VIEW FROM TODAY

VIEW FROM TODAY

My intention at this point is to present the reader with another characteristic point of view, belonging to our time; that of Nikola Kliusev, 1998/190:

“...The people in Chento’s government, most of whom were brutally tortured and executed in the dungeons and camps by Tito’s regime, suffered a terrible fate. In addition to Chento who served as vice president of the Presidium, two other vice presidents, Panko Brashnarov from the old Ilinden guard and Professor Dr. Manuel Chuchkov suffered a similar fate. After that, Secretary of the ASNOM Presidium doctor of Sorbona Vladimir Polezhina, Minister of Economy Dr. Lazar Sokolov, Minister of Justice Petre Piruze, legendary Ilinden fighter Pavle Shatev, Interior Minister Kiril Petrushevski, member of the Presidium Venko Markovski, party secretary and political commissar of General Staff Bane Andreev and others also suffered a similar fate...”

What does Lazarov’s book, in integral terms, actually mean for us Macedonians and what does it tells us?

First and foremost it tells us that we Macedonians should have erased our illusions a long time ago that “someone else” was more interested in Macedonia and the Macedonian people than ourselves. In other words, we should not have allowed Yugoslavs, Greeks, or any other foreigners and outsiders to influence and lead us, especially when it came to our people’s fate and to our country’s destiny!

It tells us that alien propaganda left our Macedonian consciousness with too many cracks and deep mental chasms. It tells us that we were divided on many issues, some of which do not even concern Macedonia!

It tells us that we were and perhaps still are under the illusion that communist ideology was the solution to our problems, including reuniting our Macedonia. How was that even possible without our involvement as leaders of our own people, as leaders of our own destiny? Did we think that the Greeks or the Asia Minor colonists were going to free us and give us our Macedonia back? We must have had these kinds of expectations because we followed their lead all through the Greek Civil War?

It tells us that we felt our lives belonged in the services of the CPG and that we bought into its ideologies.

Taken by a half century of euphoria we believed and still believe everything. Here is an example given a long time ago, which made this author say: “On February 19, 1949, according to official French sources in Paris, filed with the tag ‘Greek secret’, a secret agreement was signed between Tito and General Markos on June 1, 1948…”

“It is well known, especially now, that Markos never wanted to cede any part of Greek territory to Yugoslavia, but this information was confirmed by the Associated Press on July 25, 1948 that, according to the Press, Markos had indeed signed a secret agreement with Tito (on June 1, 1948 ).

Apparently, by this Agreement, Markos had agreed to the unification of three regions from Greece, namely Florina (Lerin), Kastoria (Kostur) and Edesa (Voden), with Yugoslavia…” (64)

What does all this mean?!

It means that some events are factual and did take place, while others, well; they were created to mislead people and stir up things… and never actually took place! Just because they were reported by the press does not make them true… someone high up may have fabricated the information and passed it along to the press… as well as verified it as being “true” when, in fact, it was not!

Lazarov, strictly adhering to French sources, took a brave walk through history and recognized that there was not enough information on this issue to make it true so he concluded that it must have been some sort of illusion created to feed emotions and bring disappointment, especially in the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia. From this discovery, Lazarov also found out that he too was learning from sources designed to mislead… which must quietly be rejected.

Lararov must have known that at that period of time the Informburo was established. And on June 30, 1948, CPG Central Committee Politburo member Mitsos Vlandas sent a letter to all DAG Commissars to inform them of the Informburo Resolution taken

against the CPY and Tito and of the position the CPG had taken, which agreed with the Informburo. It took many months for the CPG to come up with the content of that letter. Besides that, Lazarov must have known that, on August 27, 1948, General Markos Vafiadis was suspended from being the Supreme Commander of DAG. He must have also known that Vafiadis, at the CPG Central Committee 5th Plenum held on January 30-31, 1949, was suspended from his position as President of the unrecognized Provisional Democratic Government of Greece.

He must have known, or perhaps not, that General Markos Vafiadis was born in the village Tosi near Ankara, in Asia Minor, and was planted as a colonist in Greek occupied Macedonia in 1922, a man who we, again and again, meet throughout our history, who for some reason that escapes me, we see him as some sort of “great legend”, when it is well known what he told the magazine “Epikera” about us Macedonians when he returned to Athens. Markos, at best, was an ordinary person; he was no general let alone the great general who headed the army with more than 50% of the soldiers being Macedonians. He was also not a Greek… he was a pseudo Greek at best.

Our history is full of disasters because we have a tendency to follow idiots who speak idle words, tell us what we want to hear and make empty promises. We followed a man who lied to us and misled us without thinking what we were doing… a man who eventually led us to our genocide and to our permanent exile from our ancestral homeland… And now we find his name in our historiography being referred to not as a villain, but as a hero… a “great legend” no less… Why?

What we will also find out, after reading all these books, is that our wishes may have been noble but our goals were unattainable and unrealistic. The fundamental problem is that our people in Greek occupied Macedonia had been placed in the dark and Greece made sure they were uneducated, isolated and unaware of what was possible and what was not. They had no experience in major change and no resources or knowledge to organized themselves politically or militarily. They did not even consider the option of what would happen (to them) if they lost the war? Being kept in the dark for

generations also made them naïve and trusting, which was a well exploited weakness by those who wished them harm. This, unfortunately, has happened to us too many times with huge catastrophic consequences and shows that we are in desperate need of learning lessons from our history and avoid such mistakes in the future.

3.0 IT IS TIME TO HIGHLIGHT THE GENOCIDE COMMITTED AGAINST THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE IN GREEK OCCUPIED MACEDONIA DURING THE GREEK CIVIL WAR (1945-1949)

“Do not laugh, do not cry, do not even disdain, but think and understand” (Spinoza)

And now, after more than half a century of silence, if, out of respect, we were to look at the “facts” as presented by Dr. Risto Kiriazovski in the various publications, what will we see? For example, what will we learn if we were to look in the section “Views and Opinions” in the January 10, 1995 publication of “Nova Makedonija” and read the article entitled “The Greats betrayed Macedonian expectations”? What will we see if we look at his own feuilleton entitled “Legitimized violence against the Macedonians in Greece after the Second World War” published January 18, 1995, or if we look at the magazine “Denes” of Friday, January 14, 1999 and read Kiriazovski’s pragmatic text? In which he briskly said: “Macedonia’s historiography is at the height of its task.” He explains:

“...For example, Macedonian historiography has argumentatively revealed the great Greek and Yugoslav communist responsibility for the tragic fate of the Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia after the Second World War. That is why it concluded that, if the terrible events in the five post-war years were avoided because there were objective conditions, today we would have a compact Macedonian minority in Aegean Macedonia in a compact territory and we would not have today’s problems with the current Greek government.”

This will best be understood by those who lost their ancestral homes and were anathematized, slandered and defamed by the CPY and the CPG leaderships for wanting answers. I am one of those people! I was slandered for writing my book “(Self) Sacrifice of the Macedonians under Greece” in 1994, in which I demanded an explanation as to how and why the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia were manipulated and sacrificed in the Greek Civil War from 1945 to 1949. (See: Kiriazovski: SK. IV-1118 from 8.04.94.)

How important are these so-called historians who support the politics of today and how valuable is their input? Well, if we look deeper into the situation we will find that those who give the most advice are those who are least qualified to do so!

The text written by our historian in the “Denes” publication reminded me of what Spinoza had said: “Do not laugh, do not cry, do not even disdain, but think and understand.”

Exactly! It is well known that historian Risto Kiriazovski has written many works about the Greek Civil War that should not be overshadowed in this investigation, but also not to be taken by the Russian saying: “Tak skazal nachalnik! Molchat i nerasuzhdat!” Now let us see how he came to say: “…Macedonian historiography has argumentatively revealed the great Greek and Yugoslav communist responsibility for the tragic fate of the Macedonians from the Aegean part of Macedonia after the Second World War.”

Of course this raises a couple of questions:

1. What kind of Greek and Yugoslav communist responsibility could Macedonian historians have revealed???!

2. What kind of historical role did NOF play being created by the CPY and destroyed by the CPG???!

There are certain rules in a war - for example not to be personal, to be national, but for us Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia the war, through NOF, according to Kiriazovski, was a revolution which aspired to continue the Ilinden traditions. In essence, while

this tragic war was nothing more than an exercise to exile us Macedonians from our homeland, for foreign interests and so that Greece could call itself “homogenous”, our own historians nourished the illusion that it was a revolution of our own making… Does no one see how NOF was created, manipulated and monopolized to serve the interests of the CPY and the CPG? How then could this war have been a “Macedonian revolution”?

As a historian, even now, half a century later, Kiriazovski and any other historian for that matter, given the irrefutable historical facts available to him, surely should have been able to deduce that this war had the designs of genocide against the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia. This war was not a Macedonian revolution! It was an “ideological war”! This is how it was presented to the world. It was a fight between the right and the left for control over Greece. It was also an opportunity for Greece to get rid of the Macedonians! It is that simple! We Macedonians were involved in the war, there is no denying that, but the war was not our doing. We didn’t even know what we were fighting for until it was too late! Was the war lost because the Macedonians were traitors? NO! The war was led by Greek communists and they are the ones that are responsible for everything that happened, including losing it! Were the leaders of NOF traitors? How could they be when they followed CPG directives to the letter?

Edward Hallett Carr, in his book “What is history”, wrote: “The facts speak only when the historian calls upon them to speak: the historian is the one who decides which facts will speak, in which order and in what context.”

Well, there we have it. Kiriazovski did exactly that. He used available information from the Greek Civil War and turned it into a different brand of history where Macedonians are the actors, leading figures and drivers in his story. In one of his write-ups Kiriazovski wrote: “CPG General Secretary Zahariadis, in April of 1946, met with Stalin and Tito who approved the CPG’s decision to start the Greek Civil War and promised him comprehensive help.” Further on he wrote: “In the Aegean part of Macedonia, outside and independent of the CPG and under the influence of the CPY-CPM, the Macedonian national liberation movement, led by NOF, acted

strongly which, in accordance with an agreement between Tito and Zahariadis, in October 1946, was put under CPG direct leadership.”

So what is Kiriazovski telling us? He is telling us that Zahariadis, Tito and Stalin were the political and military strategists of the Greek Civil War. Zahariadis started and managed the war as well as directed and managed NOF through the CPG. At the same time he is also telling us that NOF acted independently of the CPG? Isn’t this a contradiction? What is he trying to do? Is he making it his mission, as a historian, to take the political path of least resistance and making sure the Macedonians are blamed for something they did not do in order not to offend the communists? Why? One cannot even imagine the damage this did to us, to those who were involved in that war… and for what… for nothing because we were not leading or driving that war… we were simple soldiers who followed orders and did what we were told!

If top historians like Kiriazovski said that we were “a factor” in that war, and what reason would they have to lie, then people blamed us for all the failures and everything that went wrong… We had to carry and live with the guilt for over half a century… If historians could blame us for all the wrongs that happened in that dreaded war then why not have the politicians, academics, scientists and society in general also blame us? This, naturally, made it easier for them to manipulate us and put us in our place in society.

Worse than being blamed for something we did not do was the fact that every time anyone made an attempt to correct or clarify the problem or evaluate historical facts it was quickly thwarted. Handy facts were often used that were offered in the book “Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question” by American authors Steve G. Palmer and Robert R. King who, in chapter 7 - continued interest in Aegean and Pirin Macedonia on page 125, wrote:

“The CPY was cautious in its merger actions of Aegean Macedonia. However, when the CPY stood firmly in power, the issue of unification of Aegean Macedonia was revived. In mid 1945, in the articles that were printed by the Yugoslav press, it was said that the dreadful situation of the Macedonians in Greece, who suffered under ‘the terror of the Greek chauvinists’ who were reputed to have

conducted ‘orgies of extreme anger’, was mourned.” (40) (“Borba”, June 19, 1945.)

Speaking in Skopje in October, Tito confirmed the thesis that Yugoslavia would never deny the Macedonian people their right to unite! (41) (Josip Broz Tito, “Izgradnja nove Yugoslavia”, 1 p. 158.) Quite naturally the CPG then did everything in its power to minimize the significance of the Macedonian Question.

In early spring in 1946, General Secretary Nikos Zahariadis, in preparation for the next stage of the Greek Civil War, visited Belgrade and Prague. While the Greek communists were preparing for war the CPY, through a publication entitled “Borba” (Struggle), clarified its own goals by publishing a map of the Aegean part of Macedonia showing the Macedonian “ethnic boundaries” to include Solun and a large part of northern Greece. Included in the same article with the map were words that mourned the fate of “over 250,000 Macedonians in Greece whom the Greek reactionary circles had decided to destroy”. The article also said that Greek Macedonians fought in Greek Partisan units for their freedom and they deserve the right to self-determination and to unite with their brethren in the People’s Republic of Macedonia. The article ended with a threat that Yugoslavia “cannot remain indifferent towards the destruction of our population in Greece.” (42) (“Borba”, August 26, 1946.)

When the Civil War in Greece began, the CPY, in order to simplify the CPG’s internal situation, maintained a low public profile on the Macedonian Question. However, the Yugoslavs continued to quietly work “influencing” the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia. They used local camps organized on Yugoslav territory to train guerrillas and to stimulate support for the unification of Greek occupied Macedonia with the Republic of Macedonia. (43) (Barker, “Makedonija”, p. 118.) Tito was ready to use any means possible, with the exception of starting a general war, to help the aggressive needs of Greek guerrilla leader Markos Vafiadis. Yugoslavia, at that time, was in a much better position to provide Vafiadis with material aid than were Bulgaria or Albania. Also, the Greek guerrilla bases were in the mountainous region bordering Yugoslavia. Markos became dependent on Tito, and obviously the

CPY, and requested from his organizers to work in Aegean Macedonia. In early 1947 the organization SNOF, later named NOF, was chosen to take the challenge. NOF proclaimed that its goal was to grant the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia their national rights in a communist Greece. However, because of the strong influence from Yugoslav instructors and “volunteers” from the Peoples Republic of Macedonia, as well as from the propagation of the Macedonian language, with establishing schools and frequent demands for greater autonomy for the Macedonians, NOF was used to promote Yugoslav expansionist ambitions. (44) (Kofos, “Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia”, p.166-167; 170-173.)

When Yugoslavia was “excluded” or removed from the Cominform it was also removed from acting in Aegean Macedonia, thus ending its aims to unite Greek occupied Macedonia with the Republic of Macedonia. The CPY, however, continued to support Markos for more than six months after its break with the Cominform until it had a serious fight with the CPG. A fight broke out in the ranks of the CPG between pro-Yugoslav and the pro-Cominform faction. (45) (Izbit, p. 175-177.) The pro-Cominform faction won and its wishes were imposed during the CPG Central Committee Fifth Plenum at the end of January 1948, with Markos being ousted from his command function and expelled from the party. The Central Committee promised the Macedonians in Greek occupied Macedonia “full self-determination” but also warned against the destructive action conducted by “opportunist and reactionary elements supported from abroad in order to break the unity of the Macedonians, the Slavo-Macedonian and Greek people”. (46) (Piade quoted in “CPY and the Macedonian Question”, p. 98.) Reorganized NOF tried to institute one Macedonian policy similar to the policy applied to Bulgarians and Cominform, calling for the creation of a united Macedonia as an independent state and full member of the Federation of Balkan peoples. Greek reaction to this statement was so energetic and negative that NOF was forced to withdraw its request. (47) (Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Tito and Goliath”, p. 192; Kofos, “Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia”, p. 179-183.)

In late July 1949 Yugoslavia had closed its border to the Greek guerrillas and thus highly contributed to their final defeat. But

Kolishevski invited the Aegean Macedonians living in the Republic of Macedonia to create a legal basis for achieving their national goals. (48) (“Nova Makedonija”, August 3, 1949.)

Yugoslav involvement in the Greek revolution was so great that the CPY felt obliged to present a detailed analysis of the revolution’s failure. The general conclusion was that the CPG had failed because it clearly did not recognize the Macedonian nation and that it was quite cautious in taking military action, especially when Markos was deposed “under false pretenses”. (49) (Vukmanovich - Tempo, “How and why the national liberation struggle Greece was defeated”, p. 77.)

Well, these are the facts, presented by various authors that highlight our terrible tragedy. These are the facts that point to a certain truth that there was no Macedonian factor present in the Macedonian national strategy and that we did not have principle unity. But what we did have were people who personally attached themselves to the CPG and to the CPY, who gave rise to “ideological activism” with disregard to the cruelty and brutality it brought to the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia.

It was the sinister games and the alien propaganda, which first acted with lies and then spoke of deadly weapons that brought us to our genocide. These are the facts that we need to embrace in order to heal from our past and to create a healthy atmosphere for the Macedonian people’s future. What happened to us is a fact! What we were promised and what was delivered are facts!

Above all it was shown that NOF’s role in the Greek Civil War was deceptive but not fiction. The people of NOF, on the other hand, seemed to enjoy playing their heroic roles with their desires to unite Macedonia. Unfortunately those desires, and the weight of them, were left for the ordinary Macedonian people to carry, who gladly accepted this heroic and misguided challenge without hesitation… which led them to genocide.

What do the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia remember about the Greek Civil War and how do they interpret what they remember? Many I have spoken with remember what they

had done and the events that took place around them. It was an intense moment in time. Human life did not matter much and hardly anyone cared to pay attention outside of trying to survive. A giant wave hit them and swept them away. In their struggle to survive they listened to the guiding voices coming from above and did what they were told! They remember these times as an era of brutal propaganda with destructive goals calling out on the people and wanting more of their blood… After the war ended it was followed by a half a century of fear and silence… no matter where these people were… at home or exiled abroad. This fear and silence kept them from talking about what happened during the war… about the genocide they experienced… a forgotten genocide… an unreported genocide… an un-registered genocide with world institutions and with the international community… a guilt free genocide for those who had committed it!

But what does all this mean for us Macedonians? Will our tragedy be forgotten forever by the world and even by future Macedonian generations? Will our new generation be ignorant of it; like they have been in the last half century? Will our sacrifices be remembered as a betrayal or as a failed revolution carried out in the Ilinden tradition?! Did these top communist leaders determine that the Greek Civil War was a historical inevitability or was it an absurd creation of their own collective hallucination for the “Soviet-ization of the Balkans”, through a “Balkan Federation”, a “United Macedonia”, etc.? Were these empty communist gestures, idle talk and confusion, motivation for the Greek bourgeoisie to, once and for all, get rid of this problem by getting rid of the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia? The speculation that a part of Greek territory was going to be split from Greece and joined with Yugoslavia or that attempts were being made to turn Greece into a socialist country, motivated the Greek Right to act and remove the “threat from the north” by removing the “Macedonian menace”! According to the Greek newspaper “Ethnikos Kirikas” published on May 21, 1946, the Greek Right did not just want an eviction they wanted a full expulsion of the Macedonians: “Greece should soon expel 80,000 Slavo-Macedonians”! As I have said before, on several occasions, the Greek Civil War was an opportunity for the Greek state to get rid of the Macedonian people from its Macedonian occupied territory. It has been a “Greek dream” to have a Macedonia

without Macedonians! How? By expelling the Macedonian people from Greek occupied Macedonia to Yugoslavia just as Greece did after World War I when it expelled Macedonians to Bulgaria and Turkey… and then filled the empty Macedonian territory with 600,000 Turkish Christian settlers and colonists from Asia Minor.

There is no doubt that the leaders who led the Greek Civil War (1945-1949) defined it as a “class revolution” with an ultimate goal: “to establish a socialist system in Greece.” This was confirmed by Zahariadis in his book: “Problems in the Leadership” published in 1950, where on page 81 he wrote: “The existence of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republics in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe are a spectacular, credible and decisive factor for our entry into the Socialist revolution.” He was talking about the Greek Civil War being a socialist revolution; if it was a “Socialist Revolution” for Zahariadis and the Greek communists then it was a “Socialist Revolution”, a revolution to bring socialism in Greece, for everyone including us Macedonians! It is very important to know this for further analysis because the interpretation of “historical facts” in our current historiography is based on the famous Yugoslav model… a history written to suit the current political climate…

Zahariadis’s discussions and consultations with top communist leaders for starting the Greek Civil War are well-known to both Greek and foreign historians. Zahariadis had consulted with Stalin, Molotov, Torres, Toliati, Tito and others. There are a number of books that explain this:

“Ksenokratia”, ed. 1975, by a well known team of experts.

“Conversations with Zahariadis” ed. Athens, 1986, by Lefteris Elefteriou.

“Saranda hronia agones tou KKE”, 1948.

“Episima kimena tou KKE (1940-1945)” and others.

March 20, 1946 - Zahariadis left Athens and went to Prague. He used this trip as an opportunity to discuss his armed struggle in Greece with the communist party leaders and to seek assistance

from them. But, as it turned out, he received silence or advice that it was a bad idea to start a war at this point in time and that such a move would be foolish. The most notable leaders, including Torez of France and Toliati of Italy, told him that it was “dangerous to resort to arms” at this point in time.

On March 31, 1946 Zahariadis arrived in Belgrade and met with Tito. Among other things, they discussed the “strategy of the armed struggle” (the Yugoslav model) for which Tito promised Zahariadis material and moral assistance. See: “Danas” published on 6.03.1990, pages 418, 419 and 420. Among other things on page 64 the article said: “…the network was organized under the leadership of Alexander Rankovich (third man from the top in CPY politics) who, up until 1948, supplied the Greek partisans with 35,000 rifles 2,000 mortars (German), 7,000 anti-tank guns, 10,000 landmines, 12,000 complete army uniforms and 30 wagons of food.” The article then went on to say that: “… 8,000 people had fled Greece (and lived miserable lives in the Skopje streets) and how important it was for the first man, General Markos, to confirm the newly established General Headquarters created on October 28, 1946.”

But we must never forget that more than 50% of the participants in DAG were Macedonians. A very large proportion considering that the Macedonian population was much, much smaller than the Greek. We must also never forget that the Greek Civil War, with all its Party and military functions, was led and commanded almost exclusively by Greeks. So, the question that comes to mind is: “if the Greek Civil War was a revolution for socialism, does that mean that we Macedonians had to resolve this problem, i.e. turn Greece into a socialist state before we could obtain our national rights?”

Stalin’s meetings and the views he expressed are well-known by many historiographers. Here is what Petre Galabov, in an article entitled “The Greek Civil War (1945-1949”, published in “Pulse” on October 27, 1994, had to say: “After Belgrade, Zahariadis traveled to Moscow where he met with Stalin, Zhdanov and Molotov. During this meeting Molotov expressed criticism of his non-participation in the Greek elections. Zahariadis answered with the familiar arguments that the elections were rigged ahead of time to legitimize

the authority of foreigners and the Right, who imposed the Greek Civil War on us.” The form and method of the Greek Civil War were discussed at a special meeting between Stalin and Zahariadis. According to Zahariadis, Stalin ordered the tactics of the struggle. He said: “You will start gradually from the villages then move towards the cities and try to avoid unnecessary military intervention from the English, do this with a view of finding a compromise.” More facts that express Stalin’s views on Greece and the CPG, keeping in mind that Stalin is in support of USSR’s political interests, can be found on pages 288 and 289 in Roy Medvedev’s book entitled “Let history judge”, Spokesman Books, 1976/473.

Historian Roy Medvedev also had his own views which are of great interest to us:

Stalin’s views: Stalin’s attitude towards Greece and the CPG during the war was unclear, even suspicious. From the available evidence we have there is a general indication that Stalin’s attitude towards Greece was negative. Stalin thought Greece was a small country and perhaps not a good place for conducting micro-strategic practices for the political interests of the Soviet Union.

In the period from April to October 1944, while attending meetings with the British and Americans, Stalin did not bring up any substantial objections to British claims of how Greece was going to be governed. When Churchill and Eden visited Moscow in October, Molotov and Eden worked on the percentage of influence in their respective spheres which were decided by Churchill and Stalin on October 19, 1944. When it came to interests in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary the concerns were completely different from those of Greece. Neither Stalin nor Molotov thought that there should be a major change to the Soviet influence in Greece already defined as 10%.

About the first round of the Greek Civil War in 1944, in his book entitled “Let history judge”, Roy Medvedev wrote: “In the clash that continued the Greek Communists received no real support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union resigned itself from even giving moral support to the Greek antifascists. The EAM-ELAS forces, being without any help or hope, were forced to curtail their military

power struggles. After that a government was formed without EAM’s participation. A while later this government and its policies contributed to creating conditions for a civil war. This, once again, is proof that at that time the Greek Communists received no moral or material support that was demanded from Stalin and the USSR...”

Here is an interesting find given by Spiridon Blagoev. (See: “Nova Makedonija” series published on May 17, 1997 under the heading: “The third and final Tito – Stalin meeting, May 1946”. Here is what Blagoev wrote:

Stalin: “Did Greece raise any questions regarding Yugoslavia?”

Tito: “Regarding us there were provocations, but not recently.”

Stalin: “The British have an Army there, with aims at strengthening reactions, possibly, and for other purposes.”

Tito smiling: “We have a request for them: Aegean Macedonia and Solun.”

Molotov: “Yes, Solun, an old Slavic city. What is needed is a way out to the Aegean Sea.”

One of Greece’s most prominent historiographers - Tassos Vournas, in his book “History of modern Greece – the Civil War”, on page 176 wrote that Stalin, on February 10, 1948, literally told the Yugoslav delegation in Moscow that: “I do not agree with you, my Yugoslav comrades that the revolution in Greece should continue. That struggle has no hope of success. What do you think the UK and the USA, the strongest countries in the world, will allow it to bring down a line of communication with the Mediterranean Sea? Nonsense! And there’s almost nothing of naval forces! No! The revolution in Greece should stop, as quickly as possible.”

Stalin’s statement mentioned above is also included on page 218 in Vladimir Dedier’s book entitled “Tito”, published in 1953. Gilas, in his book entitled “Conversations with Stalin” on page 182, confirms everything that Dedier had written, adding that Stalin had said that the revolution (struggle) in Greece needed to end!

That is what Stalin recommended to the Yugoslav delegation, most likely based on what was decided between Stalin and Churchill in Yalta and in Moscow from October 5th to the 20th 1944, during the division of spheres of influence of the Balkans between the Great Powers. Another of Stalin’s clear and undeniable positions was that the USSR was against Zahariadis’s decision to announce the creation of a “United and Independent Macedonian state within a Balkan Federation” passed during the CPG Central Committee 5th Plenum. Stalin’s dislike of this is made very clear in the correspondence files between the USSR leadership and Chernishov, Soviet Ambassador to Athens.