APPENDIX 3 - Part 02
On October 18, 1946 Paskal Mitrevski, Ilia Dimovski-Gotse and Mincho Fotev were invited to visit Kolishevski at his office. After a brief conversation about an agreement with the CPG, Kolishevski ordered the NOF leaders to show absolute loyalty to the CPG and all problems that NOF had were to be solved by the CPG. According to Fotev, at the end of the meeting Kolishevski told them that: “It was of particular interest that they consistently enforce unity with the CPG on the basis of this agreement, to maintain and strengthen unity in the ranks of NOF, to maintain and strengthen the brotherhood and military solidarity with the Greek people, to consistently and unreservedly fight when necessary, and any problems that arose during the fight were to be decided jointly with the CPG leadership and with DAG headquarters…” According to Fotev, after NOF was put under CPG control, all ties and contacts with the socio-political factors in the Republic of Macedonia were to be broken. The next day, October 19, 1946, the NOF Main Board representatives rushed back to Greek occupied Macedonia through Albania. They were met by DAG couriers in Korcha and were escorted back in. Paskal Mitrevski, through Gramos, arrived at DAG Headquarters on Mount Hasha where he met with General Markos Vafiadis. Ilia Dimovski-Gotse went to Mount Vicho to the Regional Headquarters of the Macedonian Partisans, where the other NOF Main Board members were, and informed them of the latest orders. Mincho Fotev went to Kostur to inform the NOF district leadership of the agreement and its implementation. The NOF leaders were expected to prepare the ground for the Agreement to be implemented and were waiting for Paskal Mitrevski to return from DAG Headquarters...
At this point it is important for me to voice my concerns and say that those from the Yugoslav and Macedonian party and state leaderships, who drafted the Agreement on behalf of NOF, gave the CPG leadership, headed by Nikos Zahariadis, far too much power and far too many rights over NOF. The trust and authority attributed
to the CPG leadership was overly abused placing NOF in a terrible predicament which, over time, stifled and hindered its normal development.
There are also many wrong historical dates in Kiriazovski’s book. Regarding the merger negotiations, Kiriazovski wrote: “Negotiations on the unification between NOF and the CPG began in May and ended on November 21, 1946 when the Agreement for the unification was finally signed…” (p. 156.) The Agreement was actually reached in October 1946. Its practical implementation began in October 1946 but was never fully implemented because the CPG repeatedly postponed it....
On page 160 in his book, Risto Kiriazovski wrote: “The Greek side commenced the negotiations conditionally requesting that Ilia Dimovski-Gotse be excluded…” Markos Vafiadis, DAG supreme commander, suspended Gotse from DAG. In September 1946, when Paskal Mitrevski met with Markos Vafiadis at DAG General Headquarters to get a timeline for implementing the merger Agreement, Markos categorically demanded that Ilia Dimovski-Gotse be removed from DAG’s ranks. Mitrevski, however, as NOF Main Board Secretary, insisted that Ilia Dimovski-Gotse remain in DAG because he was a special figure in the Macedonian PLM, but Markos declined with the following comment: “The CPG Central Committee Politburo has already adopted a decision to publicly denounce him as an autonomist and an English collaborator, and that decision stands. Therefore, as a member of the CPG Central Committee Politburo, I am obliged to respect this decision and under no circumstances am I to disavow it…” This is what happened with Ilia Dimovski-Gotse’s suspension.
On May 20, 1947 NOF held a meeting on Mount Karaorman... this meeting was over-emphasized and turned into a terrestrial Conference and a first massive event… However, if we want to see things objectively, according to decisions made and results achieved, we need to properly present those decisions made and solutions achieved and record the time, place, method of adoption, conditions maintained, intents and purposes, and so on… In other words the entire experience must be documented for historic purposes so that historians who love the truth can be afforded the
chance to study it. In this particular case during the May 20th Karaorman meeting, the NOF participants did all that and clearly identified all CPG aims against NOF. Similarly, the intentions and activities of the Macedonian separatists and dissidents were also identified. These separatists were clearly working against the moral, political and national unity of the Macedonian people. I would not be exaggerating if I said that this was a real conspiracy against NOF to inflict severe consequences against the Macedonian PLM in Greek occupied Macedonia. Judging by the way the NOF personnel were convened and the style of work conducted during the meeting, it is obvious that the organizers achieved their objectives. The NOF meeting was convened by Mihail Keramitchiev personally and, like he said, as ordered by the CPG Regional Committee for Macedonia and Thrace. At that time the top NOF leadership consisted of 6 rather than 9 members. They were Paskal Mitrevski, Mihail Keramitchiev, Giorgi Urdov-Dzhodzho, Pavle Rakovski, Evdokia Baleva-Vera and Mincho Fotev. Unfortunately Paskal Mitrevski was not there. After Mitrevski announced that he would be going to Solun, to the CPG Regional Committee Headquarters for Macedonia and Thrace, to negotiate and define the criteria for applying the NOF-CPG unification Agreement, he was provocatively isolated for almost four months. Giorgi Urdov-Dzhodzho was also not invited. Urdov at the time was at DAG headquarters for Western and Central Macedonia and not only was not invited, but was not even aware that such a meeting was taking place. Mincho Fotev too did not know about the meeting and was not invited. Fotev found out from Lambro Cholakov, NOF Board District Secretary for Kostur Region, who was inquiring why Fotev did not attend when, according to him, he was invited to the meeting. Almost all participants in the meeting, unless they were close associates of Mihail Keramitchiev, were not aware of the reasons for the meeting being convened. Almost all participants, except for the separatists, were interested and demanded to know why Paskal Mitrevski, the top person in NOF, was not there. Responding to questions, Mihail Keramitchiev said: “Questions regarding Paskal Mitrevski should be directed at the CPG leadership…” All those interested to know the whereabouts of Mitrevski were directed to see Georgios Esteriadis-Petros, CPG representative for Macedonia and Thrace. When Esteriadis was questioned on the issue he nervously said: “Paskal Mitrevski is in Skopje and he can no longer use his broom to sweep from there.
NOF now belongs to the CPG…” After he made that statement the atmosphere became very tense and the situation became explosive. The separatists, led by Mihail Keramitchiev, tried to calm the participants by saying, “everything will be okay and that we should have confidence in the CPG…”
The following conditions were imposed on NOF by the CPG leadership and by Mihail Keramitchiev, dealing a severe blow against it:
1. All NOF leaders and representatives in the CPG, EPON and DAG will no longer be representing NOF, NOMS and AFZH.
2. The “NOF Main Board” is to be renamed to “NOF Coordinating Bureau” and will consist of 5 members led by a secretary.
3. NOF’s personnel matter is now the problem of the CPG leadership.
4. NOMS is to be disbanded and the Macedonian youth are to become members of EPON, the Greek youth organization, but they cannot be members of NOF.
5. ACE’s (Agrarian Party of Greece) right to form its own organizations in the Macedonian villages is no longer recognized.
6. The “NOF Coordinating Bureau”, as the supreme body of the Organization, will consist of only 5 members that will include Mihail Keramitchiev as Secretary, Vangel Aianovski Oche responsible for organizational issues, Pavle Rakovski responsible for agitation and propaganda, Lambro Cholakov responsible for finance and Evdokia Baleva-Vera as Secretary of AFZH in Greek occupied Macedonia. It was also decided to appoint Vangel Nichev as NOF instructor for Eastern Macedonia. Mincho Fotev was to remain a member of the EPON Regional Committee Secretariat for Greek occupied Macedonia and Thrace. But about a month later, due to conflicts over Mihail Keramitchiev’s policies, Fotev was dismissed from his position and replaced by Todor Kovachev-Viktor.
These imposed conditions on the Macedonian organizations caused a severe blow against the Macedonian PLM and against the Macedonian people in general.
After this meeting the NOF membership fell into a severe crisis. But, instead of helping NOF out of this crisis and strengthening its role as per the unification Agreement, the CPG leadership did the opposite. It took measures to discredit and disqualify NOF. As for the concessions and compromises made by Mihail Keramitchiev, they were inconsistent with NOF’s policies and totally irresponsible. His sick ambition to take over the top NOF leadership was exactly what made him make the above-mentioned concessions.
The consequences of the decisions made can be grouped into the following six points:
1. The internal situation and internal relations in the Organization significantly changed. With the appointment of the “NOF Coordinating Bureau”, the Organization was practically deprived of its central governing body. It lost its leadership and its ability to decide on matters of importance it its own domain and to support its policies, of course within the global CPG strategy and within the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece. The NOF Coordinating Bureau practically became and instrument of the CPG. Its role consisted only of formally taking initiatives that were offered by the CPG and using proper methods to resolve them and taking care of practical tasks initiated by the CPG.
2. With the creation of DAG, the needs of the Macedonian PLM called for the expansion of the main NOF leadership composition and to be given greater rights and powers. But instead of doing that, the CPG not only reduced the NOF leadership composition but also stripped the leaders of the top NOF leadership from their independence to solve problems in their own domain.
3. All NOF and AFZH personnel matters were left in the hands of the CPG leadership. The CPG was the only authority with powers to promote or appoint NOF activists to higher functions. As a result, almost all NOF appointments at almost all levels required CPG Party approval. Then, at CPG representative Georgios Eretriadis-
Petros’s proposal, the NOF Coordinating Bureau agreed to dismiss from NOF all NOF leaders serving in DAG. Under no circumstances should the NOF Coordinating Bureau have allowed this to happen because, by doing so, NOF practically severed all its ties with thousands of Macedonian fighters. NOF had a duty, through its political and military personnel, to be present in DAG and to be in constant and uninterrupted contact with the Macedonian fighters in order to look after their interests, moral and political unity and to strengthen their fighting spirit. Only NOF could properly care for and act on behalf of the Macedonian fighters and address their problems in DAG. The Macedonian fighters too had a right to be members of NOF and to be in constant contact with their parent political organization because NOF was one of the main factors that created and developed DAG. Of the total number of fighters in DAG more than 40% were Macedonians. DAG’s principal forces and the war itself were located on the territory of Greek occupied Macedonia in Gramos, Vicho, Kaimakchalan and Paiak Mountains, as well as in Kostur, Lerin, Voden and Gumendzhe Regions. Gramos and Vicho were the main fronts of the two warring sides, both located in Greek occupied Macedonia. These were the battle grounds where the bloodiest and hardest battles were fought. DAG General Headquarters, DAG General Staff and the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece were also located in Greek occupied Macedonia. Kostur and Lerin Regions, also located in Greek occupied Macedonia, were the largest free zones freed by the partisans where more than 80% of the total population was Macedonian. Therefore NOF had the right to be there and to be the sole political representative of the Macedonian people. It had the right to help DAG and participate in the front lines with its fighters and to continue its strong relationship and ties with the Macedonian people fighting in DAG.
4. The NOF Coordinating Bureau accepted Georgios Eretriadis-Petros’s proposal to disband NOMS and his recommendation to have the Macedonian youth join EPON, the Greek youth organization. As a consequence of that, NOF distanced itself from the Macedonian youth and from the most vital strength of the Macedonian people.
5. The NOF Coordinating Bureau accepted the CPG’s recommendation to form Agrarian Party organizations in the Macedonian villages. But the Macedonian villagers had no need to become members of a Greek Agrarian Party because NOF consistently represented their interests. The existence of the Agrarian Party of Greece in the Macedonian villages only complicated the Macedonian position among the villagers. It was obvious that the CPG and EAM needed the Greek Agrarian Party in the Macedonian villages so that their political interests would be looked after. The existence of both a Greek and Macedonian political position in the Macedonian villages, however, was practically a wedge in the moral and political unity of the Macedonian people. Given that the village population in Greek occupied Macedonia consisted of almost 80% farmers, some CPG leaders insisted that NOF be managed by the Agrarian Party of Greece.
6. For the sake of the Macedonian PLM it was vital that NOF and the other progressive democratic parties and organizations in Greece establish closer links and program cooperation on an equal basis. This was the only way that NOF could have affirmed its position and be recognized as a democratic and revolutionary factor in Greece and as the sole legitimate representative of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia. Only this way could it properly struggle for common interests and harmonize its position on all issues. But in order to achieve this it had to remove all contradictions and all misunderstanding. But how could it do that when it had no support from the CPG? The CPG had no desire to affirm NOF as an authentic and equal national and political organization. As a result NOF’s unity, which was based on agreed principles set out in the unification Agreement, was interrupted. Unfortunately the CPG blamed NOF for all of this and removed Paskal Mitrevski and Mincho Fotev from the CPG and EPON District Committees and Giorgi Urdov-Dzhodzho from DAG Headquarters.
By caving in to CPG demands, NOF and its Coordinating Bureau turned from a massive centralized organization into an isolated and decentralized organization, distanced from the Macedonian fighters
and the Macedonian people, whose only purpose was to perform narrow tasks for the CPG.
At this point in time the CPG cracked down on NOF and on all those Macedonian cadres who expressed dissatisfaction with its views and policies. More than 40 NOF and NOMS leaders were dismissed from their leadership duties for supposedly being counter-revolutionaries and were sent to DAG’s ranks to serve as common fighters. Some were arrested and sent to the Greek concentration camps in the People’s Republic of Albania. These actions not only dealt a severe blow to NOF but were also harmful to the PLM, the armed struggle and to DAG.
Reacting to what had been done to NOF by the CPG Regional Committee, many Macedonian leaders and activists strongly protested and demanded an end to the persecution. They also demanded that the interrupted unity process resume based on the Agreement. Fighters, communists and NOF supporters demanded that the CPG leadership stop all negative activities against NOF by the CPG leaders, including by Georgios Eretriadis-Petros, Evripidis Kapetanios-Panos, Kiriakos, Theodoros Evtimidiadis and Tanasios Dzhogas-Spiros. The CPG was also asked to annul all the destructive decisions it had made against NOF, remove the separatists and return the rightful NOF leaders, who were unjustifiably dismissed and degraded, to their former positions.
On January 13, 1948, after many protests, the Macedonians were finally given permission to convene the First NOF Congress, in an attempt to overcome the great difficulties they were facing and to consolidate their positions in this historic mission…
One of NOF’s basic programming principles was to unify all Macedonians, including people of other nationalities living in Greek occupied Macedonia. In other words, everyone living in Greek occupied Macedonia who agreed with NOF’s objectives and program principles had the right to join NOF. The new people who Risto Kiriazovski calls “controversialists” (p. 220) were all Macedonians. They were DAG fighters and CPG members, all Macedonian communists. Risto Kiriazovski was one of them. The CPG itself was enriched with more members, especially after the
merger Agreement when all NOF members became CPG members. It is true that some Macedonians, communists, even CPG members, including Risto Kiriazovski, who were traditionally Orthodox, strictly followed the CPG line even towards NOF and towards the Macedonian National Question. Unfortunately contradictions existed among these particular Macedonian communists. One cannot be a pro and anti Macedonian at the same time. While they were calling themselves “Macedonians”, they followed the CPG line which was anti-Macedonian. This means that there was a radical difference between being a “Macedonian” and being a “Communist Macedonian” who follows the CPG line. But regardless of that, the new people, about whom Risto Kiriazovski speaks, eventually adopted the NOF line and that is why they were elected into NOF positions during the NOF Congress.
Here is what Kiriazovski had to say about the conflict in the NOF Central Council between President Mihail Keramitchiev and Secretary Paskal Mitrevski. On page 223 Kiriazovski wrote: “From the statements that NOF leaders made and from the documents I found during my research, I have discovered that the conflict in the ranks of the NOF Macedonian leadership was due to the various views they had on the strategic goal of the Macedonian liberation movement. Mihail Keramitchiev, Vangel Aianovski-Oche and the other old NOF leaders believed that a victory in the revolution would afford the Macedonian people the right to self-determination. Mitrevski, on the other hand, advocated for full equality with the Greek people within Greece.” Unfortunately Kiriazovski’s conclusions are both superficial and naïve. It would not only be naïve but absurd to think that in the whirlwind of the Greek Civil War, in the middle of the armed struggle where people were fighting for their lives in 1948, while DAG was being beaten to a pulp on Mount Gramos, when victory for the revolution was becoming more and more elusive and an uncertainty, when the main preoccupation of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, the CPG, DAG and NOF was to mobilize all potential combatants in Macedonia and Greece, that NOF would be holding debates to decide the Macedonian National Question! These kinds of debates are usually held during peacetime under normal circumstances and after victory is achieved. How was NOF going to solve the Macedonian National Question when its own survival and the
survival of the PLM were at stake? It would also be ridiculous to believe that Mihail Keramitchiev, Vangel Aianovski and the others had the authority to tackle such a task. The arguments Kiriazovski was referring to were caused by a tiny separatist group led by Mihail Keramitchiev. The reasons for causing these problems were, because of the policies they were leading, they were losing their positions of influence in NOF and, being encouraged by dissidents from the Macedonian PLM, they engaged in insane attacks against the other leaders in NOF who did not see things their way. This behaviour finally led them to leave DAG and the struggle, but they did it in 1848 during the most difficult moments in the Greek Civil War. The ideas they were preaching about the Macedonian question, i.e. Macedonians achieving self-determination, served only as smoke screens for them to hide their real intentions; taking control of NOF. In any case my impression is that it was a conscious effort on Kiriazovski’s part to protect the holders of the negative phenomena in NOF caused by the separatists and dissenters during the Macedonian PLM.
On page 253 Kiriazovski wrote: “On September 25 and October 3, 1948, the NOF Executive Board Secretariat held a session to discuss the deployment of the suspended NOF leaders that included Paskal Mitrevski, Mihail Keramitchiev, Ilia Dimovski-Gotse and Vangel Aianovski-Oche. It was decided to send Mihail Keramitchiev, Ilia Dimovski-Gotse and Vangel Aianovski-Oche to Yugoslavia to recruit fighters for DAG from the pool of the Macedonian emigrants in Yugoslavia. The decision made by the NOF Secretariat was actually dictated by Zahariadis…” The claims that Kiriazovski made here are not true. The First NOF Plenum was held on August 8, 1948. The CPG Central Committee Politburo made a decision during this Plenum to suspend the NOF leaders Paskal Mitrevski and Mihail Keramitchiev. Both Paskal Mitrevski and Mihail Keramitchiev, after their suspension, were deployed to new duties which were personally decided by Nikos Zahariadis and Vasilis Bardzhotas. Paskal Mitrevski was sent to the ranks of DAG as an ordinary fighter. Mitrevski accepted the decision by saying: “I am a communist; I will go where the Party sends me…” The same was ordered for Mihail Keramitchiev but he refused to accept the order saying that it was dangerous for him because he could not tolerate explosions cause by bombs and shells, because according to him he
suffered from seizures. About Ilia Dimovski-Gotse and Vangel Aianovski-Oche, they were not suspended during the First NOF Plenum and there was no explanation of where they were deployed. It is also not true that Mihail Keramitchiev and Vangel Aianovski-Oche were sent to Yugoslavia by Zahariadis to recruit new fighters for DAG from the Macedonian immigrants, as claimed by Kiriazovski.
Kiriazovski claims that “the latest CPG action sparked new anger and stronger distrust of the CPG, which was manifested by Macedonians leaving NOF and DAG…” At the same time we have the CPG joining the Informburo Resolution against the CPY and Yugoslavia and openly attacking Yugoslavia and taking rigorous measures against NOF. And as was indicated earlier, Kiriazovski reported that Mihail Keramitchiev, Ilia Dimovski-Gotse and Vangel Aianovski-Oche were sent by Zahariadis to Yugoslavia to recruit fighters for DAG from the Macedonian immigrants. How is it possible, on the one hand, for Kiriazovski to claim that Macedonians were leaving NOF and DAG and, on the other hand, to say that the suspended NOF leaders were sent to Yugoslavia to recruit the same Macedonian immigrants who had left DAG? How was it possible to recruit from inside Yugoslavia when the CPG was fiercely attacking Yugoslavia on account of the Informburo Resolution? All this is absurd!
Regarding the evacuation of the children to the people’s democratic countries, Kiriazovski has concluded that “it was done to counter-act the Athens regime which had its own motives for rescuing the children from the horrors of war. But that was not the only motive. With this action the CPG leadership had aims at freeing the parents of the evacuated children and mobilizing them into DAG in the regular units and in DAG’s support services, immediately following the evacuation...” This too was an unrealistic and naïve conclusion. The evacuation of the children was done at the request of the parents; they were worried about their survival with the war escalating. The children were placed in a dangerous and difficult situation and the parents demanded that a solution be found to save them from the horrors of the war and from the barbarism of the Monarcho-Fascists. Their parents were already strongly involved in DAG even before the children were evacuated. Many parents and
their older children were already DAG fighters. Some of the evacuated children were orphans, their fathers were killed fighting for DAG or were executed by the Monarcho-Fascists. Also among the evacuees were the children whose parents were in prison or interned because of their participation in the PLM.
It is well-known that the Monarcho-Fascist army evacuated the population from the villages it could not fully control and took the people to the cities where living conditions were difficult and miserable. The Monarcho-Fascists wanted to cut ties between the people and DAG so that they could not assist DAG. DAG made many attempts to free the people, especially the children for whom the Monarcho-Fascists had plans to turn them into janissaries. The evacuation of children under the war conditions was a great human deed, saving thousands of children from the horrors of war. NOF, and especially AFZH, were active participants in the implementation of this noble humanitarian act. NOF and AFZH undertook all possible measures to find countries to accept the children, house them, educate them, and so on. For each group of 10 children a support worker (a mother) was sent with them as well as Macedonian teachers, and so on. This is what happened with the evacuation of the children.
Most of the items reported to be discussed and decisions made during the Second NOF Congress, as reported by Kiriazovski, are biased and fictitious at best. Kiriazovski seems to be oblivious to the truth because he has made numerous errors and unjustifiable serious accusations regarding what took place during the Second NOF Congress. Kiriazovski does not even know where the NOF Second Congress was held. On page 287 he said that it was held in the village P’pli, Lerin Region, which is not true. The Second NOF Congress was held in Prespa in the village Nivitsi, Lerin Region. About the work done and decisions made during the Second NOF Congress, Kiriazovski said: “One of the goals was to escalate the anti-Yugoslav campaign…” a rather subjective and tendentious assertion. The Second NOF Congress was convened during dire and difficult times and under very complex conditions. The Monarcho-Fascist army had taken intensive actions and was preparing to deliver a devastating blow against DAG. The Informburo campaign was in full swing and was bitterly attacking Yugoslavia. Let us not
forget that Yugoslavia at that time was the CPG and DAG’s most reliable friend and helper. By attacking Yugoslavia and by putting pressure on NOF, the CPG and DAG were in effect breaking the national, moral and spiritual ties between the People’s Republic of Macedonia, i.e. Yugoslavia, and Greek occupied Macedonia. The Congress was in fact not convened with aims at proclaiming a new position on the Macedonian National Question, nor to initiate an anti-Yugoslav campaign, as claimed by Kiriazovski on page 291 of his book, nor to interrupt NOF’s national revolutionary liberation process. Despite the difficult trials it suffered from the CPG, NOF to its end remained true to its original principles and ideals and did its best to struggle, together with the Macedonian people, in a life and death scenario until the last possible moment. Also despite all the innuendos, speculations and various accusations that Nikos Zahariadis made against the Macedonian people and against its leaders, NOF still remained true to the Macedonian cause to the end. It is not right to say that the devoted leaders of NOF neglected their principles for the sake of carrying out CPG policies. That is simply not true.
The Second NOF Congress was in fact convened to consolidate NOF’s ranks, to increase and intensify its capability to act and to provide the Macedonian people with new impetus and enthusiasm in the struggle against the Monarcho-Fascist army and lead them to their final victory. NOF, with its own sacrifices in battle, with a massive participation of Macedonians in DAG and in the armed struggle managed to expand and consolidate its positions in the people’s democratic armed movement in Greece and to assert itself as an important military and political factor in the country. NOF participated equally in the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece and had its own ministerial portfolio in the Directorate for National Minorities. NOF has a representative in the DAG Military Council and an official in DAG Headquarters as an assistant political commissar. The Presidents of the Kostur and Lerin Region National Liberation Committees (People’s Councils) were members of the NOF Central Council and so were most of the Central Committee responsible for DAG. Risto Kirazovski, it seems, sees all this as a tactical move made by Nikos Zahariadis. Clearly and consistently he defends the views of the NOF separatists and dissidents...
On page 291 of his book, Kiriazovski implied that the Congress resolution did not call those NOF leaders, who did not agree with the Informburo resolution, traitors, thugs, etc., The real traitors, according to Kiriazovski’s account of the Congress, were those fighters who voluntarily left NOF, the armed struggle and the territory of Greek occupied Macedonia. The initiative for that view was carried by the 400 delegates who attended the Congress and by the DAG units whose fighters attended the Congress, who after the Congress died heroically in battles against the Monarcho-Fascist army in the legendary mountains Vicho and Gramos. In connection to the NOF Second Congress, I would like to emphasize that, at the request of the NOF leadership, the People’s Republic of Macedonia produced all the necessary propaganda materials as decided during the Congress, including posters that symbolized the brotherhood and unity of the joint struggle between Macedonian and Greek people against the Monarcho-Fascists. This material was used to advertise the struggle to the people.
Regarding the question of NOMS’s dissolution... Claims made that it was decided to dissolve NOMS during the unification discussions are not true. In fact it was explicitly stipulated in the merger Agreement that NOMS should remain active. At that time I was NOMS Secretary for Greek occupied Macedonia and was personally aware of the decisions made by the contracting parties. As NOMS secretary, I was authorized to implement the Agreement with respect to NOMS. The claim that Kiriazovski made on page 327, that the CPG leadership put NOMS under its control was wrong. The CPG failed in that respect and that is why it continued to insist that NOMS should be disbanded. An agreement to dissolve NOMS was reached between Mihail Keramitchiev and Georgios Eretriadis-Petros, as well as by other members of the central committee and by NOF on May 20, 1947.
Claims made that NOF had decided to appoint Todor Kovachev-Victor and Tashko Hadzhiianev as members in the EPON district office of Macedonia are not true. The Agreement called for the following: “Mincho Fotev, NOMS Secretary to be appointed a member of the EPON Regional Committee of Macedonia…” (see: Vangel Aianovski, “Aegean storms” p. 242.) In July 1947, after
NOMS was dissolved, Mincho Fotev was replaced by Todor Kochev-Victor. NOF never appointed Tashko Hadzhiianev as a member of the EPON district leadership. Chosen for EPON Central Council, as speculated by Kiriazovski on page 329, were Mincho Fotev, Secretary, Pando Vaina, Tashko Hadzhiianev and others. But here too Kiriazovski was wrong.
With all his circus acts and theatrics, personal authority and various means, CPG Secretary General Nikos Zahariadis still failed to bring NOF to its knees and turn it into a Greek political weapon against the Macedonian National Question, and to engage it in the Informburo anti-Yugoslav propaganda campaign. This was mainly due to a strong commitment shown by the Macedonian communists, the Macedonian fighters and the Macedonian people in general who were committed to NOF’s ideals and national liberation goals. This was also due to the moral, political, national and spiritual attachment of the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia to the Macedonian people in the People’s Republic of Macedonia. The claim that Zahariadis took NOF under his control is another of Kiriazovski’s assumptions. Zahariadis may have followed NOF’s progress but he never took control of it. Zahariadis’s failure to get control of NOF, in fact drove him to create KOEM so that he could achieve his political objectives concerning the Macedonian Question. Here is how Zahariadis motivated KOEM’s formation: “NOF not only represented the Macedonian liberation movement but actually expressed the Macedonian people’s aspirations to fight in a struggle for the Macedonian people’s national liberation. But there was a major gap in the history of the Macedonian people’s national liberation struggle. Missing was the governing core for the people’s revolutionary movement. That gap was the reason for having serious hazards in the movement. KOEM was created to fill that gap and to consistently fight for the rights and freedom of the Macedonian people.” Unfortunately those were only empty words, Zahariadis’s pure delusions to mislead the Macedonian communists, draw them in and away from NOF. If Zahariadis indeed had the Macedonian people in his heart and truly cared for them and for the Macedonian national liberation movement, if he was principled and his Communist Party was consistent with the internationalist communist obligations then, as early as 1941, immediately after the German, Italian and Bulgarian fascist occupation, the CPG would
have given the Macedonian people the opportunity to form their own Macedonian national liberation organizations, which would have reaffirmed the Macedonian nation, its struggle for its national rights and freedoms, and it would have advocated for a reasonable solution for the Macedonian National Question. Unfortunately all the CPG wanted to do was destroy NOF as it did SNOF in Kostur and Lerin Regions. The CPG severely and consistently kept attacking NOF from its inception until it was completely destroyed...
And now a few words about KOEM. The CPG and Zahariadis’s personal objectives for creating KOEM were to create a new political entity, a new so-called Macedonian management centre that would conform to the CPG’s ideological and political principles on the Macedonian Question and a good partner to fight against Yugoslavia. The CPG strived to destroy NOF by disqualifying it. But in spite of what the CPG and Zahariadis did personally, their plans backfired. The Macedonian communists did not accept KOEM because its authority was never accepted by the Macedonian people.
Pando Shiperkov, in the “First Macedonian Assault Brigade”, was Commissar of a battalion not a company commander. He was a captain in the Yugoslav National army and a battalion commander in DAG under the rank lieutenant colonel.
Krsto Mangov was not only Secretary of the NOF Regional Board and President of the National Liberation Committee in Kostur Region, but also a member of the Central Committee Executive Board and a NOF trustee (government official) in the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece responsible for issues of local people’s government.
It was Giorgi Urdov-Dzhodzho who, under a CPG directive, created the organization MAO, and not Vangel Aianovski-Oche as claimed by Kiriazovski.
Evdokia Nikolova Baleva-Vera was not only Secretary of AFZH for Greek occupied Macedonia but was also vice president of the NOF Central Council, first vice president of the All-Greek Union of Democratic Women of Greece (PDEG) and a candidate-member of the Secretariat of the International Democratic Women’s Federation.
Mincho Fotev was not only leader of NOMS. He was one of the founders of NOF in Greek occupied Macedonia, a member of the NOF Organizational Leadership (Main Board), a member of the CPM Party Delegation for Greek occupied Macedonia, a member of the NOF Central Council Executive Committee and assistant political commissar of DAG General Staff.
Tashko Hadzhiianev was presented as a member of the EPON District Committee delegated by a decision from NOF and an active member of the NOF Central Council Executive Board. But that is incorrect. He never occupied those positions.
Lazo Poplazarov was presented as an instructor and as secretary the NOF Main Board for Greek occupied Macedonia. He never occupied those positions. He was NOF secretary for Lerin and Voden Districts and a member of the NOF Central Council.
Naum Peoiv was presented as a direct participant in the people’s liberation war in Greek occupied Macedonia in 1941. That is also not true. From the fall of 1941 to September 1943 he was in Bulgaria, a regular student in the Bitola Bulgarian gymnasium.
Mihail Keramitchiev was presented as a commander of a partisan unit in the Slavo-Macedonian Liberation Army in 1943. That is not true. There was no Macedonian army in 1943 in Greek occupied Macedonia. Mihail Keramitchiev was involved in the people’s liberation war in Greek occupied Macedonia after February 1944. From 1941 to October 1943 he studied in Sofia.
Vasko Karadzha was presented as a direct participant in the people’s liberation war in 1941. Not true. In 1942 and 1943 he was a regular student at the Bitola Bulgarian gymnasium.
Nikolaos Kolaris was presented as a collaborator, war criminal and leader of an armed Monarch-Fascist gang. This is not only false but an injustice to the man. Kolaris was from the town Rushishta where I (Mincho Fotev) was born. He was a soft-spoken and honest man who had nothing to do with what was written about him. The collaborator whom I believe was referred to was a dangerous
criminal and assassin, who led a Monarcho-Fascist armed gang. I believe the collaborator’s name was Frantsiskos Kolaris-Tsevos, a colonist from Asia Minor who lived in the village Gorentsi and who for many years also lived in Rupishsta.
Skopje, November 1986, Mincho Fotev Street “Dame Iasmin” no. 6, entry III, apartment 2, Skopje
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Printed from https://macedonianhistory.ca/narrative/mincho-fotev-e-book-english/16 on October 29, 2026