapons and willing people. The Left in Greece had the means to go on the offensive; there was no doubt about it. But... its attitude was “self-defense only”. Zahariadis journeyed completely unopposed from Solun to Athens, convinced that he was creating a national movement, calling for big rallies and doubling and strengthening the Party ranks and discipline, and during the nights he kept promising that: “If the Right continues on this path, the guns will roar again.”

Zahariadis said this to three thousand ELAS fighters who had taken shelter in Bulkesh, north of Belgrade. Returning from Prague, Zahariadis stopped off in Belgrade and from there traveled to the camp in Bulkesh where, in front of a large gathering, he shouted: “I am going back to Greece with a gun…” Two months later he spoke at another rally in Athens attended by many demobilized ELAS officers during which he said:

“So far the Greek movement has received many blows from the British imperialists. But you should know that this situation has an end. From now on we will find ourselves in a straight line with the people’s republics of Europe...” And then he personally prohibited their re-activation.

People who we able to put aside their emotions and thought for themselves, knew that Zahariadis’s doing would have grave consequences and the rest interpreted the announcements simply as rhetoric and not as a call to start a war... What did Zahariadis bring from his trips to Belgrade, Prague, Bucharest and Moscow?

Markos was reminded of the bitter debates that he had had with his associates Blanas, Kikitsas and Lasanis, then sub-Lieutenants and Lieutenants in the pre-war Greek Army, during the resistance movement when they were “Kapetanios”, now promoted to generals (but not by him), with whom he created the Partisan General Headquarters. They were not happy with the news that came from Athens, only a month after the formation of the General Headquarters when Vlandas, Zahariadis’s most faithful associate, in a closed meeting in Piraeus announced that: “Those who wish to go to the mountains are cowards and are afraid of the real revolutionary struggle taking place in the cities and factories!”

Once again a special courier delivered the Party directive, which had orders not to recruit partisans into the units: “Partisan detachments are ordered not to receive any more volunteers. Send them home. In regards to government soldiers and officers, you are to confiscate their uniforms and shoes and send them home in their underwear...”

Party discipline did not allow people to question why Zahariadis did this. But Lord Balfour, head of Intelligence Service, knew why this was happening. In the well protected Athens office Balfour said to General Vendiris: “This is exactly what is needed. We should help Zahariadis do what he wants!”

He did as he pleased. No one doubted his wisdom and authority. To those closest to him and to the average party member, Zahariadis was infallible. Zahariadis in turn had only one authority and a single teacher; Stalin! So, who from the ordinary party members, from the lower, middle and top party membership and from staff had the courage to question the authority of Stalin? No one! Every time Zahariadis quoted Stalin he was right even when he was wrong. Those who were around him and those who were around those who were closest to him, even in the lowest party hierarchy, gave Zahariadis his undisputed authority. No one dared ask him about

anything and everyone always agreed with him. He was the Party and the last word belonged to him. They all believed him unconditionally...

Markos still remembered the meeting he had had with Zahariadis in July 1946. When, during a long conversation, Zahariadis had advised him on how to organize the partisans. Zahariadis advised:

“Mobilization should be carried out on a voluntary basis. Taking government units, which want to cross over into partisan detachments, should be avoided. All military activities should have a defensive character and adhere to military clashes only with paramilitary government organizations. Protect the ‘twinning’ line. Partisan detachments represent the only means of pressure against the government...”

Zahariadis did not allow Markos to ask questions or ask for clarification. Everyone listened to him and turned back thousands of volunteers who wanted to join the partisans. When these people returned to their homes, the Greek government authorities grabbed them and made them disappear. Some were executed and many were sent to prison in the dry Greek islands. And when the partisan leadership, General Headquarters, estimated that the movement needed to grow they decided to return to the Party Central Committee and ask as follows:

“Send us political staff, members of the Central Committee to come to the mountains. Ask the Party organizations to help the partisan movement. Send food, fighters and staff...”

Zahariadis’s answer to that request was: “We support you with all the means we have. The most important thing to remember is that this is a daily struggle of the proletariat. And don’t forget that we are fighting for ‘twinning’...”

Markos still carries many things in his officer’s briefcase, among which is included a newspaper clipping from the “Manchester Guardian” written in January 1947 by American journalist Robert Blake, in which Blake wrote:

“The best people mobilized by the partisans are the gendarmes. It does not matter to which village they go but when they do many of the youth in that village leave with them and join the partisans…”

In September 1947, after the Party had made its decision, Markos had already completed the mobilization. His recruiters entered houses during the night, took the young men from their homes and rallied them in the village square. Those who managed to avoid being taken the first time were later caught during the second round. The young men from Lerin Region were first sent to Prespa and from there to the Northern Pind recruitment centres where they had already taken the young men from Kostur Region. The young men from Voden Region were taken to Kaimakchalan. At the end of August they gathered all the young women and almost all were sent to Pind. After the mobilization, Zahariadis convened the third CPG Central Committee Plenum. He held a separate meeting during the Plenum during which made the following military suggestions:

“By the spring of 1948 the Democratic Army of Greece was to reach a figure of sixty thousand fighters. A reserve of fifteen thousand was to be created in the Vicho - Gramos corridor with which cities were to be attacked and occupied in the winter months...”

Following a Party directive without a military evaluation, Markos ordered an attack on the town of Grevena. He lost the battle. Markos did try to explain to the Party leadership that DAG was not ready and, at the time, incapable of such an attack, and that attempting such a maneuver was suicidal. He was completely ignored. Markos also tried to explain to the leadership that the opportunities for recruiting such a large number of fighters in such a short time, which Zahariadis requested, had passed. Again they ignored him. Zahariadis continued to insist and demanded that a geographic “Free Greece” be created and held.

Zahariadis wanted this “Free Greece” so that he could establish his government over it. He wanted to establish his institutions and afterwards seek international recognition. Markos, again remembered that his advice convinced no one at the top. Zahariadis, disregarded his advice and, for his own political purposes, ordered a new “imposed” strategy where the partisans came into “direct

clashes” with government troops. Markos followed Party directives but managed to avoid direct confrontation with the government army and disaster, until November 1947.

Markos broke down the detachments into small groups and ordered them to go south while the entire opposition force was moving north. The partisan groups eventually ended up in Thessaly where they were not welcomed because among them were those who spoke and sang a non-Greek language; Macedonian. Upon finding this out, the opponent promptly turned south and announced to the world that Markos was leading foreigners who did not speak the Greek language. But by then it was already too late. Markos took his forces back to the north. He won the battle with minor casualties, almost one hundred times less casualties than during the battle for Grevena. Over time, there was more and more pressure put on Markos to attack cities. Party generals and Zaharidis’s faithful associates Gusias, Vlandas and Barsotas spied on and pressured Markos to engage his troops in major battles until Markos had no choice but to attack Konitsa. He lost the battle, a great tragedy for DAG. About this Markos wrote the following to the top Party leadership:

“In order to safeguard the regular army we just created to remove the Monarcho-Fascists, as determined by Party decision, like it or not, we will have to stick to the spirit of defense. We will have to determine the places where and the times when we engage the enemy as we see fit and not the other way around. We should also be using partisan tactics in our activities as required with all their consequences...”

Zahariadis wanted an army that could fight against Anglo-American imperialism, as had been customary to express, but for no particular reason, he wanted an army that would be defined solely on grounds that Zahariadis, even as a youth, had brought from Moscow... He openly used to say:

“And here among us, like in the international plan, there are two opposing forces: imperialism and monarcho-facism on one side and popular democracy and national independence on the other. A third possibility, a “third force” does not and could not exist...”

The Greek government had a similar viewpoint. “In Konitsa,” wrote a Greek government newspaper, “several men of Greek race were apparently in opposition. Here the two opposing forces, which had just begun to battle, representing the two conflicting worlds, east and west, were in collision...”

After winning many small battles and losing two big ones and after many and frequent theoretical lessons from Zahariadis, Markos, after marches and battles, had long talks with his closest associates, who were wondering if this war had been imposed on them. In the meantime Zahariadis traveled to Belgrade, Tirana, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Prague, Warsaw and all of his travels led him to his ultimate destination; Moscow. There he sought and received many promises…

“Moscow,” Zahariadis said to his closest associates in the Party’s leadership, “will help us. Stalin personally told me: ‘You just proceed and we will afford you all the necessary assistance...’ Czechoslovakia, Comrades, will supply us with guns and cannons; they will also give us tanks. In Prague they told me that they will be the first to recognize our interim government. Poland will supply us with aircraft. The comrades in Warsaw are ready to receive our pilots and familiarize them with the aircraft. We need to build an airport in Prespa as soon as possible. Hungary and Romania will send us food, clothing, light weapons and ammunition. Romania will also supply us with mines and grenades. Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria will receive everything that is sent to us from those countries and then they will transfer it to our warehouses which we need to build as soon as possible. Our warehouses will be tunnels in the mountains. These countries (Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) are also prepared to take care of our wounded and refugees...”

Markos learned about this by accident, but no one dared talk about it with Zahariadis. Markos heard from Zahariadis that DAG “in spite of being a revolutionary army, was a slave to bourgeois prejudices in the art of conducting war, which in its roots stretched to ELAS. And ELAS as an army had certain disadvantages which it acquired from the pre-war Greek bourgeois army...” Zahariadis, who did not participate in the resistance movement in Greece, could not stomach the role of ELAS, which led the resistance without him…

And exactly now, standing in front of the big military map, quickly going through his memory while Zahariadis was talking, Markos began to understand the game. And in it he realized that he was the party that was losing.

Zahariadis paused for a moment and then said: “It is true that the situation is serious, but that does not mean it’s hopeless. Make new plans to counter attack...”

To all the people in the audience, Zahariadis’s words sounded like orders. And for the first time, all those who knew Zahariadis, by his tone of voice and by the movement of his arm, recognized the order... A new man was at the helm of the army...

Markos, while retreating into his trench, signaled Kikitsas to follow him. They sat on a bench made from a split stump and each lit a cigarette. A battery powered flashlight lit the smoke-filled trench. They sat in silence, except for the echoes of artillery shells in the distance. The silence was interrupted by the ringing of the Polish telephone.

The One Hundred and Seventh was on the line.

“Hello, what can I do for you One Hundred and Seventh?” Marcos said quietly.

“My sector has been infiltrated with new forces. The enemy will charge at any minute now. What are your orders General?”

Markos, holding the handset with his shoulder, pointed at the map with his flashlight and after looking at the lines, said: “One Hundred and Seven, Kleftis fell today. It now looks like Amuda is next. You know what it means if this hill falls? It will be a rapid enemy penetration into Alevitsa, a breakthrough along the border and the closing of the northern exit. Your orders, One hundred and Seven, are to defend your sector at all costs. I repeat, your orders are to defend your sector at all costs. There will be no deviation from this order… Get in touch with all the units and personally inform the commanders… Those are my orders,” said Markos and hung up.

Then after he told Kikitsas what One Hundred and Seven had said, Markos asked:

“Do you remember what your plan was, at the Headquarters about a month before the conference, about a breakthrough in the south, if we were to find ourselves in a difficult situation?”

Kikitsas put down his cigarette and said: “In this situation the proposal has already been delayed and there is no real possibility for its realization, even for its mention. Its eventual realization would now mean the total destruction of the DAG forces located in Northern Pind. I, Markos, am now waiting for a rapid progression from the Ninth and Tenth enemy divisions,” said Kikitsas, got up, went to the military map and continued: “We should expect that in a few days these divisions will reach the Gramos - Kiafa – Arena line. If the enemy Fifteenth Division brings reinforcements to the front, to the Buf - Amuda - Alevitsa line, then it will be clear that we are done for...”

“What do you suggest?” asked Markos while staring into Kikitsas’s face.

“I suggest we leave the Gramos line and transfer to the region of Vicho. This will be a lifeline for DAG,” said Kikitsas calmly, as if it was a simple move or a small task. There was a long and painful silence after that.

Markos came closer, looked into Kikitsas’s little eyes, grabbed him by his officer’s belt and, in a high-toned, excited voice asked: “Are you prepared to explain your plan and convince Zahariadis and his generals and associates?”

“If you give me your support, I think I can…” replied Kikitsas.