GREEK GOVERNMENT COMPLAINTS AND CONCERNS FOR THE CHILDREN TAKEN BY THE CPG AND

GREEK GOVERNMENT COMPLAINTS AND CONCERNS FOR THE CHILDREN TAKEN BY THE CPG AND DAG

On February 27, 1948, the Greek Government sent an official letter to the UNITED NATIONS Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) which outlined the following:

“The Greek children are being forcibly moved by DAG partisans beyond the Greek border, to Albania, Bulgaria, and other Eastern European countries and are being kept in those countries.”

“‘General’ Markos’s agents began a census a long time ago with aims at collecting children ages 3 to 14 in Northern Greece.

Their ultimate goal:

- To terrorize Greek families so that they will help the partisans; - To educate the Greek children in the communist ideology; - To destroy the Greek national consciousness and alienate the children; - To disorganize the agricultural economy. They are forcing villagers and their families to flee to the cities so that their children can be protected.”

WAS THE GREEK GOVERNMENT CONCERN FOR THE TAKEN CHILDREN REAL OR AN ULTIMATE ACT OF WHITE ETHNIC CLEANSING?

If it was real then why did the Greek government enact the edict 106.841 / 5-1-83, to repatriate only Greeks by birth?

Doesn’t this law confirm that the “PEDOMAZOMA” (child collection) was also part of the planned migration movement and part of the strategic solution that the Greek state enacted after 1913 for the forceful and violent exile of Macedonians?

Creation of UNSCOB and its role in the research of the “Pedomazoma” problem

The “Greek issue” was again put in the United Nations Security Council agenda for the third time during 1946. The first two sessions, which were met with sharp appeals from the Soviet Union and Ukraine, ended without results.

The third debate, held on December 3, 1946, continued after the Greek government had extensive consultations with the United States. The Secretary-General was then asked to put the Greek question about its conflict with the neighbouring countries on the agenda as soon as possible. (UNSCOB Report A / 574-1948, p.1. The Commission’s report was placed on the agenda of the 174th Security Council meeting.)

On December 19 1946, the Security Council proposed establishing a commission of inquiry and charging it with producing a report by May 23, 1947 at the latest. But when the Council began to back Greece’s views, representatives from the Soviet Union and Poland rejected their opinions. After much debate the Security Council on both sides vetoed the idea of establishing a commission and again the Greek issue became hopeless.

The Greek issue was then taken to the General Assembly where there could be no Soviet veto, so on October 21, 1947, the General Assembly, with 40 votes in favour, 6 against, and 11 abstentions, voted for the creation of the United Nations Special Commission for the Balkans (UNSCOB).

UNSCOB consisted of representatives from Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, England and the United States. Everything was decided without representation from the Soviet Union or Poland.

The main task of UNSCOB was to investigate all complaints coming from the Greek government which alleged that the partisans in Greece were assisted by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

These states not only refused to cooperate but they also did not allow UNSCOB observers to enter their territory. On December 1, 1947, UNSCOB established its headquarters in Solun. (UNSCOB Report A / 575 -1948 pp. 1-3.) The Commission decided to create 6

groups each represented by four observers and one auxiliary person. Six zones, one for each group, were designated in northern Greece and by the end of February 1948 the groups arrived at their designated zone. (UNSCOB Report, A / 574-1948, p. 3.)

In its June 1948 report entitled “Movement and Detention of Greek Children”, Group 4 confirmed a number of specific events:

1. There was indeed a census of children taken in some of the partisan controlled areas of northern Greece and there was evidence that this census was started a long time ago.

2. A large number of children were taken from northern Greece and sent to Yugoslavia.

3. Some of the parents did give their consent but only after they had enrolled their children and there were indeed many children who were forcibly taken under protest from their parents...

Regarding the regions, it was said that the census of children was taken in two main areas under the control of the Communists:

a) In the Slavic-speaking areas of Western Macedonia around Lake Prespa and in the Lerin and Kostur villages where the people are Greek citizens but speak a Slavonic language. (See: UNSCOB Report A / 574 -1948 p. 29 - section 2.)

A witness from Kostur Region said that: “Many children from the village found a hideout in Kostur to avoid being taken by the partisans and that, in his opinion, only 10% of parents agreed to give up their children. UNSCOB also acknowledged that there was evidence that, many children, especially from the Slavic speaking areas of Western Macedonia, were taken with the consent of their parents.

Another witness from Prespa Region said that “many parents were grateful to see their children go to Yugoslavia”.

In short, all these statements show that there was a big difference between deciding whether or not to let the children go in Slavophone versus Greek villages.

In other words, there was greater protest in the Greek villages resembling a forced collection and it took more effort to persuade Greek parents. There were also cases where children were taken without parental permission.

There was mention in the report that children belonging to partisan families and to partisan sympathizers were also sent to Eastern European countries. (See: UNSCOB Report A / 574-1948, p. 31.)

American reaction to the Greek government’s complaints about the “Pedomazoma”

The Greek government used strong and decisive words when it criticized the CPG and DAG for seizing and evicting children. Regarding the March 27, 1948 incident, Foreign Minister Chaldaris pointed out that “the seizure of Greek children was not simply a violation of the obligations under the human rights act but a crime against humanity…” (UNSCOF Report A / 574 (1948 p. 18)).

The Athens government was convinced that the Americans would approach this problem with equal intensity and speak positively for the Greek government. Unfortunately for the Greeks most Americans in authority, including Foreign Minister George Marshall, did not fully believe the strong Greek government propaganda and accusations launched against the communist “Pedomazoma”.

But, it would appear that these criticisms had more to do with putting pressure on the United Nations to deprive the communists of the “Pedomazoma” than care about the children. If the Greek government truly cared about these children, it would have allowed them to return to their homes at the first opportunity after the war ended. The fact that the Greek government slammed the door shut on them permanently showed that it did not care at all.

At first some Americans in Athens thought the issue could be of great benefit to generate propaganda against the communists. This is what Karl Rankin at the US Embassy in Greece wrote to the Foreign Office: “…on March 10, 1948, the embassy was convinced that the removal of Greek children by General Markos is a psychological gaffe which can be used in a propaganda campaign to inform the world public…On March 3, 1948, Rankin also thought that “the problem can be turned into anti-Communist propaganda,” but some Americans began to wonder if the benefits of such propaganda can be seen as a variant to the communist side.

Dwight Gliswold, leader of AMAG, in a telegram sent to Washington on March 23, 1948, said that according to recent news about the child abduction coming from the Communists the issue is “turning out to be unusual and deliberate psychological warfare against the Athens government…” (Lawrence Witner – 162.)

Gliswold also believed that the queen had been “overblown”, but it was well-known that the eviction of children had also been carried out by the same Greek government that launched the complaints. The Greek government itself had been seizing “thousands of children from “Partisan areas”, sometimes by force and those actions could overshadow the Greek government’s complaints in front of the world public.

Regarding the partisan involvement in the “Pedomazoma”, the US Consul General in Solun said that it was “a result of a war of nerves”, which in his view was intended to demonstrate that the Greek army was incapable of guaranteeing security for the Greek people.

George Marshall in Washington also questioned the Greek problem and on April 24, 1948, wrote: …even though several youths and children were taken by force from their legal guardians, the majority of the children were taken from the partisan held areas where they posed a social care problem for General Markos which left little or no voluntary consent from the Slavic minority, or from communist parents…

Later, when the Greek Embassy in Washington asked the US to support it at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, the US State Department said the children issue was a “weak link” and that while in immigration the children could be turned into armed fighters who will return and fight against the Greek state.

On August 14, 1948, the US mission in Greece became aware of the “Pedomazoma” issue in greater detail. This was evident by Marshall’s telegram which in part said that there were “incomplete assertions” claiming that many children were forcibly seized and armed.

If the Greek partisans, and only if the same Greek partisans, could be held responsible for the abduction and eviction of children… otherwise protesting and condemnation by the United Nations General Assembly “would not serve… and would have no purpose” in Marshall’s opinion.

In a recent and carefully thought out study, American historian Howard Jones analyzed the American attitude towards the “Pedomazoma” depravation and produced his own findings. (See: Howard Jones, “The Diplomacy of restraint: The United States’ efforts to repatriate Greek children evacuated during the Civil War of 1946-1949”. Journal of Modern Greek Studies.)

Howard Jones has affirmed that there were two basic assumptions about the particular position taken by the US Department of External Affairs and personally by Marshall. First, “realizing that the Greek government had shown concern for the removal of children” and because “there was no other solution to this problem except to seek the return of only those children who were taken by force”, then the truth, backed by irrefutable facts, in the name of humanity, was basically ethics and morality.

The other reason, according to Jones’s statement, was that “Washington was trying to avoid any strain on relations with Yugoslavia which, according to the Greek government, was the main culprit…”

It is certain that the widening gap between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was a result of the attitude taken by the United States in this now fundamental question, and perhaps because of Marshall’s solution to the “Pedomazoma”, the problem was presented as a second plan, but that was only an assumption for which there is no American evidence.

Whatever the motives were, it is assumed that the Americans had a practical outcome to the US action, as Jones very faithfully puts it: “Marshall’s experience in diplomacy succeeded in an otherwise hopeless situation that no one could tackle, leaving open the question which allowed the Americans and Yugoslavs to open the door for Washington to concentrate on Western European issues that were important to American security interests.” (Original title: “Studies of the Historiography of the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949”, edited by L. Baerentzen, J.O Smith. “Museum of Tusculanum Press”, Copenhagen 1987.)

Role of the United Nations and the International Red Cross

“During the Third United Nations General Assembly, held in November 1948, the issue of the Greek children was to be decided separately from all other Greek issues.

After lengthy preliminary discussions on the Greek problem, the First Political and Security Commission consisting of China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, was presented with a plan on how to solve the problem of the alleged foreign aid provided to the Greek partisans by the neighbouring countries.

Following this, the Greek envoy proposed an amendment to the resolution, adding the demand for the return of all seized Greek children back to Greece. (The Macedonian children were not mentioned.)

The Belgian envoy, who was president of the group at the time, said the Greek request would be accommodated only after “appeals for the children’s return are submitted by their parents.”

After some debating, on November 9, 1948, the Belgian President outlined what needed to be done in order to foster an agreement on the issue of repatriating the Greek children. Based on this, it was proposed that the question be approached from a “purely humanitarian point of view” during a separate Security Council session independent of politics.

After many and long discussions, the president was asked to create a draft resolution for one of the future sessions which was then accepted by motion.

On November 11, 1948, the First Commission in its changed form began its session with the Belgian proposal which read: “The General Assembly will approve the return of the Greek children to Greece, who are now away from their homes, when fathers and mothers ask for their return. In the absence of parents other people who show desire to care for these children can make such requests.”

The Yugoslav official made a comment: “...if their parents are absent, then who will be taking care of these children”, stressing that the Greek government would have to “find” the people who would provide such care and how can it be guaranteed that these people would not go against the wishes of the parents?

The impasse was resolved by a proposal made by the Australian delegate and the General Assembly resolved the issue by modifying the statement to read: “The General Assembly will approve the return of the Greek children to Greece, who are now away from their homes, when fathers and mothers ask for their return. In the absence of parents close relatives who show desire to care for these children can make such requests.”

The resolution was adopted and approved in this form with 45 votes for and none against. Copies of the resolution were sent to all concerned and asked to take the necessary measures to achieve the resolution’s objectives. The Secretary-General was also “instructed” to send requests to all States and Parties concerned so that they could pass on the information to those responsible for implementing it. Those needing help could seek assistance from the International

Red Cross. (Yearbook of the United Nations), 1948-1949, p. 239-244.)

The plan to resolve the issue of repatriating the “Greek” children was put on the voting agenda during the General Assembly session held on November 26 and 27, 1948. The case was unanimously recorded as: “(Resolution 193 (III) C)”. As usual the Soviet Union and its like-minded supporters opposed the plan, like they did in the UNSCOB findings. (Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Third Section, No. 1, 1948 pp. 661-662.)

The Greek Red Cross immediately spread the news and began to work on taking child repatriation applications. As time went on the question of the Greek children who were taken and forcibly evicted, became mainly a Red Cross concern. (There was nothing done for the Macedonian children because there was the general assumption that they were voluntarily given.)

On January 11, 1949, Trygve Lie, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, formally requested Red Cross International and Red Cross associations and subsidiaries in Geneva (hereinafter referred to as “the Red Cross”), to work directly with the Greek government and with the Greek Red Cross, as well as with governments and associations in other countries, i.e. in the countries where Greek children were located, and examine the possibilities of implementing the unanimously approved United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 28, 1948. The Red Cross was also charged with informing states and governments to begin the repatriation of all children from Greece (again no mention was made about the Macedonian children).

* * *

The first step the Red Cross took was to send a mission to Greece with P.W. Roth representing the International Commission and Gaile Galub representing the Red Cross. They remained in Greece from February 10 to March 11, 1949, to study the problem of repatriation.

During that time the Greek Red Cross received 3,445 requests for repatriation. The two officials had several meetings with both the Greek government and UNSCOB, and were received by the Greek king and queen.

The two also studied the conditions under which children would need repatriation, and found that those in charge were well prepared to get the children back to Greece.

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided them with an officially written guarantee that no measures would be taken to raise children in religious or ideological institutions against their parent’s wishes or for any other reason…

* * *

According to data compiled at the time, as of April 1949, the number of Greek children who had passed through Yugoslavia to other Eastern European countries was 13,500. (Red Cross. First Extensive Report, p. 19.)

The same report also contains an analysis of where and in which country the children were sent from April 1948 to March 1949:

Czechoslovakia 3,550 Hungary 3,050 Romania 6,400 Poland 500

Total 13,500 children

The Macedonian concern

(We did not speak Macedonian when communicating with the CPG and DAG senior leaderships)

During my entire research in the preparation for this book I was eager to find documents written in Macedonian, any kind of documents, sent from any source to the top CPG leaders or to DAG military headquarters. I was hoping to find documents written in

Macedonian from NOF to prove that NOF was indeed a political and military factor, as our Macedonian mainstream history calls it, which stood up for the Macedonian cause and addressed the CPG and DAG top leaders in Macedonian. Unfortunately, in my entire research, I found no trace of Macedonian. All correspondence and communication was conducted in Greek. I also looked for documents in Macedonian that dealt with the “Pedomazoma” (child collection) but found none. Why? Was the Macedonian language not a strategic political issue for NOF and AFZH?

If one of the basic national attributes is language, then how could NOF and AFZH, after the “Brotherhood and Unity” Agreement was signed in 1946, “renounce” the Macedonian national ideology and accept imposed terms from the CPM/CPY and the CPG? According to our mainstream historiography all terms between NOF and the CPG were mutually agreed upon.

After the “Brotherhood and Unity” Agreement was signed the well-established CPG intelligence network began to investigate every single member of NOF, AFZH and NOMS, especially those who were members of ELAS. The purpose of that was to find dirt on each and create files on them so that the CPG at some future time could punish them for past sins like it did after DAG was liquidated. It was painful to watch Macedonians shamelessly flattering the CPG and DAG leaders, wishing that they would forgive their sins and erase their guilt for disobeying the CPG, ELAS and EAM.

Some of us Macedonians in the past easily accepted our assimilation into the Greek fold and now we are doing the same under the famous communist thesis “in the interest of the Party, the state and the majority of the people”.

By doing so we inevitably again became involved in the process of Hellenization, but this time without any resistance. Despite the fact that we fought in a Greek war for foreign interests and suffered immensely in the hands of Greek authorities.

It is true that the Macedonian people were allowed to speak Macedonian in the so-called “free zones” around Kostur Region, part of Lerin Region and Gramos but with whom were they

speaking? There was no one left in those villages. All the people had been mobilized and were fighting in the war and where they were fighting they were not allowed to speak Macedonian. Could the Macedonians recruited into DAG units and sent to the depths of Greece speak Macedonian? No! They were warned: Every name and surname must be in Greek, and the language spoken must be Greek only, because the Greek fighters in DAG “will think you are Bulgarians or Yugoslavs…” And there followed the excuses that: “The CPG did not do enough explaining to the Greek people to let them know that you are Slavo-Macedonians...” One thing is for sure that every Macedonian recruited into DAG during the forceful mobilizations in the 1947 to 1949 period was registered under his or her Greek name and surname, and this was done in the birth registry introduced by the former Greek governments of Athens. It is worth mentioning at this point that NOF and AFZH were at the forefront of these mobilizations.

These vital issues of interest to the Macedonian people, especially to those who died on behalf of the CPG, were never tackled during the conflict but were left on trust to be revisited after the communists in Greece won the war…

Now let us go back to the “Pedomazoma” issue. I have not found who was officially authorized to carry out the “Pedomazoma”. Who ordered the malicious collection of children? I found a lot of information from the NOF, AFZH and NOMS generated propaganda that they organized the “Pedomazoma”. I also know from our Macedonian mainstream history that: “NOF and AFZH were military - political forces - “absolute rulers” of their own space…”, but we also know that they were fully obliged to obey CPG orders. The CPG must have possessed enormous power, ideology and credibility to induce NOF, AFZH and NOMS to convince the Macedonian people to give up their children.

The fact that we Macedonians cooperated in the “Pedomazoma” shows that we cooperated in the exiling of our own children. If what Dr. Kiriazovski claims is historically true, then it becomes clear that we Macedonians cooperated in the migration process. What remains unclear and needs to be explored is NOF and AFZH’s ideological obligations to their predecessors and to their own people…

Kiriazovski wrote: “...The authorities of the people were engaged in the successful execution of this action. The people’s militia, political organizations and other institutions... The Macedonian organizations NOF and AFZH played a special role in the success of the action in the area of Aegean (Greek occupied) Macedonia, which mobilized their full human potential.

The success of the action was also due to the fact that the evacuated children came mainly from the Aegean part of Macedonia, where the fiercest and bloodiest battles were fought, and moving them abroad was much easier as those areas were under DAG control. And, most importantly, the parents of the children, mostly Macedonians, were completely on DAG’s side and easily convinced and agreed to evacuate their children...” (See: Kiriazovski 1989 / 36-37.)

This is how the NOF and AFZH elite thought and propagated this, with their common illusions thinking that they held power and were on the right track in life, that they could decide everything even the fate of the Macedonian people. The elite were allowed to think only when it was meant to think differently. Then there were the major inconsistencies between the type of thinking and the reactions of the ordinary Macedonian peasant who was greeted with “you are not one of us!” and thus hatred filled his soul, and this ugliness became fate, and life became cruel.

Sadly we have been witnessing this kind of thinking marching across the Balkans and around the world for over half a century.

Under this kind of subjugation we became a nation of ideological soldiers with foreign patriotism. Macedonian patriotism, the feeling of love and allegiance to our homeland, has been deprived. This is confirmed by the following: There were no Macedonians present during all high-level meetings and during the decision making process. Why? Because NOF was always subordinate! The people in NOF were viewed as less valuable and dispensable. Even their transfer from the CPM/CPY to the CPG was done without their consent. “Brotherhood and Unity” with the Greeks was forced on them by the CPM/CPY.

And in all this tragedy we collectively remained silent for over half a century. In our collective silence of consciousness the most painful thing was that we ignored and overlooked the most obvious thing -that we have been uprooted from our place of birth, separated from our children and families and left to flounder in the wind.

The world, even some of us Macedonians, know little to nothing about the tragedy the Macedonian people experienced in Greek occupied Macedonia, and the little that is known are Greek lies and innuendo And that is the cruel truth...

Even the Republic of Macedonia, a sovereign state with its institutions, a centuries-old ideal of the Macedonian people, has yet to respond to our tragedy.

In this vortex of opposition to “Historical justice and historical truth” it is really difficult to find answers for the sake of the truth:

Macedonian archive (AM), collection: “Aegean Macedonia” in NOB 1945-1949, AE: volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, all documents were translated from Greek.

I will conclude this section of my book with some of historical NOF and AFZH testimony.