

*Declassified
Documents
(1939 – 1949)*



Compiled by
Risto Stefov

Declassified Documents

(1939 – 1949)

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Introduction

This series of articles will present the reader with direct quotes from declassified information from the 1940's which was once only available to governments, statesmen and diplomats.

This information will answer questions such as;

How much did “governments” in the 1940's know about the “Macedonian Question”? What did Macedonia's enemies say about Macedonia and the Macedonian people? How did the Great Powers “influence” events that were aimed against the Macedonians? And much, much more.

Since these articles will not be available anywhere on the internet, I suggest you save them.

In my opinion, these articles, never before available, depict the correct picture of past events and will be invaluable to historians, especially those reports containing information collected by the field agents of the various Foreign Offices.

Risto Stefov

Balkan States – Report 1 - December 11, 1944

Mr. Leeper to Mr. Eden
Athens 24th November, 1944

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following comments on Research Department paper of the 26th August, 1944, on the subject of Macedonia. (1)

2. The two formidable Macedonian problems in which Greece is concerned are: (a) that of Greek relations with the Slav world as represented by Serbia and Bulgaria, both of whom must be expected in the immediate future to be under strong Russian influence and to have Russian sympathy for their aspirations; and b) that of the surviving Bulgarophone minority in Western Macedonia.

3. The former problem turns chiefly on that of Serbian and Bulgarian access to the Aegean, the subject discussed in paragraphs 35-40 and 41-43 of the paper under reference. There is clearly no case (or handing over to Slav Powers any part of the North Aegean coast, which in 1940 had nowhere anything but an infinitesimal minority of Slav inhabitants. On the other hand, the strategic position of Greece here, even with Turkish backing, is very weak, vis-à-vis the Slav world, so that even in her own interests it behooves Greece to come to terms with her northern neighbours. The only possible solution-however difficult in practice under present conditions-seems to be that referred to in paragraph 51, namely, a return to, and preferably an extension of, the system of free zones. A Serbian free zone at Salonica is not difficult, but a Bulgarian zone at Kavala, or even at the outlying Alexandrupolis, would probably be out of the question for a considerable period to come, in view of the passions aroused by the atrocious conduct of the Bulgarians in Northern Greece since 1941. It remains, nevertheless, a Greek no less than a Bulgarian interest that Bulgaria's desire for access to an Aegean port should be satisfied so

far as possible; since otherwise Bulgaria's southward political aspiration, which are now largely artificial, will be kept alive by the real and continual irritation of an unsatisfied economic need. (How far this need might be met by the alternative of a free zone at Durazzo is a matter for separate study.) It may further be pointed out that the grant of free zones at her northern ports would, in fact, be of direct financial benefit to Greece herself through the revivifying influence of increased trade on the life of those ports in general and through the restoration of a natural degree of intercourse between these Greek ports and their Slav hinterland.

4. The problem of the Western Macedonian Bulgarophones, who are briefly mentioned in paragraph 7 of the paper, also remains serious and formidable, in spite of its limited dimensions. This minority, which extends through the region from Florina and Kastoria through Siatista to the plain of Yannitsa, has proved exceedingly unreliable during the war. Satisfactory data are not available, but it appears from events during the occupation that the dissatisfied minority must be considerably larger than is suggested by Greek census figures; and it is certain that successive Greek Governments have shirked facing the problem and have preferred to persuade even themselves that it did not exist. On the assumptions (1) that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to treat Greece as the most important Balkan country from the point of view of British interests, and to support those elements in Greece which are most stably pro-British and (2) that Greece does not wish to belong to a Balkan Federation in which there would be a large Slav majority, it would appear to follow that Greece had better not contain any Slav minorities at all. And since the amputation of the Slav areas in Western Macedonia and their annexation to a Slav Federation is a practical impossibility and would also be economically disastrous for Greece. It would follow that, difficult as it may be, a home must be found for perhaps 120,000 Slav Macedonians north of the Greek frontiers of 1941.

5. I have sent copies of this dispatch to the Resident Minister at Caserta, to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall at Sofia and to Mr. Broad at Bari.

I have, &c. R. A. Leeper.

(1) See "Balkan States" print section, 26th August, Section 6.

A Statement of the Bulgarian Idea of Unification as the Motive of Bulgarian Foreign and Internal Policy

April 5, 1944

No. 2782 (R-2585)

American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey

SUBJECT: A Statement of the Bulgarian Idea of Unification as the Motive of Bulgarian Foreign and Internal Policy

Sir:

I have the honor to present below a leading article from the Bulgarian newspaper ZORA of March 28, 1944, in which Mr. N. Kolarov, Editor of the Macedonian newspaper TSELOKUPNA BULGARIA, gives his view of the fundamental significance of the idea of unification in relation to Bulgarian foreign and internal policy.

The writer reviews the development of the movement in Bulgaria inspired by the idea of national unification in the nineteenth century, especially as it came to a head in the church settlement of 1870-- which achieved the setting up of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Constantinople- and the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in 1878. He also refers to the long continued struggle that has been carried on in Bulgaria since the Treaty of San Stefano. Ethnographically the writer lays primary emphasis upon the areas of Bulgarian habitation as indicated in the delimitation of the territorial limits of the exarchate and the limits of the Treaty of San Stefano.

The writer sets forth no new ideas on this subject. The article merely emphasizes the fact that the idea of unification has been a powerful force working through the whole period of Bulgarian modern history and never more powerfully than today.

For the student of Balkan affairs the article is important in that it is another reminder of the fact that this powerful well organized movement and this profound sentiment must be taken fully into account in the settlement of the Balkan problem at the close of this

war. As long as great numbers of Bulgarians live outside the frontiers of their country this struggle unification will go on, -for the Bulgarians are a determined and resourceful people in waging this kind of struggle. The aspiration for national self-determination and unification was in thorough accord with democratic sentiment in the nineteenth century, when it was born. The idea of unification was quite natural and commendable. The heroism of the people primarily concerned in carrying on the struggle, especially in Macedonia, for relief from the terrible conditions under which they lived was heroic. The literature which originated in the struggle is a fundamental part of Bulgarian literature and a part of the education of all the youth of country. Hence the ideal will not die.

The fatal element in connection with the whole movement, and that which has caused it to be wrecked in the twentieth century, was the unwise political methods adopted for its achievement, and the uncompromising attitude of those leaders in charge of national interests at critical moments, primarily in the spring and summer of 1913. In the bitter enmities and struggles between the Balkan states Bulgaria gave her enemies the opportunity of getting the drop on her, an opportunity which they were not slow to take advantage of; and so by her own lack of wisdom and political skill she wrecked the edifice which had been built up by so much suffering and bloodshed. The continuation in 1941 and since of this policy of political short-sightedness seems again destined to leave Bulgaria naked to her enemies; and to her natural enemies she has deliberately added Great Britain and the United states.

The writer of the article presented below, Mr. Kolarev, does not seem to be aware of the critical conditions which his country faces at this moment, for he writes of successful resistance to enemies without seeming to know that the forces gradually being built against his country are irresistible. He would do better, therefore, to devote his energies to devising by political skill some new alignment for his country that might save something from impending wreckage of Bulgaria's long cherished hopes.

The article shows how the most intransigent Bulgarians are still thinking and writing in this the eleventh of hour of the war in the Balkans. In free translation this article reads as follows:

In the Spirit of the Idea of Unification

By N. Kolarov

"Even for the first leaders of our renaissance, for whom the frontiers of Bulgaria were clearly defined, the unification idea, that is, the idea of the national unification of the Bulgarian nation was the fundamental and sacred aim of their efforts and of their epochal struggles. Later on in the political program of the revolutionary committee in Bucharest, the frontiers of the desired Bulgarian state were described with an accuracy which represents a true and understanding political view, especially when one bears in mind conditions at that time, conditions not only of patriotism crystal clear, but also showing an amazing ethnographical and historical knowledge.

Against all attempts to attack or deliver a deadly blow to the idea of unification the Bulgarian nation as reacted with iron determination, on which these attempts have ingloriously failed. The greatness of our church struggle rested precisely in the fact that it was an uncompromising struggle insofar as the territorial demarcation of the projected Bulgarian church (exarchate) was concerned. The southern frontiers proposed by the Patriarch of Constantinople and located on the crest of Stara Planina was turned down with an indication which made it clear, once for all, that the Bulgarian nation would no longer admit of its being challenged and insulted by such proposals. The further attempts of Russian diplomacy and of the Sultan's government to satisfy the demands of our church further increased its territorial limits over which the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian church would extend, but which did not find favorable consideration in the Bulgarian nation. Our church leaders considered themselves satisfied only after the publication of the Sultan's decree, the tenth article of which opened for them the possibility, though under difficult conditions, of gathering all the territories with a Bulgarian population within the pale of the Bulgarian exarchate.

The peace treaty of San Stefano found the Bulgarian nation with an enhanced national and political consciousness and a fully crystallized idea of the meaning of unification. This is why this

treaty, which was considered to be the crown of Bulgarian aspirations and the just reward of Bulgarian suffering and sacrifices, since it brought to life a just settlement which had long been buried for five centuries, awakened an indescribable enthusiasm in the grateful nation from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Albanian Mountains. This is why the unfortunate news, which came a few months later with reference to the Congress of Berlin, found not only a painful echo but also the firm determination to take up a new struggle in the name of the idea of unification. This struggle in our then enslaved provinces is well known to all. It is known to us by its powerful romanticism, its sacred victims and its legendary heroism. In this struggle the indomitable sons of the provinces and the noble sons of the free fatherland took part side by side dying in a fraternal embrace. It was Bulgarian in spirit, in ideology and in aims.

The political elasticity with which the juridical principles, expressed in article twenty-three of the Treaty of Berlin, and then of the Treaty for the minorities, allowed and compelled the struggle to grow, because of the stipulations of the treaty and the international conditions at the time, from small to great achievements and gradually to attain the final Bulgarian solution of the Macedonian question, a fact which is used in vain today by some enemy countries, by ethnographical nihilists, for anti-Bulgarian purposes, for ideological combinations directed against them.

The final and great aim of the Macedonian liberation movement has been the union of Macedonia with the free kingdom. Similarly the underlying motive of Bulgarian foreign policy from the date of the Congress of Berlin until today, as well as the fundamental impulse which induced the Bulgarian soldier to die at the four corners of the Peninsula in the wars of liberation, has been the unification of all Bulgarian provinces in one Bulgarian state.

The idea of unification has also been the fundamental motive force of our national and political life. To the Balkan problem, insofar as we are concerned in it, we desire to give and shall give the solution which is in the spirit of our history, our wars of liberation, our national ideology. Any ideas which carry even the smallest sign or germ of separation or of particularism are equally alien to

Bulgarians on both sides of the Osogovska Mountains. This is especially true today when we are living in a time of national and unitary states. We shall not seek our place in international life and establish the form of our state in accordance with the prescriptions of foreigners, the more so that these foreigners are known as our inexorable enemies. We shall build up our all Bulgarian state exclusively in the spirit of our idea of unification and Bulgaria will be a member of the international community ... a fully national and independent political entity." (ZORA -March 28, 1944.)

Respectfully yours, Burton M, Berry, American Consul General
To Department in original and hectograph

Balkan States - Report 2 - February 1, 1945

Brigadier Maclean to Sir Orme Sargent

(No. 4)

With reference to my dispatch No.1 of the 6th of January regarding Macedonia, it may be of interest to recall the following sequence of events indicative of trends in Yugoslav, Bulgar, and Greek Macedonia in favour of incorporation in the new Macedonian federal unit of Yugoslavia.

2. On the 18th November the Greek Macedonian Brigade held its foundation ceremony at Bitolj to cries of "Give us the right to live within the framework of federal Yugoslavia." Yugoslav partisan leaders appear to have attempted to moderate popular enthusiasm and Pasanko, representative of the Macedonian National Liberation Front, reminded his listeners that "this is a delicate diplomatic question in which the co-operation of our allies England, Russia, and America is essential.

3. The Greek Macedonian Brigade appears to have been formed partly of refugees resident in Bulgaria and partly from former adherents of E.A.M. who disagreed with E.A.M.'s minority policy. Keremediev, Political Commissar of the new brigade, accused E.A.M. of harbouring certain elements who refused to accord the Greek Macedonians their cultural rights and own military formations. E.A.M. he added, finally issued instructions for the Macedonians to be disarmed and it was to avoid this that they crossed the border to Yugoslavia.

4. There they were probably joined by volunteers recruited from amongst Macedonian refugees previously living in Bulgaria. Yugoslav sources claim that there are some 700,000 of these refugees in Bulgaria, most of them having been transferred there as a result of agreements made after the last war for the exchange of population in the Balkans. The Yugoslav partisan newspaper Nova Makedonija for the 14th November, 1944, gave the following account of their present attitude: "These Macedonian refugees realize that the independence and liberation of the Greek part of

Macedonia depends not a little on its direct participation in the operations against the German Fascists. Committees are therefore being formed in every village and town in Bulgaria where Macedonians are living. It is to be expected that the response to volunteering will assume very large proportions and will include all those able to bear arms, and that whole units will be formed from the refugees alone.”

5. On the 3rd December another meeting was held in Bitolj to elect “a Political Commission to lead the fight of the Macedonian people in Greek Macedonia.” The commission appointed Filip Velkov as its representative to the Presidium of A.S.N.O.M. (i.e. the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia) and J.A.N.L., H.Q., for Macedonia. At the second session of A.S.N.O.M. held at the end of December Velkov stated: “We Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia have a grim struggle before us to realize the age-old ideal of our people, the liberation of our part of Macedonia which is still beneath a foreign yoke.” At the same session of A.S.N.O.M., Atanas Atanasovski spoke in the name of the Bulgarian Macedonians. “The entire population of Pirin Macedonia,” he asserted, “is waiting for the happy hour when we shall be included with our brothers in Macedonia in Tito’s democratic, federal Yugoslavia.”

6. These claims for union between the Macedonian population of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece had already been advanced some weeks previously by authoritative Yugoslav partisan leaders, such as General Dzilas, General Tempo and Dimitar Vlahov. Though some of the more categorical of these claims may have been made in a burst of momentary exuberance, it is worth while examining the career of the most experienced of these politicians, Vlahov, for indications as to the more permanent aims and principles determining their policy.

7. Dimitar Vlahov was born in Kilkis in Greek Macedonia in 1878, and joined the original I.M.R.O. as early as 1903, collaborating closely with the famous Macedonian leader Goce Delcev. In 1908 he was elected to the Turkish Parliament as a deputy of the Popular Federal party, whose object was to work constitutionally for an autonomous Macedonia. In 1907, after Macedonia had been

annexed by Bulgaria, Vlahov became Governor of the Pristina district and after the Great War, served as Bulgarian Consul-General first in Odessa and then in Vienna. In 1924 he signed the Aleksandrov-Protogerov manifesto which attempted to patch up a truce between the rival I.M.R.O. leaders and he was repudiated by the Bulgarian Government. Disapproving of the terrorist methods of I.M.R.O. which was now falling increasingly under the domination of Ivan Mihajlov and degenerating into the tool of Bulgarian and Italian designs of disruption in the Balkans, Vlahov founded his own organization, the United (Obidinena) I.M.R.O., in 1925, and expounded his ideas in his well known book "Balkan Federation". Vlahov looked neither to Bulgaria nor to Yugoslavia (which was then pursuing a policy of rigid centralism) but to the Soviet Union, with whose support he hoped to achieve a union of the South Slav peoples in which Macedonia would form a separate, autonomous federal unit. Though Vlahov still continued to lay great stress on non-violent methods for the achievement of his aims, his organization was broken up by the Government of the Military League in Bulgarian in 1934, and its members sentenced to long terms of imprisonment on a charge of Communist conspiracy and planning of an armed revolt. Vlahov himself settled in Moscow in 1936 and appears to have remained there until returning to Yugoslavia at some point to join the partisans. Observant readers have been able to secure an interesting side light on his activity in Moscow from an article in a recent partisan newspaper which wrote that Vlahov had "liven in Moscow, where he worked tirelessly in the International Agrarian Institute" – the latter phrase being substituted for the blocked-out but still legible word "Comintern".

8. Although the energy with which the authorities appear to have quelled the anxiety of certain of their troops to march on Salonica (see my telegram No.63 of the 16th January) bears out Tito's repented assurances that he intends to take no premature action over the Macedonia problem, there is every reason to suppose that it is his intention to unite in due course the Macedonian provinces of Greece and Bulgaria to Yugoslav Macedonia, and that this project has the approval of the Soviet Union. Dr. Smodlaka has stated that the Bulgarian Government (no doubt under pressure from Moscow) have already agreed to cede Bulgarian Macedonia (see my telegram No.88 of the 21st January). The Greek attitude towards this problem

must be regarded as less assured and will doubtless depend on the eventual complexion of the Greek Government, although, as will be seen by my telegram No.2 of the 7th December, even E.A.M. do not appear to have proved quite as amenable on this question as Tito would have wished. It is however, difficult to see how Greece, whatever her attitude, would be able successfully to resist the wishes in this matter of an overwhelmingly strong South Slav bloc under Soviet tutelage.

F. H. R. MACLEAN, Brigadier, British Military Mission. Belgrade, 21st, January, 1945.

Balkan States – Report 3 - January 29th, 1945

Brigadier Maclean to Sir Orme Sargent

I TRANSMIT herewith a report on Macedonia. F. MACLEAN

British Military Mission, Belgrade, 7th January, 1945.

Enclosure. Report No. 1.

1. Now that some time has elapsed since enemy forces evacuated Macedonia, an attempt can be made to assess the extent to which the Partisans have been able to implement their policy of creating a Macedonian federal unit. Although the Partisans are somewhat prone to discuss the problem as “solved” by the mere proclamation of Macedonia’s autonomy, it is clear that a real solution can only be achieved through a long process of educational, administrative and economic reconstruction.

2. It will be recalled that provision was made for full Macedonian autonomy by a decree passed at the Second Session of A.V.N.O.J. at Jaice in November 1943. By this decree Macedonia was accorded a status equal in all respects to that of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia in the new federal Yugoslavia. The first step towards carrying this autonomy into effect was taken by the formation of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the Liberation of Macedonia (A.S.N.O.M.) as the acting federal authority.

3. It appears, however, that there is to be a considerable difference in the degree of autonomy which the Partisans intend to allow in the various spheres of Macedonian national life. In cultural matters Macedonia is to be accorded immediate and complete autonomy; in political and administrative matters as much autonomy as can be digested; in economic life there are so far few signs of autonomy and, indeed, in opposite policy of centralized state control may well be introduced.

4. Macedonia’s cultural autonomy is finding its immediate expression in the official stimulus given to the “Macedonian language.” The latter has hitherto been generally denied existence

and has been claimed as a Serb or a Bulgar dialect according to the national prejudices of rival philosophies. Nova Makedonija and other papers are now regularly published in the Macedonian language and a place of special honour given to Macedonian poems and songs.

5. Special efforts are also been made to educate and develop the most backward sections of the population. The Anti-Fascist Women's Front is reported to be receiving a special response from amongst the Macedonian women, and the backward Turkish minority is being courted by solemn celebration of the Feast of Bajram, by Moslem rallies held in Skopje and by frequent favourable publicity in the press.

6. The right to political and administrative autonomy is being more differently applied. In the first place, this right is by no means universally recognized by the other Yugoslav peoples, especially the Serbs in who the old great Serb conviction that there is no Macedonia but only a "southern Serbia" is still strong. Significant confirmation of this was recently afforded by an article published in Borba criticizing a meeting of educationalists at Nis who acquiesced in a statement made by one speaker to the effect that Macedonia was "just a part of Greater Serbia." The article went on to complain that at another meeting of the Women's Anti-Fascist Front, also held at Nis, a delegate from Macedonia was denied the much publicized right of making a speech in her own language.

7. If the Serbs are slow to admit the right of the Macedonians to equal partnership in the Yugoslav State, the Macedonians for their part, are not quick to forgive the Serbs for exploiting their former hegemony. Macedonia was generally regarded in pre-war Yugoslavia as a colony – a sort of south Slav Siberia to which corrupt, inefficient or recalcitrant civil servants were relegated. Their task in Macedonia was less to promote the well-being of the population than to propagate the Great Serb creed. The Macedonians are now to provide their own administrators. Although local government by the committee or "odbor" system reduces the number of officials required, it would seem that a shortage of experienced Macedonian civil servants must be felt for some time to come.

8. Perhaps more resented by the Macedonian people than the old Serbian officials were the Serbian colonists settled by Government grant on Macedonian soil. The great Serbian outlook of these colonists, together with the economic privileges they enjoyed, led to considerable ill-feeling among the Macedonian population. That this ill-feeling has not yet been wholly dissipated has been confidentially admitted by Father Vlada Zecevic, Commissar for the Interior in the National Committee, who has recently returned from a visit to Macedonia. Father Zecevic states that a redistribution of land, by which it is hoped to satisfy the needs of the poorer Macedonian peasantry without entirely dispossessing the Serb settlers, is being now carried through and is inevitably giving rise to some cases of personal resentment.

9. In the meantime economic conditions in Macedonia remain confused, as has been reported by my No. 791 of the 29th December quoting a report received from my mission there; "the economic situation here is bad largely through lack of transport and inefficiency. There is sufficient food in Macedonia but distribution problems are acute. The foregoing is probably the reason for the re-election of a new ministerial council of A.S.N.O.M., which is to take place on the 28th December." The immediate implications of autonomy in the economic field cannot therefore be regarded as an unmixed blessing, and apart from this adjustment of claims between Serb settlers and poor Macedonian peasants it seems doubtful whether the Partisans will attempt a more extensive application of the principle. Indeed, the special character of Macedonian economy suggests an opposite tendency towards State centralism. In addition to opium and cotton cultivation, both of great potential value if wisely fostered by the State, the chief Macedonian crop is tobacco. This furnishes a valuable source of income to the State, who bought it through a monopoly from the peasant cultivators at fixed low prices. The State, however, played no part in organizing or improving cultivation, though the peasant could have been greatly assisted through expert advice in methods of cultivation, model plantations, financial help, co-operatives, &c. State assistance along these lines maybe expected to yield considerable economic results, and if Partisan controlled Yugoslavia is to attempt any promising

experiment in agricultural collectivization it may well be in the tobacco fields in Macedonia.

10. That the path of Macedonian autonomy is still beset with thorny problems, both in the sphere of external and internal affairs, is suggested by Marshal Tito's decision, already reported by telegram, to send his right-hand man Kardelj to attend the Second Session of A.S.N.O.M. held on the 28th of December, 1944. In his speech to the Assembly Kardelj congratulated the Macedonians on their newly won autonomy, but went on to warn them against becoming "giddy with success." Their enemies, he asserted, were still active and the independence of small Powers was constantly threatened. "Vigilance was all the more necessary as, unfortunately, every-day experience showed that solemn undertakings not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries" – and here Kardelj made a veil reference to events in Greece – "were in practice only treated as scraps of paper." Macedonia's enemies, he continued, were "the Great Bulgarian, Great Albanian, Great Serbian and Greek chauvinists" and their supporters abroad. Equally pernicious were the opposite tendencies towards separatism. Macedonia could only flourish, Kardelj concluded, within the framework of the new federal democratic Yugoslavia.

11. A similar creed was expressed by other speakers at the Assembly, notably by General Tempo-Vukmanovic, who asserted: "We have gained a victory in the field of battle and must now gain it on the field of politics. The danger which threatens to destroy the achievements of our great struggle lies in the efforts made to stir up chauvinism and separatism." Tempo went on to stress the need for free and democratic elections by secret ballot and affirmed: "We did not fear to give arms to the people – still less shall we fear to give the people the vote." Thus the official line taken by the Partisan speakers was the avoidance of any territorial claims or suggestion of any eventual South Slav federation and affirmation of a conciliatory and moderate policy of full democracy. These discrete utterances were in contrast with the wild polemics and even wilder territorial claims advanced by General Tempo and Dr. Vlahov in November on the subject which, under instructions from the foreign office, I made strong representations to Marshal Tito.

12. From this and from the various conversations which I have had with him on the subject of Macedonia, there can be little doubt that Tito fully realizes the delicate nature of the internal and external problems involved, and there is every indication that, for the present at any rate, he intends to tread cautiously. What future plans he (or possibly Moscow) has for this traditionally explosive region remains to be seen. He has always told me that he does not intend to prosecute any territorial claims he may have in this region before the Peace Conference, and that in the case of any disputed region he would be prepared to be guided by the results of a plebiscite. In the case of the ethnological patchwork of the Kosovo Polje he has on occasion mentioned the possibility of moving what is left of the Arnaut population, whose loyalty to the Germans was unshaken to the end, to Albania on bloc. The first speeches made by Tempo and Vlahov after the liberation of Macedonia referred to above show that at any rate some leading Macedonians would like to see the present frontiers of Macedonia extended at the expense of Greece and Bulgaria.

13. A possible solution to these problems would, of course, be the creation of a Federal State comprising Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and even possibly Greece and Albania, with which the frontier of the ideal Macedonia could be firmly established, if not by mutual agreements, then by an over-ruling decision of the Central Federal Authority. On the other hand, even if no Balkan or South Slav Federation should be created it seems likely that, in view of the similarity of outlook of the regimes which either have or eventually will be set up in all these countries, the task of reaching, or if necessary imposing, settlement will present little difficulty.

F. MACLEAN., 6th January, 1945.

Balkan States – Report 4 - April 27th, 1945

Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Eden
Belgrade, 13th April, 1945.

(No. 44.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that two members of my staff recently had a long conversation with M. Emanuel Cuckov, the Minister for Macedonia. Mr. Cuckov was very friendly and appeared anxious to give all possible information.

2. He opened the conversation by saying how important it was that Allies should understand the situation in Macedonia and should realise that the Macedonians regard themselves as a separate people. What he meant by that statement was not clear, but he later said that Macedonia was very satisfied with her federal status inside the Yugoslav State and explained that the federal idea was not a new one to Macedonians, who had previously envisaged obtaining a measure of autonomy as a federal unit in a South Slav federation. From everything he said it emerged that the Macedonians have very concrete ideas on the measure of autonomy offered by their present federal status. In internal matters they seem to regard themselves as being entitled to operate almost entirely independently of the rest of the Yugoslav State. From other remarks which I have heard from prominent Yugoslavs recently, it seems possible that this tendency towards excessive independence on the part of Macedonia is causing the Central Government a certain amount of concern.

3. On being asked about the new administrative districts which have recently been set up in Macedonia, M. Cuckov said that he was not expert on this question but that he understood that these new divisions were essentially the same as they had been before 1941. They had, however, been somewhat improved and under one administrative centre were now included all villages and districts which were bound geographically to that centre. Before 1941 the divisions had been somewhat arbitrary and areas whose market produce naturally went to one town had been often included in the

administrative district of another. This had led to much inefficiency and had caused the peasants great difficulty. The frontier between Macedonia and Serbia was the historical one, i.e., a line running east to west just north of Kumanovo and south of Kacanik. I enclose as an appendix 1.0 the dispatch a list and a map (map not printed) of the new administrative areas in Macedonia.

4. M. Cuckov then spoke about agriculture. He said that attempts had been made before 1941 to encourage wheat growing in Macedonia. The son, however, had not lent itself to this and the intention of the Macedonian Government was henceforward to concentrate on the cultivation of rice, sesame, opium and tobacco, all or which could easily be grown. Macedonia had never had many factories, but it was the intention of the Macedonian Government to remedy this and to encourage industrial enterprise for the processing of commodities grown inside the Macedonian frontiers. The main industrial enterprises before the war such as the Allatini and Radusa chrome and lead mines near Stip, had not suffered much damage and were more or less ready to resume work.

5. As regards reconstruction, the Federal Government of Macedonia had- immediately after the evacuation of the Germans on their own initiative set to work to repair runways and roads. This reconstruction had been financed by the Macedonian Government itself without assistance from the Central Government. This was due mainly to the fact that the dinar had no value in Macedonia and though the Central Government had set money aside for Macedonian reconstruction it still remained in Belgrade. He believed that all roads were already repaired and the runway from Belgrade to Veles was open. From Veles to Djevdjelija the Germans had completely destroyed the runway during their withdrawal and it would take some time to repair. The runway to the Greek frontier through Bitolj was, he thought, however, very nearly fit for traffic.

6. On being asked whether the Serb colonists would be free to return to Macedonia he said, somewhat platitudiously, that all Yugoslavs would naturally be free to come to Macedonia if they wished. As regards officials, he said, however, that the question of whether they return to their old jobs depended entirely on the Macedonian Government and not on the Central Government. The Macedonian

Government were anxious that as far as possible the official positions should be filled by Macedonians and, provided that there were men to fill the posts, it was, therefore, unlikely that the Macedonian authorities would be ready to take back the old officials. For example, before 1943 the police had been almost entirely Serbian and the police chiefs had been Serbs. Now the militia who had taken their place were Macedonians and it was natural that the head of the militia should be Macedonian as well.

7. As regards the redistribution of land, he pointed out that before 1941 it had been easy for the Serbs to buy land in Macedonia, and as a result the Macedonians, for whom the purchase of land had not been easy, had been driven out of the more fertile parts of the country. He indicated that there would be as far as possible a redistribution in favour of the Macedonians and that Serbian colonists would if possible be sent back Serbia: Thirty per cent of the Banat had been owned and cultivated by Germans and here the population had been only ninety to every square kilometer of cultivable land, whereas in Macedonia it was 350. He thought that the Serbs from Macedonia could be moved to take the place of the Germans in the Banat.

8. He then spoke about the Church and stated that before the war one of the main attempts to Serbianise Macedonia had been made through that medium. Nearly all the priests had been Serbs and this had been very unpopular with the Macedonians, who were extremely Nationalistic and would only recognise a Church run by themselves with Macedonian priests. He believed that the solution lay in a federal Yugoslav Church. Whereas previously the Orthodox Church had been a Serbian Church with tentacles in Macedonia, Bosnia and other parts of Yugoslavia, he hoped to see separate Orthodox Churches in each of the federal units which each in turn owed allegiance to a central Yugoslav Patriarchate. If such an arrangement could not be sanctioned by the Orthodox Church he felt that the Macedonian Church would be forced to carry on schismatically as the Bulgarian Church had previously done for some seventy years. He then attacked the Metropolitan Joseph of Skopje, who, he said, had during the war been associated with Trbic, the Cetnik leader in Macedonia, and had continuously been opposed to the partisans. He considered him a time-server who was unfit to

stand as deputy for the Metropolitan Gavriilo whom everyone admired. The Metropolitan Joseph was also a Serb and though it might only be an internal affair of the Orthodox Church that he should call himself the Metropolitan of Skopje, it had aroused the anger of all Macedonians when he recently went to Moscow in that capacity and apparently representing the Macedonian Church. He pointed out that the Macedonian Church Assembly had sent greetings to the Holy Synod, whose authority they recognised, but not to the Metropolitan Joseph. It seems possible that the recent visit of the Metropolitan to Moscow may have been the reason for bringing to a head the Macedonian demand for a separate Church.

9. The recent elections had been a great success and had aroused widespread interest. In nearly all districts over 90 per cent of the electorate had polled. He believed that everyone over 21, except those accused of collaboration, had been allowed to vote and, in addition to this, those under that age who had fought in the Yugoslav army of National Liberation. Candidates had been chosen freely by the people and he gave an example a town of 10,000 inhabitants. This might be divided into four districts, each of five streets. Each street would at a public meeting choose two members, and a district meeting would then be held and those of the candidates who had anything against them would then be ruled out. All those who were approved as candidates would then stand for election and election was by secret ballot. No suasions had been used either by the police or by the army during the elections.

10. Opposition to the present regime in Macedonia was very slight. The Cetnik problem had never been serious and the few who had fought in the Macedonia had a long time ago gone north into Serbia. The Albanian bands who had at one point been a fairly serious menace had only been bandits, whose object was to profit from the general disorder, and at the time of the German withdrawal had impartially attacked both Germans and Partisans. These had nearly all departed – some going north with the Germans and others taking refuge in the mountains of the Kosovo.

11. A Court of National Honour was now in operation in Macedonia, but he did not know any details. He said that the number of Macedonian civilians executed for crimes under the occupation

and after the liberation had been small, and gave the figure of seventy. The main crimes had been material and cultural collaboration, spying, informing, &c., and he also mentioned that four men had recently been condemned to death for speculation. Naturally after the collapse of the Germans a number of opponents had been caught under arms and had been shot out of hand, and he mentioned a group of some forty Albanians captured near Skopje.

12. Macedonia had no problems with Albania and he thought there was no question of any change in frontiers.

13. As regards the Bulgarians, he was non-committal. At the time of Yugoslavia's collapse in 1941, however, the Macedonian people, who had been striving for autonomy for a long time, had felt that the chances were remote without outside help. They therefore welcomed the Bulgarians and thought they intended to set up an independent Macedonia. Few Macedonians, however, desired to be under Bulgarian domination, and when their hopes of independence were deceived the Bulgarians became more and more unpopular and many Macedonian patriots like himself took to the woods.

14. When questioned about Greece he said that Macedonia, being a part of the Yugoslav federation, had no separate foreign relations. The Macedonians realised that the main task for the moment was to beat the enemy and to allow no other considerations to come between them and that end. They therefore did not desire to embarrass in any way the Allies, and were determined not to create any trouble by meddling in Greek affairs. He added, however, that 70 per cent of the population of Greek Macedonia was Macedonian and they were being badly treated. He felt there were many problems to be settled with Greece, but these could wait until after the war.

15. I am sending copies of this dispatch to the Resident Minister at Caserta, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens and to His Majesty's political representatives at Sofia and Debrecen.

I have, &c. R. C. SKRINE STEVENSON.

Enclosure

The Administrative Divisions of Macedonia

By a decree of the Anti-Fascist Skupstina of National Liberation of Macedonia, published on the 13th February, 1945, Macedonia was divided for administrative purposes into eight Okrugs as follows:-

- (1) Skoplje, consisting of the areas of Tetovo, Gostivar and Rostusa.
- (2) Kumanovo, consisting of the area of Kumanovo, Kratovo and Kriva Palanka.
- (3) Stip, consisting of the area of Stip, Kocane, Carevo Selo and Radovis.
- (4) Strumica, consisting of the area of Strumica, Berovo, Valandovo and Djevdjelija.
- (5) Veles, consisting of the area of Veles, St. Nikola, Negotin and Kavadar.
- (6) Prilep, consisting of the area of Prilep, Brod, Krusevo and Kicevo.
- (7) Bitolj, consisting of the area of Bitolj, Resen and Morihovo.
- (8) Ohrid, consisting of the area of Ohrid, Struga and Debar.

Balkan States – Report 5 - May 17th, 1945

Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Eden
Belgrade, 13th April, 1945.

(No. 74.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an interesting and useful memorandum on the partisan movement in Macedonia and its opponents, by Mr. Stephen Clissold, press secretary at this embassy.

I am sending copies of this -dispatch to the Resident Minister, Central Mediterranean. His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens and His Majesty's Political Representative at Sofia.

I have, &c. R. C. SKRINE STEVENSON.

Enclosure

The Partisan movement in Macedonia and its Opponents

MACEDONIA has always presented one of the most complex and confusing issues in Balkan politics, and it cannot be said that recent events there have done much to clarify it.

The Yugoslav partisans claim somewhat naively that the problem has been finally “solved” by granting Macedonia the status of one of the federal units of the Yugoslav State. Apart from the highly controversial international implications of this “solution,” as far as Bulgaria and Greece are concerned, its acceptance within Macedonia itself has not been so unanimously approved as the partisans would have us believe. They have had to meet formidable opposition from two sides; from the exponents of the old centralist thesis that Macedonia is but an extension of Serbia and should be given no regional autonomy whatever, and from the separatists who claim that Macedonia should be given the status of an entirely independent State. It is in the light of these two opposing schools of

thought that the development of the partisan movement in Macedonia may best be reviewed.

Annexation by Bulgaria

It is generally admitted that the entry of Bulgarian troops into Macedonia was welcomed by the mass of the population as a prelude to national liberation. Official Yugoslavia had denied the existence of a Macedonian people and had regarded the inhabitants of "South Serbia" as Serbs corrupted by Bulgar influence. A strict policy of Serbianisation and centralism had therefore been pursued. Serbian colonists were settled on the land and Serbian officials—often or a very inferior grade—sent to administer the province. What the Macedonians regarded with perhaps, pardonable exaggeration as their national culture was ruthlessly harried by the Serbs as an expression of Bulgarian irredentist propaganda. It is scarcely surprising that the sudden collapse of this unpopular regime should have been hailed as the dawn of a new era.

Disillusionment soon followed, as it became clear that Bulgaria cared as little as the Serbs for the national aspirations of the Macedonians. For the centralists of Belgrade there was substituted that of Sofia. But the false hopes with which the Macedonians had started, continued to colour their outlook for some time to come, and rendered the growth of the partisan movement there of peculiar difficulty. Macedonia, it was felt, had already been "liberated" by the Bulgarians; how then, could the insurrectionary movement sweeping over Serbia bring national liberation to them! If the Macedonians grew discontented under Bulgar rule, they sought to better their lot by a struggle for social, not national, resistance. The first Macedonian Insurgents formed themselves into units which they called National Detachments, not National Liberation Detachments, as elsewhere in Yugoslavia. They formed their committees, too, but these were National Committees, not National Liberation Committees. When they chalked up their slogans on the walls of the houses in Skopje and Bitolj, one would see not the customary "Death to the Invader," but more often "down with the Filov Government."

The Beginning of Resistance

The resistance movement in Macedonia threatened therefore to develop along entirely different lines from the rest of Yugoslavia. The first and most vital campaign which the partisans had to win was the conversion of all resistance elements to their own programme. They had to ensure that it should be a Yugoslav and not an exclusively Macedonian resistance movement. It must be made to conform to central directives and give full recognition to the authority of Tito and the Partisan Supreme Staff. This issue was fought out until August 1943, and it was only when the capitulation of Italy brought a fresh accession of strength to the partisans that Tito's line found general acceptance. Even so, the old separatist and pro-Bulgar trends continued - and still continue to-day- to trouble the consolidation of the movement.

The first phase of partisan activity in Macedonia - from the summer of 1941 to August 1943-was largely conspiratorial. Detachments were formed, but they lacked the cohesion of a common aim and leadership, and were mostly soon dispersed. Communist influence had always been considerable in Macedonia, especially amongst the workers and intelligentsia, and here, as elsewhere, the Communists took the lead in building up the underground organization. A partisan headquarters was formed consisting of Mihailo Apostolski, a major - in the old Yugoslav army, Lazar Kulisevski, secretary of the Macedonian Communist party, Straso Pindur, Mirce Acev and others. (The latter two have since been killed; Apstolski is now a lieutenant-general and until recently commander-in-chief for Macedonia; Kulisevski is President of the Macedonian Government.)

Military and Political Consolidation

By the autumn of 1943; partisan activity had reached a more serious scale. The partisan detachments assumed the designation (if not the reality) of a regular army-the Army of National Liberation-and nationalists could boast that Macedonia now had the first army of its own since the days of the Tsar Samuel. Public confidence began to grow. The partisans now no longer drew their recruits almost entirely from the ranks of the intelligentsia and workers; the peasants, too, began to take up arms. Non-Communist politicians

like Andonov-Cento began to identify themselves with the movement. The first towns (Debar, Tetovo) were liberated, and partisan patrols could steal through the streets of Skopje and Prilep without fear of being denounced by a hostile population.

In the autumn of 1942 Tito had sent his personal delegate Tempo (Svetozar Vukmanovic) to direct the organization of the movement, and during 1943 he established close relations both with the Albanian F.N.C. and with Greek E.A.M./E.L.A.S. (see Bari dispatch No.62 to the Foreign Office and 64 to Caserta of the 16th July, 1944). At the end of the year the second Macedonian Brigade was formed on Greek soil. It was composed of the Pindzur Battalion and the Kristov Batev Battalion of deserters from the Bulgar army under the command of Dico Petrov.

Tile Opposition –Cetniks

Cetnik opposition was mainly confined to the towns and does not seem to have been a serious factor. The anti-Serb feelings of the Macedonian population naturally prevented the Cetniks from obtaining any great measure of popular support. Their plan was not to offer open resistance to the Bulgar authorities but to build up a secret administration to take over from them on the day of their ultimate withdrawal. A group of Cetniks was arrested in Skopje by the Bulgar police in 1942, made little secret of their intentions in court and were subsequently released. The titular head of such armed Cetniks who did resist was Vojo Trbic, son of a wealthy landowner from Prilep, and Mihailovic's personal representative for Macedonia, and Krstic, who commanded a group of Cetniks in E. Macedonia until they were finally liquidated by the partisans in the Koxjak hills in the spring of 1944.

The Pro-Bulgars

A far more serious and persistent problem was provided by the existence of the various pro-Bulgar groups. A vigorous propaganda was carried on among the Macedonian émigrés in Bulgaria by Dr. Stanisevci, Danail Krapcevcic and other leaders to induce them to return to their "liberated" homeland. The usual bribes were held out—land confiscated from evicted Serbian tenants, good posts in the

Civil Service, &c. To counter the growing popularity of the partisans, the Bulgars even began sponsoring, a rival movement of Macedonian extremists to demand autonomy, or even a greater Macedonia, including Salonica. The former I.M.R.O. terrorist leader, Ivan ("Vanco") Mihailovic had been living in Zagreb since April 1941 under the protection of his friend Pavelic. He had, however, his henchmen in Macedonia - Ckatrov, Kiril Drangov and others, who readily lent themselves to these Bulgar-inspired plans. In September 1944 he himself visited Skoplje, under German auspices, to assess the possibilities of enlisting support for a Greater Macedonia under his control (see Belgrade dispatch No.45). It was, however, too late. The partisans had stolen his thunder and summoned their anti-fascist Sobranje for the National Liberation of Macedonia (A.S.N.O.M.) at the beginning of August. Macedonia was to be a federal State enjoying full autonomy within the framework of the New Yugoslavia.

The Experiment of Home-Rule

The first A.S.N.O.M. was elected at Bitolj on the 2nd August; it was superseded on the 20th December by a second A.S.N.O.M. held at Skoplje, which was in turn developed into a full Government at the third session of A.S.N.O.M. in April 1945.

It soon became apparent that the old opponents of the partisans' Macedonian policy- the Serb Centralists and the Macedonian Separatists-had by no means been subdued by the partisans' success. The Centralists, forced to abandon their former posts in Macedonia, have been obliged to confine their activity to expressions of impotent disapproval from Serbia and have been frequently denounced in the partisan press. The Separatists, on the other hand, have been far more active and dangerous. A.S.N.O.M. itself was permeated with them, and Marshal Tito found it expedient to send his right-hand man, Edward Kardelj, to attend the second session of A.S.N.O.M. and issue a strongly worded warning against the dangers of becoming giddy with success and harboring separatist and irredentist tendencies. These warnings have been repeated on subsequent occasions by such authoritative spokesmen as Cuckov, Minister for Macedonia in the Yugoslav Federal Government, and Kulisevski, now head of the Macedonian Government.

The prevailing mood of over-confident nationalism resulting from the expulsion of the Bulgar and German forces of occupation has found expression in many ways. Attempts have been made to close the frontiers to Serbs wishing to enter Macedonia, and the Federal Government in Belgrade was forced to issue a sharp reminder that every Yugoslav subject has the right of access to any of the federal units, regardless of his national origin. To bring the lesson home, a Serb doctor, resident for many years in Macedonia, has been included as Minister of Public Health in Kulisevski's Government. In Church matters too, a marked tendency can be discerned to break away from Serbian influence. The exact position in this respect is not yet altogether clear, but a start has already been made with the holding of a congress of Serb Orthodox priests in Skoplje as a preliminary to the establishment of an autonomous Macedonian Church to be associated with the Serb Orthodox Church in some sort of ecclesiastical federation.

Irredentist ambitions in respect of Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia have increased in proportion with the desire to loosen the ties binding Macedonia to Serbia. As early as November 1944 a Greek Macedonian Brigade had been formed under Yugoslav auspices in Bitolj and this was followed a few weeks later by the setting up of a commission "to direct the struggle of the Macedonians in Greece." Finally, matters came to a head when certain Yugoslav units in Bitolj demonstrated their preference to fight for the expulsion of the Greeks from Salonica rather than that of the Germans from Yugoslavia.

The reaction of the Yugoslav federal authorities to all these manifestations of irredentism and separation has been vigorous. Whatever the ultimate desires of Marshal Tito and his advisers may be - and there are some grounds for thinking that they do envisage an eventual Great Macedonia, possibly comprising one State member of a Balkan federation - they are at present bent upon steering a middle course between the Scylla of separation and Charybdis of centralism. The extent to which they have succeeded in establishing their authority over the more impetuous elements is not easy to determine. It would seem that they still have a long way to go before those tendencies towards separatism and dependence upon

Bulgaria, which have so handicapped their movement in the past, are finally eradicated.

Balkan States – Report 6 - December 12, 1946

Notes on Serb-Partisan-Bulgarian Relations during the period August-November 1944. – (Communicated in Beri dispatch No. 209 of the 28th November, received in Foreign Office the 12th December)

THE information and notes set out here below deal solely with the experiences and actual incidents, or reported past incidents, in the areas through which Mission “Mozart” moved during the period under review. The mission landed in Serbia on the 10th August in Barje area south of Lebane, and then moved south to Oruglica and Rozdac, crossing the Morava near Mastanica, and thence to Nesverta. After some time in this area the Mission moved north once more to Crna Trava and thence to Dobro Polje. From there it made its way through Strelac and Babusnica to Pirot, where it was later joined by Mission “Entanglement.” The two Missions then moved with Partisan 13th Corps through Vlasotince and took part in the final advance on and the capture of Nis.

2. The majority of the following information about the Bulgarians and their relations with the Serbs was obtained in the period spent at the east of the Morava. Feeling here among the population were far more pronounced than on the other side of the river, and contact with the Bulgarians seemed to have been far more of a reality in this area. As a result of this, it was very noticeable that, as the Mission moved eastwards, so anti-Bulgarian feeling among both Partisans and peasants became more and more apparent.

3. Generally speaking, the Partisan attitude in Serbia to the Bulgarian occupier can be divided into four separate phases, namely; -

- (A) An initial period which generally speaking had been going on since hostilities began.
- (B) The period immediately before the Russian declaration of war while British negotiations were still taking place.
- (C) The Russian declaration of war, armistice and post-armistice period.
- (D) The period of actual co-operation between the new Bulgarian army and the Partisans.

The attitude of the Serbian people themselves throughout this period was continuous and forms a background of the whole picture of Partisan-Bulgarian relations in this area. When considering each of the above phases in turn, this attitude of the Serbian peasants and people must be borne in mind as an important factor influencing the local situation, and also it must be remembered that during the first three phases named above, the Mission, as it traveled towards and along the Bulgarian frontier, was moving into territory more and more strongly biased against the Bulgars. (See para. 2 above.) As a result of this, the picture is inclined to become at once more local in character, and cannot be said to reflect the true attitude of the whole of Serbia, but only that of a badly hit section of the country, where feelings may have become distorted and enlarged out of all reasonable proportions by hate stirred up on the spot.

Phase (A)

4. The original Partisan attitude to the Bulgars was that the Bulgarian soldiers were an unenlightened enemy with Fascist leaders, who, as the occupiers, must be driven out of Serbia. Prisoners, when taken, were given the chance to renounce their Fascist leaders, and were allowed to join in the "movement" with the Bulgarian Partisans if groups were operating in the area. Only the leaders, officers, police and secret police organizations were considered completely corrupt, and as the instigators of all crimes and atrocities were executed out of hand when caught. To the ordinary rank and file an attitude of distasteful toleration was adopted, and if the prisoners decided to co-operate they were at once accepted as men, who in past had been lead astray by their leaders, and their lives were usually spared. At the slightest sign of these converts giving trouble, or when the military situation made it impossible to have this rather doubtful element within their midst, the Partisans were forced to dispose of them. This they did purely as a necessity, and without the hate which was sometimes shown to the German prisoners, and would seem to be the only sensible solution to the problem.

Throughout the whole period the Partisans persisted in their policy of co-operation with the Bulgarian Partisan Movement, giving their

help wherever possible. The standing arrangement to send all sympathetic Bulgarian prisoners to swell the ranks of the Bulgarian Partisans was only one example of this, and quite definitely serves to illustrate the sincerity of the Partisans as a whole, whose policy it has been since the beginning of the movement to strive continuously for harmony with their Bulgarian neighbours. The Partisan quarrel with Bulgaria was not with her people, but with her leaders and the system they stood for, a system which struck directly at the heart of the Partisan will for a friendly relationship with all Balkan people.

The above attitude of toleration and willingness to cooperate was essentially evident during the Lebane offensive, where the Partisans were able to gain a decisive victory over the Bulgarian army, and at the same time remain consistent in their former attitude towards prisoners.

There were, of course, extremists among the Partisans who contemplated the long list of past Bulgarian misdeeds through the ages, and argued that the whole Bulgar race was at fault. Bulgaria was to these men “the Germany of the Balkans” and would remain a danger until liquidated. That the Bulgars should pay for their past crimes was their slogan.

The present attitude, generally speaking, was one of fear mingled with inborn hatred which grew in intensity with the lessening of the distance to the old frontier. Every village had its stories of house burnings and killings in the district, and some had actual examples to show, getting progressively worst to the east. Perhaps the most antagonizing situation for the peasants was when Partisans came into a village with some ex-Bulgarian soldiers in their midst. The Partisans the people were prepared to feed but the Bulgars they were definitely not.

Phase (B)

5. The period immediately before, and leading up to the Russian declaration of war, when it became increasingly clear that the Bulgars really were on the verge of collapse, witnesses a noticeable stiffening in the Partisan attitude towards the Bulgars. Still the former policy of toleration existed on the surface, and all men

realized as they had stated so often in the past that some agreement must be reached with Bulgaria if future peace was to be ensured. Yet, at the same time, the feeling of the impending collapse brought out many expressions of real hatred that had hitherto been suppressed. Men began to recall instances where their own villages had been sacked and burnt, or friends and relations killed, and their women debauched. Formerly they had merely despised the Bulgarians, now they began to show hatred for them, and some even went so far as to express regret that Partisan policy was of necessity a tolerant one. Even such men as Mihailo Djurovic (see Appendix "A") who was well educated and equally well-informed as to the general picture, besides being a great influence throughout the whole are stretching from Crna Trava to Kriva-Feja, expressed himself in strong terms when referring to the Bulgars. True, his area had suffered more severely than almost any other, and during this transition period even his broad view-point of the war in general, was far from being in line with the former and official policy. To him the Bulgars stood for culture on the German model in the Balkans.

There was much speculation in Partisan ranks as to what was going to happen when the end did in fact come, and all were in agreement that the Bulgarians must withdraw from the country immediately, leaving their arms with the Partisans. Any feeling of hatred the Partisans had hitherto expressed were incensed during this period by the one great fear that the Bulgarian troops, even at the last minute before their collapse, might hand over their arms and material to the Cetnic and Nedic organizations with whom they were known to be in contact in all towns of any size throughout East Serbia.

It was during this period that the peasants' feelings reached their peak in anti Bulgar intensity, and indeed in the whole area from Kriva-Feja to Crna Trava had good reason to hate. Examples were quoted of Bulgar soldiers coming into villages, shooting three of a family, shutting the remainder into their house and then burning the house and its pitiful intimates with it. Whole villages were seen with every house burnt down and with the villagers still searching among the ruins trying to salvage something from the ashes. In some cases new houses were just being built, but life was a very hand-to-mouth affair, as none of the essentials of the household remained. "Some of

the braver individuals were just uncovering their remaining worldly goods from holes in the ground beneath manure heaps that had been their hiding place for the past seven months, and on the other side of the valley smoke could still be seen rising from the ruins of two houses burnt less than ten days ago.” (Mission Diary-Nesverta)

The Bulgar destruction through the whole are had been systematic to a degree. In Novo Selo and Nesverta, for example, there was hardly a cooking utensil in the place, no cups, glasses or cutlery, all had been taken away when the Bulgars passed through. Many of the houses had been burnt or damaged, and their man-folk marched away to Bulgaria for internment or worse. The people from these villages all displayed an air of absolute hopelessness in their adversity.

The smallest incidents were taken by the Bulgarian occupier as an excuse for such action all over the area. If a village sheltered even a Partisan it was considered hostile and as likely as not liable to call down destruction on to itself.

The same situation was evident to an even greater extent in Crna Trava and the surrounding are, although the work was not so recent. In Crna Trava itself only three buildings appeared to be still intact. A typical example of the thoroughness of the Bulgar policy here was that they had even taken the trouble to erase all the names from the stone memorial to the slain of the last war. This type of behaviour can be dismissed as both futile and unimportant, but it assuredly serves to illustrate how deep-rooted the hatred of the peasant for the occupier must necessarily become, since it is connected with every aspect of his daily life, besides being a repetition of centuries of similar occurrences.

This was a period of universal East Serbian hatred for the Bulgars, which developed before Partisan policy and finally crystallized out into its present state. It was a breakaway from the previous Partisan attitude of disdainful toleration, and was due to the sudden possibility of a Bulgarian collapse, combined with the terrible local evidence to be seen an all sides of this particular are.

This condition of terrible fear amongst the peasants, and the newly-aroused hatred on the part of the Partisans, was typical of this phase, and persisted up to and even after the armistice in the case of the latter, while the former still does exist to a greater or less degree according to the locality.

It was during this period that too that the Bulgars themselves first started to show real signs, in a few isolated cases, of working out their own salvation. Desertions to the Partisans increased – 2 officers and over 100 men came over to the Partisans in the Surdulica area from a garrison in the hills. Actual fighting broke out between the Germans and the Bulgars, in Surdulica itself, yet the Bulgarians in Vranje, a few miles distant, declared themselves to be still whole-heartedly in support of the Germans, and the movement did not become general.

The reason given for these desertions were inevitably that, although they did not mind fighting for Bulgaria, they had no wish to remain with the Germans, only to be left with the prospect of being carried off to some obscure front to fight for Germany. They insisted they were not traitors to Bulgaria, but expressed grave concern at what their countrymen might think of them for their actions which they held to be completely justifiable, since their country was on the verge of suing for peace. All were most anxious to explain away the past atrocities by saying that it was merely the natural outcome of their own way of life in Bulgaria, where for the past 500 years they had lived in an atmosphere of secret police, killings, and house burning among their own countrymen. As a result of this, human life was rated very low indeed, and it didn't mean a great deal to a man to have to commit similar crimes in an enemy country when ordered to by his Fascist superiors. (This information and opinion, was volunteered by a Bulgarian officer deserter at Nesverta, who spoke English learned at the American collage in Sofia.)

It was final rush to get into the right party by men who were clever enough to see what was taking shape, and who still sufficiently uncompromised to do so.

Phase (C)

6. The Russian declaration of war, the ensuing armistice, and the post-armistice period is probably the most interesting of all, in that it may be said to pass through three main stages, viz, :-

(i) A period of complete confusion when Russia declared war on Bulgaria, closely followed by the complete collapse of the latter. No one could be sure during this period just what would happen. News was non-existent, although the Partisans in this area generally were fairly confident that at last the Bulgars would be forced to withdraw from the country at speed. The Russian attack, coupled with lack of directive as to Partisan policy, put local Partisan anti-Bulgar feeling at its highest, and on a genuine hate basis, 70 per cent, of the staff of the Pirov Bde, for example, stated on numerous occasions, and without reserve, what they intended to do with the Bulgars, how they would be made to pay in full for their past crimes, and of how the attack should be carried into Bulgaria alongside the Russians and the countryside laid waste there as it had been in Serbia. Past atrocities were discussed and speculation ran high. Then came the armistice, and gradually a less irresponsible and more imaginative and realistic attitude began to take shape. This was the beginning of the second stage.

(ii) There was still no news, but as time passed and the Bulgars showed no signs of leaving the country, the Partisans began to look for a deeper meaning behind their prolonged stay and to think once more along the former logical lines of Balkan unity. Personal dislike and hatred generated by the thought of a vanquished Bulgaria was suppressed by all Partisans for the sake of their avowed ideal of friendship within the Balkans. They did not, however, basically alter their attitude to the Bulgars, or forgive the past, but merely looked at the matter in the light of hard facts. They reasoned that, although things would continue to be very vague until new directives came in, it was still certain that the Bulgarians would have to pay their price of their crimes, that the various leaders would be tried for their complicity in the atrocities, and that it now appeared that the Bulgars had been directed to fight against the Germans, since they were not going to leave the country. It was generally considered disappointing that the Bulgars had apparently been selected by the Russians to continue to fight against the Germans instead of being sent home as a defeated army after handing their material and arms

over to the Partisans who could then have continued the fight. It was disappointing but it was accepted, for it was obviously the only practical solution. The Partisans even admitted quite openly that, had they been given the tanks and guns, &c., of the Bulgarian army, they could not really have put them to good use, owing to lack of trained personnel to man them; they would obviously be better handled by the proper owners, who must therefore stay. At the same time it was thought and hoped that the Russians would soon find out what rotten and hopeless allies the Bulgarians were.

(iii) Time passed once more and the Bulgars did not see real fighting, but more and more material and men continued to pour into the country in the Pirot area from Carribrod. It was now that directives at last came through, which stated that the new intention of the Bulgars was to conduct a full-size offensive into Serbia against the Germans, and cut once and for all the escape routs through the Morava and Ibar valleys.

However, the scheme did not begin to take shape quickly, and once more criticism was heard. The Partisans began to feel suspicious of this large army on their soil which did nothing to hamper the enemy, but merely ate Serbian food and looked impressive. Concern was expressed over the possible political developments of having a large army in a static role in and around the Pirot area, which was already known to contain many civilians who were sympathetic to the Bulgarians having lived under them for many months without having their conditions of life made radically worse than under their own past.

This was the exception and also the exact opposite of the position elsewhere in eastern Serbia, where universal hatred on the part of the peasants was still the predominant feeling. Could the Bulgarians be here for some sinister political reason was a fear which now began to present itself. Even 13 Corps staff stated that they moved their Headquarters to Barje Civilic because they feared civil trouble with so many Bulgarians and their sympathizers in Pirot. Matters were made no easier by the fact that temporarily all arms had ceased to be sent to the Partisans, as at this time British supplies had been discontinued and Russian support had not began to arrive, while at the same time the Partisans had an ever-growing influx of the

“Narod” crying out for arms which were not available, yet when the Partisans looked around they could only see their late enemies with a surplus of material of every type at their disposal. Corps Commander Vuckovic himself stated that the inactivity had gone on too long and was becoming a possible source of future trouble, and that the moment had arrived when either the Bulgars must push through Bela Palanka and Vlasotince to Nis and Leskovac, or else get back to their own country. (The Bulgarians had been sitting across the roads leading to Bela Palanka for some three weeks without making any serious move in either direction.) A “fight or go” attitude was becoming noticeable in Partisan discussions about the Bulgars, and their attitude began to stiffen once more.

(iv) Suddenly this whole situation changed and the attendant tension disappeared overnight. Russian stores arrived for the Partisans and the Bulgars who were now presumably sufficiently prepared for their attack on the Morava and Ibar valley communications, carried out a very large switch of their forces from the Bela Palanka front, where the main effort had previously been concentrated, and thrust their main force into the Morava valley and through Vlasotince. Besides being a considerable military achievement in re-concentration and switching of available forces, despite the shocking difficulties entailed by making such a large movement of men and guns over an almost impossible road, the plan was also a complete success, and Vlasotince, Leskovac and Nis fell to the Bulgars in quick succession.

After the few days doubt on the part of the Partisans as to whether this was going to be a real or half-hearted effort was finally removed, and they admitted that at last things looked like working and genuine co-operation was in view.

After the capture of Nis, the Bulgars continued their advance westwards, chasing the retreating Germans through Prokopulje and onwards through Kursumlija. Their effort here seems to have been a genuine and wholehearted affair, and up to the present moment they have been fighting as hard as they can, as their heavy casualties bear witness.

The civilian population in the towns such as Nis did not appear to be nearly as violent in their hatred of the Bulgars as had the peasants, and through an indefinite dislike was expressed by many, no serious criticism was heard. In a few cases people returning to Nis after the liberation of the town did show disappointment at seeing the recent occupier once more in the town, but this was short lived, as soon the majority of troops had moved on towards the battle and Nis had to begin to think about picking up the threads of its life again.

Short Summary and Appreciation of Existing Relations

7. We have now traced the development and vicissitudes in Partisan-Serb-Bulgar relations during the last stages of the war in Serbia, and we have seen how it was and is still developing along the normal lines necessary for future peace.

First we had the Partisans facing the Bulgarian army as enemies and without showing any great demonstrative hatred towards them, and then, after the reasonable and natural phases of hate and suspicion, we find them eventually co-operating in making war on a common enemy. That this co-operation was a compulsory clause of an armistice agreement does not necessarily mean that any basis for real co-operation could not be built up from this point. In fact, the omens are heavily weighted in favour of future peace and eventual friendship.

The new Bulgarian Government and the purges carried out by the Bulgarian Partisans have effectively removed the main reasons standing in the way of co-operation with the Partisans, for the latter's policy has been consistently, except for a few local misunderstandings as described above, one of a desire for friendship with Bulgaria, in the hope of obtaining a Balkan unity. This could not begin while Bulgaria was under the late Fascist leadership and while she played the role of occupier in Serbia. However, this is now no longer the case, and the two nations can now face each other on common ground. They will still remain recent enemies, but time, and a carefully-directed policy, should heal and deaden this as far as the Partisan movement and the new Bulgarian army are concerned.

That the peasants of Serbia are still bitter and nourish a great hatred for the recent Bulgar oppressor is both true and natural. It is the result of years of murder, pillage, house burnings and the like that has been carried out in successive wars. It is deeply ingrained into the national character, but should not prove an insurmountable difficulty, for if the Serb Partisans, who are also Serbian to the same degree as the peasants, are prepared to suppress their hatred in order to carry out the policy of a new Yugoslavia which is aiming at friendship and peace in the Balkans, then so also can the peasants and "Narod" generally do the same. Once the latter has been absorbed into the Partisan movement and given proper instructions by the means of a gradual policy, then this very real stumbling block should disappear. It is the duty of the Bulgarian Partisan Movement to carry out similar reconstruction within their own country.

The Partisans have made a true noble sacrifice in this way by suppressing all their past hatreds for sake of a cause (see Appendix "B"), and there is no reason why this sacrifice should be set at naught.

The situation should be further assisted by the fact that in years to come, the new Bulgarian army will be remembered for the part it played in the liberation of Serbia, and it should be hard for the Serbs to hate those who came to their aid and who drove out the occupier, and who at a later date sent in food, leather, &c., as laid down in the armistice terms. If this last is done, and the "new army" leaves behind it the reputation of being a liberator, then the former period when the Bulgarians were the occupiers will gradually fade from memory, as the latter is usually a very short-lived affair.

That there is still much to be done, and a great deal of precarious negotiation to be carried out before a firm peace can be established, is obvious, especially on such questions as territory and populations, which cannot be discussed here at this present stage.

Those Bulgars responsible for atrocities in the past will have to be caught and punished. There should be no weakening on this count, but simply proper justice done. But if these and similar storms can be weathered there is every indication now that a possible solution is in sight.

General Stanchev has already given a lead in his tremendous task of bringing the new Bulgarian army into being out of the sorry material of the old, a task which seems to be carrying out with success in the Nis area, and equaled only by his success in dealing with the Partisans themselves. Others like this man should be able to make Yugoslavia-Bulgaria relations at least into a working arrangement between the two nations. A step in the right direction has been made.

The Partisans under the leadership of Marshal Tito have always given "Federation with the Balkans" as one of the first principles of their whole movement. This they have striven for consistently in the past, and in so doing they have to suppress all personal feelings, after entailing great suffering and self-sacrifice to themselves, in order to bring about so great a change. Now, at last, the achievement of their aim is in sight, and the possibility of a real Balkan Federation, such as they have envisaged in the past, can become a reality.

The basis for co-operation has already been laid, and was proved by the joint operations throughout the recent fighting in the Nis area. With careful handling, a real friendship may well grow from these foundations, and Balkan unity would no longer remain a matter for mere speculation or academic discussion.

Appendix "A"

Mihailo Djugovic

CIVIL engineer, well educated, speaks French, and has traveled in France and other parts of Europe. Had experience of Yugoslav political and public life before the war. Interned by Germans, but later set free in order to be repatriated to Bulgaria as he was then subject administratively to the latter owing to frontier changes announced by the Axis.

Joined Partisan movement, where his chief task became civil administration in the south of Crna Trava.

Appendix “B”

Partisan Sacrifices for sake of Balkan Unity

AN example of this suppression of personal hatred on the part of individual Partisans was well illustrated in the case of the Political Commissar to 13th Corps.

This man came from Crna Trava area and has been with the Partisan movement in Serbia since the early days. He had witnessed all the hardships endured by his countrymen during the Bulgarian occupation, had been forced to live in the hills for many months, and his wife had been killed by the Bulgars during an early reaction in the Crna Trava area. Yet this man could put aside all personal hatred that he must have felt for the Bulgarian, and during the liberation ceremonies in Nis he did his utmost to foster good relations between the Partisans and the new Bulgarian army, and gave frequent demonstrations of his own friendship for them, and in full public view.

Balkan States 7 - June 18, 1946

Mr. Clutton to Mr. Bevin

No. 223

Belgrade, 6th June, 1946

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the trial took place last February before the Supreme Court of Macedonia of eleven members of a secret organization known as the Democratic Front of Macedonia-Ilinden 1903. The organization was charged with being responsible for drafting a memorandum in favour of the creation of a separate Macedonia, to include Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia, as a protectorate of "certain foreign countries" to whom the document was or was to be addressed. This memorandum was referred to in Marshal Tito's speech at Skopje on the 11th October, 1945 (see Belgrade telegram No. 1872 of the 12th October, 1945). A dementi appeared in the press of the 2nd November, 1945, purporting to come from the committee of the Ilinden organization, denying that it, the committee, was responsible for such a document. The denial went on to say that those of the committee who "by chance have remained alive, true to the ideals of the I.M.R.O. constellation of the time of Delchev, Gruev, Petrov, Sandanski and Hadji-Dimov, consider that the free Federal Vardar Macedonia within the frontiers of Tito's Yugoslavia represents a firm basis for the full union of the Macedonian peoples and the final settlement by democratic means of the Macedonian question which for fifty years poisoned the political atmosphere in the Balkans.

2. According to the press, the activities of the accused men began in August 1945, and it was their intention to work on the lines of Mihailov's organization, with whom one of them, Dr. Ilija Culev, was at one time associated. Plans included the assassination of national leaders, the disarming of the militia, and the liberation of political prisoners, to be followed by the taking over of authority. Efforts were made to establish connexions over the frontier near Bitolj with the ?itos organization, from whom assistance in the Liberation of Greek Macedonia was to be sought.

3. The accused whose names were: -

Konstantin Hrisimov-Smilee Kuzmanov	Kiro Pecarov	Stjepan
Atanas Acov Lazarov	Dr. Dimitar Zlatarov	Serafim
Dr. Ilija Culev Dinev	Metodi Svitjiev	Kosta
Luka Sekulov		

Were sentenced to terms varying from one to twenty years' forced labour.

4. This trial provides, perhaps, a suitable opportunity of reviewing the attitude of the present Yugoslav Government to the Macedonian problem and to the traditional Macedonian parties. Yugoslav Macedonia is a barren and sterile country of small economic value. Its inhabitants throughout their history have been the thorn in the flesh of every Yugoslav Government. Its strategic importance, however, is great as it controls the Vardar Valley and the Monastir Pass. In consequence, ever since its acquisition by Serbia in 1912, the Government of Belgrade has hung on to it with fierce tenacity. From the strategic point of view it was equally important to Bulgaria and the latter, to support its claims at first fostered revolutionary Macedonian organization known as I.M.R.O. When this movement broke out into two warring factions, the Mihailovists and Protoguerovists, the Yugoslav Government found in the later a means to serve their own ends, for the latter were ready to accept Macedonian autonomy within the frontiers of Yugoslavia, besides being opposed to the Bulgarian Government then in power. The Protoguerovists, indeed, received secret subsidies from the Yugoslav Government. The rivals of this faction the Mihailovists on the other hand, who stood for complete Macedonian autonomy or at least the incorporation of Serbian Macedonia within Bulgaria, to form an autonomous state, did not fail, on the other hand, to make contact with the extreme Croat opponents of the Belgrade Government.

5. There is no reason to believe that the present Yugoslav Government was any less determined than its predecessors that Yugoslav Macedonia should be part of Yugoslavia. Indeed, it is

more than probable that this is part of the present Soviet plan for South-East Europe, for it is significant that Macedonian autonomy is, according to the reports I have seen from the British political representative at Sofia and His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica, regarded as a reactionary plan sponsored by "foreign" Powers: It is, also interesting to note that the veteran Protoguerovist leader, Dimitar Vlahov, is a member of the present Presidium of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and that those who issued the dementi referred to in paragraph 1 so significantly omit the name of Mihailov from the great names of I.M.R.O, which is, in fact, there portrayed as a purely Protoguerovist organization. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, for Mihailov during the occupation of Yugoslavia lived in Zagreb in close personal contact with Pavelic with whom, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs recently told me, he escaped at the time of the liberation. Mihailov is, therefore, branded in the eyes of the present Yugoslav regime with the same mark as Pavelic. In short, the old Serb alliance with the Protoguerovist faction remains in essence as it was before the war despite the changed circumstances of the time.

6, Nevertheless, Macedonia still remains a problem to the Yugoslav Government. The Federal Republic of Macedonia is, it is true, given greater independence in administration than any other of the Federal units in Yugoslavia. Even so, the present measure of control by Belgrade is, according to the reports I have received, intensely resented and this is somewhat confined by the complaints of the Bulgarian Opposition parties reported by Mr. Houstoun-Boswall in his telegram No.3, Saving, of the 4th February.

7. On the other hand, it must not be taken for granted that the present solution of the Macedonian problem, which has been up to date the Yugoslav Government's policy, and which has eschewed ally demand for the union of Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia with Serbian Macedonia, is the final solution. To judge from His Majesty's Consulate-General's letter to the Chancery at Athens of the 14th April, there is, already on foot a Yugoslav plan for the incorporation of Greek Macedonia within the borders of Yugoslavia. As yet, however such a movement is not officially sponsored, and the general Yugoslav attitude is restricted to one of platonic sympathy with allegedly persecuted blood brothers across the

border. Two factors probably militate against the Yugoslav Government officially sponsoring such a movement, let alone a movement for the union inside Yugoslavia of both Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia. The first is the effect of any Yugoslav claim to Bulgarian and Greek territory on the position of the present Bulgarian regime and the opposition in Greece, both of which enjoy vigorous Yugoslav support. In the second place the creation at this stage of a large autonomous Macedonian State might well endanger the position of the present highly centralized Government in Belgrade. On the other hand, in the event of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian union or of Greece coming into the Soviet orbit, the position would be entirely different. The retention of Yugoslav Macedonia by Yugoslavia would then cease to possess any strategic importance and a united Macedonia would be a practical proposition either as a unit of a Greater Yugoslavia, or of a Soviet-controlled Balkan Confederation.

I am sending copies of this dispatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens and Moscow, His Majesty's political representative in Sofia, His Majesty's Council-General at Salonica, and his Majesty's political advisor to Supreme Allied Command at Caserta.

I have, &c. GEORGE CLUTTON.

Balkan States 8 - August 22, 1946

Mr. Clutton to Mr. Bevin

No. 310

Belgrade, 13th August, 1946.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the first Congress of the National Front of Macedonia was held at Skopje from the 2nd to the 4th August. The most prominent personalities attending the congress were Lazar Kolarov, President of the People's Republic of Macedonia and secretary of the Territorial Committee of the National Front of Macedonia; M. Neshkovich, the President of the Serbian Government; and M. Frane Frol, the Minister of Justice of the Federal Government. The congress was also attended by a delegation from Bulgarian Macedonia (Pirin), the leader of which was Krsto Stojchev, a Deputy of the Bulgarian Sobranje. There were also delegates from Greek or, as it is called here, Aegean Macedonia, and a delegate from Trieste, M. Eugen Laurenti.

2. The congress opened on Ilinden the anniversary of the rising against the Turks in Macedonia in 1903. Extremely long speeches were made by M. Kolarov and by M. Neshkovich. The main points of these were the necessity for suppressing reaction, the union of Pirin with the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the struggle of the Macedonians in Greece. M. Stojchev, the Bulgarian delegate, spoke in favour of the inclusion of Pirin in the Republic of Macedonia and added that, as he had declared elsewhere, there were in the Bulgaria of the present day still remnants of Bulgarian chauvinism which wished to destroy the fraternal relations existing between the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria and Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia.

3. Of greater interest, however, was the manifesto issued by the congress at its conclusion. This document begins by saying that, on the anniversary of the glorious rising of Ilinden and on the anniversary of the meeting of A.S.N.O.M., when the foundations

were laid for the realization of the Ideals of the Ilinden rising, the delegates, who had come from all parts of the country and who represented all classes and all nationalities in Macedonia, once again manifested the political union of the whole of the people and the unshakeable fraternity and union of the Macedonian people with all the national minorities in Macedonia. After praising the National Front, its leader, Marshal Tito and its policy, which had been created and executed by the best fighters for the rights of the working people, the Communist Party, the manifesto continues by saying, that the first congress of the front had the pleasure of welcoming guests in the persons of representatives of their brothers from Pirin and Aegean Macedonia. This had turned the congress into a manifestation of the wish of the Macedonian people of all parts of Macedonia to be free and united in the Republic of Yugoslavia. From its first days the programme of the National Front had been based on the principle that the people of Macedonia must be united in the Macedonian Republic. The realization of this ideal was to-day the ardent desire of the people. The strengthening cultural relations with Pirin and the national development of the people in that part of Macedonia would create all the conditions for the fulfillment of the wish for the union of these districts in the Macedonian Republic. This wish had also been manifested in the Vardar, i.e., Yugoslav district of Macedonia. By a fraternal understanding between the People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Macedonia should be united with the Republic of Macedonia.

4. Turning next to Aegean Macedonia, the manifesto says that the Macedonians in this region, who, with the democratic Greeks, waged a stubborn fight against their Monarcho-Fascist oppressors for the establishment of their national and democratic rights, had the undivided sympathy and moral support not only of the People's Republic of Macedonia, but also of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Taking its stand on the principle of the union of all the people of Macedonia within the framework of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the National Front of Macedonia insisted, moreover, that these national and democratic rights should be given to the Slovenes and the Croats of Trieste and the Julian March. The congress therefore firmly demanded the inclusion of this national territory in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

5. The manifesto, after an exhortation to all sections of the community to liquidate the numerous types of local reaction in Macedonia and to unite within the National Front, ends by emphasizing the importance of the elections to the Constituent Sobranje of the People's Republic of Macedonia which are to take place on the 22nd September. The elections should be a new manifestation of the unity of the people and their determination to continue on their road, led by the National Front and its chief, Marshal Tito.

6. There are two points of secondary interest in this manifesto. The first is the statement that the policy of the National Front has been created and executed by the Communist Party. As a rule, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia keeps well in the background, but there have been during the last few months several indications that the party is beginning to come more out into the open. Examples of this are Moshka Pijade's statement that the People's Committees were the creation of the Communist Party (see my dispatch No.196 of the 21st May). and Marshal Tito's statement at Split that he did not expect the Catholic Clergy to love either him or his, i.e., the Communist Party (see paragraph 4 of my dispatch No.293 of the 22nd July). Of like interest is also the linking up, I think for the first time, of Yugoslav territorial aspirations in both the north and south, the justice of Yugoslavia's claim to Trieste being based on the justness of the principle of the union of Pirin and Vardar to Macedonia.

7. The most significant feature of the manifesto, however, is that it is the first open indication of future Yugoslav policy towards Macedonia, admittedly in a form which the Yugoslav Government could repudiate if need be. His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica has reported the agitation within his district for the incorporation of Greek Macedonia within the framework of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Little or no publicity has until the issue of this manifesto been given to such ideas inside Yugoslavia. It is true that, while the manifesto openly asks for the union of Pirin to Federative Macedonia, the references to Greek Macedonia are vaguer and amount to little more than platonic sympathy. Nevertheless, it is quite clear what is in the wind.

8. Whether this projected union of the three Macedonias within the framework of Yugoslavia is to coincide with the Federal Union of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as suggested in my dispatch No. 223 of the 6th June, cannot yet be said. Perhaps the question has not even yet been decided. In this connexion I might add that I have twice asked officials of the Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs what significance should be attached to the manifesto. Their answers have been very evasive. One said that he had not yet read the press reports of the congress, and the other that he could not understand what the Macedonians were up to. They now had their own Macedonia, but he supposed that they now wanted something more. From this my conclusion is that Yugoslav plans are not yet fully crystallized.

I am sending copies of this dispatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens and Moscow, His Majesty's Council-General at Salonica, His Majesty's political representative in Sofia, and to His Majesty's political advisor to Supreme Allied Command at Caserta.

I have, &c. GEORGE CLUTTON.

Balkan States 9 - September 4, 1946

Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin

No. 324

Belgrade, 27th August, 1946.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Clutton's dispatch No. 310 of the 13th August, 1946, have the honour to report that the leading article in the issue of Borba for the 26th August was devoted to Greek, or, as the Yugoslav's call it Aegean Macedonia. At the head of the article was a map, a copy of which I attach, showing the present national frontiers and also the ethnical frontier. As you will notice the latter embraces Salonica and almost all Greek Macedonia.

2. The article opens by saying that the frightful terror which is being carried on by Monarcho-Fascist bands in Greek Macedonia is already known to the Yugoslav public. Thousands of Macedonians and democratic Greek refugees are living witnesses of the murder and incendiaryism which these bands are committing on "our brothers." This terrorism has become much worse latterly, when the Monarcho-Fascist clique, which has not been able to find deep roots in the Greek people, began its attempt to purge Greek Macedonia of Macedonians and Greek democrats. Just now active purging of Greek Macedonia is going on- tens of villages are burning, women and children and powerless old men are being murdered, as in the most terrible period of the German occupation.

3. The district, in which a particularly violent terrorism is being carried on, and which is known under the name of Greek (Aegean) Macedonia, is, in fact, ethnically a part of Macedonia. In the whole of the Balkans there is no district which has passed through in the course of recent history such a bitter terrorism as has been suffered by the Macedonian population from the Greek imperialists. The ethnical history of Macedonia is then traced from 1896-1914, during the whole of which time it is shown that the Macedonians remained in an absolute majority in Greek Macedonia. After 1914, however,

the picture began to change. The Greek soldiers killed tens of thousands of Macedonians, they destroyed villages, they burnt down houses. In the place of their former inhabitants there came Greeks or philhellene "Aromuni." The greatest ethnical change was caused by the enforced exchange of populations between Greeks and Turks after the Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. At that time the Greeks were forced by the Turks to take in all the Christian inhabitants, among whom "Karamanlija," Greeks, Kurds and other Caucasian people predominated. The great part of these people were settled in Greek Macedonia. The Greeks, for their part, sent into Turkey all the Mohammedans, such as Turks, Mohammedan Macedonians, "Arbanassi" and "Aromuni." Large numbers were also forced into Bulgaria from Macedonia. After this war, in which our Macedonian brothers fought heroically shoulder to shoulder with the Greek patriots, the Monarcho-Fascists had chased into Yugoslavia and Bulgaria about 20,000 Macedonians from Macedonia. As the result of this persecution 150,000 Macedonians had been displaced or killed from 1914 up till now. In the course of the years 1941-42 our partisan representatives personally completed a list of Macedonian families in Greek Macedonia, and they reckoned that there were still about 250,000 Macedonians there. If one also takes into account the places in which the Macedonians do not represent the absolute but only the relative majority, then this figure of 250,000 should be considerably greater.

4. What, the article goes on, can our brothers expect from the present regime in Greece? The latest terrorism which is being carried on in Greece only confirms that the Monarcho-Fascist bands are continuing the prodigious terrorism which was carried on by the reactionary cliques in the past, and that it is intended that this terrorism shall completely annihilate our brothers in Greek Macedonia. The Macedonians in Greece do not enjoy any kind of rights. It is forbidden for them to speak their national language even in their own homes. Absolutely no Macedonian schools exist. Even their local political organizations have been rendered powerless. Chauvinistic cliques try to sow hatred among the Greek and other nationals against Macedonians, and to destroy that fraternity which was created in the course of the war of liberation. But to-day, opposed to that reactionary Greek policy, there is not the old

Yugoslavia in which the Macedonians were oppressed equally with other peoples, but the new democratic Yugoslavia where all peoples have equal rights. The Macedonian people who fought with Greek partisans for their liberation expected, with reason, that this war would bring them, in the spirit of the proclamations of the Great Allies, the right to advance and unite themselves with their other brothers. With justice they expected, that finally all the Macedonian people would be united and break away from foreign slavery. But it is only the Macedonians in Yugoslavia who have succeeded in bringing about their own complete liberation; and while in the People's Republic of Macedonia a new national life is awakening, on the other side of the frontier our brothers are suffering under the yoke of Monarcho-Fascist bands.

5. Greek imperialists have no right at all to hold Macedonians any longer under their intolerable yoke; they can no longer answer that Belgrade and Sofia are persecuting their Macedonian populations and that such people as free Macedonians in their own countries do not exist. They have even less right because they are stifling with all their force the democratic movement and the democracy of their people, accepting foreign support and giving over their country to the mercy, or otherwise of foreign exploitation. The people of Yugoslavia watched patiently what was happening to their brothers in Greek Macedonia. They believed, and today still believe, that the Greek people cannot oppose the fight of the Greek Macedonians for democracy and national independence. But the latest statements of responsible Greek circles, not only in Greece but also in the international arena, and also the frightful terrorism which is being carried on in Greek Macedonia, show that the Greek, reactionary circles have become the provokers of tumult in the Balkans and have decided to annihilate their Macedonian population. There is no hope at all that the reactionary Greek circles, who to-day with naked force and with the help of foreign troops keep themselves in power, will show the slightest wish for the solution of this problem in conformity with the demands and interests of the Macedonians in Greece. This problem has become part of the fight which is being carried on all over the world for peace, for democracy and for the self-determination of peoples. Therefore, the article concludes, our country cannot remain indifferent to the annihilation of our brothers

in Greece, nor to their rights and their demands for self-determination and union with their brothers in Yugoslavia.

6. The theme of this article again predominated in the Belgrade press of the 27th August, when all three papers carried leading articles, which in Borba and Politika were headed by another map. The tone of these articles was extremely violent.

7. I am sending copies of this dispatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens, His Majesty's Political Representative at Sofia, His Majesty's Political Adviser at Caserta, and to His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica.

I have, &c, C. B. PEAKE.

Balkan States 10 - Conditions in Western Macedonia

Report of Tour by Mr. Vice-Consul Dodson
Section 1

July 1st, 1949

R 6417/10127/19
Mr. Knight to Mr. Bevin

(No. 33)

His Majesty's Consul General in Salonica presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Salonica dispatch No. 61 of 9th December, a copy of a dispatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens, No. 17 of 23rd June, regarding Mr. Vice-Consul Dodson's tour of Western Macedonia.

Salonica, 23rd June, 1949 – Enclosure

(No. 17) Salonica, 23rd June, 1949

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the accompanying report by Mr. Vice-Consul Dodson on a recent tour of Western Macedonia. Mr. Dodson had previously visited this region at the end of November last, and his account of that journey was enclosed in my dispatch No. 41 of 9th December, 1948.

2. It was not expected from what is generally known of the adverse conditions still prevailing in Western Macedonia, that the military and economic situation in that area would show any marked improvement as compared with that of over six months earlier. Even so much of the report makes, I think, rather depressing reading in view of the undoubtedly imposed state of morale, both military and civilian, noticeable during the past few months throughout Northern Greece. Mr. Dodson considers that the improved morale in Western Macedonia is to be attributed to military successes elsewhere, particularly further south, rather than to any amelioration of the local

situation; and in a region where so many villages remain empty of their inhabitants, and towns overcrowded with refugees living in such distressful conditions, the situation which still produces such conditions cannot be regarded as anything but serious.

I am sending a copy of this dispatch to His Majesty's Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Ambassador at Belgrade.

I have, &c. W. L. C. Knight.

Enclosure to Dispatch No. 17

I made a short tour in Western Macedonia between 10th and 14th June. I drove to Kozani on the afternoon of 10th June, and the following morning went by road to Kastoria together with Mr. A. M. Homes, British Police and Prisons Mission Liaison Office in Western Macedonia, who very kindly accompanied me throughout the rest of the tour. We spent Sunday visiting the neighbourhood of Kastoria and returned via Argos Orestikon to Kozani on the Monday. On Tuesday 14th June, we paid quick visit to Servia before leaving for Salonica.

2. In Kastoria we called on the mayor and on Major-General Vasilas, commanding 10th Division. All attempts to find the acting nomarch proved fruitless. On the Sunday morning we drove out to the village of Tikhion, north-east of Kastoria, and that afternoon crossed the lake by boat to visit the village of Mavrokhori. We had to abandon a visit to Nestorion, as the need for traveling with the convoy involved spending a night there, for which we had insufficient time. Similar reasons prevented our visiting Grevena from Kozani. We stayed in Kastoria with No. 2 U.N.S.C.O.B. observer group, the vice-chairman of which, Lieut.-Commander Barret, very kindly put us up. He had returned from the frontier only two hours before we arrived, and all the other members of the group were out on duty at various points.

3. On our way to Kastoria we had called on the police authorities in Neapolis, and on the return journey we called on the Mayor of Argos Orestikon, who took us around his refugee camps. We missed

the daily convoy to Kozani as a result, and had some difficulty in persuading the military authorities to allow us to proceed despite the fact that the whole road appeared to be alive with troops.

4. In Kozani I called on Colonel Smijth Windham, commanding the British Military Mission liaison unit attached to Headquarters "B" Corps and was very kindly made a guest of the Mission's hospitable mess. I also called on the Gendarmerie High Commander for Western Macedonia and at the Nomarchia. The latter was a waste of time as the acting nomarch was away and the official who received me as well as those who he summoned to his aid during our conversation, clearly had little idea of what was going on.

5. The situation in Western Macedonia is very different from the prevailing in Central and Eastern Macedonia and in Thrace. One senses the difference as one climbs up the Kastania pass, at the southern end of Vermion mountains, which divide the comparatively peaceful Central Macedonian region from the wilder area of Western Macedonia. Life seems to take on a new tempo and the mountains, rising range behind range westwards to the peaks of Smolokas and Grammos in Pindus and northwards to Vitsi, a new threat. There is in Kozani an atmosphere of urgency non-existent in Salonica. Whereas at Headquarters "C" Corps, one will discuss, over a cup of coffee, the prospects of a G.N.A. sweep against a rebel band in some far-away frontier or be told about the latest mining incident, it requires only two minutes in the busy and business-like offices of the British liaison unit attached to "B" Corps to realize that there they are dealing with a war. Their maps are marked up for two or three operations at once and these are going on all around them. While talking to Colonel Smijth-Windham after dinner on the night of my arrival I pointed to a light in the hills south-west of Servia. "Yes," he said "that's a bandit light; that's probably Ferraios."

6. I could not find that the situation in Western Macedonia had changed much, if at all, since I last visited the area in December 1948, apart from a general improvement in morale. Military dispositions in the area seem little changed from six months ago. In places, perhaps, the rebels have been driven a little higher up the mountains, but the general picture remains the same. The Vitsi front

runs more or less in a straight line from Florina to Kastoria and the triangle of Greek territory north-west of it is entirely in rebel hands. The line is held by two G.N.A. divisions, who depend on their supplies on the two main lines of road communications; Kozani-Ptolemais-Florina and Kozani-Neapolis-Kastoria. Between these roads the Siniatsikon mountains provide a line of communications for the rebels and a jumping-off ground for raids and mine laying expeditions. West of the Aliakmon lies the other main rebel position on Mount Grammos, south of which the Pindus range affords the rebels another line of communications. South of Kozani is a semi-circle of mountains, Vourinos and Flamouri in the bend of the Aliakmon and Kamvounia and Pieria south-east of it, which forms the rebel road to Olympus. This whole semi-circle, together with the Khassia mountains to the south of the Aliakmon bend, is almost entirely under rebel control. Indeed as we drove from Kozani to Servia on the 14th June Mr. Holmes told me that, apart from the tiny fringe of low-lying land around Velvendos and Servia, there were no garrisons beyond the Aliakmon at all. We were told in Servia that two nights before our visit parts of two rebel brigades had moved from Pieria into Kamvounia across the open ground between Servia and the Aliakmon rather than bother to take the mountain route.

7. The G.N.A. forces on Grammos and Vitsi are dug into positions, though Major General Vasilas, whose 10th Division is on the left of the Vitsi front, pointed out that they were nevertheless fighting a positional war offensively. He claimed to have killed 144 bandits, who had attempted to reach Vitsi from Kaimakchalan, in a battle fought the day before our visit. Behind these two front lines the remaining G.N.A. forces are engaged in keeping open the lines of communication, holding the main centers of population and carrying out sweeps against any rebel concentrations which may be reported. In other words they are holding the position in Western Macedonia until the mountain areas in central Greece have been cleared of rebels.

8. The rebels, according to information given me by the British Military Mission, have between 4,000-5,000 troops on Grammos and approximately 4,000 on Vitsi. These latter are made up principally of four rebel brigades, all of which are reported to be under strength and one of which to be composed principally of

women. In addition the rebels have a heavy concentration of guns on Vitsi. It is into these two mountain strongholds that the rebel supplies from Albania are brought. It appears that initially supplies are sent in bulk by road from Korce to the village of Vidove, just inside the Albanian frontier. Here they are broken up and the supplies for Grammos are sent on via the village of Slimnitsa. Supplies for the, Vitsi area are taken back by road to Bilisht and then driven over the border to Krystalopigi. The heights overlooking this road where it enters Greek territory are, unfortunately in rebel hands and it is impossible for the ,U.N.S.C.O.B. observers to see the lorries crossing the frontier, although I was told that, the sound of their engines was plainly audible at night.

9. The rebels seem to be expecting an attack on Vitsi, and their present strategy appears to be to prevent the G.N.A. from effecting any large-scale concentration of forces by sending small bands out in various directions, to pursue which the G.N.A. must disperse its troops. A number of these pursuit operations were certainly in progress while I was in the area. On our way from Argos Orestikon to Neapolis on 13th June we passed several columns of troops making their way up on to western Siniatsikon in pursuit, as we afterwards learned at "B" Corps Headquarters, of a reported band concentration. Only 6 miles from Kozani we saw a further force making its way onto Vourinos. I stopped to talk to the Brigade Commander, who told me that a rebel column with fifty mules was reported to have moved the night before from the area north of Siatista over into Vourinos. His brigade was moving up onto Vourinos from the north and east and further forces from Siatista were to move from the west. It was then 3 p.m. and the long lines of men and mules, moving across the corn-fields towards the foothills on the first stage of their march, must have been very visible to anyone watching from the peaks above. The following morning I was told at "B" Corps Headquarters that both these operations had drawn blank. Simultaneously with these operations other "B" Corps troops were assisting "A" Corps in an operation in the Khassia mountains against the Brigades of Ferraios and Bandekos.

10. The military authorities appear fairly satisfied with the present situation. The more sober certainly look for no final victory this year, but Colonel Smijth- Windham told me that he considered that

if Central Greece could be cleared of rebels by the autumn and the G.N.A. be left with only the frontier and the areas immediately behind it to worry about, a big improvement would have been made. He did not think that the rebel morale was at present very high and believed that many were on very short rations. At the same time he thought that the present and, as he saw it, unsatisfactory situation for the rebels had been caused very largely by their own political mistakes, particularly the dismissal of Markos and the N.O.F. declaration, and he admitted that if a political mistake of similar magnitude were to be made by the Greek Government the situation might easily change for the worse. He had a poor opinion of the rebel forces and considered that with any really determined army the war could be finished in six months. The reluctance, amounting almost to refusal, of all Greek commanders to move at night was a major factor in prolonging the fighting.

11. But although the local military situation is little different from what it was six months ago, public morale has certainly improved. There has clearly been some amelioration of the security situation in the immediate vicinity of the towns to account for the fact that all local authorities tell one that the situation is better, but in the main this improved morale must spring from reports of successes further south and from the new confidence felt by and in the army. It is perhaps easy to over-emphasize this development. When I asked the Mayor of Kastoria - an educated man and a Macedonian - what he thought of the present state of the public mind, he said it was difficult to talk in terms of morale about the reactions of the Macedonian peasant. They had been inured to... (the rest of the report is missing).

British Consulate-General, Salonica - March 16, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I toured Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by car from March 8th -11th last, visiting in particular the towns of Serres, Drama, Kavalla, Xanthi and Komotini, making Kavalla my headquarters. I was accompanied throughout by Mr. Wm. M. Gwynn, American Consul-General in Salonica.

2. Traveling by road presented no difficulties whatsoever, and the surface everywhere was better than could have been expected. Only on the stretch from Salonica to the Struma was any destruction evident, but a temporary wooden bridge has now been constructed across the Struma and other bridges and culverts repaired in a rough and ready fashion so that traveling time between Salonica and Serres is now almost normal. From Serres onwards there were practically no signs of blown bridges or damaged roads. The railway is also functioning on a reduced scale from Rodhopolis to Alexandroupolis, lignite from Serres being used as fuel. Throughout Eastern Macedonia and Thrace communications and public utilities have remained largely intact, the chief material damage caused by the Bulgarian occupation being the burning of mountain villages and the carrying off of cattle, draught animals and agricultural produce. Conditions are thus much more favourable for a rapid economic recovery than in Western Macedonia. We were everywhere received with the utmost friendliness, sometimes to the point of embarrassment and not a single untoward incident marred our journey.

3. Only a brief stay was made at Serres, but it was sufficient to impart an impression of considerable poverty, malnutrition and insufficient clothing in what should normally be a prosperous town. Most shops were shut, and the few that were open were but poorly stocked with articles or very inferior quality. British troops had not yet occupied the town, but security was reported to be good.

4. More time was spent in Drama on both the outward and return journeys. It gave signs of much greater animation and economic conditions seemed definitely better. A company of the Gurka Rifles

had arrived there the previous day (March 7th), and I was able to obtain the impressions of the Officer commanding, Captain Aurick, who had already formed several local contacts. He had not found the ELAS officer in charge of the guard company by any means as co-operative as he could have wished. He held, it appeared, the mistaken view that he was responsible for disarming the Nationalist Bands, and likewise that he could continue to carry out his functions in his own way until the National Guard arrived to relieve him. He was also maintaining a force of some 200 armed guards instead of the one hundred laid down in the Agreement of Varkiza. Captain Aurick considered that ELAS should confine itself to policing the town, and that for this purposes one hundred was entirely adequate. I therefore interviewed the ELAS officer to give him a more realistic view of his own position, stressing the point that Captain Aurick was the local representative of the Commander-in-Chief, and that he must take orders from him. I also told him that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the disarmament of the Nationalist Bands; that was a matter for the Greek Government and their local representatives, in this case the British troops. No difficulty was being made, however, as to the handing over of the arms surrendered by ELAS, which was due to take place the next day and has since been done.

5. With regard to the disarming of the Nationalist Bands of Anton Tsaous, I found a certain amount of confusion. Two days previously the Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Kimberley" at Kavalla had visited the headquarters of these bands, accompanied by the ELAS officer who had previously commanded the 6th ELAS division at Kavalla, and had told the bands that they must be prepared to surrender their arms the following Sunday, although he had wished in the first place to collect them forthwith. This had caused some perturbation to the Nationalist Bands, who saw themselves disarmed while ELAS still had 200 armed men at their disposal, plus demobilized men who had retained their arms and could be mustered against the Nationalists. Apparently, Captain Aurick dealt with this situation by agreeing that the Nationalists should retain 25% of their arms until ELAS disarmament was completed. Subsequently another British officer, acting independently and on his own initiative, also took a hand in the disarmament of the same Nationalist Bands, but when I left the position was that some measure of co-ordination had been achieved

and the handing over of 75% of the Nationalists' arms was to take place on the 13th instant. It has in addition since been agreed that, pending the arrival of the National Guards, Nationalists may carry arms north of a given line as a protection against Bulgarian bands.

6. Prior to my leaving Salonica I had sent Anton Tsaous himself and he had raised the question of his return to Drama. I suggested to him that he should remain where he was until such time as Government officials and the National Guard had taken over Drama. This line is clearly advisable, as Anton Tsaous could only return at present under British military protection, which would in itself create a definite impression that we are lending him support. It is in any case, I think, too much to hope for that there will not be further clashes between Nationalists and Communists in the Drama area, were the Nationalists are particularly strong in the country districts and have many reasons for taking revenge on their political opponents. For this reason I consider Drama the most sensitive spot of all the places visited, and particular attention should be given to it by the Greek authorities. There can be no doubt that complaints of the conduct of both sides are current here to a greater extent than elsewhere. The Nationalists complain that the EP guard are beating up their sympathizers, cutting off their electric light and carrying on propaganda against the Government. EAM/KKE elements, on the other hand, are complaining of attacks made on their members by Nationalists. It was impossible in the short time at my disposal to investigate in any detail the validity of these charges, although in the Municipal hospital I found a follower of Anton Tsaous who had been taken prisoner in a recent clash and almost lynched by the mob when he was brought into Drama. Seated by his bed was an ELAS soldier who had been wounded in the same engagement, together with a number of the EP who had been put as guard over the Nationalist. They had buried their quarrels and were perfectly happy together. When I asked the EP guard why he was in charge of a prisoner who had automatically been released under the recent agreement, he pointed to his cap where, in addition to the EP badge, he was sporting the flags of all the Allies and expressed a readiness to serve whatever authority was now the proper one.

7. Stopping again at Drama on the return journey on March 11th, I attempted to see the Nomark and Demark, but it was Sunday and

they could not be found; nevertheless, I had a long conversation with the Demark's assistant, principally about the economic requirements of the town. Each inhabitant was receiving a daily bread ration of 400 grams, the price per ration being 7.5 levas, which is equivalent, at the rate of 6 levas to 1 drachma, to 1.25 drachma or 0.5d. Grain, he said, was in very short supply and would only last a short time. When the Bulgarians evacuated, the authorities had managed to retain a quantity of 2,200,000 okes, but some five or six hundred tons of this quantity had had to be distributed for seed to peasants in the mountains and to others whose farms had been burned down. The Assistant Mayor also complained of a shortage of fats, olive oil and sugar, adding that the population as a whole was suffering severely from malnutrition as a result of the Bulgarian occupation when the bread ration had been only half of what it is now and of lower quality. Scabies was said to be rampant among the children due to lack of sugar. My informant considered that the Agreement of Varkiza had been generally welcomed, that the security position in the town was good, but that Anton Tsaous' followers were responsible for disorders outside. I asked him whether he had heard of any complaints about the conduct of the Indian troops in Drama (having heard from Captain Aurick that the communists were beginning a propaganda campaign against them) but he declared that nothing of the sort had come to his hearing. I should add that the report of communist propaganda against the Indian troops is correct, Drama is the only place where this has occurred. In Western Macedonia the communist policy is to welcome the British and Indian troops, whilst turning a comparatively cold shoulder to the National Guard. Subsequent reports received from the military authorities indicate the situation at Drama is developing favourably. British troops are increasingly warmly welcomed and the unco-operative ELAS officer in charge of the EP Company has vanished from the scene.

8. Kavalla presented a scene of unwonted activity. The advance party of the 7th Indian Brigade had arrived the previous day to arrange accommodation for the Brigade Headquarters and Battalion that are to follow. On the day of our advent officials M.L. and UNDRAs had arrived. The following day, March 9th, H.M.S. "Sirius" and the Greek destroyer "Ierax" entered the port, where H.M.S. "Kimberley" was already moored. The next afternoon an

M.L. convoy of 50 trucks arrived, followed on the 11th instant by a food ship, an oil fuel ship and the Governor General of Eastern Macedonia. It had been intended that the National Guard should arrive on March 13th, but their movement has been subjected to some delay, and the Governor General, rather unwisely, has decided he cannot take over until he has their support. The population of Kavalla showed every sign of friendliness and satisfaction at the turn of events. As elsewhere, they are obviously anxious to resume their ordinary life, and the small minority who still retain a taste for turbulent politics are at present quiet. EAM/KKE have undoubtedly suffered a more than partial eclipse in this communist stronghold, helped by general dissatisfaction at their administration and the accompanying corruption and unfair discrimination. The communist organization, however, is here as elsewhere by no means broken, and will certainly make its presence felt as soon as events present a favourable opportunity.

9. On the morning of March 9th the American Consul-General and I attended a conference between representatives of M.L., UNRRA and the local authorities, represented by the Nomark and Demark. The purpose of the conference was to arrange for the resumption of the distribution of M.L. supplies. The Nomark and the Demark fell in with all suggestions made to them, promised their full support in every direction and self-sacrificingly stressed the point that the country districts were in worse need of help than Kavalla itself. In the course of the conference they mentioned that a delegation had been sent the previous day to Salonica to request the early arrival of Government officials and National Guards to take over the administration of the town. They contended that grain was in very short supply and would suffice the population for a few days only. Up to the present the peasants had been induced to make contributions for feeding the town, but now with the arrival of M.L. and new authorities they would no longer feel under the same obligation. They stressed, too, the need for clothing, a need which was obvious to the most casual observer.

10. To introduce a little reality into the almost unnatural friendliness of the proceedings, I enquired as to the whereabouts of three previous employees of M.L. who were known to have been arrested by the ELAS police in December last. The Nomark confessed that

two of them had been shot while trying to escape, adding that if we had not intervened in Greek affairs such things would never have been necessary. He was obviously very worried about asking about the third man, Constantine Vardakis, an interpreter who had been arrested in the M.L. office itself, and showed great agitation. After considerable hedging the Demark gave the game away by whispering to him audibly that Vardakas had been shot. I understood that these three persons were members of a group of eleven persons known to have been killed by the EP in December last. I explained to the Monark that there was no comparison between conditions in Kavalla and Athens, and that the shooting of these persons would doubtless be investigated by the Creek judicial authorities, as it might well disclose a common law offence.

11. A visit was then paid to the offices of the Administrative Committee for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace to explain, if need be, the altered circumstances of their existence, but the head of the Committee, Grimbas, had already realized the position for himself. He was prepared to hand over his office immediately to M.L., which had previously occupied them as its headquarters, and produced a declaration which he had already prepared, informing the population that the Committee were handing over their functions to the Governor General and thanking the people for their support. Grimbas also made no difficulty about leaving the house of the manager of the Commercial Tobacco Company, which he and his colleagues had occupied as residential quarter. He gave the impression of a man who was both disappointed and disillusioned, and confessed that previous lack of administrative experience likewise made him little desirous of remaining in office. He took the opportunity, nevertheless, of complaining that the National Guard had searched the house in Salonica occupied by his wife and child, and subjected them to certain rough usage.

12. At Xanthi we were received by the Nomark and Demark and other officials with bouquets of laurels, gifts of their best cigarettes and an invitation to a civic banquet, which time, however, obliged us to decline. They were all quite reconciled to handing over to the Government authorities, and as in other places complained of the delay that was occurring. Politically, they said, the bulk of the population was republican, and there was a movement on foot to

form a United Republican Front in conjunction with EAM, to include both Liberals and Progressives. The officer in charge of the EP/ELAS Guard informed us that security in the town was good, but that there had been some cattle stealing in the country districts owing to the absence of any police, and small bands of demobilized Nationalists (others called them demobilized Elastites) had been terrorizing certain villages. He said he was having difficulty in keeping his guard together; they were all anxious to go home without further delay. The food situation in Xanthi appeared from all accounts to be bad, particularly in the mountain districts which were appealing to the town for help. The bread ration was 400 grammes per day, 60% barley. I enquired as to the number of prisoners held, and was told that there were at present 42 in the local gaol, 20 of them on charges of collaboration, amongst whom were some Bulgars and two Bulgarians of Greek nationality. It was said that all hostages had been released after a few days' detention. The police officer asked for my advice regarding two demobilized Bulgarian soldiers whom he had arrested a few days before. They had been found wandering about the countryside, and were in danger of being lynched by the local population. I advised him to hand them over for disposal to the first troops that arrived, considering them prisoners of war.

13. Of all the places, Komotini made the happiest impression. The local officials seemed on excellent terms with the Liberals, a delegation of whom called on us in the Nomark's office. The Nomark confessed to being a member of KKE, but claimed that out of eighteen members of the Prefect's council only two belonged to this party, the remainder being Republican. He also talked about the formation of what he called a "Liberal Republican Party", to include EAM and all Progressive elements. It was proposed, we heard, to hold a protest meeting the next day, to complain of the delay in sending Government officials and the National Guard, but the Liberals we saw said that they had dissociated themselves from this demonstration. Security in the town, we were told, was excellent, though there was some thieving going on outside. The Nomark stated that there were at present 60 prisoners in the local gaol, including six charged with collaboration with the Bulgars and two or three Bulgarians; the rest were common criminals. He also mentioned that one Bulgarian war criminal had been shot.

According to him, ten or twelve persons had been arrested preventatively during the recent troubles, all of whom had now been released. The food situation seemed better than elsewhere, although there was the same acute shortage of imported goods and particularly clothing and footwear. From reports received at Komotini it appeared that the situation in the Alexandroupolis and Demotika areas is very similar. Complaints were also made to us of the hardships caused by the inability to trade with Turkey and Bulgaria. Local efforts to renew commercial relations had failed as the present officials were not recognized by those Governments, nor could the question of payment be solved.

14. Throughout the journey one everywhere felt that EAM/KKE is in varying degrees very much on the defensive. It is anxious to prove itself respectable, moderate and patriotic, loyal to the agreement of Varkiza and anxious to co-operate to with republican and liberal elements in forming a common front against monarchists and other so-called reactionaries. But the KKE organization remains in the background unimpaired. The turbulent spirit that animates it is but temporarily repressed, and is ready to assert itself again when conditions are favourable. The demobilization of ELAS has been carried out with the greatest willingness. Most arms have been handed in, though there are many stories of hidden dumps and ultimate designs. Between Serres and Drama we saw a group of seven or eight demobilized ELAS soldiers on the road, and stopped to talk to them. It appeared that they had been disbanded some weeks previously and were then merely returning from a carnival celebration at a neighbouring village. They were extremely friendly and full of pacific intentions. It was noticeable though that EAM – appointed officials were very sensitive to any suggestions of collaboration or even relationship with Bulgarians. They were anxious to appear first and foremost as good Greek patriots, even when their previous association with Bulgarian communists had been matter of common knowledge.

15. There are two aspects of the economic situation that deserve special mention. In the first place, an early decision should be made or the question of currency, for east of the Strimon the leva is still the only circulating medium. To refuse to exchange at least limited quantities of leva into drachma at a reasonable rate will involve a

great part of the population in considerable hardship, although even a reasonable rate from the point of view of the Greek Government will cause complaints, as all prices in terms of leva are unreal, the leva enjoying a purely fictitious value owing to its scarcity. Whereas in the rest of Greece currency has undergone a considerable devaluation, here the value of the leva has to a great extent been maintained in a closed economy. It would also seem essential that the Bank of Greece should as soon as possible establish branches throughout the area and make arrangements to give advance on a generous scale against merchandise during the transitional period.

16. The second question relates to a stock of some 8.5 million kilograms of processed tobacco now ready for sale at Kavalla and elsewhere. This tobacco was bought by the Bulgarian Government from producers at unremunerative prices, and will now presumably be considered the property of the Greek State. Nevertheless, if the proceeds of its sale (and the United States is at the present moment a very interested purchaser) are paid into the Greek treasury there will be considerable local discontent, the producers complaining that they are now being robbed by the Greek Government instead of the Bulgarian Government. A reasonable suggestion for solving this problem has been made by the newly appointed Governor General for Thrace, M. Papathanassis. He suggests that part of the proceeds should be paid as compensation to the producers, and that part should be retained to form a fund for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees from Thrace now temporarily living in other parts of Greece. This proposition merits serious consideration, and it is to be hoped that something on these lines can be arranged.

17. Finally it may be said that, in general, all conditions favourable for the resumption of complete authority in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by the Greek Government. The only question is whether the Greek Government can rise to the occasion. The principle dangers lie, firstly, in delay, secondly, in the quality of officials who are to assume office, and, thirdly, in the attitude and behaviour of the National Guard. Any ill-considered action on the part of the latter body would strengthen the hands of the extremists and seriously perturb the majority of the population who are now only too anxious to see normal life re-established on a peaceful, orderly basis. Here,

as elsewhere, law must once more be made supreme and legal firms observed.

Sir Reginald Leeper, K.C.M.G., C.B.E., His Majesty's Ambassador, Athens.

British Embassy – ATHENS - March 3rd, 1947

Dear James,

The following is an extract from a letter dated 10th February which we have received from our Consul at Corfu:

“Recently I visited the prison of Corfu where six hundred prisoners are incarcerated, having most been sentenced by the special Collaboration Courts before the coming into force of the Emergency Measures Act of June 1945.

The capacity of the prison is one hundred and thirty prisoners and of the present inmates three hundred and thirty-three are communists and eight-five were convicted of normal crime.

By interrogation it was ascertained that while in Salonika Prison, prisoners awaiting transportation to Corfu sent a list of their names to “ORIM” an organization founded in 1903 for the independence of Macedonia, address:- Secretary Nicholas Papa, Anastasio Rallis (a school teacher) 9 Dean Street, Toronto, Canada, One hundred cheques of twenty dollars each have since been received by various prisoners from this source which were dispatched from Toronto in the name of individuals and not of the organization, although the accompanying letters are all written in the same handwriting.

This organization is alleged to have assisted one hundred and thirty-two families from the village of Vasiliyadis near Kastoria, to immigrate to Canada and pre-war distributed funds via Bulgaria. It is said that the procedure in 1932-1933 was for Macedonians in Greece to immigrate to Canada via Istanbul and Sofia whence they continued their journey provided with Bulgarian passports.”

We have no evidence here to support or deny this story of the activities of “ORIM”, but we think you may like to know about it and look into it.

We should very much like to know the outcome of any enquiries you may make, meanwhile we also will attempt to find more.

Yours ever, (signed) John Tahourdin.

J. George, Esq.,
Canadian Embassy, Athens

British Embassy Belgrade - April 15, 1947

I was greatly interested to read what Frank Roberts had to say in his letter of the 3rd of February to you about his conversation with Quaroni, and I have now had an opportunity to think about your letter N. 2364/389/38 of the 26th February on the same subject.

2. I must own to a certain diffidence in expressing my views on a question of the kind that after being in this country for comparatively so short a time, and, to adapt a saying of Pascal, I don't as yet know enough to write you a short letter, and I must ask you to bear with a long one.

3. In the first place, Yugoslavia to my mind represents an entirely different picture from that displayed by any other European country except Russia. Here Communism hiding under the cloak of the National Liberation Movement, has won an outright victory and reigns unchallenged. Before, therefore, attempting to answer Quaroni's question, it is perhaps worth while taking a brief glance at the past, to see how the present situation in Yugoslavia came about.

4. When, in 1941, Tito began to organize the armed rising, which took place in June of that year, although in all probability he was acting in complete independence of Moscow, yet he must have been confident of eventual Russian support since he had been trained in Moscow where he seems to have been regarded as an excellent organizer and an able and far sighted man. Little was known of him in his own country, except by his fellow communists, nor had he made - for himself a reputation as a military leader, for, contrary to popular belief, he was never in Spain at the time of the Civil war, during which he sat at Besancon organizing a depot for recruits and supplies. But when his hour struck he quickly proved himself to be a commander of genius, with a remarkable power of injecting enthusiasm and a sense of unity into all manner of diverse elements, and welding them into a Movement of National Liberation. Not the least of his achievements was the programme which resulted from the Jajce Congress of November 1943. It was not a communist programme, the emphasis being entirely upon the new and national Yugoslavia. One of its avowed aims was to put an end to the persecution and internecine strife that had always been an element of

disruption in the country between the two great wars. It had, that is to say, a strong element of reputable nationalism. This was the alternative he offered to his countrymen who, if they wished to play their part in ridding their country of the invader, had either to throw in their lot with him or to join Mihailovic, whose aim was to restore the monarchy, and with it the old dominance of Serbia in the tripartite kingdom.

5. The result was that there rallied to Tito's side many who were fired by the ideal of a united Yugoslavia in which internal strife would cease and all efforts would be bent to increasing the country's prosperity and position in the world. The majority of these did not, and I believe do not care a fig for theoretical communism. Many, indeed, must dislike it, and this, I think, applies in large measure to the Army where, however, the officers owe their social position to Tito, without whom they would revert to being errand boys and boot blacks. But they also put up with it because they are imbued with the Slav ideal; their thoughts are bent on their country, its expansion and its hegemony in the Balkans, and they believe that this regime has a better chance of achieving these aims than any other. In short, it was not least by his ability to project the one idea which could attract and hold these differing elements that Tito was able to make himself Prime Minister of the first united Yugoslavia in 1945. The rest is soon told. The young communists who had been in and out of prison with him before the war and who had shared with him the perils and difficulties of his campaigns were quickly moved into key positions, and the regime was started on its way. Here it is, and here it looks like staying. Tito's own power has waned while that of his associates has waxed, but his position in the country, and still more with the Army, remains undiminished and continues to be built up.

6. The reason is easy to see. This is a minority government, and it is well aware of the fact. It enjoys complete power, and is determined, come what may, to hold on to it. But to remain in power it is necessary first and foremost to be sure of the Army, in which communists are by no means in the majority. This is where Tito is a godsend to the Government, and it is one of the chief reasons why his prestige must at all costs be maintained. To the Army he is presented not as a communist but as a great military leader by whom his country achieved its freedom. Indeed, in this one respect only

Stalin and Russia are pushed into the background. To the army it is nothing but Tito all the time. The marching songs sung by the Yugoslav soldiers as they go about their business have for their sole theme the exploits of the Marshal, his tribulations, his battles and his victories. The nationalist ideas in the Jajce programme are kept constantly before them, and their gaze is directed as much externally to the territorial expansion of Yugoslavia as it is internally to the liquidation of Yugoslav political opponents of the present regime. No effort is, or course, being spared to indoctrinate the rising generation with the communist creed, but some years must pass before there is an Army which can be counted on for certain to be politically reliable. Until this happens Tito as a leader is indispensable and the nationalist sentiments of the army are given full rein and even encouraged in every way. It is worth recording that the Russians have themselves encouraged such sentiments. Marshal Tolbukin stayed a minimum of time in this country and, as far as we can judge, with an eye to the morale of the Yugoslav Army made every effort to withdraw his troops as quickly as possible. The Russians at that time went so far as to put it about that some victories which they themselves gained had been the work of the Partisans. They would obviously go to particular lengths in this direction in the early days when they were anxious to build up the regime. Their policy does not however seem radically to have changed in the intervening period. The Russian military instructors here are kept fairly discreetly in the background and the Yugoslav army certainly could not complain that it does not receive sufficient encouragement and praise from Russian sources.

7. This then is the historical background against which we have to judge the political thought and tendencies of the present government. The relevant points are, I think

(i) The regime built itself without Russian assistance. It would be too much to say that the Russians allowed Tito and his colleagues wide latitude; in their curious ignorance of Balkan affairs during the war they scarcely seemed to have noticed Tito until a fairly, late date. On the other hand he was himself sufficiently confident of eventual support to take very far reaching decisions on his own authority.

(ii) The regime's strongest appeal in its early days rested upon nationalist sentiment in various forms. Among the population as a whole nationalism is a confused and often parochial feeling. The Slovenes irrespective of party feel very deeply about Trieste. The Macedonians don't, but feel intensely about Salonika. Both of them loathe the Montenegrins. But Yugoslav nationalism, as opposed to regional nationalism, remains a, very potent force in the Communist Party and in the Army upon which the Party depends for its hold on the country.

8. So much for history and now for the present. No one here would think of denying that the present rulers of Yugoslavia are all convinced and many of them fanatical communists. It may seem a platitude to add that they must therefore believe in communism, but I think we sometimes forget the implications of this obvious conclusion. To Tito and his colleagues communism is not simply an intellectual theory and it has not been watered down as it must have been, for example, among many French and Italian communists by other intellectual influences. I suspect in fact that Yugoslav communism keeps at the moment far more closely to the classical principles of Leninism than does the brand of communism now favoured in the Kremlin. Yugoslav communists have a much more recent experience of persecution for their faith than have the Russians. They seem to me to believe in communism as the answer not only to internal economic- problems but also, according to the old Marxist theory, as the answer to all problems of foreign affairs. They believe that whenever another neighbouring country becomes communist it will cease, to harbour imperialist designs against Yugoslav territory; it will run its own internal affairs more efficiently; it will produce more exports for other countries including Yugoslavia; it will raise its own standard of living and will be a better potential market for the goods; which Yugoslavia can now export and for the larger quantity, which she hopes to be able to export after completion of the 5-year plan; finally, being communist it will be more sympathetic and accommodating to Yugoslavia's needs, and relations with it, being conducted by two communist governments, will be immeasurably easier. In short, we must assume that the Yugoslav communists believe that whenever another country becomes communist this process represents a direct and immediate benefit to Yugoslavia.

9. At the same time we are all agreed that the Yugoslav Government is intensely nationalist. It is not merely that they depend for their support upon that strongly nationalist organization, the army. Their own nationalism is perfectly genuine. The first symptom is intense pride in what their country has done during the war and confidence in their plans for the future. The relevant aspect of their nationalism is, however, that they desire:

(a) maximum prosperity at home in the form of a secure agricultural basis to the country's economy and the fulfillment of far-reaching plans for industrialization.

(b) international prestige;

(c) territorial expansion;

10. As I have indicated above the Yugoslav communists must believe that maximum prosperity at home is attainable only when communism has embraced as many countries as possible, when all countries are making the best use of their productive facilities and when having shed the gross prejudices which some Governments still seem to harbour, all countries are ready to trade with Yugoslavia upon the sort of terms which suit the Yugoslav Government's taste.

11. The Yugoslav communists must have just as much reason to believe that their international prestige is also to be attained in the same way. Here indeed I think they are perfectly right. This prestige exists at the moment only among communist parties and fellow travelers and in countries which are governed by communists. The press they get in Italy and Greece is as bad as the press they get in Albania and Bulgaria is good. We all know how long this state of affairs would last if Italy and Greece fell under a communist government. In short, the more communism there is in the world the more prestige for communist Yugoslavia. This must be qualified to the extent that if a major European country became communist Yugoslavia would obviously lose the position which she now seems to hold as the second most influential communist country. But you will find my answer to this qualification in paragraph 15 below.

12. When we turn to Yugoslavia's territorial ambitions it is harder to determine whether there is a conflict between the claims of communism and nationalism. I do not, however, believe that there is such a conflict. Of the 4 major Yugoslav territorial claims, three are now being prosecuted against non-communist governments and one against a communist government. There has been much speculation whether the prosecution of territorial claims against Italy, Austria and Greece is in the interests of world communism. It is obvious that such claims strengthen the anti-communist feeling in these three countries. It may be that the body which has, replaced the Comintern took account of this, but whether or not it did, one thing seems to me comparatively clear. Yugoslavia's three territorial claims against non-communist Governments are not going to be disappointed because the Comintern's successor has decided that it is better tactics to help the Italian, Greek and Austrian Communist Parties. They are going to be disappointed because the, non-communist forces in the world look like being strong enough, at any rate at the moment, to prevent their realization. We here have sometimes thought that the Russians might take pains to avoid embarrassing the Italian Communist Party over the Trieste question. They do not appear to have done so. On the contrary they pressed Yugoslav claims to Trieste, firmly and stubbornly and appear to have relinquished their pressure only when they were certain that it had failed. They and communist parties in other countries are supporting Yugoslavia's Austrian claims with a similar, disregard for the repercussions which such claims may have upon the success of communism in Austria. Finally, although Russian intentions in Macedonia are obscure they have, to say the least, not discouraged Yugoslav and Bulgarian claims on Greece which must be a great embarrassment to the Greek communist party. In fact, they seem so far definitely to have decided to back the really safe horse of a communist Yugoslav Government and not to trust themselves to the uncertainties, of public opinion in Greece, Austria and Italy where, in the absence of communist Governments, public opinion is still an important factor.

13. We do not, of course, know how Yugoslavia's territorial claims would fare if Greece, Austria and Italy became communist. It might be that once they secured power the Communalist Governments of

those countries would become just as nationalist as the Yugoslav Government and would be unwilling to make any territorial cession. But one thing is quite clear. So long as the Governments in these three countries are not communist and provided that they receive sufficient support from non-communist forces in the West there is no chance whatever of their ceding territory. If we exclude the possibility of a complete economic collapse of the non-communist forces of Europe it is therefore clear that only through the spread of communism and the emergence of further communist Governments will there arise any prospect at all of the satisfaction of Yugoslav territorial claims. Their chance of securing territory from communist Greek, Austrian or Italian governments may be less than they suppose, but at least cannot be as small as their chance of securing such territory under the present dispensation.

14. I think this argument is supported by the manner in which Yugoslav claims have been prosecuted against Bulgaria. These claims have, I think, provoked some press reaction in Sofia but not, as far as I know, the governmental reaction to which all other Yugoslav claims have given rise. I would not base an argument too strongly upon any aspect of the Macedonian question because as I have said, I find Russian intentions in this regard very obscure. But it seems at least possible that the communist Bulgarian Government are ready or have been compelled to promise territory to the communist Yugoslav Government.

15. To sum up it seems to me that the Yugoslav Government believe and have good reason for believing that their national interests as defined in paragraph 9 above are inseparable from the spread of communism over the world. I should be surprised if they made any great distinction between the expansion of communism and the expansion of Russian influence and domination. They believe I think, that if the whole of Europe embraced communism they would find themselves as a senior partner of the Balkan Federation (whether or not the technical procedure of Federation was carried out). This, I think, the answer to the qualification which I made at the end of paragraph 11 above. Yugoslavia would obviously have to cede the second place in the communist hierarchy to, e. g. a communist France, but I think the Yugoslav Government much too hard-headed to nurse unlimited ambitions. As the head of a Balkan

Federation in a communist Europe they could enjoy, or at any rate would expect to enjoy, considerably more prestige and influence than their country has possessed for centuries, and they would not, I am sure, hope for more than this. They may from time to time have to put the brake on nationalist exuberance among their supporters. For example, the shooting down of the American aircraft last September, appeared to me to be an outburst of such exuberance on the part of the army which caused considerable embarrassment to the Government. But I believe that the Government are ready to wait a long time for the realization of their hopes. So long, therefore, as communism is an expanding force, and so long as they are not disillusioned in the belief that it is a valid economic theory I do not believe that serious conflict is likely to arise between the claims of international communism and of Yugoslav communist nationalism. I have certainly no person to believe that such a conflict has yet arisen.

16. I believe that a fundamental change of circumstances is required to create conditions in which such a conflict might arise. The best example I can think of is the possibility of a serious failure of the present Soviet 5-year plan, which would, I presume first put the strongest brake upon the present Russian policy of dynamic expansion, and secondly give Russia serious reason to consider plundering all the satellites for her own benefit. Such conditions might well cause both some measure of disillusion among Yugoslav communists, and a direct and serious conflict of interest between Yugoslav nationalism and international communism, of which the latter's first object being presumably to render assistance to Russia. This is, of course, a matter of speculation and I cannot say whether even in such circumstances Belgrade would attempt to refuse any demand which Moscow seriously pressed. I can, in fact, only give you a few general ideas which I think govern every-day relations. The first is that the Yugoslav Government seem to enjoy as much confidence as the Soviet Government are ever likely to give to any organization outside Russia. As I have said above, Tito assumed authority during the war for far-reaching decisions in the confidence that they would later be approved. The Yugoslav Government are still, I believe, trusted by Moscow to take the right course in most fields of administration without too much instruction or advice. At the same time, if and when instructions are received

they have some, and probably fairly wide powers of “arguing back”. Their relation to Moscow is indeed probably very similar to that of a senior colonial governor. They are trusted and known to be working in the same direction. They can represent, very strongly at times, that local conditions made certain courses of action desirable and they know that such representations will be considered. In the last resort they will carry out instructions. Secondly, we should remember that Yugoslavia is now very useful to Russia as a source of imports, as a spearhead of the attack in international organizations and as a show piece of communism outside Russia. So far as the Russians consider unselfishly the needs of any Government it must be the Yugoslav Government.

17. These two rules may govern every day relations but would probably break down in the event of a serious clash of interests. But there is a third rule which would, however, obtain even during such a conflict. This is that the Yugoslav Government must depend to a very large extent upon Russian support for its internal position. At the moment there is no need for aggressive Russian support to keep the country held down, but one of the most potent factors which has prevented active opposition is the wide-spread belief that even if the Army could be penetrated or neutralized the Russians would still return and re-impose Tito by force of arms. If the regime were ever to lose Russian support the possibilities of a revolution would be very greatly increased, a fact which the regime could certainly not afford to ignore.

18. After Saying all this I need hardly add that at present I see no chance whatsoever of useful encouragement to national as opposed to international communists. I shall of course bear the matter in mind and let you know if I see any reason to change the conclusions I have now reached.

19. I am sending copies of this letter to Frank Roberts, Ashley Clark, Ward and Nichols.

C.F.A. Warner, Esq., CMG, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

British Embassy – Belgrade - December 21st, 1946

No. 425

Sir,

The Slav Congress, which opened its proceedings in Belgrade on 8th December, brought them to a close some five days later. Thorough preparations have been made for this meeting, and an Organizing Committee had been set up so far back as July last in order to facilitate its work, which was stated to be the development of the brotherhood between the Slav nations, with the aim of strengthening democracy in Europe and the world in the fight against fascism, and to help in the building of international peace and security. The Yugoslav press played its full part before and during the proceedings, and no effort was spared to make the occasion, which was loudly and proudly proclaimed to be the first post-war congress, a memorable one, and to point out the significance of choosing Yugoslavia as its host.

2. At first sight, it might have been thought that the choice of Belgrade was an add one. The city has suffered heavily from the ravages of war and is notably lacking in those facilities and amenities normally in demand at international gatherings. It is best with an acute housing problem, and it can have been no easy task to accommodate the 250 delegates, a list whose names is annexed hereto, who together with their advisers and experts, cannot have amounted to much less than 500 persons. But the choice of Belgrade was clearly not dictated by convenience. Yugoslavia proclaims herself with increasing assurance the leader of the Balkan countries and the head and front for the coming Balkanic Confederation. Her long seaboard on the Adriatic encourages her to believe that she is the advance guard of the Slav nations facing the West, and the choice, therefore, of Belgrade a the place most suitable for those purposes of Slav propaganda, which the Congress was convened to carry out, was no doubt made with great deliberation.

3. A study of the proceedings of the Congress, which have been published in great detail, reveals the following three main themes:- the unity and brotherhood of the Slavs, not only in Europe but the

world over, under their great mother, Soviet Russia, upon whom they are entirely depended and to whom they owe everything; the necessity of maintaining this unity against the menace of “fascism” and “imperialism”; and the superiority of the democratic system as evolved by the Slav nations since the war over what is described as the “classic idea of democracy” in the West. The list of delegates, as you will see, is a long one, and contains representatives from the United States and Canada (who sent 11 and 10 representatives), South America (represented by an Argentine Slav, who proclaimed that he also represented the Uruguayan and Bolivian Slavs) and delegates from Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. The largest delegation, 21 strong, was that from Russia, headed by Marshal Tolbukin, but Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland were each represented by approximately the same number. A delegation from Albania was also present, first as brotherly observers and later to understand, to all intents as purposes, as full members of the Congress and honorary Slavs. The decorations in the streets, which were not too well contrived, invariably gave their chief honour to the Russian flag with smaller satellite emblems grouped around it.

4. The Congress opened on 8th December with the setting up of the Presidential Committee, to which were elected, among other, M. Stalin, Marshal Tito, M. Dimitrov, President Beirut, President Benes and M. Molotov, these names being received with tremendous applause, though the loudest cheer of all was received for the name of M. Stalin. Marshal Tito then gave the inaugural address, which was softer in tone than some he has delivered lately. The Slav people, he said, must walk the way of reciprocal affection, collaboration and spiritual unity, wherever they live. They had great mission, but it was not, he emphasized, to create a pan Slav bloc. It was only when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union that the Slavs had realized, for the first time, what disunity meant. What would have happened had there been no great Soviet Union? What would have happened without the Glorious Red Army? What would have happened without that genius Stalin? No gratitude would be so great to pay to the mighty Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Slavs were creating a new and true people’s democracy. They were not meeting at the congress to make blocs against other nations, but to

demonstrate their resolution that a just peace must be made for all countries which had played their part in the struggle.

5. All this was well received, but it breathed an unexpected air of mildness, which Marshal Tolbukin, who spoke for the Soviet delegation, was at pains to correct. He warned his listeners that there were reactionary forces in the world which were trying to prepare the way for a new aggression; to conquer other countries and to enslave other peoples. They must never forget comrade Stalin's words that it was necessary to hinder and curb these war-mongers.

6. Little comment is called for upon the other introductory speeches, though it is of some interest that one of the American Slavs in spite of so recent an arrival in Yugoslavia, announced that he had discovered that it was a land of smiling people, singing their way through life, and said how great would be his privilege to tell the United States that in Yugoslavia freedom reigned, and hoped one day Americans too might enjoy the same liberty. Upon this note of mutual gratulation the day's proceedings closed, and the guests proceeded to the business of refreshments upon the customary heroic scale.

7. The following day, the Congress was offered stronger meat. The tone was set by Milovan Djilas who, while he did not deny that such great states as Britain and America had made certain sacrifices in the war, pointed out that these could not be compared with those made by such little countries as Poland and Yugoslavia. After the customary references to foreign imperialists, he went to coin a phrase by describing Russia as the Empire on which the sun never sets. When bombs had fallen on Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs had said "so many less bombs on Russia". One thing had become clear to the Yugoslav people – that there was not and could not be any salvation without Russia. There could be no Slav collaboration without unselfish love for the Soviet Union, and no success in the fight for freedom and democracy without reliance on the Soviet Union.

8. Djilas was followed by the Argentine delegate who said he spoke for 800,000 Slavs in his own country as well as the Slav communities of Uruguay and Bolivia. He described all that the Slavs are doing in South America to strengthen their ties with the Soviet

Union, - “that fortress of democracy”, - and in general to forge the links of Slav unity.

9. On the third day, a complete change came over the proceedings, and the deliberations of the Congress took on a mood of tranquil piety. The opening speech was by the Russian academician Grakov, who paid a moving tribute to St. Cyril and St. Methodius, to whom, he said, the Slav nations owe an inextinguishable debt, since they had made the worship of God possible in the language understood by all Slavs.

10. He was followed by Monsignor Ritig, so lately in evidence as a Yugoslav delegate at the Paris and the one Roman Catholic cleric of any note in sympathy with the regime, who was received with great applause, and who was carried away by the spiritual fervour of the occasion that he described the souls of the audience as being “washed with the growth of majestic thoughts”. Reconciliation, he said, was the aim of the Congress. Reconciliation between the white and the black races – and here he was addressing himself particularly to the Anglo-Saxons. But the greatest reconciliation of all he continued must be between the East and the West. With the West, the Slavs had been until yesterday allies, and they never wished to be their adversaries, not only for their own sake, but for the sake of all humanity.

11. It was only natural that so lofty an address should produce something of an anti-climax, but the Russian Archbishop Nikolai, who received an immense ovation, did his best to maintain this high level. He described the work of the Russian Orthodox Church in the course of a thousand years of history, and went on to speak of what had been accomplished by its sister churches, including that in Bulgaria, whose people he averred had been so unfortunately deceived by their rulers at the beginning of the war. After this the proceedings rather faded away in a general discussion of cultural aims.

12. A necessary tonic was provided by the publication the same evening of the Congress Manifesto, whose terms, in their wearisome familiarity, indicated where the original draft had almost certainly been prepared. “Who” it demanded querulously, “would want a new

war? A new war is only needed by imperialist conquerors. Freedom-loving people of the world”, it continued, “fight against the attempts of imperialist conquerors to enslave us. Strengthen the links of eternal friendship with the liberator and protector of all Slavs, the great Soviet Union”.

13. The following day, a mild sensation was provided by a speech from the Patriarch Gavrilo, who had returned to Yugoslavia less than three weeks earlier. He had been received by Marshal Tito a few days before the Congress started, and it was understood that their meeting had been cordial, but when he failed to put in an appearance at the previous day’s session during which so many Christian sentiments had been uttered, it was thought that he must still be in the shadows. The Patriarch’s aim was clearly to prove his entire respectability to the Government. Reciprocal love and fraternal collaboration would he said build the future happiness of the Slavs. Moreover, Slav solidarity was guided by their centuries of protector, mother Russia (loud applause), and by the noble Russian people, headed by the great Stalin. (The whole Congress stood and, for some minutes, gave frenzied applause). Some what surprisingly, the Patriarch then went on to mention the founder of the Christian religion, whose Name he had not figured much in speeches made in this country recently and to whom he ascribed qualities and ideals not dissimilar to those which had so freely, but far more fervently, been attributed to Comrade Stalin by other speakers. This tribute received but faint applause. He ended with a little doxology to the Church, the Priesthood and Marshal Tito, and this was excellently received.

14. On the same day, the citizens of Belgrade (about 200,000 according to the newspapers) flocked to the Square of the Republic to demonstrate their affection for their Slav brothers, having thoughtfully provided themselves beforehand with appropriate banners and such slogans as “Long live the best friend of the Slavs, Generalissimo Stalin” and “Greetings to our brother nation, Bulgaria”.

15. So far as Belgrade was concerned, this was the culminating point in the proceedings. The following day the delegates went off to Zagreb, where they were met by 100,000 rapturous hosts. The night

before their departure, Marshal Tito gave to the Congress a lavish reception, to which none but Slavs were invited, and marked consideration was paid to the delegates from the United States, the Argentine, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The visit to Zagreb was mostly devoted to sight seeing, there being more opportunities of this kind there than in Belgrade, and it was crowned by a particularly elaborate reception given by the Croatian Government in the evening, at which there were peasant dances, the performers in national costume, being invited to the reception which followed. The celebrations in Zagreb were followed by similar festivities at Ljubljana, where once again was assembled a vast crowd which had stood for hours along the line to greet the special train. The doings at Ljubljana were not protracted, the delegates leaving almost immediately for Bled, where the lake was especially illuminated in their honour. Finally, after an unostentatious return to Belgrade, the Congress dispersed on the 16th December.

16. Such then is the record of the proceedings, so far as it has been published in the press. The Czechoslovak and Polish Ambassadors here, in speaking to me about the Congress before it met said that, so far as their respective delegations were concerned, no one was coming who was competent to discuss political questions, nor did either of them think that politics would figure much in the proceedings. Neither M. Korbel nor M. Wende were themselves delegates, and the latter, who called on me on the day the Congress broke up confessed that he had not as yet read any of the speeches, though he was hoping, when he has a little more leisure, to do so. On the whole, I am inclined to think that political discussions were not a feature of the Congress, nor indeed would the atmosphere had been propitious for them.

17. The Congress, in my view, had a simpler and a three fold aim; in the first place to achieve the maximum publicity in the Slav press for the superiority of the Slav democracy over the ancient and outmoded forms as used in the West; secondly to penetrate the Western hemisphere with these same and finally make plain the absolute predominance of Russia and the Slav Confederation. The greatest consideration was shown to the delegates from the Americas, New Zealand and Australia, and it is particularly significant that the Marshal specially received the U.S. and

Canadian delegates, an honour not accorded to the Soviet Delegation. No pains were spared to remind them of their kinship with their brothers Slavs and to assure that, on their return to their countries of adoption, they would spread the leaven with which they had been studiously provided. The Slav Congress will be an annual affair, and no effort or expense will be too much to improve it as an organ of publicity for enlightenment both at home and abroad. Each of the smaller Slav countries will be made to serve as a spearhead of Russian propaganda when occasion offers, but this will I believe apply in particular to Yugoslavia who, I have little doubt, both in her own eyes and in those of Russia, has a special role to play among the satellites.

18. The question remains whether we can afford to stand by and watch this formidable organ of propaganda perfect itself, without making an effective reply. Moreover, it will not merely be an organ of propaganda, but a potential means of penetrating and disrupting the political life of countries where there are any considerable number of Slav immigrants. The question is one which affects not only the United States and Latin America, but also the British Commonwealth of Nations, for there is a Slav minority in Canada and Australia. At the same time it raises issues on which I am in no position to give anything but an incomplete opinion, for any counter measure would involve a deliberate offensive propaganda campaign against every Slav country and the Soviet Union in particular. There are no Anglo-Saxon minorities behind the Iron Curtain where racial or religious feelings can be exploited for political ends, and in the circumstances therefore our defense other than reliance on the fundamental health and resistance to disease of the democratic political organism must be offense.

I am sending a copy of this dispatch to Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Sofia and Washington.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble Servant, (Sgd.) Charles Peake.

The right Honourable C.R. Attles, P.C., M.P., etc., etc.

British Embassy – Belgrade - January 2nd, 1946

??/1/47

Dear Department,

Will you please refer to your printed dispatch No. 1102 of the 3rd December (R.17049/298/67) enclosing a copy from a letter from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada concerning the departure from Canada of three Bulgarian and Macedonian delegates to the Pan-Slav Congress.

2. As we reported on our dispatch No. 425 R.592/24/92 of the 20th December, in all ten delegates to the Pan-Slav Congress arrived from Canada. They did not play any very noticeable part in the proceedings of the Congress. Four of them, three of whom are off to visit relations in Bulgaria, namely Andrej Hristov, Lambo Sotirov, Andrej Palmirov and Nikola Kiris, were entertained to a cocktail party at the Embassy on December 30th.

3. They did not appear to have been particularly impressed by the series of speeches, banquets, conducted tours and demonstrations put on in their honour, and although they said that they admired what was being done in Yugoslavia in the way of reconstruction, they were only keen to return to Canada which, they said, was so much more advanced in all material matters. As for the new “new democracy” of which there was so much talk in Yugoslavia, Hristov said that he had had no hesitation in telling his fellow delegates that in Canada also there was a type of democracy which he regarded as being nothing inferior to that in the Slav countries.

4. Although they had a few opportunities of obtaining independent information on the current state of affairs in this country they said that they realized there was some dissatisfaction with the regime, though they believed this to be merely on the part of those formerly of the richer classes. Kiris, who said that he intended to write on the new Yugoslavia for the Greek paper in Toronto, said that he believed that 60 per cent of the peasantry supported the present government.

5. Palmirov, the head of the Macedonian League in Toronto, who had visited Skopje, had been impressed by the enthusiasm of the Macedonians who were at last being allowed to run their own affairs and to have their own language in schools. He compared this state of affairs favourably with that existing in Greece where he alleged that the Macedonians were not allowed to have their own schools, but he went on to say that it did not matter at all whether the Macedonians were under Yugoslav, Greek or Bulgarian rule. So long as they were allowed to use their own language they would be contented.

6. All four of the delegates appear to have been very grateful for having been asked to a British Embassy which, they said, amidst the alien atmosphere here, reminded them of their home in Canada. While it is possible that in such surroundings they tended to stress more than usually their preferences for Canada to the Balkans and their loyalty to the British Empire, we have no doubt that if the organizers of the Pan-Slav Congress hoped to find a potential 5th column in these particular Canadian delegates they were grievously disappointed. Indeed Hristov remarked that while his generation of Macedonians in Canada might be interested in preserving their Macedonian culture, their sons have no interest in their countries of origin and were just plain good Canadians.

We are sending a copy of this letter to Sofia.

Yours ever, Chancery, T.M.F

British Embassy – Moscow - May 2, 1944

My telegram No. 1128.

1. Taken in conjunction with articles to which attention was drawn in my telegram under reference article in “Trud” of May 1st (see my telegram No. 1138) warrants assumption that Soviet press has received a directive to play up EAM and to discredit new Greek Government by argument that Greek situation is in all essential respects analogous to that prevailing in Yugoslavia. This assumption is supported by detached tone of Molotov’s acknowledgment of Prime Minister’s message about Greece (your telegram No. 1309). It looks therefore as if though attitude of Soviet Government towards Greece is beginning to crystallize in a direction which diverges from our own.

2. When speaking about Balkan situation as instructed in your telegram No. 1261 I shall take opportunity to draw attention to unfortunate impression “Trud”’s article conveys at the time when we are bending our efforts towards restoration of Greek unity. When referring to Macedonia I shall moreover mention article in “Red Star” of April 30th (see my telegram No. 1138) with its favourable references to Tito’s recent promise of an autonomous Macedonia. This last-named article, which goes to show that Tito’s views on this subject are endorsed here is incidentally the first reference we have seen in the Soviet papers to Marshal Tito’s recently proclaimed program.

3. In view of importance of our avoiding serious divergence between Soviet Government and ourselves about Greece it would seem advisable that my own forthcoming representations to Soviet authorities should be reinforced by some plain speaking to Soviet Ambassador in London.

British Embassy Moscow - May 1944

My immediately preceding telegram.

H.M. Minister from his local knowledge of pre-war Balkan problems, has suggested to me that Marshal Tito's program as disclosed in Sulzberger interview which we have just seen is historical sequence of pre-war movement towards creation of an integrated Yugoslavia. Following are his comments on the subject which may possibly assist in clarifying the present situation.

2. On the Bulgarian side this movement played an important part in the 1934 coup d'état at Sofia which led at the same time to the collapse of the Mihailovist Macedonians and their supporters in the army backed by King Boris. Bulgarians responsible for this event, some of whom are presumably still active behind the scenes, were ardent believers in a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and inclined to amalgamation with Yugoslavia in a federal state in which Macedonia would naturally fall into place as an autonomous unit.

3. In Yugoslavia Mr. Balfour found that a similar concept prevailed not only amongst Pan-Serbs who argued that a greater Yugoslavia would offer a bulwark to great power domination of the Balkans, but also among the Croats who looked upon fusion of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as a means of counteracting predominant influence of the Serbs. Leaving aside its Pan-Serb advocates, the greater Yugoslavia concept bore a distinctly agrarian, not to say left wing, complications. It was in any case most disquieting to the Greeks and Romanians and an important factor in their refusal of the Balkan entente to contain Bulgaria.

4. Development of integral Yugoslavia idea was retarded in the pre-war period by existence of separate dynasties in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, by deep mistrust of Bulgaria in Yugoslav governing circles, and by the interplay of great power rivalry in the Balkans. Marshal Tito's present programme, which appears to commend itself to the Soviet authorities, revives the concept in its essential features excepting that it specifically excludes Greek Macedonia from the proposal to give Macedonia full autonomy within a federated greater Yugoslavia. The evident corollary to this exception is that Greece

should be ruled by those elements best qualified to ensure their permanent friendship to the proposed new Slav State.

Bulgaria – Macedonia - Greece

Minutes

H.E.

In accordance with foreign office telegram No. 1261 of the 27th April (at 64/4/44) and in the light of subsequent press articles commented upon in Moscow telegram No. 1139 of the 2nd May (at 122/10/44) Y.E. when next seeing M. Molotov might say that you have the following remarks to make about Balkan problems: -

1. Bulgaria

Y.E. might tell M. Molotov you are still awaiting the written answer which M. Vyshinski informed you on the 4th April would be returned to your letter of March 31st asking whether the Soviet Minister at Sofia was coming to Moscow and whether the Soviet Government had any plans for exploiting the situation in Bulgaria to the common advantage.

Y.E. might then remind M. Molotov that, as you told M. Vyshinski in your talk with him on the 4th April, we had heard from our Ambassador at Angora at the end of March that the Bulgarian Military Attaché there was spreading the story that when the ed Army reached the Danube the Bulgarian Government would invoke the aid of the Soviet Government to persuade its Allies to get Bulgaria out of the war in return for them being allowed to keep Greek Thrace and Salonika. Y.E. might then go on to say that H.M.G. are still inclined to think that like drowning men who clutch at straws, the Bulgarians may be counting on some such absurd idea as a means of saving their own skin. Does M. Molotov think that there are any means of disabusing the Bulgarian Government that they have nothing to gain by sitting tight in the hope that they may trade themselves out of the war at the expense of Greece? In general Y.E. might repeat the H.M.G. would welcome any information which the Soviet Government felt able to give them about the attitude of these Balkan Mr. Micawbers who seem to be waiting for something to turn up.

2. Macedonia

Y.E. might say that H.M.G. have noticed that in an interview given to the American journalist Mr. Sulzburger published in the "New York Times" on the 11th April, Dr. Joseph Smodlaka, who deals with foreign affairs on Marshal Tito's National Committee, spoke of the need to solve the relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria by giving Macedonia full autonomy within a federal Yugoslavia. You might then say that you had yourself noticed an article in "Red Star" of the 30th April which approved the declaration about an autonomous Macedonia. Y.E. might go on to say that H.M.G. have asked you to tell him that they assume the Soviet Government share their view that this idea of an autonomous Macedonia, on which we ourselves at present do not wish to commit ourselves, should stand over for eventual discussion at the peace conference when it should be decided in agreement with fully representative Yugoslav and Greek Governments.

3. Greece

Y.E. might say that you have noticed from the reply of M. Molotov to the Prime Minister's message of the 25th of April about Greece, the text of which you had received from the Foreign Office, that the Soviet Government did not feel able to accept any responsibility for Greek affairs or for measures taken by the British Government. You might go on to say that you hoped that the Soviet Government at any rate fully appreciated that we are spending all our efforts to secure Greek unity.

From Bulgaria to War office - December 13th, 1944

From: A.C.C. Bulgaria
To: The War Office

EMERGENCY

Ref. A.F.H.Q. FX 66493 of 10th Dec and my M/279 of 11th Dec.,
Most reliable information tells us that within last 24 hours he has received following news from several independent sources of whom bone fides he is sure but whose reports are so far unconfirmed. Partisans of General Apostolovski's Macedonia Army have crossed Greek frontier ostensibly to give aid to ELAS but in fact to establish themselves in Greek Macedonia. These troops described as 1st Macedonian Bde reported commanded by Petsko Trajkov probably number about 3,000. Some source states that Bulgarian Partisans under Slavche Trnski have entered Thrace between Nevrokop and Drama in co-operation with Macedonians.

It is not (rpt not) believed that Bulgarian Govt is in any way party to either of these movements. Personality notes on Trajkov and Trnski follow. Please pass to foreign office.

T.O.O.1710.

FOREIGN NATIONALITY GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES

MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN NATIONALITIES
BRANCH TO THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

NUMBER 189 - 13 MAY 1944

BULGARIAN-AMERICANS AND THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

Bulgarian-Americans, most of whom originated in the disputed areas of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece known as "Macedonia," are concerned that this irredentist Balkan region shall become independent or autonomous after the war. The nationalistic Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), standing traditionally for an independent Macedonia, is showing signs of coming closer to the view of the pro-Soviet Macedonian-American People's League (MAPL) which wants to see Macedonia an autonomous member of a Slavic or Balkan federation, and whose leaders have played an important part in the pro-Tito United Committee of South-Slavic Americans.

OF PRIMARY INTEREST to Bulgarian-Americans is Bulgaria's irredenta- Macedonia. Three wars have been fought over Macedonia in recent times and its fate in the present war has yet to be decided. Lately the Bulgarian-American press has become almost exclusively concerned with discussion of this question. The Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), recently assembled in special meeting, drew up a declaration to be sent to President Roosevelt urging the establishment of a free and independent Macedonia. On the other hand the Macedonia-American People's League and the Bulgarian-Macedonian Congress, both Sovietophile and pro-Partisan and both standing in opposition to the MPO, have been moved to appeal to all Macedonians and Bulgarians in the United States to join the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans and work for a South-Slav federation.

Though Bulgarian- and Macedonian-Americans (1) are agreed on two points- that Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia must not remain in

Greek (2) and Yugoslav hands after the war, and that Macedonia must become "whole" again - this difference of opinion among them as to what is to be done with the disputed region once it is reconstituted, is fundamental. Macedonian-Americans are divided between those who want an independent Macedonia and those who want the region to be autonomous within a Balkan federation. Bulgarians and Bulgarian-Americans for their part insist that Macedonia must be a part of Bulgaria.

Bulgarians in the United States

Although the 1940 Census lists only 15,500 persons of Bulgarians in Bulgarian origin in the United States, the Bulgarian- the United States Macedonian-Americans themselves claim a total of nearly 40,000. They point out that many Bulgarians were listed in the Census as Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Turks because they were born in places which became incorporated in Greece, Yugoslavia, or Turkey. Most of the Bulgarian emigrants in the United States did not come from Bulgaria proper. It is estimated that 70 per cent of the Bulgarian emigration came from Macedonia, beginning as early as 1878, at the end of the Russo-Turkish war. It was not until the decade preceding the First World War that a large wave, estimated by some as high as forty thousand, reached American shores. After 1920, a large number of Bulgarian-Macedonians, seeking to escape oppression and to find better living conditions, emigrated from areas annexed by Greece and Yugoslavia. For the most part the immigrants settled in the mining and manufacturing sections of Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri. Very few chose to work on farms.

Geographically, the emigrants of Bulgarian origin are scattered over a wide area of the United States. Though most of them were of peasant origin and though few were literate at the time of their arrival, the fact that they were less segregated than most foreign emigres tended to speed up their Americanization. This has been especially the case with the new generations which tend to sever all connections with their foreign-born forebears.

In Europe Bulgaro-Macedonians number, according to varying estimates, from one and one-half to three million persons.

Linguistically, they are more akin to Bulgaria than to Serbia, and politically also they are closer to the Bulgarians than to either the Greeks or the Yugoslavs. Especially in times of political upheaval, the Bulgarian-Americans point out, Slavo-Macedonians turn their eyes toward Bulgaria—a tendency which receives further impetus from the fact that their Orthodox Church looked to Sofia rather than to Athens or to Belgrade.

Bulgarian-American Organizations

Bulgarian -and Macedonian -American immigrants Bulgarian-American in the United States are grouped around a number Organizations of fraternal and mutual aid societies, four of which are politically active. Among the most important is the Macedonian Political Organization (MPO) of the United States and Canada, led by Luben Dimitroff, with headquarters in Indianapolis. The MPO, organized in 1921, has 1,800 members grouped into thirty-six branches. Its single political objective, expressed through its weekly, the Makekedonska Tribuna of Indianapolis, is the independence of Macedonia. (3) However, the MPO has also argued for, an autonomous Macedonia within the Bulgarian state, and before Pearl Harbor approved of King Boris's policy of collaboration with the Axis. The MPO has been regarded as the American branch of the IMRO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization which has sought by terroristic means to "liberate" Macedonia; but the MPO leadership claims there is no such connection. More recently, MPO leaders have, begun to look with favor on the idea of "federation."

Standing in opposition to the MPO is the Macedonian-American People's League (MAPL) headed by Smile Voydanoff. The League represents the pro-Soviet wing of the Macedonian movement and is the publisher of the Communist-line Bulgarian-language weekly, Narodna Volya. The MAPL was founded in Detroit in 1930. It has worked closely with the Federation of Bulgarian-Macedonian Educational Clubs whose pro-Soviet Views are also expressed through Narodna Volya. Arguing for an autonomous Macedonia within a Balkan federation, MAPL leadership, along with its counterpart in the Federation of Bulgarian-Macedonian Educational Clubs, has found its way into the pro-Partisan United Committee of

South-Slavic Americans which was organized by the Slovenian-American writer Louis Adamic.

A body of Bulgarian-American nationalists not united in any formal organization express themselves through the semi-weekly *Naroden Glas* of Granite City (Illinois). The oldest and one of the most influential Bulgarian-language papers in the United States, *Narode Glas* supports the idea of a "greater Bulgaria." It opposes MAPL for following the Communist-line and it opposes the Macedonian-nationalist MPO because Macedonia, according to *Naroden Glas* spokesmen, is a "natural part of Bulgaria" and must belong to that state entirely.

The Bulgarian-Socialist Labor Federation is a small group of old-time Bulgarian- and Macedonian-American Socialists whose activities are more intellectual than political. They take little interest in the affairs of the homeland. Their mouthpiece is the Granite City weekly *Rabotnicheska Prosveta*, scornful alike of the Macedonian nationalists and the conventional Socialists and Communists. The professed aim of *Rabotnicheska Prosveta* is "...to preach among the Bulgarian workers the principles of the true proletarian revolution—the destruction, and not the reform of capitalism and the creation, of the Workers' Socialist Industrial Republic."

Collaboration with Germany Explained

In this war as in the last, most Macedonian- and Bulgarian-Americans claim that Bulgarian support of the "Central Powers" resulted from the unwillingness of the democracies to support Bulgaria. When their homeland accepted Hitler, they argue, Bulgaria was, in the words of an MPO spokesman only "applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter." Luben Dimitroff, editor of *Makedonska Tribuna*, and secretary of the MPO, explained the collaboration between the Macedonians and the Nazis as follows: "The ideology of Nazism is completely foreign to the Macedonians ...[the Germans] freed about 2,500 young Macedonians exiled on various Greek islands and permitted the Macedonians to use their own language and worship in their own churches. No matter who would have given them those privileges they [the Macedonians] would have been grateful..."

Macedonian Independence Demanded by MPO

The problem of Macedonia was the single concern of a meeting held by the Macedonian Political Organization at the Macedonian-Bulgarian Hall in Akron (Ohio), 23 April. Gathered in extraordinary session, about 200 members of the MPO discussed a declaration demanding independence for Macedonia. The finished memorandum, sent to President Roosevelt asserted that "in the land bearing the ancient name Macedonia...there live approximately three million inhabitants whose ethnic and linguistic diversity [has served as a] ...pretext upon which Macedonian neighbors have based their claims for domination of Macedonia." Mindful of the political and administrative problem which Macedonia has created "for every Balkan state," the declaration called for a "Macedonia for the Macedonians."

In addition to its own delegates, three delegates led by Cross Misheff, representing the Macedonian-American Unity for Victory Club of Detroit came to MPO's assembly. Formerly a leader with George Pirinsky, secretary, of the Michigan Slav Congress, in the pro-Soviet Macedonian-American People's League, Misheff broke with that organization, which he had helped to found, and established his own Victory Club.

Cross Misheff vs. the anti-Communists

Misheff's participation in the MPO meeting gave it a unique flavor. A renegade fellow-traveler, signed the declaration calling for Macedonian independence but not before he succeeded in having a line of its text changed to read "allied" instead of "American" occupation of Macedonia. He proposed several resolutions which the Assembly passed. One was a message to Macedonians in the "armed forces fighting fascism." The other, addressed broadly to Macedonians fighting the Nazis abroad, brought up the question: to whom, specifically, should the resolution be sent? Misheff suggested that it be sent to Dimitri Vlahoff, a Communist and at present reported to be in Moscow as the Macedonian representative of Tito's Government, and to Mihailo Apostolsky, a Major General leading Macedonian guerrillas under Tito's banner in Macedonia.

Although there were objections to the resolution, it was finally decided to submit the message to the Office of War Information to be short-waved to Europe. Misheff failed in his attempt to have a resolution passed calling for an understanding with the pro-Partisan Macedonian- American People's League. MPO leadership tabled it. Nothing, said Luben Dimitroff, secretary of MPO, would be done to encourage any, meeting with "Communist-line" groups.

Dimitroff and Balkan Federation

What political weight Luben Dimitroff has, derives from the fact that he represents the views of some 5,000 American citizens on an issue about which the American public as a whole will probably never be called to express an opinion. Dimitroff's ruling passion is Macedonian independence. Born in Macedonia in the first decade of this century, he was reared and educated in Sofia. He was active in the Macedonian movement there and came to this country in 1931 to carry on MPO's struggle for Macedonian freedom. In a recent talk with a representative of this Branch, Dimitroff said: "We want a Macedonia like Switzerland. The Swiss have no nation but consist of Germans, French, and Italians. We have no nation -only a geographical location- but we want to be known as Macedonians."

Dimitroff prefers a Balkan to a South Slav federation. In his opinion a Balkan federation should include Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania, "roughly a bloc of 60,000,000." A federal government elected by all groups would rule the federation in which each nation would preserve its own nationality. Dimitroff's preference for a Balkan rather than an exclusively Slav federation is based upon his belief that the exclusion of Greece and Rumania would produce friction; the traditional Slav desire for an outlet to the Mediterranean at Salonika would prove particularly troublesome if Greece were excluded.

Asked for his opinion of the Yugoslav Partisans, Dimitroff replied, "We will not take any definite stand until the thing crystallizes. However, if it has to be a choice between King Peter and Tito, we prefer Tito. In my opinion the Tito movement is not all

communistic." He would oppose a Bulgaro-Macedonian republic, he added.

Dimitroff expressed his attitude towards the Adamic-Balokovich United Committee of South-Slavic Americans in this way. "We are not working against the South-Slavic Committee, but we are not joining them either. If they had based their committee on broader principles I would have been for them but up to now they have followed the Communist-line too closely. So far, their path is too narrow but if they should change their attitude we might join with them."

Bulgarian-American Communist-Line Politics

Pro-Soviet Bulgarian-American organizations, though envisaging the creation of a federation of republican Slavic states in which Bulgaro-Macedonian aspirations to "liberation" would be realized, tend to play down specifically Macedonian aims. Blago Popoff, Bulgarian-American member of the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans, expressed this inclination when he stated the leftist case against the MPO program. "There is a tendency on their part," he said, "to work out the borders of Macedonia at the present time. ...[when] ...the main thing now should be the winning of the war." In like manner most leftist Bulgarian-Macedonian leaders in the United States have joined the United Committee whose program is Balkan rather than Bulgarian or Macedonian.

The Macedonian-American People's League, as noted above, and its affiliates, the Federation of Bulgarian Macedonian Educational Clubs and the Bulgarian-Macedonian Congress (organized by leftists in July 1943) were quick to ally themselves with the Adamic-founded United Committee. George Pirinsky and Smile Voydanoff, respectively general secretary and president of the MAPL; Peter Peff, wealthy New York businessman and chairman of the Bulgarian-Macedonian Congress; and Victor Sharenkoff of the Bulgarian-Macedonian Educational Clubs; all hold offices in the United Committee. The political activity of these leaders has not been focused on their own organizations. Instead their efforts have been directed to building up the United Committee which, over the

signature of Peter Peff, all Bulgarian- and Macedonian-Americans have recently been asked to join.

NOTES;

(1) The term Macedonian-American, as used in this paper, refers to those whose mother tongue was Slavic and excludes the Greek-speaking element deriving from Macedonia.

(2) For a description of the Greek-American concern with the Macedonian question, see FN Number 153 of 29 September 1943.

(3) A map published by the Central Committee of the MPO (February 1944) illustrates what is conceived by this organization to be Macedonia. It includes all western, central, and eastern Greek Macedonia plus the island of Thasos; southwestern Bulgaria; southern Yugoslavia to a point north of Skopije; and a small strip of eastern Albania. The territory is described as an area of 23,000 square miles (about as large as the State of West Virginia).

The Bulgarian Character of the Macedonian Villagers

October 18, 1943

The Foreign Service of the United States of America
No, 1578 (R-1484
American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey

SUBJECT: The Bulgarian Character of the Macedonian Villagers

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Sir:

I have the honor to present below a signed editorial from the Bulgarian newspaper ZORA of October 13, 1943, written by Yordan Badev, one of the most vigorous and enthusiastic exponents of the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Badev is himself a Macedonian born at Bitolya in 1888/ He received his higher education in the University of Sofia and Lausanne. By profession he is a newspaper writer and in addition is a literary man and dramatist of some repute. He is an able writer and doubtless a sincere Macedonian patriot. He has made his home in Sofia for many years.

Mr. Badev is concerned to show the Bulgarian character of the Macedonian villagers. He maintains that in spite of Serbian rule - or Serbian slavery, as he calls it -during the last twenty-five years the Macedonian villager is still essentially Bulgarian, speaking the Bulgarian language and maintaining Bulgarian traditions. The Serbian effort toward the de-Bulgarization of Macedonia made its greatest efforts in the towns rather than the villages, the Serbian policy being to Serbianize the towns and then to Serbianize the villages. The three principal agencies in this work were the school, the barracks and the police station. The writer points out that the Serbians gave very little attention to education in the villages, as shown by the fact that the number of village schools found in Macedonia by the Bulgarian authorities in 1941 was approximately the same as the number of schools maintained there by the Bulgarian Exarchate in Turkish times before 1912.

One of the means of arousing the interest of the village population in Macedonia and of encouraging their Bulgarianism, has been the opening of reading rooms in the villages. These reading rooms (chitalishta) contain a small library, Bulgarian newspapers, a lecture room and sometimes an assembly hall, or a social room for gatherings of various kinds. They are found all over Bulgaria and have been spread through Macedonia during the last two years. The writer points out that the number of these reading rooms in the Bitolya district has now reached seventy. Apart from their propaganda uses, these reading rooms are most useful institutions, as they form social centers in the villages and small towns where such are otherwise lacking, except as provided by the local church. The writer believes that the villagers in Macedonia have responded with great enthusiasm to the unification movement.

This editorial emphasizes the primary problem connected with the settlement in Macedonia, the fact that a large proportion of the population there is consciously Bulgarian. The Macedonian population as a whole is very much mixed, a fact always overlooked by the Bulgarian propagandists, but in most areas of that part of Macedonia which was under Serbian rule from 1918 to 1941 the most numerous element in the population is undoubtedly Bulgarian in its sentiment and in its language and traditions. This fact only adds to the extreme difficulty of arriving at any settlement of the Macedonian question which will bring peace and the opportunity for prosperity to that troubled province.

In free translation Mr. Badev's editorial reads as follows:

THE PEASANT WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN EDUCATION

By Yordan Badev

“Among the impressions which the former Prime Minister -now a Regent -Professor Bogdan Filov, gave as the result of his recent tour in Macedonia, there was one characteristic affirmation: that the people in the Macedonian villages have been kept unspoiled both in their Bulgarian language and in their national or patriotic sentiment. Serbian slavery of a quarter of a century has not succeeded in erasing from the spirit of the peasants the memory of recent struggles for free Bulgaria, nor from the life of the peasants the hold of Bulgarian national customs. It is true that the Serbians considered it as one of their first problems in Macedonia to win over the towns and from there to creep on to the villages. And they tried by all means of suggestion and of moral and physical pressure-- particularly through the school, the barracks and the police station - first to separate the youth from its Bulgarian tradition by directing it more toward the lightness and laxity characteristic of Serbian national character. For such 'cultural conquests' the villages lacked suitable conditions. And as it was the village that held secondary place with regard to the educational policy after a quarter of a century of Serbian domination, the Bulgarian educational authorities found in the Macedonian villages about the same number of schools as had been established there by the Exarchate down to 1912. The Serbs showed absolutely no interest in the enlightenment of the villages. And so much the better, for in this way the Macedonian village was left more freely to follow along the path of its own national traditions. There is hardly a village in Macedonia which does not keep alive the memory of some Bulgarian leader, some teacher or priest, some national celebration, some battle of its own living or dead heroes of the time when the whole Bulgarian nation of Macedonia fought with arms in its hands for its freedom and for its national unification. In the villages more than in the towns have been preserved those Bulgarian national songs about kings, heroes, supernatural creatures, about the sun god, about the earth and bread and the like and also new songs concerning 'glorious leaders' and 'standard bearers'. In these songs are treasured, parallel with the image of that distant and recent national past, also the unity, the uncorrupted wholeness of the Bulgarian national language. Far from

the dynamic culture of the towns, the village also lives far from the destruction of the gossip, slander and looseness of the town vagabonds. It treasures in a crude primitive way the whole, sound and lasting Bulgarianism which is expressed today in the inspiration coming from the achievement of national unification, is loyalty to Bulgarian law and in zeal and efforts for more education. This was best understood and declared by the numerous teachers who, in many Macedonian villages, were the first teachers delegated to teach and instruct, and who had to make their own path to the villages and to separate households in order to find a place both for a home and a school.

“A new and inspiring manifestation of the love of the Macedonian peasant for education is his interest in the national reading room. Twelve kilometers northwest of Bitolya at the feet of Mount Pelister, there nestles a small village -Lara -of about one hundred households, of which fifty are Bulgarian and forty- seven Turkish. Enthused for good work, the teacher in charge of the Bulgarian Reading Union stirred by his preaching these wide- awake but poor Lara villagers arousing in them the desire for a reading room. In a short time in the most prominent place in the village, with the labor of ants and with the free offerings of the villagers and without significant help from outside, a large two-story structure was built with all the necessary rooms for a reading room, library, social hall, cooperative room and the like. And the example of the people of Lara has spread as a beneficent contagion; all surrounding villages are planning to equal and surpass them in their zeal and sacrifice. Thanks to the regard of the peasant for education and to the noble rivalry for spiritual priority in the Bitolya district alone, in the two years of freedom the reading rooms have increased from two to seventy. It is clear that the peasant in Macedonia has been kept sound and wide-awake ready to make sacrifices in the name of a more fortunate national future. But in order that this readiness may be wisely used, one condition is absolutely necessary; that this spirit be awakened and encouraged not by a dry order but by conviction and love. The people give readily only to him who knows how to ask.” (ZORA, October 13, 1943).

Respectfully yours
Burton Y. Berry, American Consul General
To Department in original and hectograph

Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia - August 9, 1943

The Foreign Service of the United States of America
No, 1106 (R-1013)
American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey

SUBJECT: Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Sir:

I have the honor to present below an article from the Bulgarian newspaper UTRO of August 3, 1943, which gives some account of the relations between Greeks and Bulgarians in the region west and northwest of Salonika, that is, in Greek Macedonia.

The Bulgarian population in this part of Macedonia is gathered mainly around the towns of Kastoria, Florina, Vodena, and Enidje Vardar.

Besides the Bulgarian population of these towns, which is largest in the town of Vodena, the Bulgarians live mainly in the outlying villages. The Bulgarians in this are represent old populations going back to the Middle Ages. This region was included within the limits of the territory assigned to Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano. Accurate information as to the total Bulgarian population in this district is lacking. At the time of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 the population of that part of Macedonia assigned to Greece was given as follows:

Turks	299,880
Bulgarians	297,735
Greeks	249,657
Kutso-Vlachs	39,480
Albanians	21,770
Gypsies	23,130
Jews	84,112

Total 1,015,812

(G.P. Genov, "Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly, page 139)

This included the area as far east as the Mesta River. A considerable part of the Bulgarian populations was expelled from Eastern Macedonia after 1919. Also the Greek population was expelled from Asia Minor in 1923. The Turkish population was also exchanged. How many Bulgarians now live in that part of Macedonia referred to in the article is impossible of accurate estimation. One might guess 100,000.

The article presented below indicates that relations between The Bulgarian and Greek population in this region are bitterly hostile. The situation described represents the struggle between local nationalities characteristic of the Balkans in regions where nationalities are mixed. The relationship is that of mass feud. There in no question in such region of right being exclusively on the side of either party. The two parties are irreconcilable. No government in the Balkans will rule an equal hand in such a district. The only solution is absolute control by a foreign power or exchange of populations.

When this region became Greek after the second Balkan War, a situation confirmed following the First Balkan War, the Bulgarian minority was deprived of its schools, churches and other Bulgarian institutions. Bulgarian children were forced to go to Greek schools. All books and newspapers in the Bulgarian language were forbidden. As it was impossible to prevent the population from speaking their native language in the home the language was continued. This is a situation characteristic of those areas of the Balkans where a helpless minority has fallen under the rule of a neighboring government.

What will happen in this area when the war in the Balkans ends with the defeat of the Bulgarian army? The probability is that the Bulgarian population will either be forcibly expelled or massacred as occurred on a considerable scale in the summer of 1913. In Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace the Bulgarian population, which consists to a large extent of settlers who have come in during the last two years, will be able to escape by flight into Bulgaria, but the Bulgarian population in the region in Macedonia indicated below

will not be able to escape into Bulgarian territory and therefore will probably in large measure be destroyed, because the local hatreds which have existed for centuries have been greatly aggravated during the last two years. The only way in which massacre on a large scale in the Balkans can be prevented is by the occupation by Allied forces of all the regions where the population is mixed.

To say that in this case the Bulgarians will deserve any fate meted out to them is beside the point, because the persons who will suffer are the peasants who had nothing whatever to do with the policies of the government in Sofia, which brought Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Axis. The idea of justice in such cases does not exist in the Balkans. It is rather a question of humanity on the part of those at a distance who, not being concerned in local passions, are able to take a more humane view of the whole situation.

The article is extremely interesting as testimony of an actual situation in one of the most remote parts of Macedonia. In free translation it reads as follows:

The Bulgarians from the Kastoria District are waging an Epic Struggle against Greek Bands

By K. Naumov

“Salonika is full of hundreds of touch and stubborn sons of Enidje Vardar and of the provinces of Vodena, Florina and Kastoria. They speak to you in a wonderfully pure Bulgarian language and in their breasts beats a steel Bulgarian spirit. I was talking to one of them who comes from the district of Kastoria.

“The whole district, where every peak, every mountain and every village is marked by bloody traces as the result of the struggles which Bulgarian Macedonia fought for freedom and national existence in the past has taken up arms to defend itself and are openly against Greek bands, who have taken the offensive and are openly against everything Bulgarian in the district of Kastoria and elsewhere. Some of these bands are communists under the leadership of some one by the name of Ksilanti, while most bands are Greek nationalists acting under the slogan ‘Great Greece’. The aim of both bands is to wipe out the Bulgarians, and they are using the most cruel and barbaric means. Separately the bands act as communists or nationalists, as was the case in Serbia.

But when it comes to attacking whole Bulgarian villages, they are then all Greeks and are inspired only by the bloodthirsty desire to destroy in the most merciless way Bulgarianism, which appears in these parts of the Balkans as the only stronghold of Bulgarianism, peace, order, tranquility and the ideas of New Europe.

“The Kastoria district already has its own militia to fight these bands. In the town of Kastoria itself there is a special ‘Bulgarian committee of the Axis.’ In every village of the Kastoria district this militia, armed more with a high spirit, a sound Bulgarian stubbornness and a steel spirit rather than with sufficient arms and military supplies, is creating a grand epic of legendary struggle. Bulgaria appears as the ideal country of the long desired freedom. The people compose and sing songs of liberty as once the whole of Bulgaria fought against the Phanariotes. Flying columns, recalling the bands of Benkovski and Kableshkov, watch over the life and

safety of the whole Kastoria district, which has already made heavy sacrifices. The pretty and purely Bulgarian villages of Nestruni, Staricheni , Drenichevo, Gurche, Chuka, Ieleyoze, Breshani, Stensko, Radokoze and Slimnitsa have been burned down and destroyed by the raging Greek communist and nationalist bands which appear as ‘fifth columns’ of the Anglo-Americans. Many other villages also in the district of Kastoria, as Hrupishte and Embore, Gorenitsi and Chetiro as well as others have suffered. There is no village in the district of Kastoria which has not made heavy sacrifices for its freedom and its adherence to the Bulgarian nation. Greek bands enter Bulgarian villages at night, drag out the more aggressive and kill them. The population of the districts of Kastoria, Florina, Vodena and Enidje Vardar is united more and more around the Bulgarian tricolor with which the Kastoria militia defends its Bulgarian origin in the struggle against the Greek bands. The Bulgarian tricolor flies high in every place where the Bulgarian militia is, Bulgarian police has been organized in some villages. In the Kastoria militia hundreds of brave and bold Bulgarian girls are also carrying arms and are defending mothers, children and old people on an equal footing with the militiamen. Everything Greek has been for years boycotted and discarded. The children do not go to Greek schools. All Greek beginning books and textbooks have been burned or thrown into the Bistritsa River. If by any chance a Bulgarian book falls into their hands it is guarded as something holy. Old exarchate teachers, men and women, have organized courses for the Bulgarian language groups similar to those in the time of Paisii at Hilendar. The Greeks allow no food to these Bulgarians, not even salt. In spite of it all, the Bulgarians from the districts of Kastoria, Enidje Vardar, Florina and Vodena with their unbreakable and enthusiastic spirit, with the inerasable memories of the great epic of Gotse Delchev and the leader Chakalarov, are fighting and defending the great cause of justice and national existence with the idealism of the pre-liberation epoch”

Respectfully yours, Burton Y. Berry, American Consul General
To Department in original and hectograph

Bulgaro-Yugoslav Relations – Macedonian question

September 10, 1940

Draft telegram No. 455 to Belgrade and No. 333 to Sofia of 23rd August recording a conversation with the Bulgarian Minister on 21st August who said Bulgarian relations with Yugoslavia were excellent and that it was no longer possible for the Macedonian issue to be used as a means of estranging the two countries. Macedonian revolutionaries now relied on funds issuing from bodies in the United States of America whose aim was an independent Macedonia, the establishment of which would entail sacrifices alike by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece.

Belgrade telegram No. 655

This is a very useful telegram on a subject which has lost its former prominence. I think we can agree with both the Bulgarian Minister and with Mr. Campbell that the Macedonian question is of little importance in connexion with Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations.

At the same time there are indications that all three totalitarian powers are showing marked interest in the movement (see Sofia telegram No. 493 on 7075/613/7). Presumably the only possible German or Italian aim in encouraging Macedonian autonomy would be to include an autonomous Macedonia within Bulgarian borders, thus disintegrating Greece and Yugoslavia. In view of the close relations between the Axis and Bulgaria it may be possible that the instrument which they will use will not be either Ivan Mihailoff's Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization or (naturally) the Communist Federalists who are mostly, I believe, organized in a Macedonian labour party which is backed very largely by American funds. At the moment I should imagine that most Macedonians belong to Mr. Campbell's third category of discontented peasants who are anti-Yugoslav, anti-Greek, anti-Bulgarian, anti-German and anti everything except possibly anti-Russian.

See also R 7515/G.

Canadian Embassy - Athens, February 16th, 1949

No. 111

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 50 of February 1st, 1949 concerning the activities in Canada of a pro-Bulgar and pro-Macedonian organization.

2. The British Embassy Security Authorities in Athens have forwarded to the Embassy a report entitled "A protest by the Macedonian People' Union of Canada to the Yugoslav Government," a copy of which is enclosed.

3. While this report has just reached me, it was obtained by British Security Authorities in Greece from the Aliens directorate of the Greek Ministry of Public Order on December 14th, 1948.

4. The protest of the Macedonian People's Union was addressed to the Legation of Yugoslavia in Ottawa. The Macedonian People's Union is possibly the same organization as the Macedonian Canadian Peoples' League mentioned in paragraph 2 of your dispatch under reference. The resolution is of particular interest in showing the Union's anti-Tito and pro-Bulgarian sympathies.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Canadian Embassy - Athens, August 28th, 1949

J. A. McCordick

No. 480

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 450 of July 20th concerning (unintelligible) relations with the northern neighbours and to report on recent developments in Greco-Yugoslav relations.

(all of page 1 is blurred and unintelligible)

...Macedonia. It might also be observed that the relation adopted by the meeting mentioned that Yugoslavia had "assisted 12,000 children from Greece and Macedonia" and invited all refugees from Aegean Macedonia to incorporate themselves as soon as possible into the economic and political life of the People's Republic of Macedonia.

4. The decision taken by Marshal Tito to cease all aid to the Greek guerrillas was no doubt the only one he could safely take after the anti-Tito campaign which the KKE and the guerrilla radio had been carrying on. During the past month the guerrilla radio has intensified its campaign to the extent that in many broadcasts the anti-monarcho-fascists and anti-Anglo-American campaign has been relegated almost to second place as compared with the anti-Tito campaign. Scarcely a broadcast has taken place without the announcements that some particular of the Democratic Army has joined in the denunciation of Tito and especially of Keramintsieff and Gotseff, two of the Communist leaders who are said to be directing the Titoist movement in Greece and are, therefore, regarded by the KKE as arch-traitors to the movement.

An illustration of this type of broadcast might be given since it is representative of the campaign against these two "traitors." "The Slav-Macedonian women fighters of the 18th Brigade of the Democratic Army condemn the Keramitsieff-Gotseff traitors" (guerrilla broadcast August 4th). It would appear, to judge from the

guerrilla broadcast, that every platoon of the Democratic Army has sent its condemnation of the two traitors to Headquarters.

On August 9th the guerrilla broadcast announced that “representatives of the Democratic Government toured the front and told the fighters of Tito’s treason. Nothing can describe the fighters’ hatred for Keramintsieff and Gotseff.” In addition, the guerrilla radio, on August 3rd and 11th, broadcast two lengthy articles against Tito, the first of which was entitled “Tito’s Knife Attacks on the rear of the Democratic Popular Movement of Greece,” by N. Zachariades, the Secretary-General of the KKE. The article contained a lengthy denunciation of Tito’s treason, which was said to have begun in 1944 and was intensified in 1947. The article also mentioned that Tito hated the Greek Popular Democratic Movement, and thrust a knife in its back and was fighting it with a vengeance. The second article, which was broadcast on August 11th, was entitled “Tito’s Treason and the Communist Party of Greece,” and was by P. Roussos, the “Foreign Minister of the Democratic Government.” Roussos’s article like that of Zachariades, was a series of charges explaining how Tito had undermined the Greek Democratic Movement from the very beginning. Of special significance is the charge that one of the ways in which this was done by propaganda for the annexation of Greek Macedonia to Yugoslav-Macedonia and the organization of a network of Titoist agents in Greek Macedonia.

5. The battle between the KKE and Tito has not, of course, been fought from only one side. On August 2nd, in a speech in Skopje, Marshal Tito claimed that the Cominform, which was attacking Yugoslavia, did not wish to help the Greek people in its heroic struggle but was seeking in a sinister and underhand way to strangle the Democratic Movement of Greece. The Cominform moreover did not do this on its own but through the leaders of the KKE itself. Marshal Tito, however, declared that the liberating struggle of the Greek people was deeply buried in his heart. This assertion, it is hardly necessary to add, did nothing to convince Greek public opinion that Tito had had a change of heart.

6. An interesting result of the Tito-Cominform dispute and the reverses suffered by the guerrillas in Greece has been the way in

which Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria have tried to outdo each other in claiming that from the very beginning it was they who had contributed most to the Greek guerrilla movement. This, despite their past repeated denials of having provided any support to the Greek guerrillas. Thus, on July 25th for example, Radio Belgrade announced that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Kardelj, had stated that it was public knowledge that Yugoslavia had given medical assistance to a great number of wounded Greek guerrillas as well as to Greek refugees and children. In Tito's speech at Skopje on August 2nd (mentioned above) reference is also made to the support given by Yugoslavia to the guerrillas. Mr. Koulichewski, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Macedonia, referred at the same meeting to the great moral and political support that Yugoslavia had given right from the start to Greek Democratic Movement, and pointed out that this assistance had had a decisive influence on the struggle against the monarcho-fascists.

7. With regards to the relations between the Greek Government and Yugoslavia, there have, of course, been a considerable number of Yugoslav accusations against the Greek Government during the past month. On July 29th it was announced that the Yugoslav Government had delivered a note to the Greek Government protesting against the bombing of the Yugoslav village of Kotsimir by a Greek aircraft. The note called for sanctions against those responsible for the alleged incident and demanded damages for the destruction which had been cause. The Yugoslav also protested because of a Greek military officer, on being notified of the incident, declined an invitation from the Yugoslav authorities to enter Yugoslav territory to ascertain on the spot the damage which the bombing had done to the village. The Greek authorities claimed that the Yugoslavs had been unable to put forward any proof whatever that the aircraft in question was actually Greek, and pointed out that the local Yugoslav authorities did not even allege to have established the markings of the plane. The Greeks pointed out that, on the contrary, the records of the Royal Hellenic Air Force showed conclusively that on the day of the alleged "incident" no Greek plane flew over the sector in question.

Whatever the merits of the case may be, the Greeks undoubtedly made a mistake in refusing to accept the Yugoslav invitation to

inspect the damage to the village. UNSCOB has been trying repeatedly to obtain Yugoslav permission to investigate incidents on the Yugoslav side of the border and the Greek refusal to the Yugoslav invitation would appear unfortunate from a tactical point of view, especially since the Greeks would nit acknowledge responsibility for the bombing merely by visiting the village in question.

8. Perhaps more important, however, than these Yugoslav accusations against Greece was the re-affirmation, on August 7th, at the celebrations held in Skopje on the occasion of the anniversary of the foundation of the Federal Republic of Macedonia, that Yugoslavia would continue its policy of attempting to create a unified Macedonia under Yugoslav auspices. The declaration made by various Yugoslav leaders at these celebrations in Skopje, the guerrilla radio's charge that Tito was operating a network of agents in Macedonia under Keramitsieff and Gotseff, the vehemence poured out by the KKE on these two Titoists, and the various reports received of Yugoslav agents crossing into Greek Macedonia – all appear to point to the conclusion the Tito is renewing his efforts to maintain leadership of the Macedonian Movement in Greek Macedonia.

9. On the other hand, a more hopeful sign occurred on August 17th, when the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires in Athens called on Mr. Pipinellis, the Permanent Greek Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This was the first official call at the Foreign Office made by a member of the Yugoslav Legation in over two years. The object of the call was to discuss the bad treatment received by Yugoslav citizens in Greece. Mr. Pipinellis refrained from bringing up what was the obvious answer to this kind of approach, namely, the treatment of Greek children in Yugoslavia. Even if the subject matter of the call was not calculated to bring about a rapprochement between the two governments, the fact that the call was made may well be a step towards a more conciliatory attitude by Yugoslavia towards Greece. It is perhaps significant that while the closing of the Greco-Yugoslav frontier was made on the grounds of monarch-fascist provocations against Yugoslavia, the first official call of the Charge d'Affaires should be to discuss the bad treatment received by Yugoslav citizens in Greece.

10. The conditions which the Greeks regard as prerequisites to any rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Greece remain the same. The first condition – a complete cessation of aid to the guerrillas – seems to have been fulfilled. No move whatsoever has been made to fulfill the second condition – the return of Greek children in Yugoslavia. With regard to the third condition – the abandonment of Yugoslav maneuvers to incorporate Greek Macedonia into Yugoslavia, the speeches made at Skopje and other evidence, seem to indicate that the Yugoslavs were taking exactly the opposite attitude and increasing their support of a greater Macedonian movement.

11. The Greeks have been watching with keen, if anxious, interest, the negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia with regards to Trieste. There is considerably anxiety in this country that if Greece is not consulted in this rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia, Greek interests are likely to suffer, since Yugoslav Imperialism will be concentrated southward against Greece. The Greeks feel it is essential that any agreement reached between the West and Yugoslavia should provide guarantees of Greece's independence. If a piecemeal rapprochement is made with Yugoslavia, the Greeks feel they will be left in the lurch.

12.
(The rest of the report is missing).

Canadian Embassy - Athens, January 3rd, 1949

No. 5

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on December 29th, 1948, the Greek daily ESTIA carried a short article entitled "Greek Communist Party co-operates with the Bulgarians." The article reads as follows:

"Abundant and indisputable evidence has been received on the betrayal of the Greek Communist Party in an agreement with the Bulgarians on the basis of a complete and clear programme. This Party (the K.K.E.), systematically reinforced by rich Bulgarian immigrants in Canada and the United States, and by the Government of Sofia, had at its disposal plentiful funds which permitted the K.K.E to finance its agents in a generous way.

Any information which may be available relating to alleged activities by Bulgarians in Canada along the lines suggested by this article, would be appreciated.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Canadian Embassy - Moscow, February 9th, 1945

No. 86

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on February 7th, I called on Mr. Stanoje Simich, the Yugoslav Ambassador and had a long conversation with him. As you know Mr. Simich has been nominated in the agreement reached between Marshal Tito and Mr. Subasich last autumn to take over the position of Vice-Premier in the new Yugoslav government to be formed after Mr. Subasich returns to Yugoslavia with his colleagues to give effect to that agreement.

2. Mr. Simich is in the process of rehabilitating his Embassy. A new Counselor has just arrived to assist him. The all-time low was reached when Mr. Simich was in Belgrade last October and November and his wife and sister became the sole occupants of the Yugoslav Embassy. When he came to the Soviet Union in March, 1943, the staff of the Yugoslav Embassy consisted of Mr. Simich, his Councilor, Mr. Marinkovich and his Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Lozich. When Mr. Simich and Lieutenant Colonel Lozich broke in March, 1944, with the Yugoslav Government in Cairo and placed themselves at the disposal of Marshal Tito, Mr. Marinkovich withdrew from the Embassy and set up a separate establishment in the National Hotel. From here he conducted a somewhat comical and fruitless campaign to secure possession of the Yugoslav Embassy and to oust Mr. Simich. The Soviet Government took the stand that Mr. Simich had been properly accredited and until his credentials were withdrawn they would continue to recognize him as the Yugoslav Ambassador. When the Sabasich Government was formed in June Mr. Marinkovich left Moscow and disappeared from the scene. Earlier Lieutenant Colonel Lozich had left Moscow to join Marshal Tito's forces since a military mission of ten officers representing the Marshal arrived in Moscow in April. For a long period, therefore, Mr. Simich was all alone in the Embassy, a situation which became ludicrous when Belgrade was liberated and he left to spend six weeks conferring with Marshal Tito. He returned on November 20th with Mr. Sabasich and participated in the

conversation with the Yugoslav Prime Minister had with the Soviet leaders.

3. I always enjoy meeting the honest, outspoken and big-hearted Yugoslav Ambassador, who is such a typical Serb.

The breezy frankness of Mr. Simich reminds me of the early leaders of the Russian Revolution. It is somewhat embarrassing, however, for me to talk to him since most of the conversation consists of tirades against the western Allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States Governments. The former he persists in referring to as “your government”, a practice I have given up trying to correct. It is also futile trying to argue with Mr. Simich in defense of the western powers. He brushes aside my arguments with some good-natured remark and then immediately launches into a fresh attack from some other angle. Thus our conversation comes to resemble the firing of a rifle in reply to an outburst of machine-gun fire.

4. On this occasion also Mr. Simich was free with criticisms of British and United States policy and loud in his denunciations of “your government”, when I asked him how conditions were in Yugoslavia he immediately complained about the absence of relief. He said that it was ironical that in the parts of Yugoslavia nearest to the Soviet Union, where there were more plentiful supplies of locally-produced food, these supplies were being supplemented by the Soviet authorities, whereas in Dalmatia, just across the Adriatic from the Western Allies and producing little or no food of its own, people were dying of starvation and no relief was being furnished. I asked him if nothing was being done by UNDRA but he replied that they were not allied to UNDRA but to “your government” and to the United States Government. Relief was needed now and if later on its way offered by the Western Allies after they had commenced to stand on their own feet, they would have to declare “thank you, we do not need help now”. Marshal Tito had concluded an agreement with UNDRA but they were not yet able to furnish relief. I asked what was the cause and when he shrugged his shoulders I suggested shipping might be the difficulty. This brought forth a reference to the many Yugoslav ships being operated by the Allies, of which he thought some should be spared to carry supplies to Yugoslavia, I

then suggested internal transport and that was why they had asked for trucks. Surely, he said, out of the thousands of trucks being produced in the United States and Canada a few could be spared for Yugoslavia.

5. I suppose that Mr. Simich had little recent information on the subject of relief for Yugoslavia. This was confirmed later when I asked him about the negotiations with King Peter and he had to admit that he was receiving no telegrams from the Yugoslav Government in London, Hoping, therefore, to get a word of praise for what he kept referring to as “your government”, I asked him if it was not true that the United Kingdom had furnished supplies to Marshal Tito’s forces when they had been in most dire need of help. He replied by stating that when he had been in Yugoslavia he saw the Partisans dressed in Italian, Hungarian and German uniforms. The only members of the Partisan forces he had seen dressed in British Uniforms were a few staff officers who had just arrived from Italy. I then said that I had understood supplies had been dropped regularly by parachute to the Partisans. His retort to this was to mention that second hand boots and second hand socks had been dropped. Some of the boots had worn-out soles and some of the socks were full of holes. These had to be thrown away. Practically speaking, he said, the Partisan forces had been both armed and clothed with booty they had captured from the Italians and later from the Germans. It became evident to me that this Vice-Premier designate of the future Yugoslav Government will not be disposed to help the application of Mr. Churchill’s formula for fifty-fifty British and Soviet influence in Yugoslavia.

6. I asked the Ambassador about present military operations in his country but referred me to an article contributed by a Yugoslav staff officer to a recent number of the Soviet newspaper “Red Star”. He then added that the Yugoslav forces were not sufficiently numerous to surround the twenty German divisions trying to escape from Yugoslavia, so that they were doing was to harass the enemy as much as possible and to cut off and exterminate the tails of the German column bit by bit.

7. I asked Mr. Simich where he had stayed in his recent visit to Belgrade and he replied that he had put up at the Hotel Moskva, one

of the few hotels in the city which had not been destroyed. He related that the most serious damage to the city had been caused by the day-light raids last Easter of the United States flying fortresses. Marshal Tito had given permission to the Allies for them to bomb military objectives, but the United States bombers had released their bombs from a great height with the result that great damage had been done to the city proper and many civilians had been killed or wounded. They resented the later statement issued by the United States Command that the bombing had been undertaken with the approval of Marshal Tito. At this stage Mr. Simich paid a compliment at least to "your government". He said that a British bomber had come in, dove down and released its bomb on the foundations of a tall building in which many of the German officers were located. As a result the bomb killed all the German working in the building who had taken refuge in the cellar. That, Mr. Simich exclaimed, is bombing of a military objective.

8. We then got around discussing the conversations taking place in London for putting into effect the Tito-Subasich agreement. The Ambassador treated these conversations as of little consequence to Yugoslavia. The comedy being enacted in London, he said, will make no difference to the internal situation in Yugoslavia. It can only have an effect on external relations and may delay the provision of relief to Yugoslavia. If so, when this becomes reality by the people of Yugoslavia, the position of the King will be still more untenable. I said that the outcome of the conversations in London would have an important bearing on the future of Mr. Subasich. He replied to this by asking me what importance was the position of one man compared to the fate of a nation. It was at this stage that I noticed the only photograph in his room was one of Marshal Tito.

9. I asked Mr. Simich if there were not many Serbs anxious for the return of King Peter. He replied that this was a common misconception held abroad. Contrary to the view of most foreigners a larger proportion of Croats and Slovenes would vote for the retention of his crown by a Serbian king then would be the case with the Serbs themselves. This would be due to the greater strength of monarchist sentiment among adherents of the Roman Catholic than among those of the Greek Orthodox Church, the greatest capitalist influence in the industrial centers of Croatia and Slovenia and the

reactionary influence of the Matchet peasant party in Croatia. He ventured to predict that not more than 10 per cent of the Serbs would vote for the return of the King to Yugoslavia whereas among the Croats and Slovenes the proportion might be 20 per cent.

10. Mr. Simich then became very eloquent about the revolution that had taken place in his country. He described it as a “new world” and said one had to be in Yugoslavia to appreciate the new enthusiasm of the people. The revolution had started in 1941 when Prince Paul’s understanding with the Nazis had been repudiated by the people, but it had found full expression in the Partisan movement inspired by Marshal Tito. It was not of such importance to men like himself who lives where drawing to a close, but it was a wonderful experience for young people like his daughter who had recently returned to Belgrade to work for the civil administration. They felt they were participating in the birth of a new era and could work with enthusiasm knowing they could be full of hope for the future.

11. I tried to bring Mr. Simich back to earth by asking him if there were not many Serbian nationalists dissatisfied with the new state of affairs and who grieved at the prospect of the loss of Serbian hegemony. He replied that this was true of a lot of old men abroad, but did not apply to those in the country who saw with their own eyes and experienced with their own feelings the strength of the movement and the enthusiasm of the mass of the people, particularly the younger generations. I then asked what the Serbs thought about Nish having been liberated and later occupied by the Bulgarians. He said Serbs were practical people and realized that if the Bulgarians help them throw out the Germans it meant the sacrifice of less Serbian lives for their purpose.

12. Wanting to clear up a point concerning the Tito-Subasich agreement about which I was in doubt, I asked the Ambassador if the agreement provided for one or two Vice-Presidents (really Vice-Premiers). He replied that there was to be really one Vice-Premier, himself, but that a later amendment to the agreement envisaged the appointment of six other Vice-Presidents, who really would be ministers without portfolio, representing each of the six autonomous regions into which it was proposed to divide the new federated Yugoslavia.

13. The Ambassador said that the six autonomous regions would be Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Voevodina would be an autonomous district within an autonomous Serbia. There was still a lot of discussion going on in Yugoslavia about these proposals and changes may have to be made, but the main principles had found general acceptance. Many of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, were expressing reluctance to be separated from the other Serbs. The Dalmatians might wish to have an autonomous region of their own, separate from Croatia, but Mr. Simich did not think this to be probable. He agreed with me when I said that the formation of an autonomous Macedonia, to which would be ceded territory now Bulgarian but inhabited by Macedonians, might pave the way for Bulgaria joining the federation. He added, however, that this would depend largely upon the Bulgarian government towards the people of Yugoslavia, an observation which seemed to indicate some doubt in his mind about the permanence of Bulgarian-Yugoslav reconciliation. I then suggested that the question of the monarchy in Bulgaria might prove an obstacle, but he laughingly observed that the future of the Bulgarian monarchy was no brighter than that of the Karageorgievitch dynasty in Yugoslavia.

14. I am sending a copy of this dispatch to the Charge d'Affaires of the Canadian Legation to the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Sgd) L.D. Willgrass.

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

Canadian Embassy - Athens, March 5th, 1947

No. 126

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose here with a copy of a letter of 3rd March from the First Secretary of the United Kingdom Embassy to Mr. George passing on for our information a report received from the United Kingdom Consul at Corfu in which he refers to the activities of an organization known as "ORIM" which was founded in 1903 for the independence of Macedonia and has its headquarters at 9 Dean Street, Toronto. This organization has apparently been sending money to prisoners of Bulgarian sympathies who collaborated either with Bulgarians or the Germans during the occupation.

2. Although the United Kingdom Embassy has no further information on the activities of "ORIM", I think you may be interested in the report and may wish to make enquiries as to the present activities of this organization which is presumably sending money to other persons interested in the movement for an independent Macedonia with Slav and Communist affiliations.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

Canadian Embassy - Athens, April 3rd, 1947

No. 175

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit for your information, further to my dispatches Nos. 147 of 12th March and 126 of 5th March, a Gendarmerie (Special Security) report from Jannina, Epirus, dated 28th February regarding “anti national activities of a Slav organization in Canada” which contains further details of the ORIM activities.

2. I received the report from United Kingdom Consul at Corfu through the United Kingdom Embassy at Athens. The Consul, Mr. Kinsella, reports that the parcels referred to in the report were two Red Cross food parcels sent through the Consulate by the Embassy to Kyriakos Kotoris, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Corfu jail on a charge of collaboration with the Bulgarians during the occupation. At the request of Mr. Kotoris’ relatives in Canada I made enquiries through Mr. Kinsella and, on his strong recommendation, I sent two parcels for him. Mr. Kinsella had reported that conditions in the jail were appalling and that the inmates were in urgent need of food and clothing. In view of Kotoris’ Canadian connection and on humanitarian grounds regardless of politics, I made the gesture of sending him two food parcels as evidence that Canada recognizes misery wherever it exists. The parcels were sent to Mr. Kinsella who handed them to the director of the prison in the presence of Kotoris on 21st November, 1946.

3. I am not much impressed by this latest example of the seditious activities of “ORIM” which the over zealous Commander of the Gendarmerie in Jannina might easily have traced to the Canadian Embassy. Nevertheless it might well be true that ORIM’s organization in Canada is worth investigating.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

Canadian Embassy Athens, July 29th, 1946

No. 515

Sir,

I have the honour to report that relations between Greece and Yugoslavia are becoming more and more strained, as disorders in the North of Greece continue, and the evidence of Yugoslav assistance to Greek armed bands is made public by Greek authorities. Matters have gone so far already that on July 26th, Mr. Cankar, Yugoslav Minister to Greece called on the Prime Minister, M. Tsaldaris and complained of the campaign which was being launched by the Royalist section of the Greek press against the Government of Marshal Tito. Mr. Cankar told me this morning that he had made it clear to the Prime Minister that, should this press campaign continue, he would return to his country, leaving his Legation to a Charge d'Affairs.

2. This formal protest, coming immediately before his Paris Conference, is all the more important because Yugoslavia is the only country immediately north of Greece with which Greece is in official relations. If diplomatic relations were, in fact, to be broken, Greece would have no tie with any Balkan State. The geographical location of Greece makes this important to her, not only for political but also for economic reasons. The same considerations must deter Yugoslavia from breaking off relations. For example, UNDRAs shipments to Southern Yugoslavia have been delivered through Salonika on several occasions, by arrangement between the Yugoslav Legation and UNDRAs Greece Mission. In fact the maintenance of relations is probably of more immediate economic value to Yugoslavia, which has no major port, than to Greece which has several.

3. Undoubtedly one of the chief grievances which Mr. Cankar and his Government feel is that the statements of responsible Greek officials have recently been made public conforming the somewhat wild speculations in which the Royalist Press has been indulging for several months regarding Yugoslav aid to the autonomist and communist partisans who are operating in Northern Greece. As

reported in my dispatch No.439 of July 6th, 1946, the Governor of Macedonia, Mr. Dalipis, wrote an aggressive and forthright article which appeared in ELLINIKON VIMA, a leading Right Wing newspaper in Athens, on June 22nd, a, Delipis's resignation was announced shortly afterwards, but it appears that not only did the Government refused to accept Mr. Delipis's resignation, but a copy of his article was sent to all Greek Missions abroad. In Yugoslav eyes, this amounts to the Greek Government's support of Mr. Dalipis's views. There was no doubt in my mind that this is correct: the fact of Yugoslav resistance to Greek armed bands seems to have been well established from what I have said in my previous dispatches, I need hardly see that Mr. Cankar's protest, made as if Yugoslavia was the injured party, strikes me as somewhat farcical.

4. The Greek Government is well aware of the importance of not breaking off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and I am sure every effort will be made to bend over backwards in the direction of official correctness to prevent a rupture. If a break should occur I believe it will be because the Yugoslavs, not the Greeks want it so. The present demarche is simply another form of pressure which is applied daily upon the Greek Government by the Governments of the neighbouring countries to the north. Although this is the first official indication of Greek-Yugoslav friction, the two countries have for many months been back to back, Yugoslavia looking to the hinterland of the Soviet dominion, while Greece, from her long coastline, looks out to sea, to the West.

5. Copies of this dispatch have been sent to the High Commissioner for Canada in London and the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and Paris.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Canadian Embassy - Athens, March 12th, 1947

No. ???

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 126 of 5th March concerning the Slavic organization in Canada known as "ORIM" and quote below from a report dated 28th February from the High Commander of Gendarmerie in Ioannina, Epirus, to the Supreme Command of the Royal Greek Gendarmerie in Athens, a copy of which was forwarded to me by the British Police and Prisons Mission, Athens.

"According to a statement of a Macedonian convict in Kerkyra (Greek for Corfu) prison, there exists in TORONTO, Canada, a Slavonic organization "ORIM". Bulgarians and Yugoslavs are members of it. This is an old organization ever assisting the Macedonian party and working for the autonomizing of Macedonia, and now is supporting the ceding of Greek Macedonia to Yugoslavia.

"Greek natives of Macedonia are also members of "ORIM", who keep in touch with Macedonian detainees in Kerkyra by sending letters and also funds and parcels through the British Consulate at Kerkyra. It is evident that the funds and parcels are not remitted to them by their own relatives in Canada but by their organizations, because all the dispatch which is received in Kerkyra is written by one of the organization in Canada, an elementary school teacher, PALLIS, N.

"Investigation of the Prison Director in Kerkyra who has made it his business to check it up corroborates the above.

"Please inform the competent authorities for action, including Greek Consulate in Canada."

2. The above quoted report defers only enough from the information attached to my dispatch under reference to arouse our further interest and to note the additional details given above.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

Canadian Legation – Washington - August 18, 1941

No. 2471

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith five copies of a memorandum received from His Majesty's Consul General at Chicago, concerning the Macedonian Community in the United States. It is considered that this memorandum may be of interest to the Department.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble servant, (can't make our signature) For the Minister.

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

MACEDONIANS

Community

The strength of the Macedonian Community in the U.S.A. and Canada is about 50,000, grouped for the most part in the industrial regions of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. They are largely employed in factories at Toledo, O., Cincinnati, O., Akron, O., Cleveland, O., Dayton, O., Indianapolis, Ind., Detroit, Mich., Granite City, Ill., Duquesne, Pa., Ellwood City, Pa., Steelton, Pa., and Johnstown, Pa.

2. Organizations

(a) The Macedonian Political Organization (M.P.O.) correlates the activities of numerous regional groups or societies, the headquarters of which are at Indianapolis. They have been in existence for about twenty years.

(b) Macedonian American People's League is an obscure group, thought to be communists in its political leanings. Its leader is said to be one S. Voydanoff.

(c) Unimportant Local Mutual aid societies complete the organization of the Macedonian Community.

3. Macedonian Political Organization

This is the most important group. Its network embraced branches in Canada. In Akron, O., and Toronto, Ontario., there are said to be strong elements and there are other active elements in Indianapolis, Ind., and Detroit, Mich. The Toronto branch is reported to have split into two parts last year because a number of members, believed to be in the majority, opposed the Central Organization at Indianapolis.

The leading officers and supporters of the M.P.O. are the following:-

Chris (Cristo) Anastasoff, or Atanasoff, of Bulgarian origin. He is a Vice-President of the organization. Reports variously place him as a doctor at Detroit and a member of the staff of Washington University in St. Louis, Mo.

Kiril Chaleff, of Bulgarian origin. Vice-President of the organization. Believed to be a saloon-keeper in Indianapolis.

Peter Aceff, or Atzeff, Indianapolis; of Bulgarian origin: Secretary of the M.P.O. Associate editor "Macedonian Tribune".

Tashe Popcheff, Indianapolis; of Bulgarian origin; Treasurer of M.P.O.

Pop Nikoloff, Detroit, a priest, active in the M.P.O.

Kosta Popoff, McKeesport, Pa., of Bulgarian origin, a baker by trade; an active member of thr M.P.O.

Alexander Dimitroff, Detroit; a student? Active member.

Luben Dimitroff, Indianapolis. Editor of the "Macedonian Tribune". (See below).

Christo Nazamoff, Associate Editor of the "Macedonian Tribune".

Vancha Michailov. See special note below.

4. Political orientation of the M.P.O.

The fundamental purpose of the M.P.O. is the establishment of a free Macedonia. In such terms they express themselves through their organ, the “Macedonian Tribune”. For the satisfaction of such and end they are linked with the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in Europe. A direct branch of the M.P.O. is said to exist in Pittsburg, Pa., but financial help is said to have been given by the Revolutionary Organization to their political counterpart in America and in order that Macedonian independence at home may be achieved and the cultural lot of Macedonians abroad may be improved. While absolute independence is no doubt the ultimate goal, relative independence from Serbian and Greek control, even at the cost of German and Bulgarian “protection” has been welcomed, Macedonians in America are therefore pro-Nazi. Being chauvinists in temperament, an added reason for their Nazi inclinations is their dislike of the communists. The personal link between the M.P.O. may be Vancha Mikhailov. (See below).

5. Press

(1) Macedonian Tribune (Makedonska Tribuna), 20 S. West Street, Indianapolis, Ind. Weekly.

Editor – Luben Dimitroff.

Ass.Editor – Christo Mazamoff, Peter Aceff.

Subscription - \$ 3.00 p.a., Organ of M.P.O.

(2) Narodn Glas, Granite City, Ill. While this is a Bulgarian Weekly, there is a Macedonian colony at Granite City and no doubt it caters too to this community. It may be noted that the Canadian Postal Regulations forbid the transmission of this paper in Canada.

6. Vancha Mikhailoff, or Mihaylof, or Ivan Michailoff

In 1940 Vanche Mihaylof, as one of the leaders of the M.P.O. was reporte to be in Albania and receiving the support of the Italians. He

was also active in Bulgaria and Southern Serbia. It was Vancha Mikhailov who is alleged to have been implicated – from a distance – in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.

Canadian Legation - To the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom

February 16th, 1945
Berkeley Street, London, W.1.
No. 89

Sir,

Following my telegram dealing with Yugoslavia from the 22nd January, the King Peter requested the resignation of Dr. Subasic's Government, I have the honour to give a consolidation of the information contained therein and to supplement it where possible with information obtained in my conversations with the British Ambassador, Mr. Skrine Stevenson, with Mr. Addis of the Foreign Office, with Mr. Cankar and with Mr. Rybar. I should add that as I know Mr. Addis as a personal friend, his information cannot be considered as entirely official in nature.

2. The manner in which King Peter precipitated the "crisis" on 22nd January although sudden cannot be said to be entirely unexpected. To understand the reasons behind the King's move a brief review of events subsequent to Dr. Subasic's assumption of leadership of the Royal Yugoslav Government may be useful. After King Peter issued his declaration on 1st June, 1944 calling upon all Yugoslavs to ignore their differences and to form a united front under the leadership of Dr. Subasic, it became apparent that the National Liberation Committee with Tito at its head would have to be recognized as the actual force within the country. This de facto recognition became more evident with the Tito-Subasic agreement of 16th June and the agreement arrived at when Tito and Subasic met for a second time on 17th August.

3. With the capture of Belgrade on the 20th October it became a matter of vital urgency from the point of view of the United Kingdom Government that the Royal Yugoslav Government could be formed within the country as soon as practicable. As reported in my dispatch No. 61 of 1st February, Dr. Subasic at this time was given more or less carte blanche to work out the terms of an agreement with Tito, but it had been previously agreed that he

would refer the draft agreement to both King Peter and the United Kingdom Government before ratifying it. Unfortunately, for reasons best known to himself, he signed the agreement on the 1st November, thereby presenting King Peter and the United Kingdom Government with a fait accompli.

4. Following his trip to Moscow, Subasic returned to Belgrade on 4th December. On 7th December in concert with Marshal Tito he signed two annexes to the agreement of 1st November. He then returned to London on 9th December; the United Kingdom Government decided to approve the agreement, but no intimation was received from King Peter of his intentions.

5. This, then, was the background to the King's statement on 11th January, which he issued without previous consultations with either his own Government or the United Kingdom Government. Although it would seem that the King had a certain amount of justification in feeling that he should have been consulted more fully by Dr. Subasic, his precipitate action was obviously ill-advised and lost him whatever popularity he had with public opinion in the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as damaging his position vis-à-vis Marshal Tito. As reported in my telegram No. 35 of 26th January, his principle adviser seems to have been his mother-in-law, Princess Aspasia. It is still not certain who his other advisers may have been.

6. On 22nd January the King issued a second statement in which he told of proposals he had made to Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito. From the text of this statement it is clear that Marshal Tito said he would deal with King Peter only through the Yugoslav Prime Minister. The statement concluded by saying that he had lost confidence in Dr. Subasic and had consequently requested his resignation. During the following week, Subasic, backed by the United Kingdom Government, refused to accept the King's request for his resignation and attempted in every way to make the King see reason.

7. On 28th January Tito made a statement to a Serbian women's anti-fascist meeting in which he once more elucidates his views. The following day an official announcement was released to the press

stating the King Peter and Dr. Subasic had reached agreement and that, following the terms of the Tito-Subasic agreement, a Regency Council would be formed and the Royal Yugoslav Government would proceed to Belgrade “as soon as possible” in order to form a coalition government with Marshal Tito’s National Liberation Committee.

8. It can be seen that throughout the whole painful process, starting with the first Tito-Subasic meeting in June 1944, it has been only through the patient efforts of the British Ambassador and the United Kingdom Government that eventual agreement was reached. In my last conversation with Mr. Stevenson he said that prior to June 1944 it had been a virtual certainty that civil war would break out in the country with all the grave results that such an unfortunate happening would have. Mr. Stevenson seemed of the opinion that the initial step towards agreement had been taken by Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin had med and agreed that their interests in Yugoslavia should be on a fifty-fifty basis. In this manner the Soviet Government had been able to place a restricting influence on Marshal Tito as, of course, had the United Kingdom Government through Brigadier Maclean. In a like manner, King Peter and Dr. Subasic had been made to realize the urgent necessity of establishing a unified Government in the country as soon as possible.

9. During the course of my conversation with Mr. Stevenson he made it quite clear that in his opinion the United States Government’s attitude towards the whole problem with Yugoslavia has been, to say the least, uncooperative. He understood that up until November 1944 the State Department had not wished to arouse United States public opinion prior to the Presidential elections and consequently had preferred to adopt a negative policy towards European affairs. He made it equally clear that following the Presidential campaign and the re-election of President Roosevelt, had the United States Government taken a firmer stand they could, his opinion, have brought about agreement in Yugoslav affairs far more rapidly. In my telegram No.49 of the 13th February I mentioned that Stevenson seemed to feel that the Crimea Conference had brought a change in the United States Government’s attitude towards their commitments in Europe and a realization that

they must take full responsibility alongside the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. for carrying out of a concerted policy in the Balkans and Central Europe.

10. Mr. Stevenson seemed to be well pleased with the outcome of events but he foresees a difficult time ahead. He is under no illusions concerning the difficulties involved, and he believes that implementation of the terms of the Tito-Subasic agreement will be by far the hardest part of the problem.

11. In presenting the United Kingdom's policy towards Yugoslavia he also amplified his Government's policy towards the Balkans and Eastern Europe generally. He said that it is not impossible that, following a successful settlement of the Macedonian problem, some form of loosely-knit federation of Balkan States could be formed. He intimated that some form of federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would be welcomed by the United Kingdom Government, but only so long as it was related to some form of similar federation between all the Balkan States. From the manner in which he spoke I gathered that this is, in fact, the United Kingdom's long-term policy with respect to the Balkan countries. He also said that it would not be a bad thing if some form of economic unity could be achieved between the Central European States (and here he specifically mentioned Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary) and a Federation of Balkan States.

12. In this respect it is interesting to note that the TIMES Diplomatic Correspondent, in an article appearing in the February 15th issue, gave an account of an interview he had with Dr. Subasic in the 14th February. Speaking in his future capacity as Foreign Minister in the United Yugoslav Government, Dr. Subasic said that in his view three questions dominated Yugoslav foreign policy: -

“(i) The general question of more effective security and of Yugoslav economic development in the Adriatic;

(ii) The rectification of the north-western frontiers unjustly traced after the 1914-18 war;

(iii) The realization by suitable stages of economic and political collaboration among the Balkan States for the insurance of peace and economic advancement in the Balkans.”

13. The article that quotes Dr. Subasic as saying “There are unmistakable signs that a final settlement of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations is in sight. That alone will do much to make broad agreement among the Balkan peoples easier.” The article concluded by saying that Dr. Subasic is well aware of the necessity of maintaining “the friendliest relations with Great Britain and the United States” and that “he noted with pleasure the welcome support given by the British, American and Russian peoples to the agreement concluded with Marshal Tito.”

14. Dr. Cankar, with whom I spoke immediately prior to his departure for Belgrade, said that it was his own opinion that the question of the Regency should have been settled before Dr. Subasic left London. He confirmed the information contained in my telegram No. 46, that the majority of the Cabinet were unwilling to leave London without first having complete agreement on the choice of members for the Regency Council. Their hand had been forced by the Crimea Conference communiqué which, as Dr. Cakar said, that either Dr. Subasic should have remained behind in order to settle the Regency question or the whole Government should have waited until a settlement had been reached. Dr. Cankar was not quite clear as to how it was now proposed to reach agreement on the Regency Council because, with the exception of Rybar, there is now nobody left in London who can act as a link between the Government in Belgrade and King Petar.

15. A copy of this dispatch has been sent to Moscow.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, John Starnes,
Charge d’ Affairs, a.i.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa

JS/LS

Canadian Legation - March 22nd, 1949

Belgrade, Yugoslavia
No. 66

Sir,

The importance which the Yugoslav Government attach to the questions of Macedonia and a South Slav Federation, acerbated as they now are through Bulgaria's strong pro- Cominform stand and the resultant worsening of relations with Yugoslavia, was again emphasized by a full-page, six-column article by Moshe Pijade entitled "The Question of Balkan Federation" which appeared in "Borba" on March 6th. Pijade is the CPY's able theoretician whom the Cominform Journal recently called a "paltry pigmy playing the buffoon on the rostrum... clowning... and, like a jester, raving, ranting, threatening and brandishing documents..."

2. The article was mainly a resume and recapitulation of what has already been said on the subject on various other occasions, such as in the speeches by Kardelj and Rankovich reported in my dispatch No. 21 of January 29th. With bitterness and heavy sarcasm Pijade attacked the "alluring voices of friendship" in Sofia whence came a stream of propaganda in favour of a South Slav Federation coupled with reproaches against Yugoslavia for blocking its realization. Recently the proposal had been broadened and Sofia had passed to the preaching of a Balkan Federation although only yesterday such a Federation was considered too artificial and problematic to be worth mentioning. The writer said that it would not be worth his attention either were it not for the attempt to embroil "democratic" Greece in the intrigue.

3. He attempted to show that the Resolution passed at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of Greece held at the end of January spoke against Greek chauvinism and in favour of the right of the Macedonian peoples to self- determination, but that it said nothing of a Balkan Federation or the relations of Greece with other Balkan states. However, the Bulgarian trade union paper "Trud" interpreted the resolution as evidence of the Greek Communist Party's alignment with the views of the Bulgarian Workers' Party on

solving the Macedonian problem through the early creation of a Balkan Federation.

4. It was better for the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia, wrote Pijade, to continue their struggle for liberation in the knowledge that the Greek Communist Party, as stated in its Resolution, would fight for Macedonia's right of self-determination after liberation, than to bother themselves at this stage about projects for union with the other two parts of Macedonia, especially when one of them, Pirin Macedonia, did not enjoy the most elementary autonomous rights in Bulgaria.

5. Pijade retraced the history and nature of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav proposals for a South Slav Federation which have already been outlined in paragraph 6 of my dispatch No.21. At first the Bulgarians wanted only some kind of pact of mutual assistance but Kardelj wrote Tito from Sofia in December 1944 to say that he had told the Bulgarians that such a pact was absolutely worthless; it would not alter the existing situation whereas what was needed was an alliance which would be interpreted by the masses in both countries as an initial step towards union. It was then agreed that a Bulgarian and a Yugoslav delegation should meet to discuss their respective drafts of an agreement for federation, and the meeting took place in January 1945.

6. The first and fifth articles of the Yugoslav draft read as follows:

"1) Democratic Federative Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are uniting themselves in a single federal state, which is henceforth to consist of seven components: Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a joint People's Parliament and a joint Federal Government, and forming a single customs area."

"5) A joint Bulgarian-Yugoslav Commission with its seat in Belgrade, to be called the Commission of the South Slav Federation, is to be formed with the task of preparing a draft Constitution of the joint federal state. This Commission is to include representatives of Bulgaria and the six constituent parts of Democratic Federative

Yugoslavia which are to be designated by their respective Governments.”

7. The Bulgarian draft agreement contained the following proposals:

"1) The Government of Bulgaria and the Government of Yugoslavia declare that they are realizing the unification of the South Slavs by way of the formation of a common, federally regulated state which will be called the South Slav Federation, with a joint People's Parliament, with joint Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and other joint institutions and ministries which will be finally established in the mutual Constitution of the Federation, which should be drafted as the result and final realization of this treaty."

"2) The beginning of the realization of such a Federation will be achieved by setting up a special joint agency of the Federation --a Provisional Council of the South Slav Federation with its seat in Belgrade. This Council will be formed on the principle of proportional representation of both Governments."

8. The Yugoslavs rejected the Bulgarians' arguments in favour of their draft: that Bulgaria, as an independent state with its own traditions, should not be put on unequal footing with the constituent republics of Yugoslavia, but should be equal with the whole six-membered Yugoslavia. It is not difficult to see that to the Bulgarians the Yugoslav draft must have seemed inconsiderate of their feelings and ungenerous.

9. The boundaries of Macedonia, according to the Yugoslav draft agreement, were to be finally settled by Bulgaria ceding to Macedonia territory acquired under the 1913 Peace Treaty (Pirin Macedonia was accorded to Bulgaria under the Treaty of Bucharest after the Second Balkan War) and by Yugoslavia ceding to Bulgaria territory acquired as a result of the Peace Settlement of 1919 (under the Treaty of Neuilly Bulgaria lost Tsaribrod and some territory in the Strumica valley to Yugoslavia).

10. Pijade charged that the Bulgarian leaders lacked sincerity and that their plans ignored Macedonia's equality and the Macedonian peoples' right to self-determination. He repeatedly castigated them

for their "Greater Bulgarian" chauvinism, which he named as the real reason which prevented the union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Although, he wrote, it went against the Leninist conception of a nation's right to self-determination for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to negotiate a solution of the relations between Pirin Macedonia and the Macedonian People's Republic as a pre-condition for South Slav Federation, the Yugoslav Government had been prepared to do this in order to help obtain practical results. Nothing came of the agreement however because the Anglo-Americans prevented Bulgaria from signing treaties with any countries.

11. If the Bulgarians are serious in their advocacy of Federation they should, in Pijade's view, first give Pirin Macedonia the same freedom and cultural, territorial and political autonomy as the Macedonian People's Republic enjoys in Yugoslavia. When this had been done the two Macedonian republics could negotiate directly with each other. Then the Macedonian Republic, within an eventual South Slav Federation in which it would be equal with Bulgaria, Serbia and the other constituent republics, would be free for all time from the menace of Bulgarian chauvinism and Bulgarian designs to transform the Macedonians into part of the Bulgarian nation. In the meantime, Pijade concluded, the Bulgarian campaign for Federation and for an independent Macedonia within a Balkan Federation was, in present circumstances, not a progressive step but part and parcel of the Cominform attack on the building of socialism in Yugoslavia.

12. Writing early in the War Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, whose knowledge of the Balkans is practically unrivalled, was of the opinion that:

“The real Macedonian Problem is the problem of Yugoslavia Macedonia. Here neither Serbian nor Bulgarian rule has benefited the people. The people of Yugoslav Macedonia are in fact neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, and they have had reason to dislike almost equally the dictatorial nationalist centralism of Belgrade and the dictatorial centralist nationalism of Sofia. Probably the only method which offers any promise of a satisfactory solution is that of regional autonomy within a federal Yugoslavia. This would mean that the administration, school system and economic life of Macedonia would be conducted by Macedonians, men born and bred in the

province; that the State authorities would officially recognize that the Macedonians are neither Serbs nor Bulgars, but a separate branch of the South Slavs; and that in all matters affecting State policy the Macedonians would accept the authority of the Central Government.

The Macedonian Problem is essentially an internal problem of Yugoslavia. If the relation between Macedonians and Serbs can be cleared in the manner described above, then minor territorial questions, such as Florina or Petrich, can be settled with little difficulty between the Governments of Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria.

The Macedonian problem cannot be solved independently of the Balkan problem as a whole. Everything depends on the type of regimes that prevail in the Balkan States after the war. If the old nationalist claims are supreme, then Macedonia will again be a cause of international rivalries.”

13. Up to a point, and admittedly more on paper than in practice, the Tito regime has taken all the steps recommended by Prof. Seton-Watson. As I pointed out in paragraph 21 of my dispatch No. 13 of January 18th these measures, are fresh memories of Bulgarian behaviour when in occupation of Macedonia during the war, may have brought about a considerable reduction in Macedonian antipathy to the Yugoslav state.

14. But the territorial questions remain unsolved and have indeed become hopelessly entangled with rival nationalist claims, the problems arising out of the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute, the Macedonian policies of the Royal Greek Government and the Greek Communist Party, and last but not least, the Soviet Union's veiled and enigmatic Macedonian policy. And thus the Macedonian Problem remains and festers, for, in the words quoted above, it "cannot be solved independently of the Balkan Problem as a whole"

15. I am sending copies of this dispatch to Athens, London, Prague, Warsaw and Moscow. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't make out the signature), Minister JAM: aw

Canadian Mounted Police - Ottawa, December 4th, 1946

Sir:

Information has reached this department that there have been appeals for Macedonian relief by a Fund in which Toncho Naibenoff, Domiter Nicholoff and Nano Petcoff are associated and that monies to the amount of \$ 15,000 have been collected for the purchase of relief supplies.

About a year ago an application for registration under the War Charities Act by a Macedonian Group in Toronto was received by this Department whereby funds would be raised for the relief of Macedonians in Yugoslavia.

We explained that the policy of the Department allowed only one registered fund for each country and that, in this connection, the registered organization to deal or to become affiliated with for relief to Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav Relief Fund.

As a result of our suggestion the committee in question informed us they did not care to co-operate with the registered Fund mentioned and that they would rather stop fund-raising activities for the benefit of the Macedonian people.

We have since tried to contact the above mentioned gentlemen and to advise them that if the \$ 15,000 in question had been raised for relief to Macedonians in Yugoslavia or elsewhere, such fund-raising activities should not have been carried out without registration under the War Charities Act. We have, however, been unsuccessful in contacting the parties involved and would be most grateful if your Department could conduct an investigation in this connection.

The foreign exchange control board have passed on information to us in connection with the Macedonian groups in Toronto, which reads as follows:

a) Mr. Iedro Hristoff applied for a change of status and to transfer money out of Canada. He declared assets of \$ 4,000.00 in his bank account and was given permission to transfer this money. When he

bought his Canadian draft he presented four \$ 1,000 bills, leaving his bank account untouched.

b) These \$ 1,000 bills were traced and found to come from a bank account in Toronto of \$15,000 held by three persons mentioned in the opening...

...persons claiming to be journalists;

Edward Yardas

Maxim Bielic

George Metesac

Have raised to transfer \$ 2,500, \$ 3,500 and \$ 3,500 reportedly to take to Europe, for travel expenses on behalf of their employers;

Edinas Publishing Co.

Zvesti Publishing Co.

League of Canadian Croatians

Srpski Glasnik.

Me. Yardas' request was approved and he bought his draft with a cheque for \$1,500 and with a \$1,000 bill, which was traced to the account mentioned in paragraph (b).

Dr. Kaye of the Naturalization Branch, Secretary of State Department, gave further information on the activities of the Macedonian group in Toronto. It appears from the Bulgarian language newspaper in Toronto that there have been appeals for a fund for Macedonian relief of which the Treasurer was Mr. Toncho Naibenoff and associated with him were Mr. Spaso Michailoff and Mr. Nano Petcoff. On October 11th it was announced in the Bulgarian paper that the fund had collected # 15,295.

I also understand that further information concerning Andro Christoff, Nicholas Kiriakopolos and Andro Palmeroff is available in your file No. D 945-3-E 353.

It would therefore appear from these facts that monies which have been collected from persons or persons of Macedonian and

Bulgarian origin in Toronto, ostensibly for relief purposes, are being misused.

The Foreign Exchange Control Board has been keeping a close watch on all Macedonian applications for transfer of funds abroad and, in this connection, the last information we have from that Department is that a contract with Iedro Hristoff, Pencho Penchoff, Anton Tsvetcoff and Lambro Luticoff concerning the sale of "The New Times Publishing Company" of 386 Ontario Street, Toronto, for the sum of \$1.00 was duly conveyed on the 26th November, 1946. Obviously some other consideration but the one dollar involved has been understood in completing this transaction. In this respect our understanding is that Hristoff's Bank Account is the pivoting feature of the deal. .

As previously stated, if the \$15,000 referred to has been raised, for war charity purposes such collection has been made without the benefit of registration. Further, the funds so collected, whether under registration or not, should not be used for purposes other than those for which they were raised, and, of immediate importance, the Committee responsible is required to have prepared an audited statement showing all receipts and disbursements since the beginning of...

Canadian Postal Censorship - Ottawa Ontario

C. 33

March 24, 1941

“Narodna Volya”

(People’s will)

5856 Chene Street,

Detroit, Michigan.

U.S.A.

February 21, 1941

Bulgarian

The lease-lend bill is pure Fascism, reads the leading article

The standard Oil is supplying both opponents in the European conflict: England directly, Germany and Italy by way of Spain. England having appropriated the merchant marine of all the countries overrun by Hitler has a higher tonnage at the present time than ever before. It is quite inaccurate to say that England needs ships as, with the 10,000,000 tons of so called “Allied Shipping”, she now commends 45% of the world’s aggregate merchant fleets. The lease-land bill is leading the U.S.A. into war. The working class wants neither war nor Fascism and must, therefore, oppose the measures which will drag us into both with all means at her disposal.

Before the Explosion in the Balkans

The eyes of the world are on the Balkan Peninsula which may soon become a theater of war. English maneuvers have caused disturbances in Rumania. Italian reverses on all fronts have compelled Hitler to come to the rescue and threaten Greece with invasion unless the latter signs a separate peace with Hitler. Mussolini has held frantic consultations with Franco and the head of the French Fascist Republic, Petain. But Franco has pleaded Spanish exhaustion, and the opposition to the various bourgeois factions in France is strong enough to compel Petain to the utmost caution. So that passage of Nazi and Italian troops over French and Spanish territories to North Africa is for the time being at least not likely.

The United States hold the key to the situation and here opinion is divided. The mass of the people want peace and preservation of the rights of the workers, but reactionary leaders and Wall Street are all out for war. They have given the President dictatorial powers and they are pushing the lease-lend bill through. This bill means war - war in the Balkans, war for America.

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria Threatened with War

England is trying to engage part of the German forces in the Balkans in order to relieve the pressure on the British Isles. She has severed diplomatic relations with Rumania and is waiting to do the same with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. She can then bomb Rumanian oil fields and Bulgarian towns. Hitler, it is said, has promised Salonika to Yugoslavia; Agach and Kavala to Bulgaria, if they let his troops through to Greece. There are 600,000 soldiers in Thrace. The Balkans are once again facing the horrors of destruction.

The Bulgarian Government has Betrayed the People

The Bulgarian Government has conspired with the German Nazis against the Bulgarian people. The Filoff Government and Tsar Boris are embarking upon the same course as the Rumanian traitors who provoked anti-Semitic pogroms in order to hide national opposition to Fascism and German occupation.

In order to justify this flagrant act of treason, Filoff gives the excuse that Bulgaria has been told by Moscow she must not count on help from the U.S.S.R. -Local Bulgarian papers in America, namely, the NARODEN GLAS, have repeated this lie.

The Bulgarian Government never intended to oppose German invasion and never took any measures to prevent it. Tsar Boris and Premier Filoff are Hitler's best Fifth Columnists in Bulgaria -they have bargained away the life and the independence of the people. How could Soviet Russia help to save a country from Hitler, when the leaders of that country have already sold it to Hitler! The U. S. S. R. would be falling right into the famous Munich trap laid by British Imperialists at the time and still waiting to be sprung: a war with Hitler.

The Bulgarian people know that the U.S.S.R. is their friend but the Bulgarian bourgeoisie is afraid of that friendship and prefers to conspire with imperialists, be they German or British, against the best interests of the country. The Bulgarian ruling classes are betraying the Fatherland because they fear the Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian Government never asked for Russian help -they avoided it. Tsar Boris sold the country to Hitler for 30 pieces of silver just as Tsar Ferdinand sold it to the Kaiser, in his day, against the wishes and better judgment of the nation. The Bulgarian people are keeping count of these treasons and the day is not far oft when the traitors will be brought before a people's Court. When that day comes, the Hitlers, the Churchills and the Roosevelts will not be able to save themselves either. The people will win in the end, after the imperialist forces and their puppets at the helm of the Balkan States have plunged the Balkan fields and dales into a murderous war -the day of reckoning will come. The Balkan workers and peasants will suffer and die, but enough of them will survive to put an end to imperialism forever.

Central Intelligence Group - Washington D.C. - June i3, 1947

Country: Greece/Canada

Subject: Letters from Macedonian Autonomists in Canada

Date of Info: 3 April i947

Evaluation: F-6

1. The letters in paragraphs 2 and 3 below were written by George Grouios (or Grouev), a resident of Canada. He went to Canada from his native village, Alonia, near Florina, in Northwestern Greece. He is Secretary General of the Slavo-Macedonian Organization in Canada, which is seeking the federation of Greek Macedonia with Yugoslavia. An important point brought out in one letter is the fact that during the spring of 1947 a considerable number of Slavo-Macedonians are preparing to go from Canada to fight as Comitaji (mountain bandits) against Greece.

2. The following letter is written to Nikolaos Tsetos, a resident of Alonia:

“Dear Cousin Nikolaos,

Many greetings from me, your cousin George Grouios. Also give my greetings to Vasiliki and to all the rest. I am well so far. I am going to America (i. e., U.S.A.), and I decided to take this opportunity to write you a few words. I am indeed very well, but I am distressed because I hear much that is not good news. They are now writing news even worse than before, namely that there are many Comitaji. In the spring, Nikolaos, the situation will be far worse. They are preparing to go there from America and from Canada by the thousands to fight as Comitaji against your mangey-bald old nanny-goat (meaning Greece), and until we get what belongs to us you will not have liberty there. Tell my godfather Panos Tantsef: “Be a little better to my boy, or Panos, you will have the same experience as Antonis Standisis” (the President of the village of Alonia who was carried off by the bandits, and his fate is still unknown). Cousin Nikolaos, don't think that the world is asleep. Everything which happens there happens because of our men. Therefore tell my boy to snap out of it, because there will be nobody to protect him. Tell the same thing to Panos Tantsef. I tell you that

letters come here from Monastir, and they write us who is harming our people. Give many greetings to all who ask about me... I am expecting much news from you and for you to write me what everybody in the village is doing.

With fraternal greetings Yours cousin, G. Grouios”

3. Elias Lalos, also a resident of Alonia, is the recipient of another letter written by Grouios:

“Dear Elias Lalos,

I received your letter some time ago, but... we learned from the newspapers that the Andartes have taken Antonis Standis, but we do not know how far this is true. I am anxiously awaiting your answer on this point. Liberty will not be slow in coming; everything that the People demand will come about. You there know nothing of what is going on. We know. Thousands of telegrams are sent from here to the Peace Conference demanding that Macedonia remain independent with Salonia as its capital, and this will happen in a short time. Pay attention to my words. This only you need to know: you and the others demand the just rights of our people. You are Macedonians and not Greeks. Demand just this by telegrams from there.

Yours friend, George Grouios”

4. Although the letters are not dated, probably written in February or March 1947.

Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Consul in Skopje

March 27, 1949

.....The Yugoslav communist Party's entire Macedonian policy is based on the assumption that they can carry in the teeth of fierce opposition from most Bulgars and some Serbs their thesis of a distinct Macedonian language and national tradition. The Party is therefore particularly committed to support advanced research in the little explored subjects of Macedonian national history and philology. Such studies have, of course, had little chance until recently of getting very far, owing to ferocious opposition from Greeks, Bulgars or Serbs, and as a result there are really no trained specialists in this field. The discovery that at Skopje University very few students are showing any interest in Slavonic Philology or the Macedonian language, and that during the recent end-of-term examinations they showed themselves much keener on the Serbian language and Yugoslav literature, is therefore a good deal more significant than might appear at first sight. One or two other minor incidents that I have observed would appear to suggest that some Macedonians, at least in Skopje, may prefer to read in Serbian, rather than Macedonian, when they get the chance. Add to this the fact that a large number of the students here are showing very little interest in their compulsory Russian studies, or at any rate are scoring deplorably bad marks at Russian in their examinations, and it will be seen that Crvenkovski has a lot to think about in his new post.

The apparent lack of interest among certain sections of the intelligentsia in the "Macedonian National Tradition", so essential to party ideology here, is no doubt also reflected in the "indiscipline" and "passivity" of the Macedonian writers and poets referred to earlier in this dispatch. It is a fact that, to judge from Dimitar Nitrev's speech, various brands of "decadence" (meaning, apparently, a failure to express oneself unequivocally as on the side of the Yugoslav Communist Party or, at the very least, to be interested in individual, rather than in mass emotions, and thus, by implication, "apolitical") is a far commoner offence here, and certainly very much graver, than any inadequacy in form or style.

Some clue to the degree to which the "Macedonian National Tradition" has captured people's imaginations here may also be afforded by the long series of free public lectures given in Skopje recently by Dimitar Vlahov. At the beginning of the series, when Vlahov was speaking on the early history of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement, his audiences were quite large -perhaps 500 or more -but a very high proportion of them appeared to be elderly people such as may have had some personal experience of the period he was describing. As the series progressed, however, not even Vlahov's considerable reputation, as the "Grand Old Man" of the Macedonian movement was able to compensate for the impossible dullness of his lectures. When I looked in one minute before he was due to begin the lecture entitled "The successes of the Macedonian People's Republic" there were precisely three people sitting there, and another half-dozen or so huddled around the stove at the back of the hall -although in fairness it should be said that Vlahov tended to begin his lectures later than the advertised time, and it has been a habit for people to return.

If as these events appear to suggest, the (not very numerous) intellectuals here are not over-impressed by the new Macedonian Idea, what then is their attitude? Some (I should say not very many) are plainly pro-Bulgarian on principle. Most of the students and young people, although probably more interested in their technical studies than in their Macedonian traditions, are, I should say, supporters to a greater or less degree of the present Yugoslav Government in the same way as are most other young Yugoslavs. As Macedonians, they are likely to be far less worried by any submergence of "Western Values" than are their fellow students, say, in Zagreb and Ljubljana. At the same time the Yugoslav Communist Party, by putting an end to the almost colonial policy in Macedonia of successive pre-war Belgrade governments, has at one stroke eliminated the greatest single curse of Vardar Macedonia, and released a good deal of latent energy hitherto suppressed. The Party can also claim, convincingly, that Yugoslavia has done a lot more to liquidate the economic backwardness of Vardar Macedonia in the last three years than Bulgaria is ever likely to do for Pirin. Finally, the Bulgarian Occupation was not a particularly pleasant affair, and the memory of it probably still works as a fairly effective discouragement to pro-Bulgarian sympathies.

On the other hand, there is evidently fairly widespread support for a Macedonian autonomist movement - largely, I should say, among older people, though certainly also in certain sections of the youth. As a spokesman of the Yugoslav security service said at the Macedonian Party Congress what opposition groups there have been have consisted "almost entirely of Mihailovists". It is a commonly held view that the Mihailovists, or IMRO, are really only advocating autonomy as a prelude for incorporation in Bulgaria when the time is ripe. The fact that they seem quite happy to talk the Bulgarian language lends credence to this view, and certainly one of the main tenets of Yugoslav propaganda is that the policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of the Mihailovists is virtually indistinguishable. I am inclined to believe, however, that this is an over - simplification, and that there is a body of opinion which seeks a united, independent Macedonia as an ultimate object in itself - quite possibly within some larger federation, perhaps, as is alleged here, under Anglo-American protection, but probably not under the protection of the Kremlin. Evidence in support of this view comes from Lazo Mojsov's book, mentioned earlier in this dispatch. Mojsov gives, for the first time, more details of the "Skopje intellectuals" who had been mentioned earlier as criticizing the Manifesto put out by the partisan Headquarters for Macedonia at the end of 1943. These, critics, who appear to have been supporters of the Partisans, were apparently professional politicians with no very great regular following, but their views are interesting none the less. They argued that there could be no final settlement of the Macedonian question within Yugoslavia, as the very name of Yugoslavia was for Macedonians a symbol of slavery; that the future of Vardar Macedonia could not be decided without reference to the other two parts of Macedonia as well; that the first aim of the Macedonian Partisans must be clearly stated as being a United Macedonia, and a joint Macedonian military command must therefore be established with a view to placing the Macedonian Question fairly and squarely "in the diplomatic arena". Other criticisms put forward by these people were that the Partisan Headquarters were "not competent" to issue any "Manifesto" in the name of the Macedonian People; that they, the "intellectual leaders", should be consulted more frequently and entrusted with diplomatic missions, etc.; that there was no need publicly to criticize Ckatrov

and other "fascists", as they were completely discredited anyway; that for General Mijalce (or Mise) Apostolski to sign himself "Mihajlo""smelt of Serbdom" , and so on.

Various extracts from Tito's letters quoted by Mojsov make it clear that he was worried by autonomist tendencies on the fringes of the Partisan movement in Macedonia. No doubt they were a good deal harder to deal with than plain "Greater Bulgarianism". It seems clear that Metodi Andonov- Cento, the Macedonian nationalist politician who eventually became President of the Presidium of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia, must have been one of these "autonomists". He must also have been a figure of some standing in Macedonia, otherwise he would scarcely have been given the appointment. This may also explain why the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proved so eager to sing Andonov's praises since their hands were freed by the Cominform Resolution. Andonov, of course, tried to escape to Greece with the object of laying proposals for an independent Macedonia before the Paris Peace Conference, and since that attempt (as on several occasions before the war) he has been inside a Yugoslav gaol.

Lazo Mojsov, of course, argues (or rather states categorically again and again -it cannot be called argument) that these Macedonian autonomists were really "tools of Bulgarian Chauvinism". If that were so, then it would of course be easier for Mojsov to discredit them in the eyes of the public. But his "arguments" are not convincing, and clearly beg the question. There seems to be no doubt that IMRO, if it plaid its cards carefully, could count on the support of most politically conscious anti-communists among the Macedonian intelligentsia, in addition to the more-or- less fascist following it has always had -in present circumstances there would appear to be no other alternative to communism, whether Titoist or Stalinesque. It is certainly a fact that autonomist bands were active in both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia during the war, and at least in Vardar Macedonia for a considerable time after the war, until they were dispersed by Yugoslav security troops. It is scarcely likely that the ideas for which they stood in 1945 have been so easily disposed of.

But IMRO has often been described with some justice as mainly an affair of the bourgeois intelligentsia, with little mass support. The same is probably true today, and autonomist tendencies are likely to be limited to certain groups of Macedonian intellectuals (not a very numerous body, in any case). The state of opinion among workers and peasants is altogether a different matter. My impression is that the Macedonian workers' main feeling is one of dissatisfaction with living conditions as they are at present -they are certainly very bad - and that they are a good deal more interested in their standard of life than in ideological or national disputes. Town workers here suffer more than those elsewhere as a result of the inevitable, but none the less frightening inefficiency of Management in their People's Republic, which can be observed at its worst in the State commercial network. As a result, housewives here have had to put up with a good deal more in the way of queuing and shortages than elsewhere, and the free market-prices of essential food are painfully higher than they are only a few kilometers away in Serbia (particularly in Kosmet).

"It was better than when the Bulgarians were here" is a typical comment, but it is not a political judgment; in fact, most people know well enough the rations in the Bulgarian People's Republic are appreciably worse than they are here. "Yes, we suppose things will get better – but WHEN?" probably best expresses the resigned attitude of most town worker.

While housewives struggle to make ends meet, many of their husbands have to work in extremely bad conditions, and workers are constantly leaving their jobs in the (slender) hope of finding something better. This again seems to be very largely due to inefficiency and thoughtlessness, resulting once more, to some extent, from Macedonian inexperience in management and administration. In the once British-owned chrome mines at Radusa, to take one fairly typical example, workers have been standing all day in several inches of water although it is said that gum-boots are in fact available if someone will only do something about it. One thing is certain, and that is that in general (although a few branches do manage to assist their members to some extent, as for instance in getting them extra rations and firewood) the Trade Unions are of almost no help at all in improving working conditions. It is scarcely

likely that the scandals revealed in the recent purge of the Trade Union leadership will do much to increase their reputation.

Nevertheless, there are, signs that the living conditions of ordinary workers will improve this year, and I should say that most of them would give their more-or-less willing support to the present authorities unless somebody else can offer them, convincingly, a standard of life dramatically better than the one they suffer at present. It seems very unlikely that advocates of union with Bulgaria could hope to make such an offer. Whether Macedonian autonomists could make their proposals more attractive with an offer of Anglo-American spam and circuses is another matter. I should be inclined to think it extremely doubtful. Probably, apart from other factors, very few of the thousands of Greek Macedonian refugees here are likely to be good propagandists for Anglo-American support.

Opinion among the peasants (the great majority of Macedonians, of course) is a different matter again. As I have reported on an earlier occasion, many (if not most) of the country districts of Vardar Macedonia are so backward that it is difficult to conceive of any but a few individuals having any sort of coherent political opinion at all. But Bulgarian (and perhaps more particularly Albanian) occupation was certainly no pleasant business for the Macedonian peasants, and I should say that by the end of the war the Partisans were regarded genuinely as liberators in many country districts where the peasants neither knew nor cared anything about communism. Macedonia possesses an unusually high proportion of really poor peasants, and many (particularly among the Albanians in the south-west, it appears) were either without land or hopelessly in debt. For these people -a very numerous class -the Agrarian Reform came as a godsend, and subsequent resistance to the idea of Producer Cooperatives was far less than in districts with a higher proportion of richer peasants.

The Macedonian Communist Party, compared with the parties in the rest of Yugoslavia, had comparatively little influence in the towns, where the Bulgarians were naturally able to develop far more effective anti-communist (or at any rate anti-Yugoslav -communist) propaganda than German or Italian occupiers elsewhere. The Macedonian Partisans, therefore, were based almost exclusively on

the villages, and it seems clear that the Macedonian Communist Party is well aware of the source of most of its strongest and most effective potential support nowadays. The Party appears to consist of a not very large group of intellectuals who in earlier days might have been Macedonian nationalists, a group (again, I should say, not large) of Macedonian workers who for one reason or another were less influenced by anti-Serb opinion than their fellows, plus the usual admixture of flamboyant "1941 Partisans" and warriors, together with an unusually high proportion of time-servers with rather murky records. The latter, although they do not occupy the highest positions, are obviously the most unstable element in present circumstances. The Party is both young and (except as regards Partisan warfare) very inexperienced. As pressure on it becomes stronger (and the leaders are obviously very nervous about the possible effects of Bulgarian propaganda, especially since it increased in vehemence at the beginning of the year), the Party is trying to consolidate its position in the most promising (and, in Macedonia, the most decisive) sector; namely, in the villages.

In my opinion, the Party is likely to be successful in its policy, given time. There is to be ideological work on a very big scale where pre-conceived political notions are few; the party's wartime record is mostly in its favour; loyal peasants of the more influential kind are to be admitted as members of the Party with little or no regard to the purity of their Marxist-Leninist ideology (if indeed they understand it at all). In this way, the Party will build up a firm basis of influential villagers committed to its support. Many of them will undoubtedly be (already are) opportunists and yes-men, but the policy in general is likely to be effective.

The main weapon in this drive for increased support in the countryside is of course the extension of the Producer Cooperatives. On this issue (as I have suggested earlier in this dispatch) Kolisevski, who, as a worker born and bred, probably takes a less novel view of the social category from which a communist party should draw its main support, appears to have been over-ruled. There is no doubt that Macedonia, compared with the rest of Yugoslavia, offers very favourable conditions for the establishment of Producer Cooperatives with the minimum of peasant opposition. It is, after all, the home of "pecalbarstvo" -the system under which

the men of a village unable to support its inhabitants would go abroad to earn their living, and send their savings home. In the case of the mountain village of Galicnik, near Debar (and others too) the entire male population used to go abroad to work as crafts men or yoghurt makers, and returned once a year in July for about a fortnight (or every other year, if they had been to America). The month of July was thus filled with celebrations and weddings, and the newlywed husbands would look forward to seeing their three-months-old children the following July. Such a way of life was extremely picturesque for foreign visitors, but not very satisfactory for the villagers themselves. Now, Galicnik has a very large and flourishing cooperative engaged in stock-breeding and carpet-making. It has libraries, electric light, a cinema. I am told by a man who has just spent a few months there teaching the carpet makers the secret of wool-dyeing that the women and young people are delighted with the new arrangements, although some of the older men who had got used to the idea of going "on pecalba" every year are still inclined to hanker after foreign parts. The case of Galicnik, of course, is so startling that it can scarcely be called typical. I believe, for example, that government loans to this particular cooperative have been unusually large. Nevertheless, it does serve to illustrate the fact that the cooperative idea is likely to become increasingly popular in the very large number of poor, backward and barren villages of Macedonia.

It is therefore clear that if "the population of Bulgaria is to be increased from 7 million to 10 million" (as has apparently been said in Sofia), it will not be as the result of a popular rising in Vardar Macedonia in the foreseeable future. Propagandists here have not much difficulty in disposing of Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism. They can point to the fact that there is not likely to be any autonomy for Macedonians inside Bulgaria -and some sort of autonomy would certainly be demanded even by Macedonians who might not press their claim to a language of their own distinct from Bulgarian. The "Kolisevski clique" can even make a convincing enough counter-claim for the inclusion of Pirin in the Macedonian people's Republic. Neskovic, at the Macedonian party Congress, strongly denied that Yugoslavia had ever claimed Pirin except as part of a general settlement in an eventual South Slav Federation. This seems, if not an actual misstatement, to be at least misleading. Mojsov's book

makes it quite clear that at one stage the union of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia within Yugoslavia and without regard to an ultimate South Slav Federation was agreed to in principle by the Bulgarian Communist Party, though without enthusiasm. They are scarcely likely to have agreed to this unless the Yugoslavs had been pressing them very strongly (and unless, one might perhaps add, they had had instructions from Moscow in this sense).

Mojsov and his fellow publicists will have a far harder task, though, to counter proposals for some sort of Macedonian autonomy with no special Yugoslav association. The Bulgarian Party appears, wisely enough, to have given up the attempt to persuade Macedonians that they are really Bulgars, or that they would be happier as citizens of the Bulgarian People's Republic. Nor can they convincingly propose Pirin as a basis for some sort of autonomous Macedonia. But if they are still thinking in terms of an autonomy based on Aegean Macedonia, then they touch the Yugoslav Communist party in general, and Lazo Mojsov in particular, on a very weak spot indeed. Publicists here have surely been thinking of this possibility when driving home the not entirely convincing argument that all Macedonian autonomists without exception are the dupes or agents of Sofia. As I have indicated the autonomists can in no sense be described as the agents of Sofia; whether they will in due course become their dupes will depend on the skill and subtlety of the Bulgarian propaganda machine. Less convincing still is Skopje's secondary argument that, pending a form of South Slav Federation acceptable to the Yugoslav Communist Party, a united Macedonia not based on the People's Republic within the framework of Federal Yugoslavia is "unthinkable". At this point Mojsov completely abandons reasoned statement in favour of a mystical wrath and categorical assertion. He claims that those Macedonians (i.e. the Yugoslav Macedonians) who fought for and won their national independence within Yugoslavia have a natural right to lead the way to Macedonian unity, and that since Yugoslavia is in itself a federation of South Slav peoples, the incorporation of the rest of Macedonia in it, along with the Macedonian People's Republic, is an obvious next step. Vardar, says Mojsov, is in any case the natural heart of a united Macedonia, gliding calmly over what I believe to be a fact -namely, the existence of a fairly general feeling in Aegean Macedonia that the people of Vardar are backward and uncouth.

Perhaps as a natural reaction on the part of the latter there is, I believe, a slight tendency here (certainly in other parts of Yugoslavia) to regard Aegean Macedonians as slackers.

Mojsov's assertion that Vardar is the natural heart and head of any united Macedonia is not likely to go unchallenged. His language at this stage of his "argument" is cautious and in rather general terms. He probably realizes he is skating on very thin ice which may expose him to the charge of Belgrade Chauvinism. Reading most of the Yugoslav Communist Party's Macedonian propaganda one might be excused for supposing the Macedonians quite entitled, if they so wish, to form a united Macedonia of their own. But this is just what Mojsov will not countenance, and he only just manages not to say in so many words that South Slav Federation is of less importance than the need to keep the Macedonian people's Republic firmly attached to Yugoslavia, and to add the rest of Macedonia to it as soon as the opportunity arises. It is difficult to see what else a Yugoslav publicist could say, given the post-Cominform situation in the Balkans, but this is certainly the weakest part of Mojsov's (and therefore of the Yugoslav Communist party's) case as far as Macedonians are concerned.

In the light of recent developments, it looks as if the first shots in what must surely develop into a high powered Macedonian propaganda campaign were in fact fired by Mito Hadzi Vasilev in his article in "Nova Makedonija" on 24 February (i.e. some days before Mosa Pijade opened up with his big guns on 6 March). Vasilev revealed, rather innocently, in a single brief sentence adduced in support of his charge of Bulgarian hypocrisy, that Mr. Visinsky's reference in Paris to the "Macedonian and Albanian minorities" in Greece had been reported by Tass and Pravda as "Bulgarian and Albanian" minorities. Since when, asked Vasilev curtly, had Tass been a mouthpiece for Bulgarian Chauvinism? - and in the rest of a nine-column article made no further reference to Soviet Policy or to Greece. He charged the Bulgarian Government with encouraging talk in Pirin (he did not say Aegean) Macedonia of a "free Macedonia not in Yugoslavia but in a South Slav Federation", and hinted darkly at the possible significance of the alleged Bulgarian claim that "Bulgaria's population will soon be increased from 7 m. to 10 m." If the

Bulgarian leaders did not realize they were making a big mistake and mend their ways, said Vasilev, “invincible Life will teach them a cruel lesson to-day or to-morrow”. I do not know whether this is in fact the article which is said to have been quoted indirectly by The Times on 21 March (I have not yet seen the Times report but if so, then Vasilev certainly got no nearer to anything that could be called a threat of war than this prophecy about "invincible Life".

It may not be irrelevant to conclude this general review of the position in Macedonia by mentioning a conversation I had last December with an officer of the Yugoslav Army Engineers in Djevdjelija. He was a Bosnian, from a remote village in Krajina. I asked him whether there were many Macedonians in his unit on the frontier, and how he liked service in Macedonia. “Macedonians?”, he replied, “of course not – we’re mostly Bosnians and Montenegrins – you can’t expect a Macedonian to be any good at fighting. Wild people too - just savages – take the girls, they just run away when you chaps appear – as for dancing..... Give me Zagreb any day”.

**Department of National Health and Welfare - War Charities
Division**

Ottawa, April 23rd, 1947

Secretary of State For External Affairs, Ottawa

Attention Mr. Scott Reid

Dear Sir:

Your letter of April 11th to my Deputy Minister concerning Macedonian and Bulgarian activities in Toronto has been directed to me for reply.

Following your information received in November, 1946, one Mr. Pepcoff, 24 Sydenham street, Toronto, was informed by registered letter that we were aware of appeals for Macedonian relief were being conducted and that \$ 15,000 had been collected for the purchase of supplies. We pointed out that the raising of funds for objects connected with the War could not be carried on without benefit of registration and that if they could not affiliate themselves with the registered organization in Toronto, which contributed to Yugoslav relief, they were to discontinue raising monies forthwith.

As no reply was received, on December 4th a request for an investigation was dispatched to the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. A copy of this letter is enclosed.

I have taken advantage of your letter to write the Commissioner and call his attention to the possible connection between the last named group and the individuals we heard about last Full. I am asking the Commissioner what progress might have been made with regard to the investigation requested by the Department last December. As soon as word has been received from the constabulary I shall lost no time in getting in touch with you.

Yours sincerely,
Leon Trebert,
Registrar,

War Charities Act.

LT/MH

Draft Minute to Mr. Laffan

The following is a resume of the points I made when discussing with you your paper on Macedonia.

Paragraph 12

Were the Bulgarian Tsars Slavized Turks or Tartars?

Paragraph 24

Two points seemed to me to require elaboration. The first was that there were really three Macedonian groups: (1) those agitating for complete independence; (2) those agitating for the inclusion of all Macedonia within Bulgaria; and (3) those willing for some form of compromise. The second point was about the Protoguerrovists. It is necessary to bring them into the picture because they link on to and explain Tito' Macedonian policy. Protogueroff split from Mihailoff because he was willing to co-operate with Agrarians and Serbs. His party moreover was subsidized by the Yugoslav Government.

Paragraph 28

Can we find out whether Petrich is now linked with the Greek railway system?

Paragraph 35

So long as Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are at loggerheads, Yugoslavia will require Greek and Turkish support to keep the Bulgars down. Their interest in the acquisition of Salonika would therefore from the purely strategic point of view be problematical, because it would not merely weaken Greece in itself, but, by depriving the Turks and Greeks of a common frontier, weaken the whole defensive system on which any form of Balkan entente directed against Bulgaria would have to be founded. Naturally if Yugoslavia and Bulgaria came to terms, the position would be different. The main Serbian interest in Salonika (see paragraphs 35 and 37) is at present historical or connected with prestige.

Serbian and (see paragraph 42) Bulgarian economic interest in Salonika is at the moment somewhat indeterminate. If the trade of these countries is mainly to be with Europe, or with Russia, the economic importance of Salonika to either will be very small. How far this country or America will take Yugoslav or Bulgarian produce after the war is very doubtful.

Paragraphs 38, 39 and 49

Salonika for the Greeks is as important strategically and economically as it is ethnically. The town and its hinterland are the richest of the Greek provinces and as we know from the present war, Salonika is essential to the defense of Greece.

Paragraph 47

A greater Yugoslavia, including Bulgaria especially under Russian influence, would almost certainly be, objectionable to us. Though in pre-war days the Russians may have favoured the idea of a Balkan federation, we can now say quite definitely that they regard it askance.

Editor Krapched Explains why Bulgaria Can Not Accept Anglo-American Demands for the Evacuation of Recent Armed Territories

February 14, 1944

No. 2434 (R-2260)

American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey

SUBJECT: Editor Krapched Explains why Bulgaria Can Not Accept Anglo-American Demands for the Evacuation of Recent Armed Territories

Sir:

I have the honor to present below an editorial from the Bulgarian newspaper ZORA of February 6, 1944, in which the Editor, Mr. Krapchev, explains why Bulgaria can not accept the demands made by the Anglo-Americans for the evacuation of the recently annexed territories. The reason he gives is that actually these demands are based on the perpetuation of the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly, a treaty which Bulgarians have always regarded as unjust and intolerable.

Mr. Krapchev reviews some of the circumstances connected with the Treaty of Neuilly as he interprets them. He regards the Treaty of Neuilly, and the other treaties signed at Paris in 1919, as the primary cause of the present war. He points out that these treaties were imposed by force upon the conquered, and that without the participation of Russia. He adds that similar conditions were imposed upon the Soviet Union. In their demand that Bulgaria evacuate Macedonia and Thrace the Anglo-Americans merely indicate that their first demand with respect to Bulgaria is the restoration of the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly.

The second condition which they lay down is equally impossible, the writer says, for it demands that Bulgaria make war upon Germany.

These demands can not be accepted by Bulgaria because they would restore an intolerable situation and, even if accepted, would not be the final demands, for they would be followed by others just as the terms of the Armistice of Salonika, which were not altogether intolerable, were followed by other harsher demands at Paris. All Bulgarians, the writer says, remember conditions in Bulgaria following the Treaty of Neuilly between 1919 and the beginning of the Second World War, a period in which Bulgaria's neighbors did not cease to interfere in her affairs, as far as they were able, and to terrorize her.

In commenting on this editorial one is obliged to point out that Mr. Krapchev veils--as he fails in all his editorials-- to refer to the fact that Bulgaria of her own free will and without provocation declared war upon the United States and Great Britain in December 1941. This was a wholly wanton act, although doubtless performed at the urgency and insistence of Germany, but still performed by the Bulgarian government acting as a sovereign power. At that time there was no hostility felt by Americans against Bulgaria, although Bulgaria had given great offense by providing bases for the German army from which the latter attacked Greece and Yugoslavia. Hence Mr. Krapchev should make clear to his countrymen why it is that the Anglo-Americans demand that Bulgaria evacuate the territories she has occupied in connection with this war. Mr. Krapchev is quite right when he states that many British and American writers and leaders in the past supported the rightness of Bulgaria's demands to Macedonia and to an outlet on the Aegean Sea in Thrace. Every person informed on Macedonian affairs knows that Bulgarians predominate by a large majority in the population of that part of Macedonia included in Yugoslavia in accordance with the terms of the treaties of Bucharest and Neuilly. Everyone also knows that the application of the term "South Serbia" to Macedonia and "South Serbians" to the Macedonians is only political camouflage and has no more actual justification than to call the Irish "West Anglians".

By declaring war on the United States and Great Britain Bulgaria put herself in a blind alley from which there appears to be no exit except by giving up the territories annexed after April, 1941. Nobody believes that this would be an act of justice, for war does not create justice, but rather promotes injustice of every kind. "He

that taketh up the sword shall perish by the sword", whether right or wrong.

Mr. Krapchev's final assumption that the demand to evacuate Macedonia and Thrace, plus the demand to make war on Germany, would be followed by other demands is probably true, but Mr. Krapchev and other Bulgarians who advocated the seizure of these territories following Bulgaria's alliance with the Axis should have thought of all this before they have committed themselves and their country to such a policy.

The editorial in free translation reads as follows:

THEY WISH TO PERPETUATE INJUSTICES

By Danail Krapchev

"When one knows what the Anglo-Americans demand of Bulgaria first of all--because this demand is number 1 --he understands that as far as she is concerned they are going back to the Treaty of Neuilly, to the treaties of Paris of 1919. And these ill-omened treaties--acknowledged as such not only by the conquered but also by eminent English and Americans-- brought on the Second World War. Even the aged Lloyd George withdrew from the unwelcome work in which he, together with the late Clemenceau, took an active part and predicted, though rather late, the Second World War. The late American President Wilson, who went to the Paris Conference with a definite program, as is known from the memoir of his helper Lansing, the second American delegate to the Conference, considered himself betrayed and died tragically of regret in his native land. The tragedy of his predecessor is best known to President Roosevelt who was then his Minister.

Besides we must recall that the Paris treaties were imposed on the conquered at the" end of the First World War without Russia's participation. And not only this: they were imposed on the Soviet Union as well.

It is these ominous treaties of peace, signed with the knife at the throats of the conquered, that the Anglo-Americans wish to perpetuate, to become the corner stone of human history.

Otherwise what does the Anglo-American invitation to Bulgaria mean when they ask her to evacuate the Bulgarian lands liberated in 1941, what does it mean if not the perpetuation of the injustices committed toward her at Neuilly? The demand is that we should evacuate the newly liberated Bulgarian lands--and this is the first demand-- lands which were taken away from us by force after the First World War, but also those which were taken away from us by force during the war between the Balkan allies (1913) by our former allies.

The Anglo-Americans wish to make the injustices committed toward the Bulgarian nation in the course of history, in the course of centuries, permanent, even including those injustices against which the English protested at that time. Even those treaties which do not bear the signature of the Americans, as in the case with regard to Western Thrace. This of course is demand number one, after which the other numbers follow. The second of these is to make war on Germany. Other demands will follow later, as was the case after the First World War, when at the Armistice of Salonika somewhat more tolerable conditions were imposed, but later at Neuilly they were made ten times more severe. These conditions affected even the oldest territories, as the Western Frontiers. They also affected the army, while preparations and restitutions were imposed upon us. Nothing was left of Bulgarian sovereignty. Our neighbors continually and un-interruptedly made Bulgaria's conditions worse up to the eve of the Second World War. Bulgaria was constantly terrorized and humiliated, while the Bulgarian nation was torn and enslaved.

Only he who has a short memory has forgotten the not distant past, which the Anglo-Americans desire to perpetuate."

Respectfully yours, Burton Y. Berry, American Consul General
To Department in original and hectograph
FHB; SA. File No.891

External Affairs – Ottawa - Athens, April 27, 1948

No. 87. Following for D.M.I. from Military Attaché, Begins:

M.A. 28. Civil war period 12th to 26th April.

1. Rebel activity still widespread. Looting, sabotage, recruiting raids continue, especially Peloponnese. Few major rebel incidents, mainly Peloponnese. First phase G.N.A. general offensive commenced April 15th in Roumeli area.

Operation given code word “dawn”.

2. Minor rebel activity confined to sabotage of road-rail communications, especially Peloponnese, shelling communication Northern Greece, looting and recruiting raids all areas, especially Peloponnese. Rebel units Voulgara area, X88, reported moving northwest, probable due to operation “dawn”. Being pursued by G.N.A. commando units. April 11th, strong rebel band attacked Kalavrita, c.9760, killed or captured entire garrison of two N.D.C. companies. G.N.A. drove rebels out of town and clashes continue in Mount Aroania area, D. 04.

3. G.N.A. operations in Khaicsidiki are peninsula east of Salonica and in Papadhes area, K. 9817, resulted in considerable rebel casualties and kept them on the move. April 13th, G.N.A. clashes with band of 500 strong in Mount Khasia area, S. 96, and captured 134 rebels. G.N.A. generally taking more offensive attitude. April 15th, operation “dawn” commenced with three divisions. Embassy cable No. 79 of April 16th refers. April 25th, G.N.A. units closing ring had reached general line X.9317.

Fleece No. 212 - February 6, 1945

For Foreign Secretary from Foreign Office

Please refer to paragraph 9 of FLEECE 89 reporting the Soviet Government's view on Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation.

2. Tito has been careful not to give us a hint of negotiations for Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance and mutual understanding, and in reply to our representations has confined himself to an assurance that federation is not an immediate probability. There have, however, been so many recent signs of friendship between the two countries that this development, however unwelcome, does not come as a surprise.

3. It seems to us here that most of the disadvantages seen in respect of a federation apply to a lesser degree to a pact is intended to be the first step towards a federation. If a pact were concluded, Bulgaria would escape from much of the treatment which she deserves of a defeated enemy and the reactions on the position of Greece would be unfavourable. We think that we should take the line that an enemy state under an armistice regime is debarred from entering into special treaty relations with another state, especially with which she is still technically in a state of war, except with the explicit permission of the victorious powers with whom it concluded the armistice; and that we should insist on full reparation being made to Greece before Bulgaria may conclude the projected alliance.

4. It would be a great help if you could arrange for this subject of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations to be discussed at the present meeting. You will remember that the U.S. Government have not yet given their views in reply to our request.

Circulation:

The King
War Cabinet
Secretary of State for Dominions
Lord Privy Seal
Secretary of State for air

Minister of Production
Minister of Information
Foreign Office
Mr. Pack
Defense Office

Foreign Office - January 1945

My telegram No. 4886 to Moscow.

In the light of Belgrade telegrams Nos. 47 and 88 and your telegram No. 108, you will see from my telegram No. 85 to Belgrade that we have now instructed Brigadier Maclean to make to Tito a communication on the lines foreshadowed in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference. You should also immediately inform the Bulgarian Government of the views of H.M.G. on the following lines:

While H.M.G would welcome a confederation between all the Balkan States, both Allied and enemy and including possibly Turkey, they could not approve an exclusive union of federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Moreover while H.M.G are prepared to agree to the creation of a Macedonian State in the future federal Yugoslavia they would be strongly opposed to the creation of a Greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory. They therefore look with disfavour on the activities of Macedonian propagandists in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian Government appear to have condoned and they do not recognize the right of the Bulgarian Government to transfer without the consent of the United Nations any part of Bulgarian territory to the Yugoslav federal State of Macedonia.

My telegram No.10823 of 28th December:

His Majesty's Government's view on Macedonian question and Yugoslav Bulgarian federation.

Tito, who has not yet been notified of views of His Majesty's Government, has expressed himself in conversation with Maclean as opposed to a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation at the present time. Question arose over a report which had reached Tito that General Velebit his representative in London had informed the press that Albania and Bulgaria would join the new Yugoslav Federal State. After reference to London Maclean informed Tito on 8th January that there appeared to be no truth in the report. Tito expressed relief

and went on to say that, although he did not exclude the possibility of an eventual extension of Yugoslav federation at some period in the future, there was no question of either Bulgaria or Albania entering into any federal union with Yugoslavia at present. In case of Bulgaria in particular Tito was not ready for such a step. As he had pointed out to a Bulgarian delegation who had visited him the day before with polite messages the Bulgarians had, on several occasions in the past, sworn eternal friendship to the Serbs but this had not prevented them from turning on them and massacring them at first opportunity. It would take the Serbs some time to forget the behaviour of Bulgaria in three wars.

At the same time there was no point in perpetuating such enmity, and, if good relations could be achieved, it would be to everyone's advantage.

2. This assurance taken with the assurance in regards to Greek Macedonia reported in telegraph 2 of my telegram under reference indicates that at any rate for the present Tito's views on these questions are substantially in conformity with those of His Majesty's Government.

3, I am anxious that to avoid the risk of subsequent misunderstandings our views should be communicated formally to Tito, the Yugoslav Government in London and the Bulgarian Government as soon as possible. On the other hand I should not like to do so before being assured that these views are not materially at variance with those of the United States Government and Soviet Government. I suggest therefore that you should communicate the gist of the foregoing paragraph to the State Department and inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that we propose to notify Tito, the Yugoslav Government and the Bulgarian Government of the views of His Majesty's Government on 18th January (repeat 18th January) unless we hear before then that the United States and Soviet Governments see objection to this procedure.

Free European Movements - Dropping of Leaflets

April 13, 1951

Dispatch No 357

From The Charge d'Affairs a.i., Belgrade, Yugoslavia

To The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada

On the night of March 22, or 23 leaflets were dropped in this country by an identified aircraft. I am enclosing two samples of the leaflets, one in Bulgarian and the other in Albanian. Several thousands of the Bulgarian leaflets were dropped along the line Nis-Topola-Zagreb and the Albanian leaflets near the Albanian border. I am enclosing a translation of the Bulgarian leaflet but have not yet been able to obtain a translation of the Albanian one.

2. You will note that the Bulgarian leaflet refers to Radio Geryanin "the voice of the BROTHERHOOD FOR BULGARIAN FREEDOM". It is, of course, obvious that both lots of leaflets were not intended to be dropped in this country.

3. The day after they were dropped, Mr. Mates asked Sir Charles Peake to call on him, and Mates gave it as his opinion that the leaflets had been dropped by Italian aircraft. There is, however, no proof of Mates' statement and I am inclined to think that Mates may be blaming the Italians mainly because he cannot think of anyone better to blame.

4. In some respects the leaflets bear a resemblance to leaflets prepared by the American O.S.S during the war and it is not uninteresting that the U.S. Ambassador has said that he is not in a position to state definitely that they were not fact prepared in the United States. I gather from this remark that he is not kept informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other agency which may be conducting propaganda of this kind, and is, therefore, unable to make a definite statement.

5. Whoever is responsible for dropping the leaflets, however, their propaganda efforts appear to be, to say the least, premature and I should be interested to know whether you are able to throw any light on their origin.

6. On the evening of March 30 I dined with Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong at the British Embassy and took the opportunity of asking him to what extent the U.S. Government was supporting so-called free national movements outside Yugoslavia. I gathered from his remarks that the State Department has at least given tacit approval to some of these so-called free movements, although he added that, as is usual with such movements, there is a great deal of internal squabbling. I was, however, interested to see from the New York Times of February 12 that a declaration by the Yugoslav National Committee in the United States had been signed by most of the prominent Yugoslavs there, including Fotitch and Machek. From the reports in the Times it would appear that Machek has buried the hatchet at least temporarily with some of his political opponents outside this country.

7. While our high Commissioner in London has already sent me some information on the European Movement and the National Committee for Free Europe in the United States (Canada House dispatch No. 2369 of October 4, 1950), I should be interested to receive as much information as you may have available on Yugoslav political movements outside this country, support which is being given to them by either the U.S. or U.K. Governments. In the same connection I should be interested in similar information concerning such movements of Hungarians, Roumanians, Bulgarians and Albanians.

8. In my opinion it would be unfortunate if any or all of the Western powers support a free movement of Yugoslavs outside this country in the present circumstances. The Yugoslav authorities are suspicious enough of the ultimate motives of the Western powers and if we wish to get anywhere with them on the kind of strategic problems raised in my Dispatch No. 304 of March 31, 1951, it would be undesirable for any of the Western governments to give support to an outside political movement at this time. In any case, I doubt whether any of the individuals involved in the Yugoslav

movement in the United States would be acceptable to the bulk of the population in the country. It seems to me much more desirable to support the present Yugoslav regime insofar as this is necessary to meet current defense plans and to avoid deterioration of the economic situation in this country to the point where the regime would be threatened. Quite apart from these considerations, while it is still too soon to say how far party doctrine may be modified in the long run, there is at least some hope modification may take place on a permanent footing. It would, in my opinion, be preferable to attempt gradually to bring about such modifications rather than make an effort to overthrow the regime through support given to a political movement of émigrés, whose return to Yugoslavia could hardly result in anything but internal strife.

(Can't make out signature)
Charge d'Affairs a.i.

Memorandum for Defense Liaison

A.F. Broadbridge /dg
April 27, 1951

Attention Mr. McCrdick

I refer to dispatch 357 of April 13 from the Legation in Belgrade concerning Free European Movement: Dropping of Leaflets.

You will, no doubt, be interested in the translation of the Bulgarian leaflet which apparently were dropped inadvertently upon Yugoslav territory.

Mr. Crean also comments on the free national movement outside Yugoslavia and in paragraph 8, he gives his opinion that it would be unfortunate if any or all of the Western powers supported a free movement of Yugoslavia at this time. I do not think we would wish to dispute this point. However, he does not ask for information on Yugoslav movements outside the country and before I make a reply, I should be grateful for any comments you might wish to make on this matter.

European Division.

A.F. Broadbridge

From Belgrade to Foreign office - January 16th, 1945

Brigadier Maclean

No. 61

The Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Liberation of Macedonia asks that the following message be conveyed to the Prime Minister.

“The delegates of Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Liberation of Macedonia who have met together for their second session in Skopje, capital of Federal Macedonia, wish to salute you and people of Great Britain for the contribution which you and the British people have made towards the defeat of the common foe of all freedom loving people – German fascism.

By manifesting today their firm attachment to the cause of the new federal Yugoslavia, the Macedonian people show once again their desire and readiness to live as a free and equal people in democratic federal Yugoslavia.

In the name of the Macedonian people we pledge ourselves to strive with ever increasing effort to take part in the onward march of the armies of the freedom loving people towards Berlin the lair of the Fascist beast.”

[Copies sent to Prime Minister.]

O.T.P.

From Foreign Office to Moscow - March 17th, 1945

No. 1323

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No.781A [of March 13th: Yugoslav- Bulgarian relations].

Principle object of our representations is to avert the danger of joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian pressure on Greece to surrender western Thrace. Salonika has been traditionally coveted both by Yugoslavia and by Bulgaria and this division of interest has made it easier in the past for Greece to resist pressure from either side. Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact would remove this safeguard and enable claim for Salonika to be put forward as a general Slav interest. If the pact included, as seems possible, an undertaking by Bulgaria to cede territory to the Yugoslav Macedonian State, there would be an added danger of a strongly backed demand for the satisfaction of traditional Macedonian aspirations at the expense of Greece. These dangers would be intensified by actual federation; and it must also be borne in mind that a pact would be likely to be a first step towards eventual federation.

2. We are also concerned to see that Greece's reparation claims on Bulgaria are satisfied. Consequence of Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact would probably be that priority would be given to Yugoslavia's claims over those of Greece. This is indeed already happening and the tendency would be increased by the conclusion of a formal pact. It will be an incentive to Bulgaria to give satisfaction to Greece if the Great Powers make it clear that Bulgaria cannot be granted any favours or be allowed to progress on the way to rehabilitation, until she shows a genuine willingness to carry out all the Armistice terms including the payment of reparation to Greece and the restitution of Greek property.

3. Lastly the position in the Balkans is still far too confused to make it desirable that any adjustment of the relations between the Balkan States should be made at this stage. Pacts and treaties, especially those of an exclusive nature, should wait until conditions are more

settled and the balance of relations between the Balkan States is more stable.

O.T.P.

From Salonika to Athens - March 12th, 1945

His Majesty's Consul-General.

No. 145

I returned yesterday from four days tour of eastern Macedonia and Thrace, in the course of which I visited Serres, Drama, Cavalla, Xanthi and Komotini. I was accompanied by United States Consul-General.

2. General impressions are satisfactory. Reasonable order prevails throughout the whole region. E.L.A.S. have been eager to disband and hand over arms while present officials appointed by E.A.M. influence have invariably expressed anxiety to hand over as soon as possible to Greek Government nominees. Present anti-Government propaganda is principally based on delay in sending Government officials and security forces.

3. We were well received throughout by both officials and people and the population are undoubtedly happy at breaking down of barriers with the outside world. Although in urgent need of clothing and grain, economic recovery should be rapid as Communications and public utilities east of Struma have not been destroyed. There is also eight and a half million kilogrammes of tobacco ready for export with United states a keen buyer for this and other quantities that become available.

4. Leva is only currency at present in use and the introduction of drachma is likely to cause considerable dislocation as leva retains internal value out of all proportion to real worth.

5. There is considerable activity at Cavalla, M.L. and U.N.D.R.A. personnel returned there on March 8th, a convoy of 50 trucks arrived on March 10th and the first supply ship on March 11th. The newly appointed Governor-General was also due to arrive yesterday and the first National Guards on March 13th. Communist influence in Cavalla has suffered severe setback and their leaders have lost confidence. They are particularly sensitive to any accusations of collaboration with the Bulgarians.

6. Situation at Drama is less satisfactory than elsewhere on account of an E.L.A.S./Nationalist bands complex. Disarming of the latter is however proceeding *pari passu* with E.L.A.S., but early dispatch of government forces very desirable. Meanwhile presence of company of Indian troops is moderating influence.

7. It is clear that every effort should be made to complete occupation of all Eastern Macedonia and Thrace by Government officials and troops as soon as possible taking advantage of present disposition of population. The only danger I can foresee are delays and aggressive conduct on the part of the National Guards as they arrive, especially in districts where communist influence is in no case strong.

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign Office - February 12, 1945

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall
No. 197
10th February, 1945

My telegram No.182, paragraph (a).

The following is translation of message to Mr. Churchill, left here today.

[Begins]

Delegates of 500,000 Macedonian émigrés in Bulgaria, called together in their first free Congress at Sofia, send their greetings to you, and through you to the Democratic, British people, whose armies together with the Red Army and American Army, are killing the Fascist beast and ensuring the freedom of much-suffering Macedonian people in its, free Federal State within the boundaries of Democratic Federated [grp. Under] Yugoslavia. Signed: - President of Congress, LAMBREV. [End],

2. I have no acknowledged message.

Foreign Office please pass to Belgrade, Washington and, Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 19, 23, and 36 respectively.

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign office - January 16th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell
No. 74

Your telegram No. 451 to Washington.

If Marshal Tito has indeed expressed his views frankly to the Bulgarian representatives, the present spate of pro-Yugoslav propaganda here and organization of discursive voluntary relief for distressed population of Yugoslavia (see my telegram No.72 and Major General Oxley's No. M/467 to the war office) may be designed to allay his misgivings by demonstrating Bulgaria's good faith and their determination to dissociate themselves, once and for all from past, perfidy towards the Yugoslavs. Moreover reciprocal mistrust of the Serbs may still be prevalent in some quarters here. There is therefore no essential inconsistency between Tito's attitude as reported, and our interpretation here of the present Bulgarian activity as preparation of Bulgarian public opinion for the eventual accounting. Whatever the ultimate outcome this ostentatious laying of the olive branch on the altar of Balkan harmony can hardly fail to go to Bulgaria's credit

One thing is certain: the Bulgarian Government can do nothing to promote closer relations with Yugoslavia without at least the tacit approval of the local Soviet authorities and hence presumably of Moscow itself.

Foreign office please pass to Washington and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 11 and 15 respectively.

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign office - January 19th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell
No. 86

Belgrade telegram No.47.

When I mentioned this article to Minister for Foreign Affairs and recalled to him that Lieutenant General Terpeshev had attended the meeting (my telegram No. 21). he said although of course a Cabinet Minister could never make a speech unofficially in a foreign country Bulgarian government as such had not been represented on that occasion Lieutenant General Terpeshev had expressed a desire to go to Skopje in order to take greetings to Asnom from the Bulgarian Workers (Communist) Party; he had accompanied Mr. Harizanov representing the Patriotic Front (Dr. Harizanov had in the past been a keen student of the Macedonian problem). As this was by no means the first occasion on which Terpeshev had made irresponsible statements of this kind (c.f. military mission telegram M/467 to the War Office), I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to look into the matter and as he had already told me that his colleagues had had no authority for saying any such thing, I suggested some further effort ought to be made to restrain the General's oratorical exuberance. He promised to make enquiries. He remarked that as Bulgaria was now so democratic and all in favour of self-determination and so on he supposed that, if eventually the people of the Pirin area wanted to join their brother Macedonians, it might be difficult to stop them but the time was not ripe for considering anything or that sort yet. Before we left the topic he said it had been pointed out to him that, whereas the Bulgarian Government had not been represented officially at the meeting of Asnom, His Majesty's Government had sent a representative. I said I had heard it had been reported in the newspapers that an officer of the Military Mission at Skopje was present at the meeting but that he could not be regarded as representative of His Majesty's Government.

Please pass to Belgrade as my telegram No.7.

[Repeated to Belgrade as Foreign Office telegram No. 67].

O.T.P.

From Sofia to Foreign office - January 24th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell
No. 108

IMMEDIATE

It has come to our knowledge through what we regard as a most reliable source that for the last few days the Bulgarian Prime Minister has been "indisposed" and that Lieutenant General Terpeshev has been presiding over the Council of Ministers in his absence. M. Georgiev is, in fact, believed to have left Sofia in the company of Soviet officers for the purpose of discussing with Marshal Tito or his representatives the establishment of a South Slav Confederation. He is expected, according to the source, to return to Sofia within the next day or two when some declaration on the subject will be made.

2. The inference is that this has been timed so as to anticipate the forthcoming three-power conference.

3. Source also stated on March 3rd (anniversary of Bulgarian liberation and of accession of King Boris III) Bulgaria would be proclaimed a Republic. This development would be followed a few weeks later by the cession to the autonomous Macedonia State of the Pirin area of Bulgaria (see my telegram 86). Source however, thought that local inhabitants of that district might resist.

4. Finally source said that Soviet authorities were understood to have indicated that any claim which might be advanced by the new South Slav Confederation to Salonika would enjoy their support.

5. Though this may at first sight appear sensational, I report it as it is consistent with events as they have been developing. I am the more suspicious because as you know the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been persistently evasive whenever I have mentioned this subject.

6. Please show to Major General Oxley.

Foreign Office please pass to Belgrade as my telegram 9 (no priority).

[Repeated to Belgrade telegram No. 77].

(O.T.P)

From Sofia to Foreign office - March 12th, 1945

Mr. Houston Boswell
No. 8 SAVING

Former Bulgarian Consul-General in Tirana Minkov recently returned to Sofia by way of Macedonia. He told members of my staff that he found the Macedonia was ruled by Partisans of the highest level of ignorance. They seemed determined to impose their power on the population (who appeared oppressed) and were unwilling to take the advice of older men who know more about local circumstances. He had become profoundly skeptical of the possible future of Macedonia as an independent state. It was a poor country Vlachov (see my dispatch No. 6), Vice-President of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia, was already an old man, and, although he knew more than the present ruling class, was not apparently paid much attention to. Minkov could understand why the partisans were so keen to enforce their power; after all they had fought in the hills and had suffered, but he felt that the essence of democracy was to learn to combine all the people's goodwill and interest in the, form of a state; this they were certainly not succeeding in doing. He was disappointed and depressed.

2. This picture, you will note, bears a certain resemblance to that of Bulgaria.

From Washington to Foreign Office - February 27, 1945

Earl of Halifax.

No. 1527.

27th February, 1945.

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 10825.

Following is text of substantive part of the State Department's reply to my aide memoir on your telegram under reference.

The United States Government holds the view that the pre-war frontiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in the Macedonian area must be considered as the legal boundaries, and that revision of any of them should be permitted only if it conforms to the freely expressed will of the populations directly concerned and has international sanctions as a part of the general peace settlement.

If in the reconstitution of Yugoslavia, the government and the people of that country desire to set up a regional and de-centralised administration under which the area of South-eastern Yugoslavia would have a certain autonomous character there would of course be no grounds for objection on the part of the United States Government. This Government concurs however in the view of the British Government that there is no legitimate basis for any claim made on behalf of "Macedonia" whether as an independent State or as a part of Yugoslavia, or of a larger South Slav federation to territory within the boundaries of Greece on the ground that such territory is "Macedonian".

With regard to the frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the United States Government favour the retention of the present boundary but would not be inclined to object to any settlement calculated to contribute to the peace, stability and general welfare of the region if reached through free negotiations on the part of those two states at such time as it may become clear that their respective governments are in a position to represent the real desire of the

people involved, including also those inhabitants of parts of Yugoslavia still under enemy occupation.

It is in the view of this government that changes in territorial boundaries of Bulgaria should not be made during the period proceeding the general settlement with Bulgaria as an enemy state.

The United States Government believe that union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to constitute a single unit [grp. under? or a] federation would under present circumstances be a disturbing rather than a stabilizing factor in south-eastern Europe since the neighbouring non-Slavic States, including Turkey, would consider it a threat to their security. In the opinion of the Government such a union in any case should not be permitted before the conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and the United Nations. This Government would be willing however to give consideration to a plan for regional understandings to include all States of southeastern Europe rather than an exclusively Slavic bloc, should all these States decide, with the concurrence of the principal Allied Governments that such a grouping represent a contribution to the welfare and progress of that area.

2. Foreign office please pass to Belgrade and Sofia as my telegrams Nos. 18 and 13 respectively.

[Repeated to Belgrade and Sofia under Nos.196 & 229]

OTP.

KKE and NOF - April 8th, 1949

Belgrade, Yugoslavia

No. 82

Sir,

Since sending my dispatch No. 66 of March 22nd regarding Macedonia and a South Slav Federation I have read the texts of the KKE and NOF (National Liberation Front of Macedonia) Resolutions given in dispatch No. 174 of March 23rd from the Canadian Ambassador in Athens, as well as the account of the KKE and NOF denials that a separate unified Macedonia state within the South Slav Federation (but dominated by Bulgaria) was envisaged.

2. Macedonia is very much in the limelight at the moment but the situation is far from clear, and speculation, though enriched by the dismissal of Kostov in Bulgaria, is still guess work while the evidence gradually accumulates. By reviving the idea of a Macedonian state Bulgaria has been able to spearhead the Cominform offensive against the CPY and at the same time to further her own traditional "Greater Bulgarian" interests. Yugoslavia and Greece have a common interest in thwarting Bulgarian ambitions in Macedonia but at the moment the Yugoslav Government can go little further than to reduce their anti-Greek propaganda campaign and their complaints to UNO (steps which already appear to have been taken) and to cease aiding the Greek guerillas. I understand that the Yugoslavs have discreetly let it be known in Western quarters that they can go no further as long as Tsaldaris remains Prime Minister.

3. I think you will be interested in the attached extract from a lengthy dispatch from Mr. Hilary King, British Consul in Skopje, who possesses a good knowledge of Macedonia. Mr. King examines the success achieved by the CPY in Macedonia with its policy based on the thesis of a distinct Macedonian language and national tradition. He feels that the idea of a "Macedonian National tradition" has not attracted a large following amongst the Macedonian intelligentsia, which in its younger branches probably supports the

present Yugoslav Government. Pro-Bulgarian sentiment is not widespread. He has, however, found evidence of fairly strong support for a Macedonian autonomous movement, perhaps under Anglo-American protection but probably not under the Kremlin's wing.

4. Autonomous tendencies, Mr. King thinks, are limited to some Macedonian intellectuals who form a very small group. Amongst the workers and peasants the situation is quite different. Although the workers complain of bad economic conditions and the low standard of living, they would give their support to the present authorities unless offered a dramatically better standard, which advocates of union with Bulgaria are unable to do.

5. The peasants, of whom a high proportion are very poor, have benefited by the land reform carried out by the Communist Party. For this reason, because of its war record, and through its establishment of producer cooperatives the Party will be able, in Mr. King's opinion, to secure the support of the peasant masses.

6. Mr. King concludes that there will be no popular pro-Bulgarian rising in Vardar Macedonia but that there will remain considerable support for some sort of Macedonian autonomy with no special Yugoslav association.

7. I am sending copies of this dispatch, with enclosure to London, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and Athens.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't make out the signature), Minister

JAM: aw

Secretary of State, for External Affairs, Ottawa

"We have unsubstantiated reports that elements in the Bulgarian embassy here are working closely with Greek colleagues on activities that are not in our interests."

US Amb. Reeker, Skopje, RoMk, 29-Jul-2009

<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09SKOPJE369.html>

Viewing cable 09SKOPJE369,

MACEDONIA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATO ADVISORY
TEAM

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PRIORITY 0544
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
PRIORITY

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SKOPJE 000369
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO MK BU NL
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATO
ADVISORY TEAM
SNAFU

Classified By: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: The assignment of Bulgarians to both the commander and deputy positions of the NATO Advisory Team for Macedonia is not in U.S. interests. End summary.
2. (C) We learned off-line in early June that Bulgaria was the only Ally who volunteered to fill the "Chief NAT" position in Skopje, i.e., the deputy position at the NATO Advisory Team for Macedonia. As we understood it, the plan had been for the former Dutch DATT to take the Chief NAT position, but it appears that the Dutch government did not move precipitously to effect this. We then worked with Naples, USNATO, SHAPE, and the Dutch to turn this around, but it now appears that the Dutch DATT will almost certainly not be assigned, and the momentum remains that the next Chief NAT will be a Bulgarian. A Bulgarian, Commodore Valentin Gagashev, already holds the NAT Commander slot.
3. (C) The negative consequences for NATO's engagement in Macedonia could be significant. Bulgaria and Macedonia are wary neighbors at best. Part of the larger Macedonian region became part of Bulgaria as a consequence of the Balkan Wars, and Bulgarian fascists occupied present-day Macedonia during World War II. To this day, there are elements in Bulgaria who consider the modern state of Macedonia as a historical mistake, and many Bulgarians do not recognize the Macedonian language as separate from their own. While a number of Macedonians work in Bulgaria and hold Bulgarian passports as a matter of convenience, we should not mistake this for deep affection. We have unsubstantiated reports that elements in the Bulgarian embassy here are working closely with Greek colleagues on activities that are not in our interests.
4. (C) Regardless of the intentions of the new Chief NAT, it makes no sense from a NATO perspective that the commander and chief would come from the same country, especially a

neighbor, and especially a country so new to the Alliance.

Macedonia, and our interests here, would be far better served -- as in the past -- by a NAT leadership steeped in NATO experience from established Allies with no "negative baggage" here (such as Greece). Macedonia needs advisors in the NAT who have established relationships within NATO and know how to manage the unique bureaucracy at SHAPE. This is why the Dutch DATT was the ideal choice. When CHOD LTG Stojanovski learned that the new Chief NAT would be from Bulgaria, he was incensed and called SHAPE immediately. His response should have been predictable: many Macedonians do not trust Bulgaria. Thus the assignment of Bulgarians to run the NAT calls into question NATO's commitment to Macedonia, especially since a number of Macedonian military contacts had told us that they viewed the assignment of the Dutch DATT as a signal of NATO's commitment to again send its "A-team" here.

5. (C) The new NAT commander, Commodore Gagashev, is by all accounts a professional and working in good faith. While we understand he privately believes it would be a mistake for his deputy to also be a Bulgarian, he cannot force the issue within his national command structure. While it is likely too late for the Dutch DATT to be assigned to this position, we would ask that Washington, USNATO, and Embassy Sofia work to issue to ensure a better outcome for U.S. and NATO interests in Macedonia.

REEKER

Macedonia - August 26, 1944

SUMMARY

1. Geography.-Macedonia is mainly hilly, with rare patches of fertile land, with grassy uplands and considerable mineral deposits. Through it run two historic highways, one from the Danube to Salonica and the other from the Albanian coast through Salonica to Constantinople. Salonica is its natural metropolis (paras. 1-3).

2. Population.-The populations of Greek and of Bulgarian Macedonia had become by 1938 respectively Greek and Bulgarian in national sentiment. The "Macedonian Question" had become by then almost confined to Yugoslav Macedonia. The population of Macedonia as a whole has for many centuries been mixed. Published statistics are not reliable. The position in 1938 was as follows: (a) The Greeks were almost confined to Greek Macedonia, where since 1922 they had formed the overwhelming majority. (b) Most of the Slavs, who were not to be wholly identified with either Serbians or Bulgarians, were in Yugoslav Macedonia. Here they had become less Bulgarophil than they had been. (c) The Albanians formed a fringe in the west. (d) The Turks formed a docile minority in Yugoslav Macedonia. (e) The Jews were mainly concentrated in Salonica. (f) The Vlachs led a pastoral life in the west and were found in some of the towns (paras. 4-11). An attempted estimate of the numbers of these elements (para. 12).

3. History-Medieval Macedonia was inhabited by several races and saw many varieties of governments. From 1372 to 1912 it was politically under the Sultan; the Christians being under the civil jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople (after 1453). The modern Macedonia question began with the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the competition of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians for the adherence of the population (paras. 13-15). In 1878 Russia sought to give nearly the whole of Macedonia to the proposed State of Bulgaria; but the Treaty of Berlin restored Macedonia to Turkey. From the 1890's dated two revolutionary movements, one aiming at the incorporation of Macedonia in Bulgaria and the other at her autonomy. The Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 assured the greater part of Macedonia to Bulgaria. There

was no Greco-Bulgarian apportionment of territory. In 1912 the Balkan States overcame Turkey, and in 1913 the Bulgarians fought the Serbians and Greeks. The settlement imposed on Bulgaria gave most of northern Macedonia to Serbia, southern and eastern Macedonia to Greece and only a small and mountainous remnant to Bulgaria. In 1915 Bulgaria, by joining the Central Empires, obtained all Serbian, and the eastern end of Greek Macedonia. In 1919 this was reversed, and Bulgaria, in addition, lost Strumica to Yugoslavia (paras. 16-22). Thereafter Greece got rid of most of her Slavs by exchange of populations with Bulgaria, and Greek refugees from Asia completed the hellenisation of Greek Macedonia. Yugoslavia claimed that her Macedonian Slavs were really Serbians and could quickly be educated into feeling so. The Macedonian revolutionaries, with help from Bulgaria, resisted violently, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations were extremely strained till 1934, when a rapprochement took place between the two States. In 1941, except for the south-west, some districts in the north-west, and Salonica itself, Bulgaria obtained all Macedonia. The Bulgarians savagely de-Hellenized eastern Macedonia and showed no regard for autonomist aspirations in Yugoslav Macedonia (paras. 23-28).

4. Economic and Social Factors.-Macedonian communications are bad. There are few railways, all radiating from Salonica (para. 29). (a) In Yugoslav Macedonia agriculture was primitive; there was little industry; stock breeding and the cultivation of tobacco and opium poppies were staple activities. Political aspirations before 1941 were mainly for autonomy, or Communism (usually ill-defined), or both (paras. 30-31). (b) The public works connected with the settlement of the 600,000 refugees in Greek Macedonia and the enterprise of the refugees made this area the chief cereal-producing district of Greece and economically improved the area in many ways. The political sentiments of most of the population appeared to be wholly Greek, with some Communism in the industrial centres (paras. 32-33). (c) Bulgarian Macedonia is a poor and mountainous district, which appeared to have become an integral part of Bulgaria (para. 34).

5. Conflicting Interests.- (a) The Vardar valley provides the easiest route from Serbia to the sea. The Serbians have considered the Free Zone at Salonica unsatisfactory and have aspired to the possession

of Salonica both for commercial and for strategic reasons. The Serbian claims to Macedonia, on ethnic or historical grounds, except as regards the north-west, are weak, but vehemently upheld (paras. 35-38). (b) The now overwhelmingly Greek character of the inhabitants of Greek Macedonia and the settlement of the refugees there give Greece a strong ethnic claim to this territory. The area is also of great economic interest to Greece, though Salonica has lost by being separated from some of her hinterland. Greece's strategic interest lies in securing a defensible frontier and preventing the domination of the Balkans by a Slav Power (paras. 39-41.) (c) The Bulgarian interest in Macedonia is primarily ethnic. Bulgaria has an interest in acquiring an economic and strategic outlet to the Aegean from west Bulgaria across Macedonia. But Greece, probably supported by Turkey, would resist a proposal that she should cede any part of her coast to Bulgaria (paras. 42-44). (d) Albania has an ethnic claim to a part of western Macedonia; but only a small district is on her side of the mountains (para. 45). (e) Revolutionary movements of to-day in Macedonia may alter the political situation. Their strength is as yet unknown and will partly depend on the policy of the Greater Allies (para. 46).

6. Possible Solutions.- (i) a unified and independent Macedonia. This appears out of date, since the southern area is now definitely Greek and not Macedonia. (ii) (a) A unified and autonomous Macedonia in a Balkan Federation. This, too, would encounter the same objection, apart from the improbability of such a Federation. This might be the best way to end the Serb-Bulgar antagonism and would probably have considerable support in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the U.S.S.R.; although it would arouse Greek and Turkish apprehension. (c) The same, in a Balkan Federation. Could such a Federation be created, this proposal would have the merits of (b) together with the economic advantage of reuniting Salonica with the whole of its hinterland. (iii) The cession of part of Yugoslav Macedonia to Bulgaria and an exchange of populations. There are many formidable objections to this. (iv) Such a cession and exchange might be effected within a South Slav Federation comprising Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. (v) The elimination of the Macedonian question through the control of the Balkan peninsula by an outside Power, e.g., the U.S.S.R. This would arouse many apprehensions in the Balkans and elsewhere. (vi) The restoration of the status quo of

1940, possible mitigated by international control of the ports and main communications of Macedonia, but providing no permanent solution. But new factors may produce an unforeseen solution (paras. 47-53).

Geography

1. Macedonia is here taken to include the areas watered by the following rivers and their affluents: the Vardar and the Vistritza a in the west, and the Mesta and the lower Struma in the east. Its approximate boundaries are the Rhodope and Rila mountains, the hills north-east and north of Skoplje, the Sar Planina mountains and their southward extension, Lakes Ohrida and Prespa, the Pindus range, the Kamvunia mountains, Mount Olympus and the Aegean Sea.

2. Macedonia is mainly hilly; the only extensive plains being those around the lower basins of the main rivers. There are also the smaller elevated plains in the neighbourhoods of Tetovo, Skoplje and Bitolj. There are wide grass uplands suitable for grazing. The mineral resources of the area are believed to be considerable; iron, lead, magnesite and manganese have been found in many parts and, above all, chrome, the reserves of which are supposed to be large.

3. Two important features of Macedonia need emphasis. (a) The area lies in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula. Through it, intersecting on the lower Vardar, run two of the main routes across the peninsula—the north-south route from the Danube up the Morava and down the Vardar to the Aegean, and the west-east route from the Albanian coast along the northern coast of the Aegean to Constantinople. (b) All the Macedonian highways lead towards the gulf of Salonica. This is completely true of western and southern Macedonia, where mountains block all other routes, and even north-eastern Macedonia has tended to do its overseas trade through Salonica owing to the lack of harbours at nearer points on the coast.

Population

4. One contemporary feature of Macedonia needs to be stated at this point. By 1938 the nationally Greek character of the population of

Greek Macedonia (see paragraphs 6, 23, 39 and 47), and similarly the Bulgarian character of Bulgarian Macedonia (see paragraph 34) appeared established. The question of Macedonian autonomy, by that date, had reference only to Yugoslav Macedonia; though it was complicated by the presence of a Slav population within the borders of western Greek Macedonia and by the problem of access to the sea at Salonica.

5. The population has for centuries been a mixture of races speaking various tongues. Hence the culinary expression, *une macedoine*, for a jumble of different ingredients. There have never been any reliable linguistic or racial statistics of Macedonia. This is largely due to the illiteracy of many of the inhabitants and of the fierceness of national animosities, which has led the authorities to adjust the figures to their own satisfaction and the peasants to describe themselves as may at the moment seem safest. In many cases the peasants themselves do not clearly know what they are.

6. Six main peoples inhabit Macedonia. In the order of their probable numerical strengths in 1938, they are the Greeks, the Slavs, the Albanians, the Turks, the Jews and the Vlachs. (a) The Greeks of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia, who till 1912 formed a considerable part of the urban populations, were by 1938 negligible in number. On the other hand, most of the Aegean coast has been Greek-inhabited continuously since long before the Christian era. And the Greek element in Macedonia was increased between 1919 and 1928 by some 600,000 refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. By 1938 the over-whelming majority in Greek Macedonia consisted of Greeks, Orthodox in religion and nationally conscious, and including an Orthodox and Greek-feeling, but Turkish-speaking, minority among the refugees.

7. (b) The Slavs in 1938 formed the great majority in Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia, and a small remnant in Greek Macedonia. Before 1870 they were merely the Slav-speaking portion of the submerged Christian population, which was mostly Orthodox by religion; there was also a Turkish-speaking Moslem minority. In 1870 the Bulgarian Exarchate (autonomous Church) was founded, and this created a schism between its adherents and those of the Greek Patriarchate (see paragraph 15). By 1912 most authorities

were agreed in considering these Slav-speaking Macedonian adherents to the Exarchate to be mostly assimilated in sentiment to the Bulgarians; though in the north there were some whose sentiment was Serbian; and everywhere there were some who professed to be merely Macedonian. Twenty-three years of Yugoslav (Serbian) Government diminished the attachment to Bulgaria; but the political sentiments of the Macedonian Slavs were obscure.

8. (c) The Albanians, though found further east, were mainly concentrated along the western border of Macedonia. The great majority of these Albanians were Mohammedans, though a few in the north were Catholics and some of those in Greek Macedonia were Orthodox.

9. (d) The Turks of Macedonia were a pathetic remnant of the former dominant caste. Turks vanished from Greek Macedonia with the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. A considerable number also left Yugoslav Macedonia; but in 1938 there was still a Turkish element living along the Vardar and in the towns. They appeared to be without national ambitions and to be resigned to their subordinate condition.

10. (e) The Jews of Greek Macedonia in 1938 were almost all concentrated in Salonica. In Yugoslav Macedonia there were a few thousand Jews in the towns.

11. (f) The Vlachs, or Kutzo-Vlachs were the remnant of the once numerous Romanised Thracians or Illyrians. They were Orthodox by religion. They led a pastoral life in the hills of western Macedonia, both Greek and Yugoslav, and kept themselves to themselves. There were also Vlach elements in the towns; but these tended to disappear by assimilation to their urban neighbours.

12. The estimate of the various races in Macedonia in 1912, attempted in the Foreign Office Handbook No. 19, Macedonia (1920), was as follows: -

Slavs.....1,150,000

Turks.....400,000

Greeks.....300,000

Vlachs.....200,000
 Albanians...120,000
 Jews.....100,000

Great changes, especially in Greek Macedonia, have occurred since then. The following figures are an attempt to estimate the numbers of these racial elements for 1938, bearing in mind the remarks in paragraph 5 (the linguistic figures according to the latest census giving them are shown in brackets).

	Greek Bulgarian Total Macedonia(1) Macedonia	Yugoslav Macedonia(2)	
Greeks	1,250,000	10,000	
	1,260,000 (1928: 1,250,000)		
Slavs	120,000	750,000	220,000
	1,090,000 (1928: 82,000)	(1921: 553,000)	
Albanians	40,000	130,000	
	170,000 (1928: 2,000)	(1921: 124,500)	
Turks		100,000	
	100,000	(1921: 116,000)	
Jews	70,000	7,000	
	77,000 (1928: 60,500)	(1921: 5,000)	
Vlachs	45,000	50,000	
	50,000 (1928: 20,000)	(1921: 7,800)	
Totals	1,525,000	1,047,000	220,000
	2,792,000		
 Recent Census			
Totals	1928: 1,411,769	1931: 950,435	1934:
	207,065		

(1) The Greek census figures for 1928 seem to over-estimate the number of Greeks and to under-estimate other elements.

(2) The last Yugoslav census to give linguistic figures was that of 1921. It appears to have under-estimated the Albanian and Vlach elements. Since 1921 the Slav element has been strengthened by immigration; and the Turkish and Albanian elements weakened by emigration.

History

13. Macedonia was hellenised from about the ninth century B.C. by Greek settlers both from the interior and from the Greek city-States round the southern Aegean. In the fourth century B.C. Philip and Alexander the Great, Kings of Macedonia, imposed their rule on the Greek city-States of the Macedonian coast and southern Greece. This enlarged Macedonia became a Roman Province in the second century B.C.; at the close of the fourth century A.D., it was included in the Eastern, or Byzantine, half of the Empire. By then all Macedonia was Greek-speaking, except for a Latin-speaking northern fringe near Skoplje. A new element arrived, in the sixth century, with Slav invaders who largely supplanted the Greek-speaking and Latin-speaking populations of the interior and spread down to the coast at the mouth of the Vardar. During the tenth century the Bulgarian (Slavised Turkish) Tsars extended their dominion over all Macedonia, except the coast, and established a Bulgarian Patriarchate at Ohrida. In 1019 the Emperor Basil II extinguished the Bulgarian power; and Macedonia retained a Byzantine province till 1186. From that date till 1372 Macedonia was in dispute between Byzantines, Bulgarians and Latins; and was finally incorporated into the short-lived Serb empire of Stephen Dusan, whose capital was Skoplje. In 1392 the Osmanlis arrived on the scene, and in 1430, with the capture of Salonica, which had been Greek throughout the periods of Slav rule in the hinterland, they completed the Turkish conquest of Macedonia.

14. For more than five centuries Macedonia was part of the Ottoman Empire. From 1453 onwards its Orthodox inhabitants, of all nationalities, were collectively classified as “the Millet of Rum” and were all placed under the civil (though not all under the

ecclesiastical) jurisdiction of the (Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. The Ottoman conquest enriched the macedoine with two new ingredients: Moslem Turkish military colonists from Anatolia and Spanish-speaking Jewish refugees, expelled from Castile, to whom the Ottoman Government gave new homes in Salonica.

15. With the advent of the Western ideology of nationalism in the nineteenth century the peoples of Macedonia began to stir. The peasants desired release from the incompetence and abuses of the latter-day Ottoman regime. The Christians wished to shake off the Moslem ascendancy; the non-Greeks to escape from the extortions of the Greek clergy, who since 1767 had become their ecclesiastical as well as civil superiors. The modern form of the Macedonian Question was the outcome of the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. the Ottoman Government, under diplomatic pressure from Russia, authorized the formation of an autocephalous Bulgarian Church for almost all the territories which by 1885 were included in Bulgaria, with the addition of Nis, and also provided that other districts might be annexed to this Exarchate if two-thirds of their inhabitants so desired. The Greek Patriarch of Constantinople resisted this innovation and finally excommunicated the whole Exarchist clergy as schismatic. Thereafter it was war to the knife between Patriarchists and Exarchists for 40 years in most of Macedonia. Greeks and Bulgarians used priests, schoolmasters, and armed bands of “komitadjis” (a word derived from the committees which organized them) in the struggle to establish their ethnic claims against the day of Turkey-in-Europe’s collapse. Hatred of the common Turkish ruler became less bitter than detestation of the Christian neighbour.

16. The abortive Treaty of San Stefano (3rd March, 1878), imposed by Russia upon Turkey, provided for the creation of a Bulgarian Principality which would have included fringes of modern Albania and Serbia and the whole of Macedonia except the Vistrizta valley, Salonica, and the Chalcidice peninsula. At Berlin, however, the Powers, alarmed by Russian policy, drastically revised the terms of San Stefano and reconfirmed Turkey in the possession of the whole of Macedonia, which continued in anarchy under Turkish sovereignty for 34 more years. Bulgarians did not forget that at San

Stefano their State had been promised territory which would have made it predominant in the Balkans and would have nullified Greek ambitions in Macedonia.

17. After 1878 the Bulgarians increasingly attracted the Macedonian Slavs and succeeded in gaining several bishoprics for their Exarchate. Towards the close of the century the Serbians began to join in the melee; and even distant Roumainia supported the Kutzo-Vlach cause. In this fight of all against all, the Ottoman Government could rely on the loyalty of three elements only: the Albanians (except when they were exasperated by attempts to govern them), the Turks and the Jews. They resorted to bargaining with one race at the expense of another; and were assisted by the half-hearted support of the Great Powers other than Russia.

18. In 1895 there was founded in Sofia by Macedonian refugees (who were very numerous in Bulgaria and constituted nearly a half of the population of the city) the "Supreme Committee," to demand the annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria. In 1896 was founded the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), whose object was the autonomy of Macedonia and whose leaders, though Slavs, attempted for years to maintain friendly relations with all the nationalities, even the Turks, of Macedonia. Despite confusing changes in these two organizations during the subsequent 40 years, this division of principle was permanent. The "Supremists" stood for Bulgarian nationalism; IMRO till some years after 1919 stood for Macedonian autonomy and some members of the organization have never ceased to do so, though others went over to "Supremism" (see below, paragraph 25).

19. The attempts of the Powers to procure peace by international control of the finances and the gendarmerie did little to restrain the inter-racial strife. The glorious expectation, aroused by the Young Turk revolution (1908), that all the races and religions of Turkey were now going to be free and equal, was soon followed by disillusionment. The strife of nationalities was resumed. But in 1912 the Balkan States, for the first time, decided to solve the Macedonian Question themselves. The Balkan League of 1912 and the ensuing war were the result.

20. The preliminary Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, of the 13th March, 1912, indicated, if not the sincerely agreed claims of both States, at any rate their relative strengths. Of the Turkish territory, which it was hoped to annex, Serbia recognized the Bulgarian right to all east of the Rhodope mountains and the Struma; while Bulgaria admitted the Serbian right to all north and west of the Sar Planina. As for the main part of Macedonia, a line was drawn (marked in broken green on the map). Serbia made no claim south-east of this line. Bulgaria, in a curious clause, accepted the line, provided that the Tsar of Russia, to whose arbitration both parties agreed, pronounced in its favour. Thus Serbia contented herself with a modest strip of northern Macedonia, including Skoplje; while Bulgaria, as between the two Slav States, was to have the whole of the rest of Macedonia, with a right to argue about the line of division. The assertion of Serbia's rights west of the Sar Planina showed that she proposed to annex Albanian-inhabited territory, across which alone she could hope to reach the sea. In the corresponding Greco-Bulgarian treaty, of the 29th May, 1912, no territorial stipulations were made. No Serbo-Greek treaty is known to have been made. Bulgaria was the leader and the pivot of the League.

21. In the First Balkan War (1912-13) the Bulgarian troops were mainly directed eastwards, and therefore conquered little of Macedonia, but nearly all of Thrace; while the Serbians overran the valley of the Vardar and northern Albania, and the Greeks occupied southern Macedonia up to and beyond the coveted port of Salonica. Meanwhile the Great Powers had agreed on the creation of an Albanian State and the consequent expulsion of the Serbians from the Albanian coast. By the time that peace was made with Turkey (the 30th May, 1913), disputes between the Balkan Allies had already begun. Serbia argued that, having been expelled from north Albania, which she had expected to acquire, she must have a larger share of Macedonia. Bulgaria took her stand against Serbia on her treaty rights, and claimed that Greece had acquired much more of the loot than her military efforts justified. Serbia and Greece, being in possession of Macedonia, made a treaty of mutual support; no appeal was made to the Tsar for arbitration; the Allies prepared to fight each other. The Bulgarians attacked the Serbians and Greeks, but were repulsed, and had also to sustain Turkish and Roumanian invasions in their rear. By the Treaty of Bucharest (the 10th August,

1913) Macedonia was divided along the lines of actual occupation (see frontiers marked in green on the map). Serbia acquired nearly all the Vardar basin, together with Ohrida, and a promise from Greece of a commercial outlet to the sea at Salonica; Greece obtained all southern Macedonia, Salonica itself and the Aegean coastal strip to beyond the Mesta. Embittered by the miscarriage of all their plans, the Bulgarians awaited an opportunity to reverse the decisions of 1913. As for their Macedonian protégés, they were equally embittered. The autonomists saw their hopes shattered by the partition of their country. The “Supremists” saw Macedonia divided from the Bulgarian “mother-country.”

22. Bulgaria’s opportunity came in 1915, when she joined the Central Empires and was rewarded with the occupation of all Serbian Macedonia and the eastern extremity of Greek Macedonia. The country was Bulgarised, Bulgarian priests and teachers were introduced, and the Slav inhabitants had to change the ends of their names from ic (-itch) to -ov. In 1919 all this was reversed once more, the Serbians and Greeks returned, -ov gave place to -ic again, and Bulgaria had to cede the Strumica Valley to Serbia (now Yugoslavia).

23. After 1918 Greece and Yugoslavia followed different policies with regard to Macedonian unrest, which was almost wholly the work of Slavs. Greece, under the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), conducted an exchange of populations with Bulgaria, thereby securing the removal of all but a few thousands of the Slavs of her eastern Macedonia. The Slavs of her share of western Macedonia she left in their villages, though providing them with Greek schools. An enormous influx of Greek refugees from Asia Minor quickly completed the hellenisation of Greek Macedonia.

24. But Yugoslavia asserted that her Macedonian Slavs were Serbs, who only needed a few years of “education” to become thankfully aware of the fact. Experience of Yugoslav government, however, caused the Macedonians to complain bitterly to the League of Nations and to the world at large. They alleged that the administration was incompetent, corrupt, and brutal, the means of communication as deplorable as ever, the State Tobacco Monopoly oppressive to Government, not trusting the Macedonians, did, in

fact, in the 1920's import officials, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and clergy from Serbia, as well as applying agrarian reform for the benefit of colonists from Serbia. As the salaries of officials were small, the conditions of life primitive, and the chances of advancement dependent on party intrigue, the less desirable type of Serbian civil servant tended to go to Macedonia.

25. The natural effect of the "education" was to provoke the vigorous resistance of IMRO (see para. 18), for whom Yugoslavia was "Enemy No. 1." Partly from sympathy with IMRO, partly from inability, in her almost demilitarized condition, to control IMRO, Bulgaria gave the Organisation a free hand to operate in and from the district of Petric. In IMRO itself two tendencies operated. One wing, led by Ivan Mihailov, increasingly co-operated with the Bulgarian chauvinists, in return for whose support they acted as the gunmen of the Bulgarian political police and removed public men who favoured Liberal politics or showed signs of goodwill towards Yugoslavia. The other, led by Todor Alexandrov, stood for Macedonian in touch with the Soviet Government, to work for Macedonian autonomy within a Balkan Federation; and a periodical, *Federation balkanique*, was published in Vienna to propagate that programme. (This Vlahov is said to be identical with the Vlahov who was announced as a Vice-President of the Yugoslav Partisans' National council of Liberation established at Jajce in Bosnia in November 1943.) Neither autonomy nor Soviet influence suited the plans of the Bulgarian nationalists, and for this reason Alexandrov was murdered in 1925. General Protogerov, who succeeded him in his policy, which in fact enjoyed the approval of the mass of Macedonians in southern Yugoslavia, was also murdered, in 1928. The subsequent history of IMRO is one of desperate resistance to the Yugoslav regime and blood-thirsty internal strife. Under Mihailov, who maintained relations with Pavelic and the Croat terrorists and was said to be financed from Italy, IMRO's sorties into Yugoslavia were so violent that the Yugoslav Government had to establish a system of barbed wire and innumerable blockhouses along the Bulgarian frontier and employ the local peasants to repel their "liberators," until they finally got the better of the Organisation.

26. The situation was a vicious circle. The Yugoslav Government said that they could not accord more liberty to Macedonia while the danger from IMRO existed. The Bulgarian Government replied that their public opinion would not permit them to suppress IMRO while Macedonia groaned under tyranny. King Alexander attempted, after 1929, to solve the problem. Many Yugoslav officials were moved, and others, largely from the former Austro-Hungarian lands, were introduced; salaries were increased; native Macedonian clergy were given parishes; the end of party politics somewhat improved the atmosphere. The health service did much good work in attacking malaria. Loans were made to peasant co-operatives. These improvements prepared the way for the King's approach to King Boris of Bulgaria in 1933; which was the suppression of IMRO in Bulgaria, and the end of the closed frontier. Bulgarian opinion appeared to become increasingly reconciled to the loss of Macedonia. Meanwhile Mihailov fled to Turkey, but had the satisfaction of knowing that one of his gunmen had murdered King Alexander in October, 1934.

27. The unabated grievances of the Macedonians of Yugoslavia were the absence of employment for the educated class and the smallness of the expenditure on public works, except at Skoplje. Though political crime died away, the ideal of autonomy persisted. The British Vice-Consul at Skoplje estimated in November 1940 that the majority of the Slavs and Turks of Yugoslav Macedonia were autonomists, only a minority of the Slavs still cherishing the hope of annexation by Bulgaria.

28. In 1941 Bulgaria once more occupied all Yugoslav Macedonia except the upper Vardar valley, above Skoplje, as well as Greek eastern, and some portions of Greek western, Macedonia. Most of Greek western Macedonia was occupied by the Italians, and Salonica was firmly kept under German control. Many thousands of Greeks were massacred in eastern Macedonia, others were deported to Bulgaria, and many more fled to southern Greece. The Bulgarian Government began a systematic replacement of the dead, deported, or fugitive Greeks by Bulgarians. In Yugoslav Macedonia no savagery on a similar scale was displayed; but Bulgaria showed no tenderness towards Macedonian aspirations for autonomy and introduced Bulgarian officials, teachers, and clergy, either

Macedonians long resident in Bulgaria or men with no Macedonian connections at all. Many thousands of Serbs fled into Serbia. The population received the right of option for Bulgarian or their former nationality. If they chose the latter alternative, they had to emigrate. Both from Salonica and the Yugoslav towns here were deportations of Jews to unknown destinations.

Economic and Social Factors

29 The lack of railways, together with the indifferent conditions of road transport, is partly responsible for the poverty of Macedonia. The few railways of Macedonia all radiate from Salonica. They are: the main line to Serbia up the Vardar and down the Morava, with side-lines to Ohridea and Stip and a loop line by Florina and Bitolj to Veles; the main line of Greece from Salonica to Athens; and two lines running eastwards from Salonica to Drama, whence a single line runs on through Thrace. In Bulgaria two lines from Sofia reach the frontier, near Kustendil and Petric. After April, 1941, plans were made for the extension of these lines across Macedonia. By June 1944 the line to Kustendil had been carried on to Kumanovo (on the main Salonica-Belgrade line) and was expected to be open to traffic within a few weeks; while the narrow-gauge line to Petric had been extended to join the Greek railways at Siderocastro (Demir Hissar), and a beginning (the first 25 miles south from Gorna Djumaja) had been made with the conversion of the line to normal gauge.

30. (a) In Yugoslav Macedonia agriculture has been primitive, though it has gained by the comparative peace of the 1930's, and the introduction, on a small scale, of improved methods. In addition to cereals, the chief crops have been tobacco (to whose cultivators the State Monopoly paid a derisory price) and opium poppies; with some rice and cotton. Industry has been confined to a few breweries, soap and flour mills, and the chrome mines; and to traditional handicrafts. A considerable part of the population has lived by breeding sheep and cattle.

31. Before 1912 the proximity of the sea, and contact with the foreign schools and international life of Salonica and Constantinople produced a small, but intelligent, educated class of Macedonians of all nationalities. In Yugoslav Macedonia, after 1919, the various

elements of this intelligentsia, diminished by the disappearance of most of the Greeks, gave evidence of mutual co-operation. Their main demands were for honest and enlightened government, which would afford educated Macedonians a chance of employment and make possible a reasonable livelihood for the peasants. Macedonian opinion appeared, in so far as a generalization may be attempted, to seek the realization of these benefits (often paradoxically identified by Balkan Slavs with what were once the normal European liberties of the individual) under Russian or other foreign auspices. The two aspirations seemed to be not infrequently entertained simultaneously.

32. (b) Greek Macedonia was completely transformed after 1918 by the settlement of the Greek refugees from Turkish Thrace and Anatolia. To accommodate these immigrants large estates were broken up and distributed, as was surplus communal pastureland. Large areas of marshy and malarial land were drained in the valleys of the Vardar and the Struma and measures were taken to provide adequate water-supplies by boring artesian wells and laying pipes and conduits. The Refugee Commission distributed draught animals and sheep. The refugees were, on the whole, a fine type, sturdy, hard-working, and intelligent.

They applied themselves energetically to reclaiming waste land, learning new agricultural methods, and producing new, as well as old, crops. Macedonia, with its patches of fertile soil, became the chief cereal-producing area in Greece. Before the coming of the refugees tobacco had been grown mainly in eastern and central Macedonia; the new settlers extended cultivation to western Macedonia; indeed, so much tobacco was produced that production exceeded demand and had to be restricted. The refugees also engaged with success in market-gardening near the larger towns, and in the production of hemp and silk.

33. Economically the assimilation of the refugees seems to have been successfully accomplished, but they tended in some parts to lead a segregated life, in villages of their own. In the towns the converse seems to have been the case, as it proved difficult to find employment for some of the professional men. In any case, there seems to be little doubt about the national sentiments of the refugees. They are Greeks by race and by national consciousness.

The industrial proletariat of the tobacco centres of eastern Macedonia is reported to have leanings towards Communism, but what it understands by this term or how far it would wish to come under any form of Russian influence is very doubtful.

34. (c) Bulgarian Macedonia is a poor and mountainous district. After 1919 the Supremist IMRO leaders made it their headquarters, into which even the Bulgarian authorities could not venture without their connivance. In 1934 their rule disappeared with astonishing completeness. Since then the district has probably become fully integrated into Bulgaria.

Conflicting Interests

35 (a) Yugoslav interests.-The Yugoslav interest in Macedonia is Serbian, not shared by Croats and Slovenes except indirectly. From Serbia the Morava-Vardar route to Salonica is the geographically natural way to the sea, blocked by Greek possession of the outlet. After long disputes the Treaty of 1929 gave Yugoslavia a small free Zone in Salonica, with free use of the railway to Gjevgjeli, subject to the maintenance of Greek sovereignty over the zone and railway. As, however, Yugoslavia's trade was almost entirely directed overland northwards and westwards, she made little use of the Free Zone. Its exports were confined to minerals from the Trepca (The Trepca mines lie about 110 km. N.N.W. of Skoplje) and Allatini mines; imports were negligible. Further, the Yugoslav authorities seem to have considered a zone in a Greek port unsatisfactory and to have cherished the hope of gaining Salonica itself; a hope momentarily justified when, on the 25th March, 1941, Hitler promised them Salonica on their adherence to his "New Order." It appears improbable that the agricultural products of Serbia and Yugoslav Macedonia will find a ready market overseas. But their mineral resources should find such markets and be increasingly exploited. For the export of minerals and for imports (if the world returns to freedom of international trade), Yugoslavia would have an interest in the possession of Salonica. But the Free Zone, especially if reasonably enlarged, ought adequately to meet her needs.

36. Serbians have aspired to the possession of Salonica for strategic reasons. It would provide Yugoslavia with an alternative outlet to

the Mediterranean (and one nearer to Serbia) should the Adriatic be controlled by a hostile Power. Should Serbia become separated from the Croat and Slovene lands, this Serbian desire would be strengthened. On the other hand, as long as Yugoslavia's relations divide Greek territory and completely alienate Greece, would destroy Yugoslavia's defensive Balkan alliances and leave her Balkan frontiers surrounded by enemies. Only if Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were politically united or on the friendliest terms, would this vital objection to the Yugoslav acquisition of Salonica lose its weight; and even then Yugoslav statesmen would need to consider whether it would be worth while to gain Salonica at the cost of Greek, and also Turkish, hostility.

37. Serbian ethnic and historical claims in Macedonia, though vehemently upheld, are weak. Serbians do not forget that Skoplje was the capital of the fourteenth century Serbian Empire. But that Empire was both multi-racial and short-lived. Only in the north, in the neighbourhood of Skoplje, can the Macedonian Slavs be said to be predominantly Serbian in national sentiment.

38. (b) Greek interests.-First, Greece has an ethnic interest. Salonica and most of the coast have been continuously Greek-inhabited since long before the Christian era (see para. 13 above). In 1913 Greece acquired her considerable share of the non-Greek-inhabited hinterland. After 1919 the character of the population changed, with the removal of the Turkish-speaking Moslems and most of the Bulgarians and the enormous influx of Greek refugees. Greek Macedonia was, in 1938, overwhelmingly Greek-inhabited. The secular Greek character of the coast and the achievement of Greece, with the help of the League of Nations, in settling Greeks of Asia Minor in the area, give Greece an undeniably strong claim to her share of Macedonia.

39. Secondly, Greece's economic interest is great. Salonica, indeed, cut off by the northern frontier of Greece from a large part of Macedonia, has not flourished since 1918; though its economic difficulties must also be attributed to the War of 1914-18, the disasters in Asia Minor, and the world economic depression. Greek Macedonia is the richest of the Greek provinces and is of great value to Greece for its cereals, its pasture lands, its tobacco industry, its

not yet fully exploited mineral resources, and its hardy rural population.

40. Thirdly, the area of Salonica is essential to the defence of Greece. Greece's strategic interest is to have an adequate hinterland serving as a screen for Salonica and for the routes to Florina, Kastoria, and Thrace, against any enemy of less than Great Power strength. It is also to Greece's interest that Bulgaria should not be extended (as in 1941) to include Yugoslav Macedonia, and that a single Slav Power, holding all non-Greek Macedonia and dominating the Balkan Peninsula, should not be created.

41. (c) Bulgarian interests.-The acquisition of most of Macedonia has been a traditional aspiration of the Bulgarian people. Until 1919 Bulgaria could appeal to the sentiment of the majority of the Macedonian Slavs. After 1919 the Bulgarian-minded population of Greek Macedonia was reduced to a small remnant, and most of that of Yugoslav Macedonia appeared gradually to exchange their hope of annexation to Bulgaria for that of autonomy in a Yugoslav or Balkan Slav or Balkan Federation.

42. Bulgaria's main economic interest in Macedonia lies in the acquisition of an adequate outlet to the Aegean Sea, which Bulgarians declared was closed to them before 1939 by the ill-will of the Greek authorities. It may be true that Bulgaria will only find markets for her produce in Central Europe; but, should the world find its way back to freedom of international trade, Bulgaria will need to import goods from countries overseas. The best outlet for western Bulgaria would be Salonica; or, failing that, Kavalla. Alternatively such an outlet could be found not in Macedonia, but at Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis), in Thrace. Apart, however, from the certain opposition of Greece and Turkey to a cession of any part of the Aegean coast to Bulgaria, it should be remembered that Bulgaria has a considerable coast on the Black Sea.

43. Bulgaria's strategic interest appears to be twofold. First, the possession of the Vardar basin would enable her to separate Greece from Yugoslavia and reach a common frontier with Albania; a situation which, were Yugoslavia to disintegrate, would leave Bulgaria dominant in the Balkans. Secondly, a more modest share of

Macedonia, but one including a port on the Aegean Sea, would release Bulgaria from dependence on the Black Sea-Dardanelles and Danube routes of supply and support. Again such a port might be found in Dedeagatch. And again the opposition of Greece and Turkey to the cession of an Aegean port to Bulgaria is certain. (In regard to paras. 43 and 44 see Territorial Issues between Bulgaria and Greece, (Foreign Officer print: "Balkan States," June 20, Section 1.) paras. 12-16).

44. (d) Albanian interests.-Albania might advance an ethnic claim, whose validity it would be difficult to assess, to the districts of Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo, and Ohrida. But the first three of these districts lie within the basin of the Bardar and belong geographically to Macedonia. Ohrida is over the mountains, in the basin of the Drin. On economic and strategic grounds a frontier giving Ohrida to Albania would appear justifiable (see The Albano-Yugoslav Frontier, (Foreign Office print; "Balkan States," August 26, Section 1.) paras. 18 (e) and (f), 20 (e), 21, 25).

45. (e) Revolutionary Movements.-In contrast with all these "traditional" interests, there have developed, especially since 1941, in and around Macedonia, powerful currents of revolutionary sentiment, which appear to cut across the historic boundaries and national antagonisms of the Balkan Slavs. Amongst Serbian and Macedo-Slav "partisans" and Bulgarian Leftists there appeared in 1943 to be more zeal for a social revolution than for national States. In Greece and Albania there were similar tendencies. The strength of these movements in relation to the forces representing the traditions of the nineteenth century, and the outcome of their conflict with those traditions, will at some stage depend on the policy adopted towards them by Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. These movements have gained prestige by their active opposition to the German forces. But until the policy of the Greater Allies in relation to the Balkans, is known, it is difficult to assess the relative strengths of the conflicting forces in Macedonia, beyond the view that the Greek character of Greek Macedonia appears established.

Possible Solutions

46. The solution originally advocated by IMRO was the independence of Macedonia as a whole, based on the equal rights and treatment of all its inhabitants irrespective of race. Provided that Macedonia were genuinely independent, Bulgarian resistance to this solution would probably not be widespread, particularly after a lost war. An intransigent opposition, however, would be shown by the Serbians, who claim that Yugoslav Macedonia is a part of Serbia; unless power in Serbia passes in the future into the hands of new and much less nationalist elements. But, even so, the idea of an independent Macedonia is obsolete. Such a State could not exist without its natural capital, Salonica; and Greece would not willingly surrender that great Greek city, nor would the Macedonian Greeks accept separation from Greece. Moreover, it would isolate Greek Thrace from the rest of Greece and probably stimulate Bulgarian, Macedonian, and perhaps Turkish claims to that province.

47. Secondly, there are several forms which it might be suggested that Macedonian autonomy might take, within a Federation. (a) The autonomy of Macedonia as a whole, within a Balkan Federation. This would include Greek Macedonia in the autonomous State; and would encounter the same objections, on that account, as were raised to the preceding suggestion. (b) The autonomy of non-Greek Macedonia within a Federation of the Balkan Slavs, which the advent to power of new elements in Serbia and Bulgaria might make possible. As between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria this has long seemed the best way to put an end to the mutual antagonism of the two States, which has its roots chiefly in the Macedonian Question, and thus to make possible the creation of the Great Federated Southern Slav State which is the ultimate ideal of a considerable part of the more enlightened and less chauvinistic Balkan Slavs. Such a solution for non-Greek Macedonia might have the approval of the U.S.S.R.; but the creation of a Slav Federation extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea would arouse the apprehensions of both Greece and Turkey, and might be opposed to British interests. (c) The autonomy of non-Greek Macedonia within a Balkan Federation. This solution would combine self-government for a population conscious of its separate identity with economic freedom in a wider area and free access to Salonica. Yet a Balkan Federation, for its harmonious operation, would require a degree of mutual confidence

and co-operation between all the Balkan nations of which as yet they have given little evidence.

48. Thirdly, a return might be made to some form of the proposal made by the Entente Powers to Bulgaria in 1915 for the cession by Serbia to Bulgaria of several districts east of the Vardar; subject to an exchange of those portions of the population of Yugoslav Macedonia which preferred to cross the new frontier line. Such a proposal might be welcomed by Bulgaria as a final settlement of her claims in non-Greek Macedonia. But it would entail the removal of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier from mountain ranges into a river basin; it would be held by the Yugoslavs to endanger their main line of communication with Greece and Salonica; it is improbable that many of the peasantry would avail themselves of the option of exchanging their nationality, or that the two States would put pressure to emigrate on populations which each considers hers, with the result that irredentism would not cease; it seems wholly improbable that the Serbians would consent to cede to Bulgaria territory for which they have four times fought in 30 years; and, lastly, the proposal would almost certainly arouse the opposition of Greece.

49. Fourthly, were anti-traditionalist, left-wing forces to become predominant in both Serbia and Bulgaria, a possible solution for non-Greek Macedonia might be found in the combination of a south Slav Federation, including Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see para. 48 (b) above), together with, not the autonomy of non-Greek Macedonia, but the cession to Bulgaria of several districts of eastern Yugoslav Macedonia (see para.49). Elements of the population, which so wished, would then be free to transfer themselves across the internal frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria, and the Serbo-Bulgarian feud might be expected to come to an end. This solution would not provide the advantages of local autonomy (for which it may be argued that non-Greek Macedonia is too small and poor); and, like the solution indicated in para. 48 (b), it would arouse the apprehensions of Turkey and Greece.

50. Fifthly, it is possible that, if the Balkan peninsula passed under the control of a Great Power, that Power might end the local feuds and reconcile the races of Macedonia and of the whole peninsula in

a common subjection to herself. The only Power able and conceivably willing to perform this function would appear to be the U.S.S.R. This solution would arouse strong opposition from Turkey, Greece and large portions of the other Balkan peoples. It would also raise wider issues in the international field.

51. Sixthly, there is the restoration of the pre-1941 status quo, with the inevitable continuance of intransigent nationalism in Macedonia. That situation might, indeed, be somewhat mitigated, were adequate Free Ports created at Salonica and Kavalla, and were those Free Ports and the communications between them and the chief centres of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia placed under international control. Such an arrangement might prove economically beneficial, and the presence of international officials might possibly serve to raise the standard of local official conduct, provided there were an effective International Authority, entitled to intervene in restraint of injustice on the evidence of its officials. It would, however, be naïve to expect much political assuagement to follow from these measures, and it must be frankly recognized that, while this course may be the only practicable one in view of the political situation, it will not provide a final solution either to the Macedonian or to the Balkan problems.

52. Lastly, however, the Balkan situation includes such uncertain factors (see para. 46) that some other solution, which cannot at present be foreseen, might come to appear practicable.

Research Department, Foreign Office, Whitehall, 26th August, 1944.

Macedonia - Appendix A - National Liberation Front (NOF)

Mrs. Beaton applies the term "Macedoine" to a dish containing a conglomeration of fruit or vegetables, sometimes loosely bound together by jelly or some such unstable medium.

The term is well chosen. MACEDONIA is a geographically indeterminate area which, for two millenniums, has contained an ethnographical conglomeration of different races and creeds.

On a "1066 and all That" level, it is generally associated with (a) Alexander the Great, and (b) an appeal to St. Paul for help. Probing more deeply into its history, the average mind reels under the impact of successive waves of Romans, Huns, Vandals, Byzants, Turks, Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks.

The object of this Article is to simplify, not to obscure, the present issue. It begins therefore in the second half of the nine- tenth century, when for 400 years MACEDONIA had been under Turkish domination; ruled as a feudal state, by Moslem overlords who, (rather on the one time British practice whereby the "lesser breeds" were divided brutally into Dagos or Dutchmen) I recognized no difference of race or nationality, but classified all unbelievers within this part of their Empire, as "Greeks".

The War of Greek Independence, 1821-32, had detached the whole of ATTICA and the MOREA from an Ottoman Empire already weakened by corruption and decadence, and by internal schisms. Elsewhere in the BALKANS, Greeks predominated numerically in Southern MACEDONIA; Bulgars in the north and north-east. In the north-west, Serbs had moved southward in the hope of gaining access to the Adriatic; while Albanians had encroached southwards into the EPIRUS. Over the whole are were scattered isolated pockets of Vlachs and Greeks.

Colonies of pure Turks had also been planted in Macedonia even before their conquest of the Balkan Peninsula; but, although with the gradual shrinkage of the empire they had been reinforced by refugees, they had at no time formed the majority of the Macedonian population.

The general spirit of unrest in EUROPE, and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, led to resurgence of nationalism in the BALKANS, which infected most of the races and tribes of the Macedonian conglomeration in particular the Bulgars, the Greeks, and the Serbs.

The amalgam (or jelly) which bound together the “Macedoine” of the Christian communities during the years of Turkish rule, was the authority of the Greek Orthodox Church – the only “Hierarchy” tolerated by the Turks – at the head of which was the Ecumenical Patriarch of CONSTANTINOPLE. The first move to break this tie had been made by the Serbs in 1831; and now, in 1870, it was further weakened by the declaration of the Bulgarian Exarchate, also independent of the ecclesiastical authority.

The territorial ambitions of the Bulgars became evident in 1878, when the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, which ended a short Russo-Turkish war, became public. Had it not been for the intervention of the Great Powers under the leadership of Lord BEACONSFIELD, Bulgarian territory would have been extended, with Russian approval, to include the lion’s share of MACEDONIA. As it was, however, the terms of the Treaty were never put into effect, and, in its place the Treaty of BERLIN was signed in July 1878.

By this treaty, ROUMANIA, SERBIA, and MONTENEGRO were declared completely independent of the Porte; while the grandiose scheme for a Greater BULGARIA was reduced to the grant of a relatively narrow strip of territory between the Danube and the BALKANS, as an independent state, but still under Turkish suzerainty. MACEDONIA thus remained intact within the Turkish Empire.

GREECE’s modest (1) claims to CRETE, THESSALY, and the EPIRUS, together with part of MACEDONIA, were for the moment disregarded.

The period between the Berlin settlement and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, is taken up with intrigues, revolts, and

reprisals, and a growing antagonism between Greeks and Bulgarians, competing for ultimate supremacy in MACEDONIA when the final disintegration of the Turkish European Empire took place. The latter, during the last years of its existence, fell into such a state of corruption and mismanagement that, in 1905, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, AUSTRIA and GERMANY, were forced to intervene and set up an International Commission to supervise the administration of MACEDONIA. The peasants were everywhere ruthlessly oppressed and, as a result, BULGARIA, from 1895 onwards, became the self-appointed champion of their rights.

What she had been prevented from gaining by the Treaty of BERLIN, she now tried to get by propaganda and other means. Various societies and committees were formed, which were ultimately welded into the formidable IMRO (Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization), with its own civil administration, police courts, and "muscle men", known as Comitadjis. Thus were the Christian population pressed to declare themselves BULGARS.

To counteract this state of affairs the Greeks began, in 1903, to form bands of Andartes (the name appears for the first time), to fight the Comitadjis.

This state of chronic insurrection and unrest continued with periodic outbreaks of counter-terrorism by the Turks, until the latter were finally ejected from the BALKANS as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

Without overloading this Article with historical detail, it is impossible to do more than summarize the course and consequence of these important wars.

Very briefly, the actions taken by the principal participants were as follows.

The Bulgarian army crossed the frontier of THRACE and, after one week's hard fighting, drove the Turks in full retreat on CONSTANTINOPLE, - but leaving ADRIANOPLE still in Turkish hands.

It remained so until the Bulgars finally took it, with the aid of the Serbs, five months later.

The Greeks marched north and entered SALONIKA, (shortly before the arrival of the Bulgars), FLORINA and PREVEZA. Farther west, they occupied ARGYROKASTRO and KORCE. Finally they took IOANNINA by storm. At sea, the Greek fleet Annexed, practically without fighting, all the AEGEAN Islands, except CYPRUS and those occupied by the Italians.

The Serbs, advancing with three armies, sent one column down the DRIN valley into ALBANIA, while the other two captured PRISTINA and USKUB, OHRID and MONASTIR, respectively. A detachment was also sent to support the Bulgars at ANDRIANOPOLE.

The results may be summarized as follows;

The Bulgars, who bore the brunt of the fighting, and who sustained by far the greatest proportion of losses, failed, in spite of their military successes, to achieve their main political objective, viz, a major port on the AEGEAN.

This was largely due to their own fault. On the defeat of the Turks, they had been awarded the whole of THRACE and Western MACEDONIA up to the STRUMA, but their desire to augment their gains at the expense of their recent allies, led to a short war between themselves and the Greeks and Serbs, as a result of which they were deprived of KAVALLA and all of Western MACEDONIA, West of the NESTOS.

The Greeks, at comparatively small cost won territorial gains which were not only vast in extent, but of the highest commercial and strategic importance, namely, SALONIKA, IOANNINA, Southern MACEDONIA, the greater part of EPIRUS, CRETE, and the Islands. The Greeks also entered a fruitless claim to part of ALBANIA.

The Serbs obtained Central MACEDONIA, including OHRID, MONASTIR, KOSSOVA and large stretch of territory to the north,

which brought them into immediate contact with the Montenegrins. But they, too had failed to achieve their main ambition - an outlet to the ADRIATIC.

ALBANIA was established as an independent state.

This settlement, in which the Great Powers took a strong hand, did little towards achieving stable conditions in the BALKANS.

The Great War gave the Bulgarians a chance, for a short time, to occupy the whole of Eastern MACEDONIA, though the peace settlement of 1919 left them worse off than ever, while the Greeks added Western THRAC to their pre-war territories.

The Greek campaign in ASIA MINOR in 1922 was followed by an exchange of population between GREECE and TURKEY. Of the 1,500,000 Greek immigrants, a large proportion settled in MACEDONIA -to the great benefit of the country. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, treaties were also made with BULGARIA for the exchange of populations and, as a result, 92,000 Bulgars and Slavophones in GREECE, and 42,000 Greeks in BULGARIA, opted to emigrate. In Greek MACEDONIA thereafter the racial question almost disappeared, 90% of the population being Greek.

A number of Turks and Bulgars also left Yugoslav MACEDONIA but no general exchange was arranged for the remaining SLAVOPHONE population the whole of which was claimed by YUGOSLAVIA as Serb. Material prosperity increased, and efforts were made by YUGOSLAVIA to Serbize the population, by severely repressing Bulgar national feeling and by banning Bulgar schools.

The policy of BULGARIA in regard to MACEDONIA has varied in form, but not in object, over the past fifty years. For a time, she aimed at the realization of a Greater BULGARIA as mapped out at San Stefano. When this failed, she devoted her energies to the emancipation of MACEDONIA and the Establishment of an autonomous principality under a Christian governor, As such it was

hopped that MACEDONIA would become the nucleus of a BALKAN federation, eventually to be annexed by themselves.

The technique adopted by the Bulgars was one of penetration backed up by terrorism, through various agencies viz; up to the time of the Balkan Wars, through the Comitadjis, working in collaboration with local Slavophone elements; after World War I, through a revived IMRO; and from 1941 onwards through all organization known as OCHRANA which was founded by the Bulgarian Army, and used for the purpose of conducting a deliberate campaign of extermination against the Macedonian Greeks.

NOF now comes into the picture. Starting, during the Axis occupation, as SNOF, the movement was aimed primarily at liberating Macedonian territory from alien control -but with the ultimate object of establishing an autonomous state. It was made up exclusively of Slav-speaking individuals inhabiting Western MACEDONIA and the district of EDHESSA. According to the Greek census of 1928 there were some 80,000 Orthodox Slavs living in the area adjoining the Yugoslav frontier who had been unwilling to leave their homes during the general exchange of population. The Bulgarians claimed them as Bulgarians but the Greeks maintained that all elements with Bulgarian affinities had already emigrated and that all those remaining must be regarded as Greeks.

During the latter part of the German occupation they worked with and under, EAM, though always with the object of achieving Macedonian autonomy. In order to maintain their connection with KKE after the defeat of GERMANY they dropped their "S", in order to disguise their pro-Slav sympathies, which would have estranged a large proportion of patriotic Greek Communists from their cause. Since the war they have, in fact, taken their orders, not from KKE, but from NOF headquarters at SKOPJE, until the split occurred between TITO and the COMINFORM. There is reason to believe that there is at present a divided allegiance within the party, a few remaining loyal to TITO, while the majority have transferred their allegiance to SOFIA.

Recent events are once again confirming the fact that the aim of this small Slav-speaking group, (now forming part of the Greek rebel

movement), is to detach large sections of territory from. GREECE - this time under orders from international Communism: and that their presence in the frontier areas constitutes one more source of trouble in the relation of GREECE with her neighbours.

Macedonia - Background

The Free Greek Radio broadcast at 1st March announced that the following Congress of N.O.F (Slavo-Macedonian guerrilla movement) would declare “the union of Macedonia into a complete, independent and equal Macedonian nation within the Popular Democratic Federation of the Balkan Peoples”. The statement has been widely (and we think correctly interpreted in the West as meaning that Cominform policy is now directed at the formation of an independent Macedonia, composed of parts of Bulgarian, Greek and Yugoslav territory, as part of a Balkans federation, under Dimitroff . Hitherto Tito, as suzerain of the existing People’s Federal Republic of Macedonia, has held that the Greek and Bulgarian sections of Macedonia should be united with Yugoslav Macedonia. The Present development whereby Bulgaria resumes her traditional role, of sponsor of Macedonian autonomy, is therefore as much a part of the Soviet “war of nerve” against Tito as an attack on the territorial integrity of Greece. In fact, when read in conjunction with apparently deliberately fostered rumours of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans, the former hypothesis appear the more likely. This move however the disadvantage, from the Cominform point of view, of alienating the Greek Nationalists in the rebel ranks and the Greek Government have been quick enough to make an appeal to these nationalists of whose views Markos was the chief propagandist A number of former communists have recanted and their recantations are being used by the Greek Government to encourage further desertion from the rebel ranks.

The Cominform appear to have realized that the move was not a very astute one and since the broadcast on March 1st there has been much back pedaling, including denials that any form of Macedonian State was intended and the suggestion that the original broadcast was merely intended to unite the Slavo-Macedonians behind the Greek democrats "in their struggle". The N.O.F. Congress announcement for March 15th may or may not have taken place; no publicity has yet been issued over the Free Greek Radio.

On Tito's side there has been a vigorous reaction, in particular an article in the Nova Makedonia describing both the Balkan and Greek Communists as chauvinists and stating that the Cominform’s

decision to reverse the situation in the Balkans by causing a Macedonian State might be a casus belli.

Suggestions for what might be said in the house

A draft reply to a possible parliamentary question on the subject of the N.O.F. broadcast was recently prepared with a view to warning the Cominform not to proceed with the provocative subject of proclaiming a Macedonian State.

Sir W. Strung directed that this form of words, which we constructed with the legal adviser, should be put into cold storage for suitable opportunity. The text runs as follows "I have noted this proclamation, which appears to threaten the use of force to detach territory under the sovereignty of an existing State with a view to creating a new political entity. I agree that such a proclamation if made or supported by any State would constitute a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations.

I should however add that subsequent broadcasts from the same station suggest that the ill-advised enthusiasm of certain Macedonian elements among the Greek rebels may have been tempted by wiser counsels."

It may also be desirable to point out the discrepancies of the Soviet attitude towards nationalism. Thus while the nationalistic tendencies of the Greek and Yugoslav communists are condemned by Moscow, the Kremlin makes no bones about sponsoring Bulgarian expansionism and the national tendencies of the Macedonians whose claims to self determination have for the last 80 years been the sport of power politics rather than the serious study of ethnologists.

The New Macedonian State is a link in Balkan Unity

M. Harizanov returns from Skopje

M.Ivan Harizanov, member of the National Committee of the Patriotic Front, has returned from Skopje, where he went to bring the greetings of the Patriotic Front Bulgaria to the new Macedonian State.

On this occasion H. Harizanov made the following statements:

“My impressions are excellent. What was a dream is now a reality. The Macedonia of the Vardar is free. She has her own Government, her own language and her own Constituent Assembly. She has her own face in every respect. The visitor immediately feels that. Everything is in effervescence and in creation. Everyone is conscious that a great historical deed is being done, which had been the dream of many generations.

Q. What are the feelings towards us, M. Harizanov?

A. It must be confessed that they have been very hostile until now. This is due to the occupation, to ill-treatment by our officials, and especially to the wrong and fatal policy of our Dynasty and its governments.

Q. What are the faults of the former Bulgarian policy, in your opinion?

A. The former rulers could not grasp what Macedonia really was. In this respect, we Bulgarians are very guilty in regard to the Macedonian people. When the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization of Gotse Delchev and Sandanski was struggling heroically for the freedom of Macedonia, the Great-Bulgarian chauvinists of the Bulgarian dynasty and its governments did all in their power to destroy and to suppress it.

The leaders of the revolution opposed this, and therefore the most eminent members of the organization were eliminated by the agents of the dynasty.

These leaders were the first to proclaim before the world the great covenant: “Macedonia must be autonomous and instead of being an apple of discord must become a link for the unity of the Balkan peoples.”

And this is exactly what is going on now.

Macedonians going to Yugoslavia - Ottawa, July 28, 1947

(Front page missing)

There are no indications that Macedonians were among the expatriates who sailed on the S.S. RADNIK for Yugoslavia in May, 1947. The Bulgarian-language weekly NOVO VREME, which reported the news of the repatriation, made no mention of even one of Macedonians returning to Yugoslavia on that boat.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 of the Canadian Ambassador's letter No.289 - More detailed information on the financial transactions of the Macedonian War Relief Committee in Canada can be obtained from Lt.-Col. P.L. Browne, Director of Voluntary War Relief Division, Department of National Health and Welfare, Old Supreme Court Building, Ottawa. According to information available to this Branch, the campaign for a "relief for suffering Macedonians" was conducted in Canada in the Summer of 1949. It was closed on October 11, 1946. The collected money reached the sum of \$15,295.87. We understand that the Macedonian committee was refused permission to transfer the collected funds abroad. There are indications that part of the collected funds were used for other purposes than relief, i.e., financing the trip of Yugoslav and Bulgaro-Macedonian delegates to the All Slav Congress held in Belgrade in December, 1946.

3. With reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of Letter No. 289 -Letter of Col. Petse Traikoff, Commandant of Skopje (published in NOVO VREME of April 26, 1946) was written to Nicola Goushev of Kitchener, Ontario. NOVO VREME adds that the Macedonian Government intended to send Col. Traikoff to Canada to assist in the collection of Macedonian relief funds. In his letter Col. Traikoff relates also his life's story: On January 21, 1935 he was put into a concentration camp, presumably after the German break with the U.S.S.R. In 1941 he was again arrested and put into a concentration camp, "with many other Bulgarian progressive leaders". He did not stay long in the camp but in 1943 he was re-arrested and sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. He was liberated on the 8th September, 1944, made a Colonel and appointed the organizer of the GOTSE DELTCHEV BRIGADE of the "people's liberation army",

numbering, according to his statements, 12,000 men. In his letter he praises the "people's hero-leader of Yugoslavia, Comrade Marshal Tito", and expresses the hope that Macedonia will become a "free federal member of Tito's democratic Yugoslavia", the beloved leader Marshal Tito" and the "Great Soviet Union". The contents of the letter and its publication in NOVO VREME on the eve of a fund collection campaign indicate that it was written with the purpose of assisting in the money collection.

4. Reference paragraph 7 of Letter No. 289 -The number of Macedonian associations in Canada is reasonable within proportion to the number of persons of Macedonian descent. It has to be borne in mind that many individuals are members of several societies and that the membership of associations is comparatively small. Macedonian Canadian People's League and other associations affiliated with the League are closely linked up with the Canadian Council of South Slavs and when celebrations or mass meetings are arranged, they are attended by all Slavs of Communistic affiliations, to give the impression of numerical strength. Memoranda to the Paris Conference or United Nations can be sent by private persons or a parish association; there are no restrictions in this respect in Canada, and apparently the small Macedonian associations in Canada achieved their aim -not to be ignored but to be given attention.

5. Re paragraph 8 of Letter 289 - There were only two delegates of the Macedonian Communist group from Canada who attended the All-Slav Congress in Belgrade in December, 1945. They were Andrew Palmeroff, Secretary of the Macedonian People's Council, and Nicola Kyriakopoulos, former Deputy of the Greek (Revolutionary?) Parliament, and member of the Macedonian-Canadian People's Council. Andrew Christoff, the Editor of NOVO VREME (New Times) represented the Bulgarian Canadian Communist group.

6. Re paragraph 10 of Letter 289 – Mr. Grouios of Leamington is not known to us. His statement that “this spring thousands of persons in Canada and the United States are preparing to come to fight as guerillas for the independence of Macedonia against the Greek Government can be taken as pure boasting. The number of all

persons of Macedonian descent in Canada does not exceed a few thousands, children, women and old people included. If a person applies for a passport to go to Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, he would be known to Canadian authorities. American authorities discontinued issuing visa to Yugoslavia for the present, according to the American press.

7. Re paragraph 11 of Letter 289 – It is possible, but not likely, that among the 500 repatriates who left for Yugoslavia on the S.S. RADNIK in May, 1947, there were a few who intended to join the partisan forces to fight against Greece.

8. Re paragraph 13 of Letter 289 -Postal censorship does not exist in Canada and, therefore, it may occur that persons writing to Europe have included small amounts of money in letters to their friends or relatives. But these sums are insignificant and could hardly be classed as financial support of insurgents. Any amount of money sent through the medium of a Canadian bank requires a clearing from the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board, and until recently all collections of relief funds required a permit from the Voluntary War Relief Division.

Macedonians in Canada: Their Estimated Numbers and Division

Macedonia is a country divided between three states: (a) Bulgaria; (b) Yugoslavia; and (c) Greece. Macedonian Canadians originate from these states. There is no separate classification in the Canadian census for Macedonians. Their figure has to be worked out through deduction. According to the Census of 1941 there were in Canada:

3,260 persons of Bulgarian origin
11,692 persons of Greek origin
21,214 persons of Yugoslav origin

Of these 36,166 persons, about 6,000 originated from Macedonia and belong to the Macedonian ethnic group. Politically they are divided into federalists and autonomists. Federalists show Communistic leanings and are pro-Tito, and seem to work in close co-operation with and under the guidance of the Council of South Slavs who determine their policy. This policy is directed from Belgrade, as can be traced from its actions, and this group can be estimated to be 3,000 strong, men, women and children. The autonomists are striving for complete, independent united Macedonia. The headquarters of this group is in the United States where they publish their newspapers. A small number of Canadians of Macedonian descent do not take an active interest in European-Macedonian affairs.

There are very few intellectuals among this ethnic group. Most of them are in the restaurant business in Eastern Canadian cities, in the trades, as labourers in various industries and as truck farmers.

Memorandum for Mr. George - January 14th, 1949

M. Blais

I attached dispatch No. 5 of January 3rd, 1949 from the embassy in Athens, requesting information on certain alleged activities of Bulgarians in Canada.

2. File No. 102-ZR-40c dealing with the activities of Bulgarians in Canada has been in abeyance since December, 1945. The documents last filed refer to the creation in Toronto on December 2nd, 1945, of the Bulgarian-Canadian People's League of Canada, of which the general objectives were to work for better relations between Bulgaria and Canada and to support all progressive movements against fascism. The Secretary of the Central Executive Committee was the Mr. Andro Hristov, Editor of "New Times" (Novo Vreme). Dr. Kaye, of the Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, informs me that this newspaper is still published and is following Cominform lines.

3. I do not know whether this organization is still in existence, and if so, whether it is cooperating with the Greek Communist Party. I shall appreciate it if you can furnish me with any information that may be sent as a reply to our Embassy's request.

European Division

Memorandum for Mr. MacDermot - January 19th, 1949

J. George /JS

The article in "Estia" reported in General LaFleche's dispatch NO. 3 of January 3 is, of course, an old complaint and I do not think it need now be taken very seriously as we have kept the Greek Government fully informed of our difficulties in suppressing pro-Bulgarian and pro-Macedonian propaganda in Canada. We have not, however, told the Greek Government that the Macedonian Canadian War Committee, a front for the Bulgarian Canadian Peoples' League (both with headquarters in Toronto) collected about \$ 15,000 in 1946 and then used the money, quite improperly, to finance a delegation of eleven to the Slav Congress in Belgrade which was, as I recall, held in December 1946. It is quite likely that the balance of the funds collected were given to Macedonian organizations in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which were assisting the Greek Communists. The Macedonian Canadian War Aid Committee was not registered under the War Charities Act and although the matter was reported by the R.C.M.P. to the authorities responsible for administering the War Charities Act, nothing was done. During the past two years, we have no knowledge of any funds being sent from Canada to the Macedonian or Greek Communists, but it would be a comparatively easy matter to send money in the mails and this has always been the practice of Bulgarian immigrants, both for legitimate and illegal purposes.

The principle Macedonian organizations active in Canada are still the Macedonian Canadian Peoples' League and the Bulgarian Canadian Peoples' League. Nothing has been heard recently of Hristov (Christoff). Both organizations are inclined towards Communism but may now be divided in their attitude towards Marshal Tito.

The old Independent Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) is a smaller organization of terrorists from the Balkans who hope to "liberate" Macedonia by terrorist methods. They are no longer important but are still active. When Tito came to power at the end of the war they looked to him to establish their promised land

but are now disillusioned and most of them have become instrumental in raising funds for the Greek Communists.

G. G. Crean
Defense Liason.

Memorandum on the present situation in Macedonia - July 24, 1945

The task of harnessing the Macedonian resistance movement to the general Partisan movement throughout the rest of Yugoslavia was one in which the Partisan leaders only achieved a moderate measure of Success. Due to this the task of bringing the new regime in Macedonia into line with the regime elsewhere has proved, and is proving, one of the main difficulties of the new Government. This task has not been made easier by the fact that the Partisan movement in Macedonia, until the period immediately before the liberation, was comparatively weak.

2. To put the present position in its proper light it may help to recapitulate two main causes for this. In the first place, nearly all Macedonians had welcomed the arrival of the Bulgarian army of occupation as a means of achieving their independence after more than 20 years of Serb domination, and though most Macedonians quickly became disillusioned by the oppressive measures taken by the Bulgarians, conditions did not become bad enough to drive them to open opposition. Moreover, to most Macedonians the domination of Sofia appeared, if anything, slightly preferable to that of Belgrade. The Partisan movement, drawing its inspiration from Serbia, did not therefore find much support in Macedonia until its programme promised Macedonian autonomy. Many of those who joined the movement on the announcement of this programme, and among them a large number of the present leaders, gave a far wider interpretation to the promised autonomy than appears to have been intended by the Partisans. In this belief they may well have been encouraged by General Vukmanovic-Tempo, who for two years was Tito's personal delegate in Macedonia and who was completely out of touch with Partisan General Headquarters. He expressed himself in the summer of 1944 as seriously worried as to whether he was interpreting Partisan policy in Macedonia correctly, and on his return from a visit to General Headquarters, gave the impression that he had been brought into line. Some units formed near the Greek frontier which appear to have had shadowy allegiance both to the Partisans and E.A.M./E.L.A.S., certainly fought until the end largely for the creation of a fully or virtually great Macedonia. The Partisans appear to have seen the danger and made some attempts to

co-ordinate the Macedonian Partisan movement with the development elsewhere and to overcome the traditional antagonism between Serbs and Macedonians by making Serb and Macedonian units fight along side and on each others territory, and putting Serbs from the Kosovo in Macedonian units. This, however, was not on a large enough scale for any widespread results and was partly offset by other units which co-operated more closely with Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian Partisans, and whose leaders tended to conduct their own peculiarly Macedonian foreign policy with them. Secondly, Bulgarian military control of Macedonia was strong and in those areas near the Albanian frontier most suitable for Partisan warfare the Partisans encountered a hostile population. The Macedonian Partisans could, therefore, only operate on North-Eastern, Eastern, and Southern fringes of Macedonia. This hampered the spread of Partisan ideas through Macedonia and the distance of the main Macedonian centers of resistance from the centers of population made it difficult for recruits to join the Partisans.

3. When with the collapse of Bulgaria it was clear that the Partisans would inevitably come into power, there was a large influx of recruits, including many officials who had worked whole-heartedly with the Bulgarians. These could not be absorbed into the Partisan movement or indoctrinated with Partisan ideas before final liberation took place when many of them, coming from the small educated class, were immediately given jobs of responsibility in the new Macedonian administration.

There were, therefore, left within the Partisan movement when it took over the government, large undigested masses who looked on the liberation merely as an opportunity to establish an independent greater Macedonia and most of whom still preferred Bulgarian to Serbian dominion. In many parts of Macedonia, the liberation celebrations made little mention of Macedonia's place in federal Yugoslavia, speeches merely stressing the achievement of autonomy by Macedonia, paying no more than lip service to Tito's leadership and dwelling on aspirations for greater Macedonia. Macedonian nationalism for a time ran riot and relief at release from the Bulgars was least equalled by satisfaction at the end of Serb dominion. The Macedonian boundary with Serbia was set up further to the north than was warranted either historically or ethnically and was closely

controlled. This was accompanied by a feverish attempt to show the ability of Macedonia to stand by herself without aid from the central Yugoslav Government. Railways and roads were repaired with money raised in Macedonia and a grant from the central Government was left untouched in Belgrade. Schools were quickly re-opened with compulsory teaching of the Macedonian language and with Macedonian teachers, the top three classes of the gymnasias being released and enrolled for this purpose. Government offices were set up with Macedonian officials and many of the old Bulgarian officials stayed at their posts. Serbs trying to return to Macedonia were thrown into prison, and in order to avert the necessity of calling on Serbia for further technicians and officials, an appeal was launched for all Macedonians to return from Bulgaria.

4. Though some of the extravagances soon ceased and Tito's leadership of the movement was recognized, these separatist tendencies, together with a dangerous propaganda campaign against Greece gave rise to serious disquiet in Belgrade and, as previously reported in Belgrade dispatch No. 74, Dr. Kardelj was sent late in December to the second extraordinary session of A.S.N.O.M. to deliver a warning against the prevailing mood of chauvinism and Macedonian nationalism. No immediate results were apparent from this visit though there was some slackening of the campaign against Greece. Probably, however, the visit achieved its object, which was presumably to prevent either an open breach between Macedonians and Serbs or any precipitate action by the Macedonians against the Greeks. Henceforth, greater stress was laid by Macedonian leaders on the role of Macedonia in federal Yugoslavia and on the central control of Belgrade. The Macedonian authorities continued, however, to make it impossible for Serbs who had been expelled by the Bulgarians from Macedonia to return. Matters came to a head once more with a meeting in an artillery brigade of 15 Corps which was ordered to the Srem front, but demanded instead to be allowed to march to Salonika and with a visit to Bulgaria of Pavel Shatev, an old member of the United I.M.R.O. and a member at the time of the Presidium of A.S.N.O.M., who speaks only Bulgarian and has lived nearly all his life in Bulgaria. His object in going there was to negotiate direct with the Bulgarian Government on the question of the re-establishment of the frontiers between Macedonia and Bulgaria which had hitherto been non-existent on the Yugoslav side.

These Macedonian activities called forth energetic action from Belgrade and General Vukmanovic-Tempo visited Skopje and roundly trounced the Macedonians for ignoring Belgrade.

5. The results of this warning were more immediately obvious, the Macedonian campaign against Greece stopped abruptly in early February, and it was clear from the instance of Macedonian officials that they could not express any opinion on foreign policy that they had been seriously frightened off their excursions into foreign affairs. It was rumoured that they had at one time considered setting up a department of the Macedonian Government responsible for Macedonian foreign policy. The Serbo-macedonian boundary was moved south to exclude the towns of Kacanik and Presevo which had previously been arbitrarily incorporated by the Macedonians in Macedonia. Meanwhile, Belgrade began to set about the task of organizing a more effective control.

6. The Communist party, whose obedience to Tito is presumably beyond doubt, was put increasingly in control of the Macedonian Government. In the first Macedonian Federal Government set up in April the Prime Minister, Lazar Kulisevski, was the Secretary of the Macedonian Communist Party; both Vice-Presidents were Communists and all but two of the remaining Ministers. In the local National Liberation Committee, the Secretary, who is normally the most powerful member, is almost invariably a Communist. More and more of the key services were directly controlled by the central Government. O.Z.N.A., who appear to have the power to veto many decisions of the Federal Government, and the Corps of National Defense, who act as frontier guards, were moved in strength to Macedonia and are responsible direct to the Ministry of National Defense. The frontier with Bulgaria was re-established and control over passage between Bulgaria and Macedonia became strict, permission to cross it being granted only by Belgrade or Sofia. Mines and railways were placed directly under the Ministry of Mines and Communications in Belgrade and in these two services the Macedonians were obliged to accept Serbian technicians. Taxation, with the exception of small local taxes for local services, and the provisions to money to the Federal Government, is shortly to be co-ordinate under the central Government. Civil Courts have been established and the Public Prosecutor's service for Macedonia

will be responsible directly to the Minister of Justice in Belgrade for the administration of justice in the federal unit. Any important legislation envisaged by the Federal Government must be referred in detail to Belgrade before being put into effect. Skopje radio, hitherto independent, has been placed under the control of Belgrade. At the beginning of June the Macedonian military command was dissolved, and 5th Yugoslav Army was moved to Macedonia with headquarters in Skopje. Though this army consists mainly of Macedonian units, it is believed to contain at least one Serb division, and one Croat division is thought to be about to join it. It is under the command of Major-General Rodic who, with his Chief of staff, Political Commissar and the majority of his staff officers, is Serbian. It seems also that Belgrade is keeping Macedonia very short of essential supplies and though U.N.D.R.A. supplies are expected, they have not yet begun to arrive. This again may be a move on the part of the central Government to make the Macedonians realize how dependent they are on Belgrade. Finally, during the summer holidays the Youth organizations are being kept mobilized to undergo courses of political education from prominent Partisans.

7. From conversations with numbers of Macedonian officials it is clear that within the limits dictated to them by the central Government, the Macedonian Government intends to take all the autonomy it can. On the other hand, while maintaining effective control of Macedonia the central Government appears to have deemed it wise to make some concessions to re-awakened Macedonian nationalism. In Macedonian Government departments nearly all officials remain Macedonian, with a sprinkling of Bulgars. In a recent conversation, the Macedonian Prime Minister stated that the Government had no need for Serbian officials since there were sufficient Macedonian officials; the Serbian officials were corrupt and would in any case be unable to carry out their duties as all official business was transacted in the Macedonian language. As regards former Serbian colonists, the Prime Minister said that while many Serbian small holders who had helped the Partisan movement would be allowed to retain their land and some Serbian colonists had come back, he did not expect the return of the majority of the colonists who had left during the Bulgarian occupation. Most of those had in any case acquired their property illegally and this had been taken from them by the Bulgars. When the Bulgars had left, it

had been confiscated by the State as enemy property. He gave the impression that the question of whether those who had acquired their property legally would have it confiscated or returned to them, still remained to be settled, but said the uncertainty of their position would deter them from returning. There is, in any case, a serious shortage of land in Macedonia and it is clear from what has happened so far that the land of Serbian colonists is confiscated on the flimsiest pretext to satisfy landless Macedonians. The position appears to be that Serbs who return to Macedonia as technicians and officials in those organizations under the direct control of the central Government but will be excluded from the local services controlled by the Macedonian Government, and are unlikely to be attracted to return as private settlers. In this it seems that there is some conflict between Skopje and Belgrade, since the central Government has on several occasions categorically stated that former settlers should be allowed to return to their pre-war domiciles, and that the Macedonian Government is doing its best to steer a middle course between the Scylla of the centralism of Belgrade and the Charybdis of the separatist Macedonian aspirations. The conflict between the Central Government and the Macedonian Government may, however, be more apparent than real, though there is always the possibility that such prominent Macedonians as Dimitar Vlahov, who is President of the all-powerful National Liberation Front which controls all political activity and the press is Macedonian and can hardly be considered as a Yugoslav, may be playing their own, Macedonian game. The Central Government is forced to pander to strong Serbian opinion which is thoroughly anti-Macedonian and resents Macedonian autonomy and exclusion of Serbs, while the Macedonian Government relies largely for support on Macedonian nationalist feeling. A different stress is therefore laid on Macedonia's position by the central and Macedonian Governments, the Central Government emphasizing Macedonia's place in Federal Yugoslavia and the Macedonian Government stressing the autonomous aspect of Macedonia's position. In order to make this possible, concessions have had to be made on both sides.

8. The Macedonian Government is taking what advantage it can of the main visible concession to Macedonian autonomist feeling, namely the grant of full cultural autonomy. Though some schools for the Turkish, Albanian and, according to the Minister of

Education, Serb minorities, have been provided by the Government, in all other schools all instruction is in Macedonian. In some entirely Serb-speaking districts only Macedonian is taught and the Cincar-Vlach minority are alleged to have petitioned to be taught in Macedonian because they have no written language of their own. Macedonian school books and dictionaries are to be provided by the beginning of the next school year, teaching having so far been carried out under great difficulties with no books and few trained teachers. A great drive is being made to rediscover and establish a separate Macedonian literature and folk lore. Further, the Orthodox Church in Macedonia which late in April voiced a desire for Independence from the Serbian Patriarchate, is at present administered by a Macedonian Church Council and appears to be already enjoying a certain amount of independence. Its aims are described as a semi-autonomous status in the Yugoslav Federal Orthodox Church. This development is the direction of independent status appears to have been regarded with dismay in Belgrade.

9. Opposition

There is little prospect of organized opposition to the regime in Skopje from outside the Partisan movement. The Cetnik organization in Macedonia, always Great-Serb and a weak offshoot of organization in Serbia, has shown no signs of activity (see enclosure in Belgrade dispatch No.74). Arnaut villages contain certain irreconcilable elements, and mention has been made of sporadic unrest by armed bands. But attempts have now been undertaken to conciliate both Albanians and Turks by giving them their representatives in the Government, their own newspapers and committees. Never the less the Muslims, with alone in Macedonia England is popular, are believed to constitute an element fundamentally hostile to the new regime. They are, however, leaderless and are only likely to constitute real danger if other opposition elements come out actively against the Government.

10. Throughout the whole of Macedonia there is however widespread grumbling, discontent and disillusionment with the new regime, and this has even spread to some elements of the old Partisan movement. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Macedonia suffered little in the war and with the liberation expected

benefits of all kinds. Instead they found themselves for the first time conscripted into the Army or into labour squads. There were arbitrary arrests, though these were few compared to other parts of the country, wholesale requisitioning by the Army and economic and financial instability. The leva was changed at what was considered an unfair rate and there was a heavy levy on money changed. Trials by military and "honour" courts were thought, and are now admitted by the Government, to be most unfair. There is a lack of consumers' goods; the prospect of bad crops due to lack of rain; high wages and prices; premature attempts by the Government to brine business under government control without having the organization to direct it, a process which has gone further down the social scale in Macedonia than Serbia owing to the lack of big business and heavy industry; and there have been many mistakes by an inexperienced administration and the ham-handed O.Z.N.A. Some of these abuses the Government is trying to remedy. Requisitioning and forced labour, except in the Bitolj area, have ceased; civil courts are to be established, and an attempt is being made to control wages and prices though these still remain very high.

11. That the general discontent has not crystallized into active opposition is due to the firm hand of the police and the complete lack of leadership. Political parties, apart from the communist party are non-existent and opposition on pre-war party lines is inconceivable. Before the war the political parties in Macedonia were merely extensions of Serb political parties with Serbian leaders and as such have no support in present-day Macedonia. Metodije Andonov the president of the Macedonian Assembly and a pre-war Agrarian, who claims that the party had in Macedonia before the war, a special Macedonian character in so far as it was used by Macedonians to oppose the Government and keep alive Macedonian national feeling, stated categorically in conversation that the re-emergence of the old political parties in Macedonia was impossible. As elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the discontented elements expect the regime to change but do not contemplate playing an active part in bringing it down. They hope, therefore, for collapse from within or for outside intervention, and only in the event of the elections leaving the Government still firmly in the saddle, are they at all likely to become active.

12. Nevertheless, discontent is certain to increase while the majority of the youth idles in the Army instead of being harnessed to restoring the country, while priority is being given to Army over civilian needs as in the case of railways, which during the month of June were allotted exclusively to the Army, from whom the civilian authorities had to get permission to move goods for civilian consumption, and while the central Government cannot or will not give Macedonia what she needs to put her house in order. Unless also the food situation is remedied by winter the position may become most serious. The Ministry of Agriculture admitted in conversation that Macedonia, in view of the very poor harvests, could need large quantities of wheat and that he did not know where the necessary supplies would come from since before the war they had come from Kosovo Polje, whose wheat was now being sent to Albania.

13. Amongst the intellectuals, traders and even some peasants, the hardships caused by the attempt of Macedonia to stand on her own feet has given rise to a wish to end at any price the experiment in Macedonian autonomy and return to some sort of security and stability. Since it appears only immediately possible to do this by going back under the control of Belgrade, they would welcome the return of Macedonian pre-war status.

14. Amongst the broad masses, however, hatred of Serbia still remains strong and has been increased by the recent attempt to reimpose the domination of Belgrade on Macedonia. With this, pro-Bulgarian sentiment which has always been strong among certain members of the Macedonian National Assembly, has shown some increase though there is no widespread wish to try again the experiment of Bulgarian rule so shortly after its failure. Nevertheless, there are areas, particularly along the Bulgarian frontier, where a village in the Novo Selo area is reported to have petitioned recently to be reincorporated into Bulgaria, and in the Bitolj-Ohrid region, where pro-Bulgarian sentiment remains very strong. In Bitolj this has been accentuated by the overbearing behaviour of Serbian troops recently billeted in the town who have, treated the Macedonians with ill-concealed contempt. Nevertheless, the Government evidently do not consider the danger from pro-

Bulgarian elements to be really serious as they are allowing ex-Bulgarian officials to remain and encouraging more to return.

15. The Partisans on first achieving power exploited the strong separatist sentiment in Macedonia with their promises of autonomy and thus stole the thunder of the old extremists I.M.R.O. of Vanko Mihailov who was produced by the Germans at the time of the Bulgarian collapse to foster the movement for independent greater Macedonia. Mihailov had in any case forfeited his popularity in Macedonia as a whole, first by the active part he played in bringing about the fall of Stambuliski, who enjoyed much sympathy in Macedonia, and latterly by his wholehearted collaboration with the enemy during the war. Having won most of his potential supporters to their cause, the Partisans smashed the surviving elements of his party and arrested and sentenced to death all the leaders remaining in Macedonia. The party, as such, is therefore virtually leaderless. The Macedonian Government has not yet lost the support of the very strong separatist elements and their tight-rope walk between centralism and separatism, trying to preserve an outward semblance of autonomy while deferring to Belgrade in all essential matters, is at least in part occasioned by the desire to keep the separatists with them. The present press campaign against Greece fostered by the Central Government finds the separatists strongly behind it and the Macedonian Government are taking advantage of this to divert to some extent at my rate the attention of the separatists from Belgrade's increasing encroachments. That some separatist elements are dissatisfied and wish to have more drastic action is witnessed, however, by the fact that some 300-350 boys and girls were recently arrested in Skopje on charges of separatist activities on behalf of I.M.R.O. and are awaiting trial. Should the regime fail even to achieve for the separatists any concrete results in the satisfaction of their expansionist aims, the separatists will probably become a very dangerous element of opposition under the possible leadership of the Federalist I.M.R.O. which is at present strongly entrenched in Macedonian Government circles.

16. Relations with Bulgaria

There is at present little concrete evidence as to relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over the Macedonian question. At the time

of Bulgaria's occupation and rapid change of sides it was generally assumed in Yugoslavia that she was ready to cede the Pirin province of Macedonia to Yugoslavia and unguarded statements to this effect came from both Dr. Smolaka and Dimitar Vlahov. It was expected at the same time that Bulgaria would get some return for this and for supporting Macedonian claims to Greece, and it is suggested this return may have been Yugoslav support for Bulgarian claims to Eastern Thrace and certain frontier readjustments in the Caribrod and Bosiljgrad areas. In Macedonia the cession of the Pirin was thought to be virtually a fait accompli, and relations between Macedonians and Bulgars became very close. Macedonian officials traveled back and forth to Bulgaria and movement over the old Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier appears to have been in no way restricted. There were reports that an attempt was made by Bulgarian Macedonians from Federalist IMRO to set up an administration in the Pirin, independent of the Bulgarian Government, and that delegates were sent to Skopje to discuss the future frontiers of Macedonia. An appeal was launched for Bulgarian Macedonian to return to their liberated homeland. These appeals remained largely unanswered though a number of Bulgarian officials remained at their posts or returned from Bulgaria. These and other indications seem to show that Bulgaria may have begun to use this detente in her relations with Yugoslavia to play her own game in Macedonia and is working through elements friendly to her in the Macedonian government to try to increase her influence in Macedonia at the expense of Yugoslavia and to encourage separatist or pro-Bulgarian tendencies. The Macedonian government seem to have cooperated willingly in these plans and on at least one occasion the Macedonian government ordered and accepted supplies direct from the Bulgarian government while the Bulgars sent supplies to their former sympathizers in the Bitolj-Ohrid area. It seems possible that these tactics of the Bulgarian government may have been occasioned by the situation in Greece. Bulgaria's acceptance of the loss of Pirin was, it is suggested, based on the assumption that E.L.A.S. would gain power in Greece and that this would result in the establishment of a Balkan federation including an independent greater Macedonian state which would absorb Greek Macedonia. With the defeat of E.L.A.S., Bulgaria saw these hopes receding and began to draw back their earlier promises, not wishing to hand over the Pirin to a purely Yugoslav Macedonia. At the same time

Bulgaria by sending back some Bulgarian officials, tried to safeguard her position in Macedonia. Metodije Andonov in conversation stated that he thought Bulgaria was less ready than she had been to cede the Pirin, and that this area had been brought again under the strict control of the Bulgarian Government. The leaders of the separate administration of Bulgarian Macedonia are also reported to have been arrested by the Bulgarian government. However this may be, it seems clear that the Yugoslav government soon began to see through the Bulgarian game and to take counter measures. As mentioned above, the Yugoslav government ordered the Macedonian government to accept Serbian officials and close the frontier between Bulgaria and Macedonia, manning it with troops under the direct control of Belgrade. The Macedonian government were called to task for accepting supplies from Bulgaria and the Bulgarian dispatch of supplies to pro-Bulgarian elements was publicly denounced. Nevertheless, at the end of May, Dimitar Vlahov again launched an appeal for the return of Bulgarian Macedonians and even of pure Bulgarians with relations in Macedonia. This appeal appears to have been met again by refusal by the Bulgarian Government to disgorge any Macedonians living in Bulgaria and by a further influx of pure Bulgarian officials, some of these coming to Belgrade and on to Skopje under cover of the recent Youth Congress.

At the same time Slav refugees from Greece coming into the Pirin were sent by the Bulgarian Government to Yugoslav Macedonia.

17. It seems possible that the Russians who, presumably, have firm control over the actions of the Bulgarian Government, may be favouring the idea of an independent Macedonia in a Balkan or South Slav federation and with this end in view are trying to hold the balance between Bulgarian and Serbian domination of the projected state. In this connexion the recent Russian support for the formation of an autonomous Macedonian church is perhaps significant. Yugoslav intentions would appear to be to retain even a greater Macedonia inside Yugoslavia unless a Balkan or South Slav federation becomes a fact. It seems clear that the task of pressing Macedonian demands on Greece falls to Yugoslavia and it is to assist her in this task that Bulgaria has returned Macedonian refugees from Greece to Yugoslav Macedonia. Whatever Bulgaria's aims may be, she may, however, feel forced by her present weak

international position, to make some concessions to Yugoslavia, to preserve her friendship and support.

18. Relations with Greece

The renewed press campaign against Greece (see Appendix "A") which started at the beginning of June has raised acutely the question of Yugoslav intentions in Greece. It is clear that this press campaign has been carefully coordinated in Belgrade and is not, as in the case of the earlier campaign, largely purely Macedonian ebullience. It did not start in Macedonian press until the lead was given by the Belgrade press and recently all important Macedonian leaders have been in turn to Belgrade, presumably to ensure that the agitation in Macedonia is on lines laid down by the central government, and does not get out of hand as it did at the beginning of this year. This is borne out by the fact that on the return of the Macedonian leaders from Belgrade a plenary session of the Macedonian National Liberation Front was held in Skopje when the main subject for discussion was the situation in Greece.

19. As previously suggested, one of the main reasons for the campaign is to harness the separatist element to the Macedonian government. Another reason is probably that the Yugoslavs are now in a very difficult position with the Slav Macedonians on the Greek side of the frontier. They say that they recruited some 15,000 Slavs from Greece into the Partisan army, and when doing so presumably made them glowing promises have not been fulfilled though probably there was some vague undertaking between E.L.A.S. and the Partisans that they should be, at least in part, if E.L.A.S. gained power in Greece. The Yugoslavs cannot now afford, without forfeiting the sympathy of the Slavs in Greece, and thus giving up their hopes of expansion there to appear to retract their promises and abandon to the Greek government all those who have thrown in their lot with them and many of whom have sons in the Partisan army. They must, therefore, if only vocally, keep up some sort of campaign on their behalf. That some terrorization is taking place on the Greek side of the frontier is undoubted. Two responsible American journalists recently interviewed a large number of refugees from Greece in Bitolj and the stories told by these refugees were too circumstantial to be entirely false. All the refugees agreed

that the most common atrocities were for Slav villages to be surrounded by E.D.E.S. and Greek gendarmerie working together and for Greek villagers then to be assisted in rustling livestock from the Slav villages. This was usually followed by the arrest and disappearance of a number of men from the Slav villages. Whether the Greeks have justification for the arrest of Slavs is another matter. Some of the refugees when asked for the reason of their persecution said that it was because they were pro-Tito and pro-Stalin instead of giving the prescribed answer, which was that it was because they were Macedonians. From the standpoint of the Greek government they undoubtedly form a dangerous fifth column which engages in active pan-Slav and anti-Greek propaganda. Moreover, the Slavs of Greek Macedonia must at least to some extent appear in Greek eyes to be war criminals, since like all Macedonian Slavs they certainly welcomed the Bulgarian occupation troops as liberators and at least at the beginning of the occupation probably worked closely with them and against the Greeks. The final reason for the renewed press campaign is, it is suggested, a desire on the part of the Macedonian and Yugoslav governments to ensure that the persecution of Slavs in Greece ceases though it is doubtful if in return they would be prepared to refrain from making pan-Slav propaganda amongst these people. The refugees, to whom, if they wish to retain their sympathy and support, the Yugoslavs cannot refuse sanctuary, are creating a serious economic problem. The Prime Minister of Macedonia, in conversation, said that there were some 7,000 civilian refugees chiefly in the Strumica and Bitolj areas and approximately the same number of troops, many of them pure Greeks from E.L.A.S. These have to be fed and sheltered and this aggravates the present food shortage in Macedonia and though the central government has just allotted 1,000,000 dinars for the care of refugees and has sent some of them (about 1,500) to the Vojvodina, this is not sufficient to solve the problem, particularly as more and more refugees are said to be coming over the frontier every day. The Prime Minister said that this must be stopped and that the minimum requirements must be granted by the Greek Government, namely that the Slavs should be allowed to use their own language and should have some cultural freedom.

20. This press campaign has had a deplorable effect both on the army and on the population of Macedonia. They have been led by

chauvinistic propaganda, particularly in the army, to expect an attempt to seize Salonika and parts of Greek Macedonia at any moment and feeling is tense on this account. Troops passing recently through Skopje and Stip are said to have stated that they are on their way to Salonika. An eventual conflict with Greece on this point is accepted as more or less inevitable since Yugoslav demands have been presented to them as irrevocable and no mention whatever has been made of trying to find a peaceful solution which might be acceptable to both Greece and Yugoslavia and would enable the two countries to live on friendly terms.

21. Despite this, responsible members of the Macedonian government have stated in private conversation that there is no intention of trying to settle the question by force prior to the peace conference. Among them was the Prime Minister who was, nevertheless, extremely bitter about British intervention in Greece against E.L.A.S. whom he considered would have been sympathetic to Yugoslavia's claims. He alleged that owing to this at Trieste, England was very unpopular in Macedonia. The claims against Greece are fantastic and extend as far south as Mount Olympus, but nevertheless both Metodija Andonov and Pavel Shatev claim that these areas should be included in Macedonia, both on ethnical and economic grounds. The population figures on which they base these claims are those of 1912, before the First Balkan War, before which date they claim to have irrefutable proof that the population was 60% Slav, 20% Greek and 20% Turk. Their claim is that the changes in the balance of population after the Balkan wars are artificially induced by colonization and therefore cannot be accepted as valid. Colonization was tried in Yugoslavian and Bulgarian Macedonia but was not successful and the Macedonians succeeded in maintaining their national conciseness. In Greece, however, the influx of refugees from Asia Minor and the persecution of Slavs entirely changed the picture. Kulisevski stated that in the ten years after the Greco-Turkish war 700,000 Slavs from Greece emigrated to Bulgaria and Andonov gave the figures of 350-400,000. It is claimed that at present there are still some 250- 300,000 Slavs in Greek Macedonia and that there is still a Slav majority in the Kastoria and Florina areas and in the mountain area on the Greek side of the frontier stretching through Gumendja as far east as Djevdjelja. When discussing this matter they all gave the impression

that the claims of Bulgarian Macedonia would automatically fan into line if a satisfactory solution were found for the claim of Greek Macedonia. As for their claims against Albania, these could easily be settled, and the Prime Minister indicates that they would not be pressed. The presence of the Sixth Albanian Division on the Greek border in the Ohrid area of Macedonia seems to indicate that Albanian and Yugoslav action with regard to their respective claims on Greece is closely coordinated. Andonov admitted freely that Macedonia had no valid ethnical claim to Salonika which had never had a Slav majority, but added that Macedonia must have an outlet to the sea and suggested that for Salonika the best solution would be to put it under international control. He added that he was fully aware of the necessity of trying to live on terms of friendship with Greece and that with this in view Yugoslavia would be prepared to compromise on their extreme claims. He suggested as a possible frontier a line running from the north of the Grammos mountains to Kozani and running north-east to leave Greece a strip of land north of the Gulf of Salonika with Salonika as a free port contiguous to Macedonian territory in the north. The frontier would then run north of the Chalcidice and rejoin the coast to the east of it. There could then be transfer of Greek and Slav population north and south of the frontier.

22. The economic argument advanced for frontier revision other than necessity of Macedonian outlet to the sea, is that before the erections of the frontiers after the Balkan Wars, the winter pastures of large numbers of flocks in what is now Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonia were in the plains of northern Greece. The flocks in the summer pasture in the mountains of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia and in winter went down to Greece. With the erection of artificial frontiers this has ceased and the effects on the sheep rearing industry in Bulgarian and Yugoslavian Macedonia had been serious and great hardship and impoverishment had been caused to the peasants there. This had hit Bulgarian Macedonia particularly hard since there was no winter pasturage there at all and the sheep had to be maintained throughout the year on the poor summer pasturages. In addition to this, in the mountain areas of northern Greece, the valleys and natural trade routes led only towards the north and many of the villages and towns are completely inaccessible from the South. The establishment of the frontiers had

forced the population to send their produce south and had imposed very hardships on them. Some Macedonian towns, particularly Bitolj, had lost their former prosperity on this account. Further, on the Aegean seaboard the inclusion of such previously prosperous ports as Kavalla in Greece had rendered them virtually useless. Where before 1912 they had taken much of the import trade into Bulgaria this import trade was now sent through the Black Sea.

23. Andonov said that the tactics which the Yugoslav Movement proposed to adopt were to press their claims at the peace conference on the basis of the 1912 population figures. He and Shatev strongly disclaimed my intention to try to use force prior to this and expressed the certainty that a just solution would be found by the great powers at the peace conference. Presumably in this they base their hopes on Russian support for their claims. In the meantime they hoped that action would be taken to see that Greek injustices towards the Slav population of Greek Macedonia ceased. All indications are that the Yugoslavs are at present in no position to use force against Greece, and the control of the frontier by picked troops under the direct command of Belgrade, ensures that no incident can be provoked by irresponsible elements in Macedonia. The Yugoslav Fifth Army though large – possibly about 30,000 men and largely concentrated near the frontier - is not composed of the most experienced Yugoslav troops and is not well equipped. There are no signs of unusual military activity, though an air force of about 40 planes recently arrived in Skopje. Means of supplying the army on a war footing for operations against Greece are lacking. There is little motor transport and a great lack of rolling stock. The railway from Veles to Djevdjelja is completely out of action and is unlikely to be repaired even by the end of the summer since the track is to be re-laid on the other side of the Vardar. The narrow-gauge railway to Ohrid is incapable of taking much traffic and the railway from Skopje to Bitolj is broken by a destroyed tunnel south of Veles and on the line from Bitolj to Veles and to the Greek frontier there are only two engines in a poor state of repair.

24. Nevertheless, should British troops be withdrawn from Greece, there would be a strong likelihood that the Yugoslavs would be tempted to take the law into their own hands. If, further, Yugoslav claims remain unsatisfied at the Peace Conference, the Yugoslav

government may well find that they have no inflamed public opinion that unless they attempt to use force to satisfy their claims, or can play up some other success elsewhere, they will be left with a very dangerous internal situation.

Minutes - January 2nd, 1944

Please see attached minute No. M. 1255/4 of December 31st, from the Prime Minister.

The telegram to Washington and Moscow, to which the Prime Minister refers, shows that we are doing our utmost to preserve Greek territory intact and to prevent any threat to Greek Macedonia from developing. The news that we are taking such a strong line on Greece's behalf would certainly gratify the Archbishop and other Greek politicians and might promote unity among them. On the other hand, we must realize that if the information is given to the Archbishop and if he is allowed to pass it on, it will immediately become public property. I am very doubtful that this would be advisable at least until we know whether the United States and Soviet Governments are in agreement with us.

There have been innumerable reports about propaganda which is being conducted in favour of independent Macedonia and of incursions by Yugoslav and Bulgarian partisans into Greek territory. Almost all reports state that E.A.M. are in close touch with these Slav forces, and there is enough evidence that Bulgarian units are taking part on the attack on Zervas. If E.A.M. are in fact assisting or even supporting these pro-Macedonian activities, they will lose a great deal of support even amongst their own members. For the moment people in Athens and most other areas of Greece have so much to think about that they cannot pay attention to events in the north, but once they have time for reflection the Slav danger to Greece should work strongly against E.A.M. and in favour of Greek unity.

NOTES BY MR. RITCHIE ON VISIT TO ATHENS

The impression which Greece leaves in one's mind is a most unhappy one – politically. The brilliant sunlight of this halcyon season of the year, the beauty of the surroundings, the vitality of the people -all contrast with the darkness of the political outlook.

2. For Greece feels itself to be an outpost of civilization threatened by inundation from the neighbouring Slav- Communist countries. Insecurity is the predominating feeling among all the people with whom I talked. Their eyes are turned towards the frontiers and beyond these frontiers they see their ancient enemies the Albanians and Bulgars supported by Yugoslavia and by the might of the Soviet Union waiting their opportunity to extinguish the national independence of Greece and to install a puppet Communist regime in Athens similar to those in power in Sofia and Belgrade. Nor, it must be admitted, is this picture a fanciful one. The Greek-Albanian and Greek Bulgar frontiers are kept in ferment by incidents engineered as part of a war of nerves designed to intensify the very feeling of insecurity which dominates Greece. I talked to an American officer who has just returned from the Albanian frontier – a careful and objective witness who told me at first hand off the organization of these raids and left me in no doubt that they were part of a deliberate policy organized by Moscow. The frontier raids were stepped down during the Paris Conference but were now beginning again to take place at intervals of a few days apart. They are on a small scale but they keep the frontier in a state of insecurity. This United States officer had personally interrogated prisoners captured by the Greeks from raiding parties. One was a former officer of the Greek army turned Communist who described the organization of these raiding groups in Yugoslavia. First, indoctrination of Greek Communists by Russian agents, and then the specific orders to infiltrate into Greece and to establish contact with Greek communists within the country. The Greeks fear and have reason to fear an efficient Communist conspiracy on their frontiers which makes use of the ancient hatred of the Bulgars and Albanians for the Greek people.

3. It is against this background one has to consider the vehement of Greek feeling with regard to their frontier claims against Bulgaria

and Albania, and their bitter disappointment at the result of the Paris Conference as it affected the frontier question. This disappointment results in part from a genuine misunderstanding as to the scope and purpose of the Conference. Most Greeks seem to have thought that the Conference could and perhaps would give them the frontiers which they regard as essential to their national safety. The Government seem to have encouraged them in this illusion. In any case the Greeks are for the most part a somewhat primitive people – they cannot understand the procedures or the limitations of the powers of the Conference. They see the issue in similar terms. And so far as I could judge there is on this point an approach to unanimity among them.

4. The Greeks see the position in the following terms: After their magnificent resistance, which was so much praised by their war-time allies at the time, they have been let -down or discarded by their friends. The ex-enemy countries like Bulgaria and Romania have, been, treated as well if not better than themselves. They have not got anything like the reparations which they feel they deserve. On top of this they have not been given minimum national security. For this they blame the Anglo-Saxon powers and especially the United Kingdom.

Among the Greek Royalists (and it is an important reservation that most if not all the Greeks whom we met were Royalists), the feeling about the British is extremely bitter. They think that the United Kingdom is trying to appease the Russians at the expense of Greek national interests. They cannot forgive the British for not voting in favour of their frontier claims against Bulgaria and not backing up their claims to Northern Epirus.

The Royal family appear fully to share these feelings. In the time I was in Greece I heard no word of appreciation for the backing Greece has received from the United Kingdom. The British were accused of breaking their promises to Greece, although no specific promises were mentioned. They probably had in mind the excessive assurances of general aid made during the war by the B.B.C. rather than any formal assurances from the United Kingdom Government. This bitterness does not appear to extend to the same extent to the United States although the United States has been less sympathetic

to Greek claims than the United Kingdom. But they never expected as much from them.

When it became known that the United Kingdom delegation had abstained from supporting Greek frontier claims in Paris there was a hostile demonstration outside the British Embassy in Athens. So far as the Greek Communists are concerned, they take the line that they are as interested as any other Greek political group in obtaining frontier rectifications, but that this will never be possible as long as a Right Wing Government is in power. If, they say, the Communists were in power, Greece would have the support of the Soviet Union which, unlike the United Kingdom, does not betray its friends but looks after their interests. Thus the failure of the Conference to endorse Greek claims has undoubtedly given the Communists a useful propaganda weapon. So far as the Right Wing in Greece is concerned, disillusioned as they are about British Policy, they know that they have no other friend abroad so that they must continue to depend on British support. But the honeymoon period in British-Greek relations is certainly over.

5. If insecurity is the prevailing note in foreign affairs, it also dominates the internal scene. One point in the international situation which must be appreciated is that the plebiscite for the King's return – roughly a 4-1 vote – was essentially an anti-Communist vote. The monarchy is thought of primarily as a stabilizing institution which will, it is hoped, save the country from Communism. As was explained to us by almost everyone we met, there is no equivalent in Greece of a British Labour Party, no strong moderate group which now commands sufficient support to form a Government. The United Kingdom Government, has, sought in vain to conjure out of the air such a government which could be more easily supported in the United Kingdom and abroad than the present Government, but despite the efforts of the former British Ambassador, Sir Rex Leeper, they have failed. There is no such in the middle-of-the road opinion. The situation is one of fears and hatreds on either, side which may at any time break out in a civil war. So that British policy is now getting the worst of both worlds. It supports its friends grudgingly, and yet is attacked by the Communists as the protector of reaction.

6. The immediate task of the Government and of the monarchy is the restoration of internal security. The difficulties in the way are enormous. Communications are in a chaotic condition, many of the roads are impassable, parts of the country are infested with Communist bandits who terrorize the peasantry. The Greek army is totally inadequate in size to deal with internal security, and at the same time to guard the frontiers. The Gendarmerie have put up a good show, but again they are not strong enough for the responsibilities imposed on them. Arms are the first need and the 'Greek Government is now in negotiation with the United Kingdom authorities to obtain them. As they are received it may be possible to enforce order. On the other hand, there is the danger that the Right Wing may well take advantage of this strength to carry out a wholesale liquidation of their opponents. Memories of the casualties and outrages practiced in the civil war are fresh in people's minds. There are deadly grudges to be paid off. Many people we met including members of the Royal family described the atrocities of which the Communists were guilty. Atrocities, however, may not have all been on one side.

7. The outlook for the people of Greece is certainly not bright and their difficulties are intensified both by economic and psychological factors. They are a miserably poor people (the working classes live at the bare subsistence level at the best of times) and at the moment they live mainly on UNDR. What happens when UNRRA ceases no one dares to foresee. The country is over-populated and the soil barren. Moreover, the very virtues of the Greeks seem to turn against them. This gallant and high-spirited race will fight for a principle to the end - even if it means fighting their own brothers. Their love of liberty runs to an extreme individualism which will brook no control or authority (for example, it has been totally impossible to introduce a rationing system in Greece, as the people cannot be made to abide by it). Their very loyal ties involve them in bitter vendettas. Then, too, they suffer from a very widespread corruption. Everywhere in Athens we heard of one "racket" or another, a condition which is encouraged by the wretched rates of pay of the public servants.

8. But despite the gloomy prospects ahead, the Greeks have a genius for survival. They are a virile and hardy race. Their history has long

been one of difficulty and danger and it may be that once again they will triumph over their difficulties, but only, it is to be feared, at the expense of further bloodshed and suffering.

Office of the High Commissioner for Canada

Canada House, London, S.W.I.

May 17, 1941

??? A. 257

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a memorandum which has been presented to me by the Greek Minister in London, Monsieur Charalambos Simopoulos, and which deals with the activities of The Revolutionary Macedonian Organization.

2. Monsieur Simopoulos called me the other day to explain that this organization has active supporters among the Bulgarian emigrants in Canada and the United States. He added that it was particularly active in Toronto where the largest majority of Bulgarian inhabitants are to be found, and he suggested that some steps might be taken by the Canadian Government in order to discredit the organization. The Greek Minister has been asked by his Government to bring the facts to the notice of the Canadian Government and to request their earnest consideration.

3. I should be glad to receive in due course instructions as to the reply which should be made to Monsieur Simopoulos.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can't tell signature)

The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

The Revolutionary Macedonian Organization ever since the first war has had a purely ant-Yugoslav and anti-Greek character. Its objective is the revision of the treaties, which after the last European War defined the frontiers of the Balkan States.

The organization has not confined itself to terrorization only in the Balkans, but has extended its activities under the cloak of propaganda to countries outside of Bulgaria itself. These activities assumed greater impetus especially after the settlement in Greece of refugees from Asia Minor (1922). The majority of the population of Macedonia had from time immemorial been racially Greek. The establishment in Macedonia of the Greek refugees, coinciding with the voluntary emigration to Bulgaria of the elements of Bulgarian origin, caused the population as to become homogenously Greek and Macedonia thus became as Greek as any other province of the Kingdom.

The Macedonian Organization has always enjoyed the support of every Bulgarian Government, with the exception of those in power from 1934-1936. Financially it was subsidized by the Italian Legation in Sofia. Of recent years it has also received financial support from the German Government, in order to aggravate dissension between the other Balkan States to the benefit of the Axis; this has been amply proved by recent events in the Balkans.

The Bulgarian Organization has also made use of certain Bulgarian immigrants to Canada and the U.S.A. In these countries their principle objective has been, and still is, to collect funds for subversive action in Macedonia and at the same time to extend their sphere of influence by the organization of meetings in the chief cities and the publication and distribution of pamphlets advocating the idea of an administratively autonomous Macedonia or even the creation of an independent State, which would naturally be under the direct influence, if not control, of Bulgaria and her allies.

It would, therefore, be to common interest if the Canadian authorities would assist in putting an end to these activities and cause this propaganda to cease, as it creates a most painful impression both upon the Greek and Yugoslav peoples, who so recently have been subjected to such severe tests.

List of Organizations in Canada

1. MACEDONIAN CANADIAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE

386 Ontario, St., Toronto, Ontario

President	- Spaso Mikhailoff
Secretary	- Andrew Palmeroff
Members of the Executive	- Toucho Naidenoff
	- Nano Petkoff
	- Nikola Kyriakopoulos (Kiris)

2. BULGARIAN-CANADIAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE

386 Ontario, St., Toronto, Ontario

Honorary President	- Simion Cvetkoff (Tsvetkoff)
President	- Nedelco Dimoff (organizer and Secy. of Hotel Restaurant Union)
Vice-President	- Radoslav Raicheff (Chemist, Asst. Editor of NOVO VREME on the death of Andrew Christoff, Editor.)
Secretary	-Until Jan. 1947- Andrew Christoff, Editor of NOVO VREME. Died on his return from All-Slav Congress in Be...
Executive Committee:	Manol Timoff Nedelcho D. Kozhukhanoff Pencho Pencheff (veteran of the Spanish war) Nano Petkoff (restaurant worker) Georgy Chakyeroff (from Kitchener)

3. UNITED MACEDONIAN COUNCIL OF CANADA AND MACEDONIAN CANADIAN WAR RELIEF COMMITTEE

380 Ontario -St., Toronto, Ontario

Chairman: Kosta R. Andrews
Secretary: Spiro T. Vasileff

Members of the Executive: - Zakhari Kostoff, Secretary of the
"Christo Bosteff" Association,
Toronto, Ontario.

4. MACEDONIAN AND BULGARIAN YOUTH CLUB

386 Ontario St. , Toronto, Ontario.

President: Vasil Peykoff
Vice-President: Dan Giamon Secretary
Secretary: Zilka Georgrieff

ORGANIZATIONS NOT CONNECTED WITH MACEDONIAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE

1. PRAVDA ASSOCIATION (Bulgarian) -Toronto, Ontario. This
association is called "pro-fascist" by the Communistic wing.

2. MACEDONIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
(Abbreviated M.P.O. Headquarters presumably in Minneapolis. Has
an associated organization in Toronto, Ontario. NOVO VREME of
August 30, 1946 refers to that organization as "reactionary".

“Otechestven Front” - December 2nd, 1944

The Macedonian Minister of Justice Pirouze on the great problems of Federal Macedonia.

Will Macedonian immigrants, who are at present in Bulgaria, return to Macedonia?

The question of the Macedonians in S. W. Bulgaria.

The Minister of Justice of Macedonia, Mr. Peter Pirouze, arrived in Sofia yesterday evening. To the journalists of the capital he made the following statement:-

"It is very pleasant to find myself in the capital of new national and democratic Bulgaria. I came here during 1941, but was obliged to leave your capital, because there was at that time a Fascist regime which did not permit any free expression, and which persecuted anything honest and conscientious. As to the situation of free Macedonia, which surely interests you greatly, I shall try to describe it in a few words.

You know that after the occupation of Yugoslavia by Germany many parties started to follow a German policy. Only the Communist Party, supported by some other groups of honest people, began an action against the occupation by the Germans. The army amounted to from 18 to 20 divisions and there were the troops of Drazho Mihailovich, Pavelich and Gen. Nedich, who were with them. We started several attacks against these reactionary parties and their armies. During all this time we were not alone: our Allies, the USSR, England and the USA and all the national liberation movements in Europe were helping us too, together with fraternal Bulgarian liberation troops, who started their action immediately after they had been formed. As the result of this struggle, we have to-day, a free Macedonia within the framework or federal Yugoslavia.

In November of last year, in the town of Yaitze, the historical AVNOJ was called together, and decisions were taken on the re-

building of Yugoslavia in the form of a federal, democratic and free state.

On the 2nd August this year, our ASNOM was called together in the monastery of prochor Ptchinsy.

In these meetings Macedonia was formed as a separate federal state in federal Yugoslavia. Out of the Asnom, a presidium was elected which formed the Government of new Macedonia. The new government is headed by Comrade Metody Tchento, and consists of eight ministries: Home Affairs, Public Instruction, Public Health, Economy, Agriculture, Finance, Roads and Constructions, and Justice. The residence of this government is at Skopje.

Comrade Dimitr Vlachov was elected president of the Macedonian Liberation Front; this election took place a few days ago at a conference in Skopje. Separate party groups participate neither in the National Liberation Front nor in our government. All pioneers are gathered here, all that is honest.

The common Skupstina, in which the delegates of all the federal states participate, is the supreme organ of our federal Yugoslavia."

To the question of what the feelings of the Macedonian peoples and the Macedonian government are towards new Bulgaria of the Patriotic Front, Minister Pirouze declared:

"On the 9th September a historical change took place in Bulgaria which altered the aspect of the country. Now, in the government of the Patriotic Front, the Bulgarians have an administration which deserves the support and trust of all those who are honest in the country. The government has shown a sound understanding in regard to us Macedonians. The policy of the Patriotic Front has nothing in common with yesterday's Fascist Regime in Bulgaria. I consider that with this government we can count on the collaboration and friendship of the Bulgarian people when the national question is decided, as well as other questions which are of interest to you and to us."

In connection with the return to Macedonia of the Macedonian immigrants who are now in Bulgaria, the Minister spoke as follows:-

"We shall not stop anyone who would wish to return to Macedonia. On the contrary, we wish to attract there all who are fit to work and are honest, but I think this must be done on a voluntary basis. Those who want to come are welcome; those who don't are not going to be forced. As to the Macedonians in SW Bulgaria, they will themselves decide where they would like to be, here or there. Our fundamental desire at any rate, is to create a South Slav Federal State, and after that a Balkan Federation. There are no obstacles, in these circumstances, between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and at some time we shall establish, in one form or another, the closest friendship and collaboration between the two fraternal peoples. There are certainly people who do not wish this, who are trying to separate us, and who are continuing to provoke. We have arrested a great number of them, and they are now awaiting the verdict of the People's Court. All those who have behaved badly before, and who dipped their hands in the blood of the people, will get what they deserve."

Ottawa - July 7, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson:

It is desired to refer you to your communication of the 13th ultimo, with respect to the activities in Canada of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (I.M.R.O.). In this regard our files have been examined and attached hereto will be found a copy of a memorandum dealing with the Macedonian Political Organization, which is undoubtedly the organization referred to by the Greek Minister in London.

2. It is appreciated that some points in the attached memorandum are inconsistent but it is desired to point out that extreme difficulty has been encountered in securing definite, reliable information with respect to the activities of the Macedonian Political Organization. The present situation is rather obscure and every effort is being made to secure additional information.

3. In connection with your request that you be provided with advice as to the reply which should be returned to the Greek Minister's representations, we can only suggest that he be advised that the activities of the Macedonian Political Organization are being kept in touch with as closely as possible. At the present time information secured indicates that some members of the Macedonian Political Organization in one district in Canada are with Greece owing to the fact that most of the members' families reside in Macedonia or Greece. It is a matter of awaiting developments and if it is established that the activities of the Macedonian Political Organization are inimical to Canada's war effort, appropriate action will be taken as the circumstances may warrant.

Yours sincerely,
S. T. Wood.

N. A. Robertson, Esq., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario.

OTTAWA - February 1st, 1949

No. 30

I refer to your dispatch no. 5 of January 3rd, 1949, requesting information on certain alleged activities of Bulgarians in Canada in favour of the Greek Communist Party.

2. We have in the past experienced difficulties in suppressing pro-Bulgar and pro-Macedonian propaganda in Canada. The Macedonian-Canadian War Aid Committee collected about \$ 15,000 in 1946 and then used the money, quite improperly, to finance a delegation of eleven to the Slav Congress in Belgrade which was held around December, 1946. It is quite likely that the balance of the funds collected were given to Macedonian organizations in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which were assisting the Greek Communists. This Macedonian-Canadian War Aid Committee was a front for the Bulgar-Canadian People's League and the Macedonian-Canadian People's League; both organizations are still active in Canada. Both are inclined towards Communism, but may not be divided in their attitude towards Marshal Tito.

3. However, during the past two years, we have no knowledge of any funds being sent from Canada to the Macedonian or Greek Communists, but it would be a comparatively easy matter to send money in the mails and this has always been the practice of Balkan immigrants, both for legitimate and illegal purposes.

4. As to the old Independent Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), most of its members have become anti-Communists, so that it is unlikely that they have been instrumental in raising funds for the Greek Communists.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your Obedient servant, T.W.L.M.,
Secretary of State for External Affairs

The Canadian Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Athens, Greece

OTTAWA - Athens, November 4, 1946

???-K 353

Refer: Natl. War Services (by letter) Done 20-11-46 MH

It has recently been drawn to our attention that three individuals, Andro CHRISTOFF, Nicholas KIRIAKOPOULOS and Andro PALMEROFF, are leaving shortly for Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to attend a Slav Congress there as delegates of Bulgarian and Macedonian progressive organizations in Toronto.

2. CHRISTOFF is the managing editor of the left wing Bulgarian language weekly, "Novo Vreme", published in Toronto, Ontario, and for some considerable time has been one of the more active members, and chief promulgator of pro-communist propaganda, in the Bulgarian and Macedonian left wing organizations. The only prominence the other two individuals enjoy, warranting them being included in the delegation, is the fact that they also have been active participants in the activities of the same left wing organizations, assisting CHRISTOFF in exerting his malign influence.

3. This information is forwarded to you as of possible interest.

(Don't recognize signature)
for the Commissioner.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario.

OTTAWA - November 13th, 1946

No. 1903

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that three delegates from the Bulgarian and Macedonian organizations in Toronto are leaving Canada shortly to attend a Slav Congress in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Mr. Ando CHRISTOFF is the managing editor of "Novo Vreme", a weekly paper with communist sympathies published in the Bulgarian language in Toronto. Mr. Nicholas KIRIAKOPOULOS and Mr. Andro PALMEROFF are active in Bulgarian and Macedonian organizations whose general aim is the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia as a member of a federation of Balkan States.

You may wish to draw these facts to the attention of the foreign office.

(Signed) G. L. Magann
For the Secretary of State for External Affairs

The High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom,
London

Very interesting new publication of collection of 61 documents (records), made from the Bulgarian Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Forces (CDDAABCSSISBNAF)

It is noteworthy that today's Bulgarian unreformed ex-communist secret services work by the same plans, with the same methods and with the same peoples (agents), even!

State Security – Political Police
(09.09.1944 - 10.11.1989)

Collection of Records
2011

Editor in charge: Dr. Orhan ISMAILOV
Compilers' body: Dr. Orhan ISMAILOV, Hristo HRISTOV,
Momchil METHODIEV
Scientific consultant: Veselin TSELKOV, Professor, D.Sc.
Technical assistants: Hyulya IBRAHIMOVA, Gyursel SALIM

Source URL for downloading of the ePublication (106 MB):

<http://www.comdos.bg/media/SBORNIK-05.pdf>

Intersting for Macedonia and Macedonian Question (but not all!!!):
(by number of pages of the ePublication)

p.172 to p.174 (1952):

"Doc.No.19.

Strictly confidential written reference about the Section of National Minorities based on an order to activate agents' operative work in Department III, 20 August 1952 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.13, inv.1, a.u.970, sheets 5-7) It contains information on the Turkish and Macedonian minorities and the related main tasks in the work of the Section."

p.269 to p.275 (1960):

"Doc.No.31.

Top Secret memorandum of crucial significance from General Georgi Krastev, Head of Division III of the State Security, to

General Mircho Spassov, Deputy Minister of the Interior on: "The implementation of planned activities in the division to enhance the intelligence and counterintelligence work", 20 October 1960 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.13, inv.1, a.u.1672, sheets 16-22) The document bears a higher degree of secrecy because it contains data about the attempts of Division III of the State Security to conduct intelligence activities outside the country through its agents."

p.273 (1960):

"For USA and Canada, Agent "Gosho", who is new-recruited and promising agent, and is young and have contacts with Mihajlovist circles, and is well-built environment for his bringing;"

p.325 (1975):

Anonymous pro-Macedonian leaflets and contention of the new Bulgarian socialistic nation!

"Doc.No.41.

Top Secret written reference on the operative situation in the country in the area of anonymous activities in the period 1974-1977, 22 November 1977 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.22, inv.1, a.u.74, sheets 1a-5)

It is a written reference on countering the anonymous political activities in the period 1974-1977, which contains statistical data about the anonymous letters throughout the years and exposed authors of anonymous documents. The document is indicative of the attention paid to this activity by the State Security."

p.382 to p.388 (1981):

"Doc. No.45.

Top Secret events that Division VI proposes to include in the overall plan to frustrate the attempts of certain circles abroad to falsify and usurp the historical past of Bulgaria, 16 November 1981 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.22, inv.1, a.u.141, sheets 35-41) The document outlines some measures against the attempts of certain circles abroad to falsify Bulgarian historical heritage. Penetration in specific foreign scientific institutes, collection of archives relating to Bulgarian history, strengthening the propaganda abroad of the Bulgarian vision of the history are proposed. The document is indicative of the attempts of the State Security to impose its views on researches not only in Bulgaria but abroad as well."

Secret work for the Bulgarian communistic state security service (the communistic political police):

p.386 point 9.: Agents from Slavonic Committee [former name of the Bulgarian Agency of the Bulgarians Abroad] p.386 point 10.: Agents from Bulgarian Orthodox Church (of Maxim)

p.386 point 11.: Agents from MPO for USA and Canada ("Through our agents, to influence leaders of MPO activity to strengthen their opposition and exposing Skopje's and Greek falsification of our history. To do more to actively make use of their journals in USA and Canada."

p.414 to p.421

"Doc.No.48.

Top Secret information from Department 02 on guaranteeing the safety of Bulgarian citizens temporarily residing abroad, 8 September 1982 (CDDAABCSSISBPA) – M, f.22, inv.1, a.u.166, sheets 1-7) The information is from September 1982 and concerns the measures of Division VI to guarantee security for the Bulgarian citizens traveling abroad. The focus of these measures is placed on the need to "protect" those citizens from Western influence, while they are abroad. It contains a list of measures to improve

“counterintelligence provision” for the Bulgarian citizens temporarily staying abroad, including by strengthening the control over issuance of permits to travel abroad.”

p.418:

"The leader of the Anarchy-Movement and Secretary of the Bulgarian Section of BBC Alexander Georgiev, traitor of the fatherland from 1959, favour of the national-chauvinistic base for union of the Macedonian population of Greece, SFRJ and PRBg."

Partial report - starts on page 2. (Page 1 missing)

..., being opportunists, were quick to get over to the side which they thought had the best chance of coming out on top.) One of these named Keramidjieff from Kiessa was a leader in the OCHRANA, and occupied a leading position SNOF after he had joined that organization.

6. Following the withdrawal of the Germans from Greece in October 1944 Gotseff went to Yugoslavia after declaring the autonomy of Macedonia. Meanwhile, OCHRANA was being officially abolished and a large majority of its members joined the SNOF battalions. These people were welcomed into SNOF because the aims of the two organizations were similar, namely the separation of Macedonia from Greece, and the Communists seeing a great opportunity to increase the ranks of SNOF declared that any OCHRANA member joining SNOF would thereby escape punishment for having collaborated with the Germans.

7. In November 1944 the battalion under Gotseff, total strength approximately 4,000 were concentrated in Monastir and were accommodated in the town barracks. Here on 18 November 1944 the “First Shock Brigade of Macedonia of the Aegean” was officially formed and colours presented which was the flag of the People Republic of Macedonia of the Vardar. Ranks of the Yugoslav Army were given to the leaders of SNOF, Gotseff being given the rank of Colonel.

8. In April 1945 SNOF was renamed into NOF (Naroden Osloboditelen Front). This was done mainly as a political expedient in order to remove from the title of the organization the reference to its Slavic affiliation since it was felt that this too clearly indicated its intentions.

9. The above summary gives the background to the organization of NOF and briefly traces the two recent movements having as their aim the separation of Greek Macedonia from Greece. Of the two driving forces behind these movements, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia finally gained the leading position. The following paragraphs deal in the present situation of NOF.

10. The feud between Tito and the Cominform resulted in a split in the NOF organization. That split became apparent after the 5th Plenary Session of the KKE in January 1949. As a result, two opposing groups were formed within NOF, each following its own line of policy. One group under Gotseff and Keramidjieff has declared itself as the followers of Tito. Its aim is still the incorporation of Greek Macedonia into the People's Republic of Macedonia which constitutes one of the six republics of the Federated Peoples Republics of Yugoslavia. This group is now in Yugoslavia and comes under the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The second group is lead by Mitrofski (Metropoulos – member of the Communist Provisional Democratic Government as Minister of Food) and Kotchef (Kotsopoulos – also member of the Provisional Democratic Government as Director of Minorities). In April 1949, this group changed the name of NOF to K.O.A.I.M. (Communist Organization of Macedonia of the Aegean). This second group follows the Cominform policy line. Its political aim is the foundation of an Independent Communist Macedonian State within the Balkan Communist Confederation. It is politically directed by the Cominform, co-operates with the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) and is supported by official Bulgarian policy. The K.O.A.I.M. is administered by a Central Committee and district organization. Metrovsky is Secretary General of the Central Committee.

11. The K.O.A.I.M. receives instructions direct from the Cominform. As far as is known there is no separate channel of communication direct with the Communist party of Bulgaria.

12. The K.O.A.I.M. does not have a separate military organization, the followers being distributed among units of the "Democratic Army", particularly among these units operating in the area of Western Macedonia. Many K.O.A.I.M. members held appointments as commanders of units and formations up to divisional level in the "Democratic Army", e.g., Vainas alias Vainofsky, Commander of XI Division, "Democratic Army". It is estimated that on the average 20% of the personnel of the "Democratic Army" is made up of K.O.A.I.M. followers.

Comment

13. The familiar communist pattern can be seen in the history and organization of NOF; communist nationals as senior officers of the organization, the use of a name which could easily feel the uninformed as to the organizations true nature, the appeal of independence to the public, etc.

14. Although K.O.A.I.M. may not have a separate military organization now, there is ample evidence to show that SNOF or NOF did have a military formation. I am making further enquiries on this point and will keep you informed. The K.O.A.I.M., or that part of the original NOF organization which follows the line laid down by the Cominform is believed to be the larger of the two groups formed as a result of the split between Tito and the Cominform.

15. With reference to appendix "A" Sofia is referred to in its capacity as Cominform headquarters of course and NOT as headquarters of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

16. I have handed four copies of this letter to the Charge d'Affaires.

(R.F Rethschild) Col.
Military Attache.

Partial report - starts on page 3. (Pages 1 & 2 are missing)

...authorities to the terrorists, the Yugoslav Government is reported to have said that members of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, I.M.R.O., had established co-operation with the Ustasha, providing for terrorist instructions to be furnished to the latter. The Ustasha is the Croatian organization of which Ante Pavelich and Gustav Pertchets were leaders. After the assassination Pavelich was arrested and detained in Turin.

12. The position therefore appears to be that the I.M.R.O. is a nationalist or minority movement of Macedonians dissatisfied with their present political position who have formed a temporary alliance with those elements among the Croats who are similarly influenced.

13. In accordance with its usual policy the Comintern is seeking to make use of nationalist minority movements in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as elsewhere, but the only Macedonian organization into which they have penetrated is the "United" I.M.R.O.

14. The Macedonian Political Organization has three branches in Canada, these being located in Kitchener, Ontario, Toronto, Ontario and Windsor, Ontario. There are approximately 34 branches in the United States.

15. As mentioned above Ivan Mihailoff was the leader and it appeared that at one time he was anti-Axis but late reports indicate that he has thrown his lot in with the Italian Government, it being understood that he was promised that if Italy and the Axis conquered the Balkan States he would be set up as the head of a Macedonian State.

16. In Canada the Macedonian Political Organization was definitely anti-Communist but the Communist Party endeavoured to obtain a footing in the M.P.O. but were unsuccessful and during the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the M.P.O. held at Toronto during September, 1936 all the Communists were ejected from the Hall in which the General meeting of the organization was being held.

17. During July, 1940 a copy of a periodical named “PRAVDA” (Justice) published by the M.P.O. of Toronto was examined. Only two issues of this publication have come to our attention and it was observed that Volume I No. 2 Issue of July 27, 1940 contained an article, which for some reason not clearly shown, to the effect that the M.P.O. of Toronto was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Central Committee of the M.P.O. and also with the Macedonian Tribune. The issue concerned attacked Peter Atzeff, Secretary of the M.P.O. of Indianapolis. It was claimed that he and his colleagues in the Central Committee had unlawfully fostered and adopted a new constitution under which they gave themselves more power over the activities of the M.P.O. It was not possible to conclude from the publication mentioned whether the complaints were true or otherwise, but generally speaking there did not appear to be any differences as to the main object behind the M.P.O., namely, a free Macedonia; in other words, the differences were internal but not political.

18. Our investigations indicate that the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was organized in the year 1903. The I.M.R.O. organized the Macedonian peasants into free lance bands and an I.M.R.O. revolution was apparently crushed at a place called Illinden Macedonia. The Chapter of the present Macedonian Political Organization in New York, N.Y. is known as the “Illinden Chapter”. It is apparently a custom of the M.P.O. to name their chapters after such incidents or important individuals. According to an official booklet covering the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the Macedonian Political Organization held in Pittsburg, Pa., between September 1st and 4th, 1940 the Macedonian Political Organization was first officially incorporated at Fort Wayne, Indiana, U.S.A. in 1921.

19. It is interesting to mention that the programme of the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the M.P.O. contains a full page of photographs of Dr. Ante Pavelich leader of “Fighting Croatia”, with a greeting from the Croatian Home Defense of the United States to their Macedonian Allies in their mutual struggle for independence, wishing success to the Macedonians in their cause. It is understood that this Dr. Pavelich is the individual who has recently been placed at the head of a newly formed Croatian Government.

20. On March 8, 1941, an article appeared in the Toronto Daily Star to the effect that the Bulgarian "Comitadjis" (organized by the I.M.R.O.) were joining the Greek Army under the leadership of Ivan Mihailoff. It is appreciated that this is inconsistent with the report that Mihailoff had thrown in his lot with the Italian Government but the actual situation is obscure.

21. Generally speaking the activities of the Macedonian Political Organization in Canada have been exceedingly quiet for some time and difficulty has been encountered in securing definite information with respect to same. It is, however, of interest to mention that as recently as June 17th, 1941, it was reported that the sentiments of the sympathizers of the M.P.O. in the Windsor, Ontario District, were with Greece owing to the heroism of the Greek Army and also because of the fact that most of the members' families were then living in Macedonia or Greece.

(Rest of report is also missing).

Protest by the Macedonian Peoples Union of Canada To the Yugoslav Government

January 10, 1949

Date of information December 14, 1948

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The following protest from the Macedonian Peoples Union was addressed to the Yugoslav Embassy, Ottawa, Canada.

“The Macedonian Peoples Union is a Democratic Organization.

The Union is interested in the evolution of our Motherland – Macedonia, and has done everything possible for material help to its people.

Our relations in the past with the Republic of Macedonia and of Yugoslavia has been friendly. Lately, however, because of events in Yugoslavia, some Government personages in Macedonia have conducted polemics by which they tried to interfere with the internal matters of our organization. Letters were sent to various members who were asked to oppose our attitude towards the Yugoslav question and instead to support TITO. In other letters of the same origin, unpardonable and insulting attacks have been against the Bulgarian brother people.

In consequence we protest to your Government at the activities of these officials and request an end be made to this mode of interference on our organization.

At 12th October 1948.
Macedono-Canadian Union
President: S. Michaelov
Secretary: S. Vassilev.”

R 1291 - February 9th, 1948

I agree with the above.

If I may add my own conjecture, it is that there is a row developing between Dimitrov and Tito as to who is to lead the South Slav bloc (which Moscow has not condemned as it has a general East European Federation). Possibly also there is jealousy on the part of Dimitrov because the Markos effort is almost exclusively in the Albanian-Yugoslav sector. I recall in this connexion that the forecasts we previously heard mentioned Serres, which is about in the middle. I imagine that Dimitrov is panting to get down to the Aegean and is afraid that the Yugoslavs are going to jump his claims. This, I admit, is pure speculation, but it is perhaps human nature that there should be such rivalries.

2. The line which Moscow would obviously take in order to keep both Tito and Dimitrov in order would naturally be to underline the necessity for party discipline and this adequately explains the use of Pravda. I agree with the comment in a recent letter from Mr. Peake that there is certainly scope for disagreement between Balkan politicians behind the Iron Curtain. But they will not express this disagreement very publicly and in my opinion we must resort to the traditional subtleties of diplomacy in reading between the lines of their statements in order to judge what those differences are.

3. Personally I do not see how the Kremlin are going to produce the South Slav bloc unless they are prepared to remove either Tito or Dimitrov, because I cannot imagine those two particular personalities forming a satisfactory omelette. Presumably Dimitrov is senior in the party hierarchy to Tito, so the question is likely to prove pretty embarrassing to Moscow. I should think there was a fertile field for mischievous propaganda by us here.

4. It is perhaps not inconceivable that the Secretary of State's Speech which has a considerable effect abroad, increasing the Kremlin's desire to keep Dimitrov in order in case he did anything silly and let them in for serious trouble in Greece.

Sd. R.M.A. Hankey

9th February 1948.
R 1291

**Royal Canadian Mounted Police Headquarters - Ottawa,
August 14, 1947**

Attention Mr. G.G. Crean

Information has been received from a confidential source which in turn received the information from a source of unknown reliability to the effect that three individuals, Andrew PALMEROFF, one MIRTICHEV and one Nikola KOVATCHEV, Communists who attended the recent Pan-Slav Congress in Belgrade, have been assigned a mission in the United States and Canada. It is alleged that they have been designated to induce Bulgarian and Macedonian immigrants to send their dollar savings for deposit in the Bulgarian National Banks as a patriotic measure in support of the Bulgarian economy. It is alleged that these individuals are being used by Russian-trained Binko PETROVSKI, Bulgarian Director of Foreign Trade, as a nucleus of a group to promote commerce between Bulgaria, the United States and Canada.

2. Of the three individuals mentioned above, only Andrew PALMEROFF is believed to be from Canada. He attended the Congress in Belgrade as a representative of the Macedonian Canadian People's League and is known to us as a confirmed Communist.

3. The above is supplied as being of possible interest to you. If any further information in this connection comes to our attention, it will be forwarded to you.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA,
Ontario.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police - Ottawa, June 13th, 1941

Dear Commissioned Wood,

I am enclosing a copy of a dispatch, No. A. 257 of May 17th, from our High Commissioner in London, transmitting a memorandum he has received from the Greek Minister in London relative to the activities in Canada of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).

I should be glad to receive any information in your possession as to the activities in this country of this organization, and your views as to the reply which should be returned to the Greek Minister's representation.

Yours sincerely,

N.A. Robertson

Commissioner S.T. Wood, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa

Ottawa, July 10th, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your dispatch of the 17th May, No. A 257, which enclosed copy of memorandum presented to you by the Greek Minister in London dealing with the activities of the Revolutionary Macedonian Organization.

2. With regard to the activities in Canada of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (I.M.R.O.), as it is called, the Commissioner of the Canadian Mounted Police has forwarded to me a memorandum dealing with the activities of the organization in Canada. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

3. I would suggest that the Greek Minister be advised that the activities of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization are being

closely watched by the responsible Canadian authorities, and every effort is being made to secure additional information concerning the activities of its members. At the present time, information secured indicates that the members in one of the districts in Canada under surveillance had been thoroughly sympathetic to the Greek cause owing to the fact of family connections in Macedonia or Greece.

At the present time all developments are being carefully checked, and if it is established that these activities appear to threaten the effectiveness of the Canadian or Allied war efforts, appropriate action will be taken without delay.

I assume you will communicate the substance of these remarks to the Greek Minister.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, N.A. Robertson
for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Right Honourable, Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for
Canada, Canada House London, S.W.1, England

Royal Canadian Mounted Police - Ottawa, June 23rd, 1947

The Commissioner,
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Ottawa, Canada

I enclose, for your information, a translation of two letters from Mr. Grouios to addressees in Greece. It would appear that MR. Grouios is a Macedonian autonomist. This information has been received from the Central Intelligence Group in Washington and has been passed to us by our Embassy.

G.G. Crean

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Translates Jannina, 28 February 1947

Anti-national activities of a Slav organization in Canada

I have the honour to report the following information received from the Commander of the Gendarmerie, Corfu, obtained from an Ochranite of Macedonia, detained at the Criminal Prison of Corfu, and from censorship of correspondence from Canada, to detainees in the above prison:-

In the town of Toronto, Canada, there exists the old Slav organization "ORIM" in which Bulgarians and Yugoslavs have actively engaged since a long time ago. This organization which always helped the activities of the Comitatus and was making propaganda in favour of the independence of Macedonia by Yugoslavia. Greeks from Macedonia also participate in this organization and they correspond with the collaborators and criminals from Western Macedonia detained in the gaol of Corfu, to whom money is sent by post, and parcels through the British Consul at Corfu. It is characteristic in this matter the fact that this money is not sent by relatives in Canada but on behalf of this organization, This is evident by the fact that all letters to the detainees have been written by the same hand of teacher Nicholaos Anastasiou Palli, who is reported to be the secretary of this organization.

After these facts which resulted from the Director of the Corfu Prison's investigations, I request that the competent authorities be informed, so as to follow the anti-national activities of the Slav-Macedonians and also the Greek consular authorities in Canada be informed for the enlightenment of the Greeks from Macedonia living there.

(sd) John Bailakis, Colonel High Commander

Gendarmerie G.H.Q., Security Section, Athens.

Royal Greek Embassy – Ottawa - July 13, 1951

Dear Mr. Reid,

With reference to our conversation of the 11th instant, I think I had better give you below the exact titles of the newspapers in question:

Makedonska Tribuna (Bulgarian)
Ellinoamericanicon Vima (Greek)

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Nicolas A. Anissas, Ambassador of Greece.

Mr. E. Reid, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

E. Reid/PW

July 11, 1951

Memorandum for Defense Liaison Division (2)

Macedonian Propaganda in Canada

The Greek Ambassador when he was calling on me today said that he wished to draw our attention to the importation into Canada of two newspapers which by considered were directed by the Cominform and which, in his opinion, were having harmful effects among persons in Toronto of Macedonian origin.

2. These two newspapers are: Makedonska Tribuna, published in Indianapolis; Pamericane Tribune, published in New York. The first is the Bulgarian language, the second in the Greek language.

3. According to the Ambassador, these two newspapers are not openly communistic. Openly they are in favour of Macedonian autonomy. However, in the Ambassador's opinion, the present agitation for Macedonian autonomy reflected in these newspapers is directed by the Cominform in Bulgaria.

4. The Ambassador suggested that it would be in the interests both in Canada and of Greece if the importation of these newspapers into Canada could be prohibited. He realizes the difficulties.

5. I said I would have this matter looked into and that we would let him know.

6. I should be grateful if you would look into it.

E.R.

Royal Yugoslav Consulate General - Montreal, September 2nd, 1936

Hr. 85/36.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that a convention will be held in Toronto on Sept. 6th, 1936, for a duration of three days by the Macedonian Organization of Toronto, Ont. This political organization intends to carry a banner of the picture of Vlade Tehermazemski, assassin of the late King Alexander I of Yugoslavia.

We have been informed that the demonstration will march through the main streets of the city of Toronto with the banners which procedure is directed against our Dynasty and our country which is friendly to Canada. Such proceeding is calculated to rouse the feelings of loyal residents of the Yugoslav people in Canada and may provoke a serious breach of public peace and good order besides creating bitter feelings among Yugoslav colonies all over Canada.

Therefore, I earnestly beg your intervention to prevent such proceedings on Canadian soil as organized hero worship of murder which we feel certain has no encouragement either from your Government or from the friendly people of Canada. I may ask you to be so kind as to take the necessary steps as soon as possible because the time is very short.

Enclosed you will find the article from the Evening Telegram of Toronto.

Trusting that you will give our request your kind attention,

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (George Sigmund), Secretary

Telegram 306 - London, February 16th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 306

My telegram Circular D. 200 of February 2nd.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact. We have received no independent information from Brigadier MacLean regarding negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for conclusion of a Pact of Alliance and Mutual Assistance referred to by Soviet Government.

2. Our preliminary view is that proposed Pact would be open to much same objection as a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation. Meanwhile, Brigadier MacLean has been instructed to reserve our position if Tito mentions the project.

Telegram 455 - September 3rd, 1940

Bulgarian Minister remarks on Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations, and politically his opinion constitutes over-simplification of a complex situation. They should not be accepted without prior critical analysis. It is true, however, that relations remain normally good though Yugoslavia's slight disappointment and anxiety over Axis influence on the Bulgarian Government and Russian influence on Bulgarian population seems now rather paltry.

2. [South] Macedonian, here again situation is complex. Italy is at work and perhaps Germany too with (incidentally) no friendly intentions towards Yugoslav unity.

3. The Macedonians of South Serbia as distinct from Macedonian leaders outside the country may be divided into three main groups: (1) Ideological Federalists whose spiritual leader is Mihailoff, democratic in outlook but lacking political realism. They tend to idealize Bulgarian people but for the present are generally loyal to Yugoslav State. (2) Communist Federalists, whose goal is a free Macedonia within a great South Slav Federation linked to the Soviet Union. (3) Disconsolate peasantry who resist tax collectors, without their crops, and remain in a perpetual state of discontent against the Serbs.

4. It remains to be seen whether Italian propaganda can re-awaken among the people a movement for an independent Macedonia, this desire for which at present seemed to be practically confined to Macedonian leaders. In any event it seems that the idea of an independent Macedonia under Italian influence is generally regarded as a poor second best by Macedonian leaders who, it seems, would prefer for the present that Macedonians of South Serbia should continue to belong to Yugoslavia as loyal citizens subject to grant of increased local autonomy.

5. Matter should not therefore be over easy for Italy especially if Yugoslav Government are prepared to conciliate Macedonian National sentiment. This they have not so far been prepared to do and recently appointed Ban of Vardarska Banovina is a reactionary "old Serb" with Federalist ideas which he has been putting into

practice with brutal thoroughness. It appears however that the Government have been recently trying to moderate his zeal.

6. I agree that it seems hardly necessary to consider question of Macedonia at present moment in connexion with Yugoslav-Bulgaria relations.

7. I am continuing to watch developments of Macedonian situation and am trying to collect material sufficiently well-founded to justify a considered report to your Lordship.

Telegram 488 - London, December 12th, 1946

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 488

My telegram Circular D. 1150, 10th December.

Greece

Current discussion on alleged incursions over Greek frontier by her northern neighbours contain frequent references to Macedonian autonomous movement NOF. This organization is present day counter-part of former autonomous movement IMRO and OCHRANA; but it differs in being more closely allied with Yugoslav-Macedonian aspirations, in relation no doubt to suspected plans for Yugoslav and Bulgarian Federation after signature of Peace Treaty with later country. The following notes by United Kingdom Consul General at Salonica on NOF, may therefore be of interest, Begins.

1. During the enemy occupation of Greece, Bulgaria, not content with Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, was anxious to annex Central and Western Macedonia, and with German permission infiltrate OCHRANA agents who operated mainly in the area between Florina, Kastoria, Kozani and Edessa. Kalcheff, now serving a life sentence in Greece as a war criminal, was the chief of OCHRANA in Greece. OCHRANA's aims were exactly the same as those of IMRO. At that time there was no collaboration between OCHRANA and EAM/ELAS. On the contrary there were frequent clashes, and ELAS disarmed OCHRANA bands wherever it could.

2. As, however, Axis power showed distinct signs of weakening another organization was indicated, this time an anti-fascist one, and about July-August 1944 SNOF (Slavomakedonski Narodni Osloboditelni Front) was founded, the members of which were the same as those of OCHRANA with a few additions. Directives now came from Moscow – though via Tito – and SNOF collaborated with EAM/ELAS until about October-November 1944 when a split

occurred and Gotche (alias Gotseff) its military leader, and his men withdrew into Yugoslavia (Vardar Macedonia). It is said that this split was caused by EAM/ELAS insistence on bringing SNOF bands further south, presumably with the object of utilizing them against the Government and British in Athens, and by Gotcheff's refusal to abandon his own area.

3. Subsequently SNOF dropped the S (Slavomakedonski), which was objectionable to a large section of KKE following, and became NOF. That this latter is merely the continuation of SNOF is admitted in a leader in "Deltion" of 20th February. "Deltion" claims to be the "official organ of NOF" and is believed to be published in Skopje. It is printed in Makedonski and Greek. In the same issue, an extract from a manifesto is published by ASNOM (Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Macedonia) urging "Macedonians" under Greece and Bulgaria to participate in the "gigantic antifascist front" which is the only way "to win the right of self-determination and unity of the entire Macedonian people under the aegis of Tito's Yugoslavia".

4. It is correct that NOF does not participate in "autonomous activities" in that it does not work for Macedonian autonomy in the true meaning of the work (which was the object of IMRO when first founded in 1891-1892), nor for autonomy and the incorporation with Bulgaria, which IMRO and OCHRANA subsequently stood for. For reasons best known to Moscow, Belgrade and Sofia, NOF now owes allegiance to Tito, and the means to ensure Macedonia passing under his "aegis" would be the union of "Vardar" (Yugoslav), "Aegean" (Greek) and "Pirin" (Bulgarian) Macedonia under the president of Vardar Macedonia at Skopje – to form a single unit of the Federal State. This is clear from another leader of "Deltion" of 15th March, where it is stated that "from the early days, the Macedonian people had expressed its will to live with the people of Yugoslavia, since the Yugoslav people esteem it (the Macedonian people) as a people, and since under Marshal Tito's wise leadership the Macedonian people, in a common struggle with the people of Yugoslavia, won its national freedom for the first time". In the same leader it is said that "the Macedonian people of Aegean Macedonia is right in wanting union with its supporter the leading Macedonia of Vardar".

5. Nor is it only NOF which holds such ideas. Tito in his speech at Skopje on October 11th, 1945, as reported in the "Deltion" of 21st October, spoke of the unity of all Macedonians within Federal Yugoslavia and rebuked Bulgarian "reactionaries" who still spoke of "Greater Macedonia" i.e. "independent" Macedonia. Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 554 - London, April 12th, 1944

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 554

Following for the Prime Minister. Begins:

The development of a Resistance Movement in Bulgaria has brought to the surface again the Macedonian question. There are a considerable number of Bulgarians fighting with Tito's men in southern Serbia and Macedonia, and Tito's programme includes the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia. The Bulgarian Resistance Movement proper is divided on the Macedonian question, some sections of it advocating an autonomous Macedonia and others not.

2. We are determined at all costs to avoid being involved in the Macedonian question at this stage, and our liaison officers in Bulgaria are to be instructed to make it perfectly plain that we decline to discuss the question with anyone, and that our only concern is in getting Bulgaria out of the war and freeing Greek and Yugoslav territory from Bulgarian forces.

3. The Macedonian question has been the bane of Bulgarian politics for many years. It involves all Balkan countries to a greater or lesser extent. The Greek Government from the early days of the war have been suspicious of any contact we have had with the Macedonians, and our support of Tito in southern Serbia and of the Bulgarian Resistance Movement has led to a renewal of this nervousness. An autonomous Macedonia would cut across Greek aspirations to a frontier rectification with Bulgaria in, for instance, the Struma Valley. Tito's advocacy of an autonomous Macedonia is understandable as part of his programme of diminishing Serbian influence, since such a state could only be formed at the territorial expense of Serbia. Our support of Tito, however, does not include support of his anti-Serbian aims. Bulgarian interest in Macedonia is, of course obvious.

4. Our information regarding the present situation in Macedonia and the Macedonian movement is, however, far from complete and, since the Partisans operating in Macedonia are under Tito's control, we are asking our liaison officers in Yugoslavia to supply us with a report on their activities. Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 775 - London, May 7th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 775

My telegram Circular D. 52? of 29th March.

Yugoslavia

Ambassador, Belgrade, reports that Yugoslav Government decides on April 26th to recognize Hoxha's Administration as Government of Albania and to establish diplomatic relations with that Government and with Bulgaria.

2. Yugoslav Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed Ambassador that he would receive an official notification of this effect. Ambassador replied that while decision about Albania was comprehensive, he did not quite understand the position regarding Bulgaria as that Yugoslavia is still at war with that country. Under-Secretary explained as Bulgarian Army was fighting along side Yugoslav troops in the liberation of the country, it was natural that Yugoslav Government should wish to establish some kind of diplomatic relations with Bulgarian Government. He explained that the position of Yugoslav representatives in Sofia would be analogous to that of Sir N. Charles in Rome.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 316 - London, February 20th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 316

My telegram Circular D. 306 of 16th February

Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations

Proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact was discussed at Crimea Conference, but no final agreement was reached. In discussion Mr. Eden maintained that proposed Pact raised serious issues of principle as Bulgaria was an ex-enemy State whose affairs were regulated by Armistice regime. In our view Bulgaria was debarred from entering into such treaties without permission from the Armistice Powers concerned. Mr. Eden suggested that it should be made clear to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments by the Three Powers that they should not proceed with proposed Pact. M. Molotov said he thought that the Three Powers should limit themselves for the present to an exchange of views, but promised to consider the whole matter further. No further progress was made at the Conference.

2. Brigadier MacLean has now been instructed to take an early opportunity to let Tito know our views, and we are informing Soviet Government that if there were any public allusion to a proposal for such a Pact we, likewise, would be obliged to make public our own views.

3. We are informing United States State Department and expressing hope that they will adopt attitude similar to our own.

Telegram 365 - London, February 27th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 365

My telegram circular D. 316.

February 20th, paragraph 2, Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations.

Brigadier MacLean has spoken to M. Tito according to his instructions.

2. During this conversation M. Tito said that the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Agreement was one of trade and friendship which would in no way prejudice Greek interests. To Brigadier MacLean's suggestion that the signature of such a Pact would cause a deplorable impression, M. Tito replied that signature was not in fact imminent. Tito said he was always telling the Bulgarians not to expect their neighbours to forget their past atrocious conduct in a few months, but on the other hand he had no wish to perpetuate the traditional enmity of two countries.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec'd 4:54 a.m. Feb. 28th.

Telegram - June 6, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 999

My telegram circular D. 437 of March 13th.

Greek Government have expressed to us and to United States Government concern over efforts now being made to promote a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation. Greek Government say that this would be tantamount to a Slavic hegemony over Balkans threatening Salonica and eastern and western Thrace; that having in mind this possible menace they feel justified in asking for a strategic rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier by cession of Bulgarian territory; and that only such conditions as would give Greek people a sense of security will permit them to view without apprehension a possible future Balkan Federation.

2. Greek Government asked us to warn Yugoslav Government against any claims or designs prejudicial to territorial integrity of Greece in Macedonia or to Greek claims in northern Epirus.

3. In reply, we are informing Greek Government of warning given to Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments last January against formation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation or creation of a greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory (my telegram Circular D. 182). We do not propose to inform them of warning (my telegram Circular D. 365) given to Tito against conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty (in favour of which Soviet Government had expressed themselves - see my telegram Circular D. 200)

4. We doubt whether Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania are justified and are confining ourselves to informing Greek Government that we can enter into no commitments at this stage.

5. State Department, who enquired our views, have been informed of our reply.

Telegram 388 - London, March 3rd, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 388

Yugoslavia

In response to statement of our views on question of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation and a Greater Macedonia contained in my telegram Circular D. 1 of January 1st, United States Government have now replied as follows.

2. United States Government hold view that prewar frontiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece in Macedonian area must be considered legal boundaries and that any revision should only be allowed in accordance with freely expressed wish or populations concerned and as part of a general peace settlement.
3. United States Government would not object if, in reconstitution of Yugoslavia, Government and people of that country wished to set up a regional and de-centralized administration under which south eastern Yugoslavia would have a certain autonomous character. They, however, share our view that there is no legitimate basis for any claim made on behalf of "Macedonia", whether as an independent State or as a part of Yugoslavia or of a larger South Slav Federation, to territory within the boundaries of Greece on the ground that such territory is "Macedonian".
4. While the United States Government favour the retention of the present frontier between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, they would not object to any settlement beneficial to the general welfare of the region provided it represented the real wishes of the people concerned, including those Yugoslavs still in enemy occupied territory.

Telegram - London, March 26th, 1949

Circular H. 75. Saving. My telegram 23rd February Circular H. 50. Saving

Greece and the Yugoslav – Cominform Dispute – Position during the War

1. During the German occupation of Greece it was policy of the Communist Party of Greece (K.K.E.) to make use of the National resistance movement in order to seize power and establish a Communist state. With this end in view, the Communists formed a resistance organization known as the National Resistance Front (E.A.M.), which was on the surface a non-political union of different resistance groups, but was in practice completely dominated by K.K.E. E.A.M. made it its business to suppress all rival resistance groups, if necessary by force, and by the end of 1944 it was left alone in the field.

2. Meanwhile the resistance movement in Yugoslavia was known by the similar name of O.F. (Liberation Front) or N.O.F. (National Liberation Front). Its counter part among the Slav-Macedonians of Northern Greece was S.N.O.F. (Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Front) or, later, simply N.O.F., which remained under E.A.M. control until September 1944, when the leader of the Slav-Macedonian Units, Gotseff (Elias Dimakis) broke with E.A.M. and lead his men to Skopje (Yugoslavia) where a federal republic of Macedonia had been set up within the Yugoslav federation. (After January 1946, N.O.F. activity, directed from Yugoslavia reappeared in Northern Greece working in conjunction with the increasing rebel activities of K.K.E.).

3. During the occupation the aim of the N.O.F. and K.K.E. were in one respect identical that is to say that both were more interested in achieving power after the war than in actually driving out the Germans. Apart from this, however, their aim was inherently contradictory: whereas K.K.E. sought to establish a new regime with authority throughout the whole of Greece, N.O.F. were bent on setting up a new People's Republic of Macedonia to be formed by the union of the Pirin (Bulgarian), Vardar (Yugoslav) and Aegean

(Greek) areas of Macedonia. So long as Soviet Russia was primarily interested in winning the war, she was able to play down these differences and even a certain amount of co-operation was witnessed between the two parties. At the conclusion of the war, the only chance in the situation was only that the policy dictated by Moscow became that of a destroying the established Greek Government at all costs preparatory to the setting up of some sort of Communist-Controlled regime. The precise form which that regime would take was not specified and Moscow was thus still able to keep well in the background the conflict of interest between N'O'F' and K.K.E.

Developments following from the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute

4. On the outbreak of the Yugoslav-Cominform dispute, the Russians seem to have realized:

- (a) That they could no longer hope to control the Yugoslav-dominated N.O.F., and
- (b) that, so long as Greece's northern neighbours were divided amongst themselves, plans for destroying her government must be for the moment put aside.

They therefore re-shaped their policy, and it now seems that their main objective is to set up a People's Republic of Macedonia, under Bulgarian influence. In this way, they would hope to divert the autonomous aspirations of the Slavo-Macedonians in Greece from the Yugoslav to the traditional Bulgarian channel. As a long term objective the Russians probably had in mind the value of a land bridge to Albania, at present very hard hit by the isolated position in which her anti-Titoism has placed her. (My telegram Circular H. 31 Saving).

5. This change of policy has had two visible results. The first was the purge of K.K.E. (my telegram under reference); this purge was presumably designed to remove from office any nationalist deviationists who might have objected to a policy involving the sacrifice of Greek territory. The second was the setting up of a rival N.O.F. under Bulgarian influence based on Aegean Macedonia. The activities of this body are reported in my immediately following telegram.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH
RELATIONS

Telegram - London, January 1, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 1

My telegram circular D. 1835 of December 20th.

Yugoslavia

There have recently been various signs that the idea of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation is favourably entertained in the Yugoslav National Liberation movement and that the Bulgarians are preparing to foster agitation for a Greater Macedonia at the expense of Greece. As regards Macedonia, Tito has given personal assurance that he had no aggressive intentions against Macedonia and that any Yugoslav claims would be raised in an ordinary fashion at the Peace Conference and not before. (See my telegram Circular D. 1796 of December 12th, paragraph 3).

2. Our view on the general question is that we should welcome a Federation between all the Balkan states, both Allied and enemy, and including possibly Turkey. We would not, however, approve an exclusive Union or Federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which would not only be unlikely to promote a Federation between all the Balkan states but would also isolate Greece and so endanger her position as a Balkan state. It would also enable Bulgaria, who has in both world wars joined Germany against her neighbours and against the Western Democratic Powers, to escape from the consequences of her acts by merging her identity in that of one of the United Nations. As regards Macedonia, we are prepared to acquiesce in the creation of a Macedonian State as a Federal unit in the future Federal Yugoslavia. But we must insist that this state (or the Yugoslav Government speaking on its behalf) shall not annex nor lay claims to any territories whatsoever belonging to either Bulgaria or Greece, on the ground that such territories are "Macedonian".

3. We are informing the United States and Soviet Governments of our views as above.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Telegram - London, January 8, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 33

My telegram circular D. 1 of January 1st.

Yugoslavia

Head of British Military Mission in Belgrade reports that second session of Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation of Macedonia (A.S.N.O.M.) opened at Skopje on December 28th.

2. Session was attended by Kardelj, Tito's political right hand man, Vlanov, Vice-President of Avnoj, and General Tempo. General Eresen is also reported to have been present representing the Bulgarian Government, and representatives of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front and Macedonians from Pirin as well as representatives of the British, American and Soviet Missions were also present.

3. Speaking as Tito's representative, Kardelj congratulated Macedonians on their newly won autonomy, but warned them that they still have to achieve victory in the political field as well as on the field of battle. For Macedonia, Kardelj emphasized the future could only be within the framework of the new Federal Democratic Yugoslavia.

4. Apart from a veiled reference to the present position in Greece, his speech seemed unobjectionable. It confirmed that the new Macedonia will remain part of Yugoslavia and made no reference to a possible wider Southern Slav Federation. Nor did Kardelj make any territorial claims on behalf of Macedonia outside the present frontier of Yugoslavia.

5. Brigadier Maclean believes that Kardelj was sent to Skopje by Tito in order to ensure adherence to the party lines, which in this case seems to have been one of moderation and discretion.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Telegram - London, January 16, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 84

My telegram circular D. 1 of January 1st.

Yugoslavia

Tito, who has not yet being notified of our views on the idea of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation, has expressed himself in conversation with Brigadier Maclean as opposed to Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation at the present time. He went on to say that, although he did not exclude the possibility of an eventual extension of Yugoslav Federation at some period in the future, there was no question of either Bulgaria or Albania entering into any Federal Union with Yugoslavia at present.

In case of Bulgaria in particular, Tito was not ready for such a step. As he had pointed out to a Bulgarian delegation, which had visited him the day before with polite messages, the Bulgarians had on several occasions in the past, sworn eternal friendship to the Serbs but this had not prevented them from turning on them and massacring them at first opportunity. It would take the Serbs some time to forget the behaviour of Bulgaria in three wars. At the same time, there was no point in perpetuating such enmity and, if good relations could be achieved, it would be to everyone's advantage.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Telegram 158 - London, January 26th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 158

My telegram circular D. 84.

Bulgaria

British Political Representative at Sofia reports that according to reliable sources the Bulgarian Prime Minister has been "indisposed" for the last few days and Lieutenant General Terpeshev (see my telegram Circular D. 33 of January 8th, paragraph 2) has been presiding over the Council of Ministers in his absence. M. Georgiev is, in fact, believed to have left Sofia in the company of Soviet officers for the purpose of discussing with Marshal Tito, or his representatives, the establishment of a South Slav Confederation. He is expected, according to the source, to return to Sofia shortly when some declaration on the subject will be made.

2. Source also stated that on March 3rd (anniversary of Bulgarian liberation and of accession of King Boris III) Bulgaria would be proclaimed a Republic. This development would be followed a few weeks later by the cession to an autonomous Macedonian State of the Pirin are of Bulgaria. Source, however, thought that local inhabitants of that district might resist.

3. Finally, source said that Soviet authorities were understood to have indicated that any claim which might be advanced by the new South Slav Confederation to Salonica would enjoy their support.

4. Mr. Houstoun-Boswall comments that this report should not be made before the general settlement with Bulgaria as an enemy state.

5. United States Government do not favour the union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as a single unit, since the neighbouring non-Slav States, including Turkey, would consider it a threat to their security. They would, however, consider a plan for a regional understanding

to include all south eastern European States rather than an exclusive Slav block, provided these States decide, with the concurrence of the principal Allied Governments, that it would be to the general benefit of that area.

6. United States Government have not yet made known their views on the proposed Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact of Mutual Assistance (see my telegram Circular D. 316 of February 20th)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec'd 7:22 p.m.

Telegram 159 - London, January 26th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 159

My telegram circular D. 84.

Yugoslavia

Brigadier MacLean reports that in a moment of indiscretion recently Dr. Smodlaka, Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation, confirmed that Bulgarian Government had definitely, agreed to cede Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, article in "Politika" (one of Tito's newspapers) on January 14th by Commissar for Public Works in National Committee referred to Bulgaria's to cede territory to Yugoslavia as evinced by statement of "official representative of Bulgaria" at last session of Asnom (see my telegram Circular D. 33 of January 8th) that "Bulgaria is prepared to cede her part of Macedonia" to Yugoslavia. However, official reports of Asnom meeting omitted any reference to such a statement. Mention of it in above article may be in nature of an indiscretion.

2. British Political Representative in Sofia drew attention to Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to this article and reminded him that a member of Bulgarian Government, the Lieutenant General Terpeshev, had attended the meeting. Minister for Foreign Affairs said Terpeshev was not there officially as a Cabinet Minister but as representative of Bulgarian Workers (Communist) Party. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that if people of Pirin are wanted to join their brother Macedonians in might be difficult to stop them, but time was not yet ripe for this sort of thing.

3. Mr. Houstoun-Boawall considers that present spate of pro-Yugoslav propaganda and organization of relief for Yugoslav population may represent Bulgaria's effort to remove Yugoslav mistrust (see my telegram Circular D. 84 of January 16th). He

comments that, whatever the outcome, this ostentatious demarche can hardly fail to go to Bulgaria's credit.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec'd 2:03 a.m., January 27th.

Telegram 182 - London, January 31st, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 182

My telegram circular D. 159 of January 26th.

Macedonia

In light of the information regarding Bulgarian Government readiness to cede Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia, contained in my telegram under reference, we instructed Brigadier MacLean to speak to Tito and convey to him our views on questions of Macedonia and Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation as set out in my telegram Circular D. 1 of January 1st. At the same time, Brigadier MacLean was to inform Tito that we have noted with satisfaction the assurance he has already given (see my telegram Circular D. 1796 of December 12th, paragraph 3). That he has no aggressive intention against Macedonia and that any Yugoslav claims will be raised in an orderly fashion at the Peace Conference.

2. Brigadier MacLean spoke to Tito as instructed on January 26th. Tito reported that he was convinced that this was not the time to try to establish a federation with Bulgaria or any other neighbours of Yugoslavia and that he had no intention of attempting to do so in present circumstances. He also indicated once again that he had no intention of trying to annex territory from Greece or Bulgaria before the Peace Conference when he would put forward any claim he might have in the proper way.

3. Acting on instructions, British Political Representative at Sofia has also informed Bulgarian Government of our views as follows;

While we should welcome a confederation between all Balkan States both Allied and enemy, and including possibly Turkey, we could not approve an exclusive union or federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Moreover, while we are prepared to agree to the creation of a Macedonian State in the future Federal

Yugoslavia, we should be strongly opposed to the creation of a greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory. We, therefore, look with disfavour on the activities of Macedonian propagandists in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian Government appear to have condoned and we do not recognize the rights of the Bulgarian Government to transfer, without the consent of the United Nations, any part of Bulgarian territory to the Yugoslav Federal State of Macedonia.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Telegram 200 - London, January 2, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 200

My telegram circular D. 1 of January 1st.

United Kingdom Charge d'Affairs, Moscow, conveyed our views on subject of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation as instructed. In reply, Soviet Government have stated that they are aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for conclusion of a Pact of Alliance and Mutual Assistance are proceeding, and that their attitude towards this is favourable. They consider, however, that question of a Balkan Federation and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Federation is "not at present actual and is of no practical importance".

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 217 - London, February 5th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 217

My telegram circular D. 33 of January 5th.

Macedonia

Brigadier MacLean reports that on January 30th General Tempo spoke in Belgrade on the Partisan Movement in Macedonia. He admitted that certain ill feelings still existed there between Macedonians and Serbs. This was legacy of the former policy of Serb centralism. (Recent reports received by Brigadier MacLean's Mission in Macedonia confirm friction between Macedonians and Serbs).

2. Tempo implied that a united Yugoslav, Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia was the ultimate natural culmination of the legitimate aspirations of the Macedonian people, but condemned Bulgarian irredentists who were trying to ensure that Yugoslavia should not command the areas lost by Bulgaria.

3. General Tempo stated that Greek Macedonians who had joined forces with EAM/ELAS and taken part in the Greek Liberation Movement had done so on four conditions;

- (a) Retention of Macedonian fighting units within ELAS.
- (b) Retention of their own political organization.
- (c) Administration by Macedonians of territory liberated by themselves.
- (d) Ultimate right of self-determination including the right to secede, from or join any State of their own choice.

Tempo asserted that EAM and ELAS had not respected those conditions and so Greek Macedonian forces decided to cross into Yugoslav territory.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Telegram 423 - London, March 9th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 423

My telegram circular D. 388 of 3rd March, paragraph 6.

United States Government have now informed us they share our opinion that it would not be desirable for Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria particularly, since the latter country is still an enemy state, to enter into a Pact of Mutual Assistance or other international agreement of a political character during the armistice period.

2. United States Government are accordingly informing Soviet and Yugoslav Governments of their views. They would, however, prefer to await an expression of Soviet Government view before discussing this question with Bulgarian authorities.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec'd 2:30 a.m., March 10th.

Telegram 437 - London, March 13th, 1945

From the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
To the Secretary of State for External Affairs Canada

CIRCULAR D. 437

My telegram circular D. 423 of March 9th.

It was hoped that M. Molotov would let us know his Government's views on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact at the Crimea Conference. However, as this was not possible (see my telegram Circular No 316 of February 20th), discussions will now take place between M. Molotov and United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors in Moscow.

2. United Kingdom Ambassador, Moscow, has accordingly been instructed to take part in the discussion on the lines of paragraph 2 of my telegram Circular D. 1 of January 1st and to make following two further points:

- (a) We still wish to learn the Soviet Government's views on an enlarged Macedonia, and
- (b) We think it is important that the Bulgarian Government should be made aware at an early date of our views on the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Pact. Though we would prefer a three Power communication to Bulgaria, United Kingdom Ambassador is to inform M. Molotov if he does not agree to this suggestion, or if discussions become unduly prolonged, that we shall be obliged, to make a communication on our own.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

Rec'd 1:48 p.m.